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THE PORTFOLIO;

A

COLLECTION OF

STATE PAPERS,

AND OTHER

Documents and Correspondence,

HISTORICAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND COMMERCIAL.

VOL. IV.

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F. SHOBERL, JUN., 4, LEICESTER STREET,
LEICESTER SQUARE.
1836.

THE PORTFOLIO.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE SUBJOINED RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE.

[One of the most unfortunate effects of Mr. Canning's policy in the East was the estrangement which it produced between the cabinet of St. James's and that of Vienna.

It had ever been the policy of England, consecrated by experience, to ally herself firmly with that power in Germany most interested in preserving the independence of the separate states in that empire. We allied ourselves with the Empress Queen to preserve her rights against a formidable confederacy. In the seven years war, we lent our effective assistance to Frederick the Great, when asserting the liberties of Germany in opposition to a formidable league to partition the Prussian monarchy. The power which was most capable of maintaining the independence of the German states, when not engaged in aggressive schemes herself, was Austria.

It was then, we repeat, peculiarly unfortunate that Mr. Canning, by the attractions that innovation ever holds out to a discursive and imaginative mind, abandoned this wise maxim of our forefathers, and repelled the confidence of Austria. In subsequent numbers, we shall produce documents which will prove that the treaty of July, commonly called Mr. Canning's treaty, originated in St. Petersburgh. But the policy of Russia, of making England the instrument of dismembering Turkey, through the advocacy of

constitutional principles in Greece, may be traced as far back as the Congress of Vienna, when a document was presented to the British Plenipotentiaries on the part of Russia, as a protest against the proposed transfer of those islands to the Protectorate of Austria.

The documents which we now present to the public show the helpless state into which Austria was thrown by England's being estranged from her, and how much the administration of the Duke of Wellington, which was framed according to principles which offered every facility for regaining the confidence of Prince Metternich, conceived itself fettered by the engagements entered into by his brilliant predecessor.

But, if the position of Austria in 1829 compelled her, in self-defence, to abandon all thoughts of supporting Turkey, what prospect can we entertain, in 1836, when Russia has acquired such an augmentation of territory and such wonderful increase of influence, that Austria can maintain even her own independence against Russia?

The Russian quarantines at the mouth of the Danube equally threaten the commerce and the rights of Englishmen, as they do those of Austria; but if England, with her thousand ships, dare not protect her commerce on the only sea in which it is endangered; if her fleet remains to protect her commerce in the British Channel; what is the value of England in the relative scale of nations? What is England to Austria?]

LETTER FROM THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA

TO

HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.

St. Petersburg, the 10th February, 1829.

Sir, My Brother,

Amongst the letters that Count Ficquelmont has presented to me on the part of your Imperial Majesty, I feel myself more particularly called upon to reply to that in which, in the most confidential terms, your Majesty has made known to me your intentions and your wishes on the subject of the grave circumstances of the moment. M. de Ficquelmont has verbally added such de-

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Copie d'une Lettre de Cabinet à Sa Majesté L'Empereur d'Autriche, en date de St. Petersbourg, le 10 *Fev.* 1829.

Monsieur, Mon Frère,

Parmi les lettres que le Comte de Ficquelmont m'a remises de la part de votre Majesté Impériale je me trouve plus particulièrement appelé à repondre à celle où, dans les termes les plus confidentielles, elle m'a fait connoître ses intentions et ses vœux au sujet des graves circonstances du moment. M. de Ficquelmont y a ajouté de vive voix les développements que

velopments as the importance of the questions indicated in this letter may have rendered necessary. In these explanations your Imperial Majesty has displayed sentiments of friendship and confidence for which I cannot sufficiently express my gratitude. They command the most entire frankness on my part.

No one knows more than I do how to appreciate the grave nature of the circumstances in which we find ourselves; they impose on my people direct charges, material sacrifices, and, as your Majesty says with so much truth, they embrace a whole futurity. If, in such conjunctures, the maintenance of the general peace stands more than ever in need of a guarantee, it can only be found in the union of the principal powers of Europe. It has been my

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l'importance des questions indiquées dans cette lettre pouvoit rendre necessaires. A ces explications votre Majesté Impériale à fait présider des sentimens d'amitié et de confiance pour lesquels je ne saurois assez la remercier. Ils commandent la plus entiere franchise de ma part.

Personne plus que moi n'apprécie la gravité des circonstances où nous nous trouvons : elles imposent à mes peuples des charges directes, des sacrifices réels, et, comme votre Majesté le dit avec tant de verité, elles embrassent tout un avenir. Si, dans de telles conjonctures, le maintien de la paix générale a plus que jamais besoin d'une garantie, celle-ci ne peut se trouver que dans l'union des principales puissances de l'Europe. J'ai la conscience de

conscientious endeavour to neglect no means of strengthening this union, in the midst even of a war which I have not provoked. The protestations that I caused to be transmitted to your Imperial Majesty, at the moment when this war broke out, will have furnished you with the best proof that the obligations imposed upon me by the memorable transactions to which the world already owes fifteen years of repose, will always be sacred in my eyes. I ought not, however, to conceal from your Majesty, that, since the crisis with which the East is desolated is prolonged beyond my *wishes*, and *the hopes which I was authorised to cherish*, my personal inclinations, and my zeal for the interests which relate to the general policy, may often meet with restraints. It is necessary, therefore, first of

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n'avoir négligé aucun moyen de resserrer cette union au milieu même d'une guerre que je n'ai point provoquée. Les protestations que j'ai fait parvenir à votre Majesté Impériale au moment où cette guerre à éclaté lui auront fourni la meilleure preuve que les obligations que m'imposent les mémorables transactions, auxquelles le monde doit dejà quinze années de repos, seront toujours sacrées à mes yeux. Toutefois je ne saurois dissimuler à votre Majesté que, puisque la crise dont l'Orient est désolé se prolonge au-delà de mes vœux et des esperances que j'étois autorisé à concevoir, ma bonne volonté et mon zèle pour des intérets qui se rapportent à la politique générale pourroient souvent se trouver enchaineés. Il faut donc avant tout qu'il soit mis un terme à cette

all, that a term should be put to this fatal compl cation, but it is important also that its solution should be worthy of Russia, and that, above all, it should surround her with that consideration, with that sentiment of strength, which, in decisive circumstances, have alone been able to render her moral support useful to her allies. Much will depend in this respect on the language and the attitude of your Majesty during the campaign which is about to commence, and which the obstinacy of the Porte, of which she has very recently afforded a new proof, renders unhappily inevitable. I am willing to believe that this attitude and this language will be conformable to the assurances of which Count Ficquelmont has been the organ; thenceforth they will serve efficaciously the

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funeste complication, mais il importe encore que le denouement soit digne de la Russie, et que surtout il l'entoure de cette consideration, de ce sentiment de sa force, qui dans les circonstances décisives ont seuls pû rendre son appui moral utile à ses Alliés. Beaucoup dépendra sous ce rapport du langage et de l'attitude de votre Majesté durant la campagne qui va s'ouvrir, et que l'obstination de la Porte, dont elle à fourni tout récemment encore une nouvelle preuve, rend malheureusement inevitable. Cette attitude et ce langage seroient, j'aime à croire, conformes aux assurances dont le Comte de Ficquelmont a été l'organe; dès lors ils serviront efficacement la cause de la paix et du repos. A cet

cause of peace and repose. On this point I participate warmly in the wishes of your Majesty. I beg your Majesty to be persuaded of this truth, and to believe in the sentiments of attachment and high consideration with which I am, &c. &c. &c.

NICHOLAS.

égard je partage bien vivement les vœux de votre Majesté. Je la prie d'en être persuadée, et de croire aux sentimens d'attachement et de haute consideration avec lesquels je suis

NICHOLAS.

DESPATCH FROM COUNT NESSELRODE

TO

M. DE TATISTCHEFF.

St. Petersburg, Feb. 12, 1829.

Count Ficquelmont preceded by a few days the courier whom your Excellency sent to me on the 20th of January, (Feb. 1), and who arrived here in the course of the 31st, (12th). Independently of his letter of credence, the general was the bearer of a confidential letter from his sovereign to His Majesty the Emperor. Your Excellency will find subjoined a copy of this letter, as well as the answer that our august master has made to it, and which you will have the goodness

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Copie d'une Dépêche à M. de Tatistcheff, en date de St. Petersbourg le 24 *Février*, 1829.

Mr. le Cte de Ficquelmont a précedé de quelques jours le Courier que Votre Excellence m'a expedié le 20 Janvier (1 Fevrier), et qui est arrivé ici dans la journée du 31 (12). Indépendamment de sa lettre de créance, le Général m'a été porteur d'une lettre confidentielle de son souverain à S. M. l'Empereur. V. Ex. trouvera ci-près une copie de cette lettre, ainsi que la réponse que notre auguste maître vient d'y faire, et que vous voudrez bien

to communicate to the Emperor Francis in an audience which you will solicit for this purpose. I think it right also to add herewith a copy of this answer.

These two documents will make your Excellency acquainted with the nature of the assurances and of the explanations with which M. de Ficquelmont has been charged. He first of all acquitted himself of this duty at a personal audience with the Emperor himself, which his majesty deigned to grant to him, and afterwards in a long interview which I had with him. The object of his explanations was evidently to justify the conduct of Austria, since the beginning of the war, to efface the unfortunate impressions which it has often necessarily produced, and in fine to disavow

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remettre à l'Empereur François dans une audience que vous solliciterez à cet effet. Je crois devoir également joindre ici une copie de cette réponse.

Ces deux documens vous feront connoître M. l'Ambassadeur la nature des assurances et des explications dont M. de Ficquelmont a été chargé. Il s'en est acquitté d'abord auprès de l'Empereur lui-même dans une audience que sa Majesté a daigné lui accorder, et ensuite dans un long entretien que j'ai eu avec lui. Le but de ces explications a été evidemment de justifier la conduite de l'Autriche depuis le commencement de la guerre; d'effacer les impressions facheuses que souvent elle à pu produire; enfin, de désavouer toute démarche tendante à faire adopter un

every measure tending to bring about the adoption of a plan of intervention between Russia and the Porte. On this occasion, the Austrian Cabinet has re-produced all the motives of alarm created by the fermentation which, according to its opinion and the information it possesses, reigns in more than one country, as well as the progress latterly made by the revolutionary tendency; and it has called the attention of his Majesty to a state of things which threatens the future with still greater dangers. These apprehensions are more particularly betrayed even in the letter of the Emperor Francis. Our answer was an easy one. We are far from denying the dangers which Austria points out to us. The anterior declarations of his Imperial Majesty have more than once developed his opinions on this subject. These

---

plan d'intervention entre la Russie et la Porte. A cette occasion le Cabinet Autrichien a reproduit tous les motifs d'alarme que lui donnent la fermentation qui d'après son opinion et les informations qu'il possède regne dans plus d'un pays ainsi que les progrés qu'ont fait dans les derniers tems les tendances revolutionnaires, et il a appelé l'attention de sa Majesté sur un etat de choses qui menace l'avenir des plus grands dangers. Les apprehensions se trahissent surtout dans la lettre même de l'Empereur François. Notre réponse a cté facile. Nous sommes loin de méconnaître l'existence du danger que nous signale l'Autriche. Les déclarations antérieures de S. M. I. ont plus d'une fois developpé

same declarations must necessarily have offered the surest guarantee of the principles upon which she would regulate her policy if the apprehensions of the Cabinet of Vienna should be realized; but there is a truth which we have not thought ourselves justified in disguising from it. As long as the war in Turkey shall last, and since, by means of foreign influence, which we have but too frequently pointed out, the resistance of the Porte assumes a character of obstinacy which delays beyond our wishes and our hopes the term of this crisis, and even demands redoubled efforts and new sacrifices on our part, Russia will be forced to devote more than ever her whole attention to interests which so immediately affect the honour and the welfare

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sa penseé a cet egard; ces mêmes declarations ont du offrir aussi les plus sûres garanties des principes sur lesquels elle reglerait sa politique, dans le cas où les apprehensions du Cabinet Autrichien viendraient à se réaliser, mais il est une verité que nous n'avous pas cru devoir lui déguiser. Tant que durera la guerre de Turquie, et puisque, par des influences etrangères, que nous n'avous que trop souvent signalées, la résistance de la Porte prend un caractère d'opiniatreté qui récule au-delà de nos voeux et de nos espérances le terme de cette crise, et commande même de notre part un redoublement d'efforts et de nouveaux sacrifices, la Russie sera forcée de vouer plus que jamais toute son attention à des intérêts qui touchent indirectement son honneur et le bien-être de ses sujets: des-lors les moyens qu'elle pourrait opposer au

of her subjects: from that moment the means which she could oppose to the breaking out of the revolutionary spirit in the rest of Europe must necessarily be paralysed. No Power, then, ought to be more interested than Austria in the conclusion of peace, but of a peace glorious to the Emperor and advantageous to his empire. For, if the Treaty we should sign did not bear this character, the political consideration and influence of Russia would experience through it a fatal blow, the *prestige* of her strength would vanish, and the moral support which she might perhaps be called upon to lend in future contingencies to friendly and allied Powers would be precarious and inefficacious. Now, by one of those contradictions, for which it is difficult to account, the attitude which Austria has thought fit to adopt since the

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débordement de l'esprit revolutionnaire dans le reste de l'Europe se trouveront nécessairement paralysés. Aucune Puissance ne devrait donc être plus interessée que l'Autriche à la conclusion de la paix, mais d'une paix glorieuse pour l'Empéreur et avantageuse pour son Empire. Car, si le Traité auquel nous souscririons ne portait pas ce caractère, la consideration et l'influence politique de la Russie en éprouverait une funeste atteinte: le prestige de la force s'évanouirait, et l'appui moral qu'elle serait peut-être appelée à prêter dans de futurs contingens à des Puissances amies ou alliées serait précaire et inefficace. Or, par une de ces contradictions dont on a de la peine à rendre raison, l'attitude que l'Au-

commencement of the war, far from diminishing, must necessarily have encouraged, the resistance of the Sultan; her neutrality has not always been impartial; her wishes evidently inclined in favour of Turkey: the language of her public journals sneered at our successes and exaggerated some insignificant reverses which we had experienced. Add to these indirect means employed against us armaments * so inopportune under the circumstances in which they were formed, and it will no longer be difficult to conceive why the Porte has often given herself up to the most dangerous illusions, and has seen in the dispositions of Austria the chances of a powerful diversion. As the Emperor says in his letter to his august friend and ally, much will

triche a cru devoir adopter depuis le commencement de la guerre, loin de l'abréger, devait nécessairement encourager la résistance du Sultan ; sa neutralité n'a pas été toujours impartiale : ses voeux penchaient evidemment en faveur de la Turquie : le langage de ses feuilles publiques dénigrait nos succés, et exagérait quelques revers insignifians que nous avions eprouvés. Ajoutez à ces moyens indirects employés contre nous des Armemens si inopportuns dans les circonstances ou ils ont eu lieu, et l'on conçoit que la Porte se soit souvent livrée aux plus dangéreuses illusions, et qu'elle ait entrevu dans les dispositions de l'Autriche les chances d'une puissante diversion. Comme l'Empereur le dit dans sa

* See Despatch of Colonel Kavanagh, in answer to interrogatories respecting these armaments, in this Number.

depend on the attitude and language of his Cabinet during the second campaign. If they continue to be the same, no doubt but they will be followed by the same consequences, and the Emperor, in spite of himself, will be forced to devote exclusively his whole attention and all his efforts to the prosecution of a war which his conscience acquits him of having provoked, but which his first duties oblige him to terminate in a manner honourable to himself and advantageous to the interests of his empire. Let Austria then renounce at last the deplorable policy which she has hitherto pursued; let her make known to the Porte those truths which her obstinacy and the bad faith of which the Turkish government has given so recently an example have

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lettre à son auguste ami et allié, beaucoup dépendra de l'attitude et du langage de son Cabinet durant la seconde campagne. S'ils continuent à être les mêmes, nul doute qu'ils n'entrainent les mêmes conséquences, et l'Empereur, malgré lui, sera forcé de vouer exclusivement toute son attention et tous ses efforts à la poursuite d'une guerre qu'il a la conscience de n'avoir pas provoquée, mais que ses premiers devoirs l'obligent de terminer d'une manière honorable pour lui et avantageuse pour les intérêts de son Empire.

Que l'Autriche renonce donc enfin à la Politique déplorable qu' elle à suivie jusqu'ici; qu' elle fasse entendre à la Porte les verités que méritent son obstination et la mauvaise foi dont le governement Turc a fourni encore un si récent exemple: qu' elle

deserved; let her support in London, but frankly, and without those restrictions which render this support illusory, propositions of which she can neither deny the moderation nor the necessity — then she will have the consolation of assisting in the re-establishment of peace in the East, of securing to herself titles to the gratitude of the Emperor, and of thus re-establishing those former relations of intimacy and confidence which his Imperial Majesty is so ardently desirous to maintain with her. Our august master is happy in regarding, as a first step towards a return to less painful relations, the answers which your Excellency has obtained to our first overtures. The support which Austria promises us in London, is, however, accompanied by some restrictions, which your Excellency will

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appuie à Londres, mais franchement et sans des restrictions qui rendent cet appui illusoire, des propositions dont elle ne saurait meconnaître la modération et la nécessité, et alors elle aura la consolation de concourir au rétablissement de la paix en Orient, de s'assurer des titres à la reconnaissance de l'Empereur, et de retablir ainsi ses anciens rapports d'intimité et de confiance que S. M. I. a si vivement à coeur d'entretenir avec elle. Notre Auguste Maître aime à considerer comme un premier pas vers un retour à des rélations moins pénibles les réponses que V. Ex. a obtenus a nos dernières ouvertures. L'appui que l'Autriche nous promet à Londres se trouve cependant accompagné de quelques restrictions que vous vous serez sans doute efforcé, M. l'Ambas-

no doubt have endeavoured to remove, or to weaken, in your subsequent interviews with Prince Metternich. In fact, the manner in which he has expressed his opinion with regard to the future limits of Greece cannot satisfy us, for its aim is evidently to confine them to the Morea and to the Cyclades, and to confirm England in the intention which she announced in this respect, consequently to oppose our efforts in London, instead of facilitating a negociation, whose principal object is precisely to make our allies feel the necessity of granting more extended limits to this new state. Our opinion on this subject is strengthened by the labours of the conference at Poros, which I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Excellency, from which you will gather some useful information and decisive arguments to lead back

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sadeur, de faire disparaître ou d'affaiblir dans vos entretiens subséquens avec le Prince de Metternich. En effet la manière dont il s'est prononcé sur les limites futures de la Grèce ne saurait nous contenter, car elle a evidemment pour but de les borner à la Morée et aux Cyclades, et d'entretenir l'Angleterre dans l'intention qu'elle annonce à cet egard, par conséquent, de contrarier nos efforts à Londres, au lieu de faciliter une negociation, dont l'objet principal est precisément de faire sentir à nos alliés la nécessité de donner au nouvel etat des limites plus étendues. Notre opinion à ce sujet est renforcé par le travail de la Conférence à Poros, que j'ai l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint à V. Ex. et dans lequel elle puisera

the Cabinet of Vienna to our way of thinking: you will neglect no means to obtain this result, and by succeeding in it you will be certain to acquire fresh claims to the favour of the Emperor.

Despatches from London of the 18th January (30th), announce to us the arrival of Count Matuszewicz in that capital. His first interview with the English Ministers, to whom Prince Lieven hastened to present him, already offer us a favourable presage. Although the opening of the formal Conferences was to be delayed until the return of Prince Polignac, we have, nevertheless, already obtained the assurance that the Duke of Wellington, as well as Lord Aberdeen, cherish a sincere desire to terminate, by a happy and complete

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des informations utiles et des argumens décisifs pour ramener le Cabinet de Vienne à notre manière de voir. Elle ne négligera aucun moyen pour obtenir ce résultat et en y réussissant elle sera sûre d'acquérir de nouveaux titres à la bienveillance de l'Empéreur.

Des dépêches de Londres du 18 Janvier (30) nous annoncent l'arrivée de M. le Comte Matuszewicz dans cette capitale. Ses premières entrevues avec les Ministres Anglais, auxquels M. le Prince de Lieven s'est empressé de le presenter, nous offrent dèja des présages favorables. Quoique l'ouverture des Conférences formelles dut être ajournée jusqu'au retour du Prince de Polignac, nous avous néanmoins obtenu l'assurance que le Duc de Wellington, comme Lord Aberdeen, nourrissent sincèrement le desir de terminer par un heureux et complet accord sur les affaires

agreement on the affairs of Greece, the important negociations with which Prince Lieven and Count Matuszewicz are charged. The language of the English Ministers has farther afforded us the certainty that England has neither conceived, nor will admit the idea, of intervening in our private differences with Turkey, either separately, or with other powers; that the Ambassadors of England and France will not return to Constantinople till a decision has been taken in the Conference: and that, at all events, if even these two powers should decide upon sending them back there, *before it would be possible to concert for them common instructions*, it would be under the solemn engagement that the affairs of Greece should not be entered upon in the Ottoman capital before the

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de la Grèce les importantes négociations dont le Prince Lieven et le Comte Matuszewicz sont chargés. Le langage des Ministres Anglais nous a fourni de plus la certitude que l'Angleterre n'a pas conçu et n'admettra pas l'idée d'intervenir dans nos différends particuliers avec la Turquie, soit isolément, soit avec d'autres Puissanees; que les Ambassadeurs de l'Angleterre et de France ne retourneront à Constantinople, qu' à la suite d'une décision prise en Conférence; que dans tous les cas, et quand même les deux puissances se decideraient à les renvoyer avant qu'il n'eut eté possible de concerter pour eux des instructions communes, ce serait avec l'engagément solennel que les affaires de la Grèce ne seraient pas entamées dans la capitale de l'Empire Ottomane,

definitive bases of the negociation should have been laid with Russia, or that the latter should be in a situation to take a direct part in this negociation; in fine, that our propositions of the 22nd December have produced a salutary effect, and that those which more particularly refer to the future state of Greece will be maturely weighed.

The present despatch, as your Excellency will easily perceive, is not of a nature to be placed in extenso before the Austrian Minister; and it is the less destined for this use, as it does not enter into the views of our august Master to prolong, by direct recriminations, a state of schism, by which his Majesty has been but too painfully affected, and which Austria herself expresses the wish to see finally terminated. But you may draw from this

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sans que les bases definitives de la négociation n'eussent été arretées avec la Russie, ou que celle-ci ne se trouvât en mesure de prendre à cette négociation une part directe; enfin que nos propositions du 22 Decembre ont produit un effet salutaire et que celles qui se rapportent plus particulièrement à l'avenir de la Grèce seront prise en mûre consideration.

La présente dépêche, ainsi que V. E. s'en convaincra aisément, n'est pas de nature à être mise in extenso sous les yeux du Ministère Autrichien, et elle est d'autant moins destinée à cet usage qu'il n'entre pas dans les intentions de notre auguste maître de prolonger un état de scission dont S. M. n'a été que trop péniblement affectée, et que l'Autriche elle-méme témoigne le désir de voir

despatch those arguments which you may judge most fit to make a salutary impression upon the mind of the Emperor of Austria, or of his Minister. You will employ them usefully to develope the opinion of our august Master, as expressed in his letter to H. I. & R. Ap. Majesty.

Meantime we have much satisfaction in repeating that the Emperor sincerely congratulates himself on the prospect of the termination of these vexatious complications. The mission of Count Ficquelmont affords him a happy presage of it. The reception he has met with here, and the frankness which has presided in all our explanations with him, will prove to the Count and to Austria how much his Majesty appreciates the motives which have dictated the mission of this General, and how

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enfin cesser. Mais V. E. pourra puiser dans cette dépêche les argumens qu'elle jugera les plus propres à faire une impression salutaire sur l'esprit de l'Empereur d'Autriche ou de son Ministère, et elle s'en servira utilement pour développer la pensée de notre auguste maître exprimée dans la lettre à S. M. J. et R. Ap.

An reste, nous le répétons avec une vive satisfaction, l'Empereur se félicite sincèrement de voir approcher le terme de ces facheuses complications. La mission de M. le Comte Ficquelmont lui en offre un heureux présage. L'accueil qu'il à trouvé ici et la franchise qui à présidé à toutes nos explications avec lui prouveront à la Cour d'Autriche combien sa Majesté apprécie les motifs qui

much his Majesty desires to meet the wishes of which he is the organ.

Receive, &c.

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ont dicté l'envoi de ce Général et combien elle désire elle-même venir au-devant des voeux dont il est l'organe.

Recevez, &c.

DESPATCH FROM COUNT NESSELRODE
TO
M. DE TATISTCHEFF.

St. Petersburg, Feb. 12, 1829.

I have laid before the Emperor the two despatches in which your Excellency gives an account of the explanations of Prince Metternich, relative to a project of terminating the present war through the mediation of the principal powers of Europe; Count Ficquelmont has repeated to me these same explanations in allowing me to read a despatch which has been addressed to him to this effect. In this document, as in his interviews with your Excellency, the Chancellor of the Court and State formally denies the existence of such a project, and visits

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Copie d'une Dépêche à M. de Tatistcheff. St. Petersbourg, le 12 *Fev.* 1829.

J'ai mis sous les yeux de l'Empereur les deux dépêches dans lesquelles V. Ex. nous rend compte des explications que lui a donneés M. le Prince de Metternich, relativement au projet de mettre un terme à la guerre actuelle moyennant la mediation des principales Puissances de l'Europe; le Comte de Ficquelmont m'a repété ces mêmes explications, en me donnant lecture d'une dépêche qui lui a été adressée à cet effet. Dans cette pièce, comme dans ses entretiens avec V. Ex., le Chancelier de Cour et d'Etat nie formellement l'existence d'un pareil projet et le frappe de la

it with his strongest disapprobation. It is sufficient that Austria acknowledges, in so authentic a manner, how ill-timed such a project would be; that she is penetrated with the conviction that in no hypothesis could it be admitted by Russia, for his Imperial Majesty to take no further notice of this incident. It has afforded to the Austrian Cabinet an opportunity of manifesting intentions which have caused a lively satisfaction to our august master, and thenceforward his Majesty could not regret having cleared up a misapprehension which would be shared with us by Cabinets to which Austria had, in the month of November last, addressed directly certain overtures relative to the affairs of Greece, as is proved beyond all doubt by the

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plus forte desapprobation. Il suffit à l'Empereur que l'Autriche en reconnoisse l'inopportunité d'une manière si authentique, qu'elle soit penetrée de la conviction que dans ancune hypothèse il ne sauroit être admis par la Russie pour que Sa Majeste Imperiale ne donne plus aucune suite à cet incident. Il a fourni au cabinet Autrichien l'occasion de manifester des intentions qui ont causé à Notre Auguste Mâitre une vive satisfaction, et dès lors Sa Majesté ne sauroit regretter d'avoir fait relever une supposition que partageroient avec nous des cabinets auxquels l'Autriche avoit adressé directement, au mois de Novembre dernier, certaines ouvertures relativement aux affaires de la Grèce, comme la prouve

necessity in which Prince Metternich found himself, as he himself confessed to your Excellency, of rectifying on this point the ideas of Count Bernstorff. I observed to M. de Ficquelmont, that, these overtures having been addressed by Austria to two of the contracting Powers to the treaty of July the 6th, to the exclusion of the third, and communicated to a Court which had taken no part in this transaction, it ought not to have excited surprise that it should have given rise with us, who can be but very imperfectly informed of this circumstance, to conjectures painful as regards Austria.

Your Excellency will confine yourself to reproduce this observation, if this matter should

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jusqu' à l'evidence la necessité où s'est trouve le P. de Metternich, d'après ce qu'il a confié Lui Même à V. Ex. de rectifier à ce sujet les idées du Comte de Bernstorff. J'ai observé à M. de Ficquelmont que ces ouvertures ayant été adressées par l'Autriche à deux des Puissances contractantes au traité du 6 Juillet à l'exclusion de la troisiême, et communiquées à une Cour qui n'a prise aucun part à cette transaction, il ne falloit pas s'étonner qu'elles aient fait nâitre chez nous, qui ne pouvions être que très incomplettement informés de cette circonstance, des conjectures pénibles pour l'Autriche.

Vous vous borneriez, M. l'Ambassadeur à reproduire cette observation, s'il devoit encore être question de ce fait entre vous et

again be discussed between yourself and Prince Metternich. His disavowal has fulfilled our object, and it is not the Emperor's intention to prolong a discussion which henceforward can have no utility. His Majesty desires only to indulge those hopes which are authorized by the friendly and satisfactory assurances which the Emperor of Austria has again very recently reiterated to him through the channel of Count Strogonoff.

Receive the assurances, &c. &c. &c.

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le P. de Metternich. Son désaveu a rempli notre but, et il n'est pas de l'intention de l'Empereur de prolonger une discussion, qui dès lors ne sauroit plus avoir aucune utilité. S. M. ne veut se livrer qu'aux espérances auxquelles l'autorisent les assurances si amicales et si satisfaisantes que l'Empereur d'Autriche lui a fait réitérer encore tout récemment par l'organe du Comte Strogonoff.

Recevez, &c.

LETTER FROM COLONEL KAVANAGH,

FIRST REFERENDARY TO THE AULIC COUNCIL OF WAR,

TO PRINCE METTERNICH.

Vienna, 8th June, 1829.

In returning to your Highness herewith the list of questions which were communicated to me, I have the honour to make the following answers to them.

I. On the extent of the recruiting in the years 1828 and 1829.

In the year 1808 was created in Austria the system called the system of reserve, according to which a certain number of men were raised for each regiment, from the population;* they were exercised for three weeks every year; then they were disbanded, and successively called to complete the regiments, according to their wants. On the proposal of the late Marshal Prince Schwarzenberg, this system received in 1816 an extension which raised the reserve for each regiment to two thousand three hundred men; but, on the other hand, the infantry was reduced to a hundred men for each company of one hundred and sixty men, on the peace establishment, fixed in the reign of the Emperess Maria Theresa, and which had been preserved ever since. In consequence of this measure there was no recruiting for several years.

This system of reserve was attended with numerous inconveniences, which had not been foreseen; and the principal of which was the too advanced age which the men of the reserve attained in time of peace, before being drafted

* From the canton of enrolment.

off according to their turn in the regiments. Thence the always increasing number of invalids in the midst of peace. By a hand-billet of the 10th of December, 1824, his Majesty demanded proposals to remedy this evil; they were stated to him in the annexed Protocol of 22nd January, 1825, after having heard the advice of the Council of State. Conformably to the opinions given by the Aulic Council and the Council of State, his Majesty judged fit to dissolve entirely the institution of the reserve; and in consequence it was openly abolished in the entire monarchy.

The annexed copy of a resolution of 4th August, 1827, confirming the proposals of the Protocol of 22nd January, 1825, and occasioned by the abolition of the system of reserve, re-established the former complement of the infantry at one hundred and sixty men each company. The recruitings of 1827 and 1828 have placed it on this footing, and have necessarily been the more considerable, because the soldiers enrolled in 1813 and 1814 were to be dismissed, their term of capitulation having expired.

The obligation of the military service being for fourteen years, all the soldiers enrolled in 1815, when a considerable recruiting took place, after the landing of Napoleon at Antibes, will be sent home in the course of 1829; in order to replace them, another equally considerable enrolment must take place.

The whole tendency of these measures is entirely pacific:* the epoch of their adoption, from 1824 to 1827, long before the battle of Navarin, proves this sufficiently.

II. Re-establishment of the Landwehr, and exemption from this service.

* The first enrolment to increase the infantry to one hundred and sixty men each company was ordered the 4th of August, 1827, and the Embassy notified it at the time.

At the time of the discussions which took place on the above-mentioned measures, new principles for recruiting, and the abolishing of several exemptions from service, which dated even from the time *when the obligation of military service extended to the whole of life*, were resolved upon. These changes then date as far back as the year 1825. In the Protocol here cited, the organisation of the Landwehr, which, since 1821, had been entirely abandoned, is treated of. Of all the proposals of the Aulic Council, submitted to the Emperor for the regeneration of the Landwehr, his Majesty, by his resolution of the 2nd March, 1829, approved only of the following: that to compensate for the diminution which had taken place in the Landwehr by deaths or other causes, it shall be completed, *on paper*, to the necessary number, by the inscription of those who were under the obligation of placing themselves on the lists. The proposal of exercising, in 1829, the Landwehr during a fortnight, in conformity with its primitive institution, was rejected from motives of economy,* as well as that of adding a pensioned officer to each company of the Landwehr, which have each but one officer. In the second battalions of the Landwehr the officers' places are vacant, which may be perceived by the military almanack; and even among the chiefs of battalions, there are some who are seventy-four years old and upwards. In this respect, then, there is no indication of military activity.

III. Concerning the re-mounting.

From economy, the cavalry had been left during ten years on a much lower footing than that which was fixed upon for a time of peace; and very old horses had been kept in

* The Emperor Francis himself had assured his Excellency the Ambassador, who notified the same to his Court; that the Landwehr should be assembled and exercised, and it is still publicly believed to be so.

the regiments. Thence arose the necessity for re-mounting in the course of last year, but *in every hundred re-mounts forty horses of four years old were allowed to be taken*, which again indicates nothing but pacific dispositions. The re-mounting of the dragoons and cuirassiers is now entirely stopped.

Towards the autumn it will re-commence, in a small degree, after the reviews of the regiments. The transport of horses from Russia for the light cavalry, will take place in July and August. What has been supposed with respect to the re-mounting of the train of artillery is *pure invention, and devoid of all foundation.* * In the whole monarchy not one hundred horses even have been purchased for the artillery and its train. The deficiencies in the teams are successively supplied by horses of cuirassiers and dragoons, which are no longer fit for active service.

IV. Manufacture of harness.

This is explained by the necessity of keeping complete in reserve in the depôts of the train the necessary articles, in the same way as it is necessary to have in the arsenals a sufficient quantity of arms. This necessity is common to every well-governed monarchy.

Major Achbauer, charged with the inspection of these depôts, was for several years, in consequence of illness, unable to make his rounds. After his death, his successor found that time had so much injured the articles belonging to the harness, that it was necessary in all the provinces to sell great quantities of it by auction. The consequence is, that, in order to replace them successively, a greater degree

* A considerable purchase of horses had been ordered in Bohemia; this number was said to be 40,000; whence the supposition that some were destined for the artillery and the train. On the 4th of May this purchase was suspended.

of activity has prevailed in this branch, in which, during many years, nothing had been done.*

V. The works on the arsenal, and in the manufactories of arms, are limited to the manufacture of a very inconsiderable number of arms, with the intention of employing the workmen, and to attain to a double complement of the stock of arms which is to be kept in reserve. Very little activity is necessary to this end, the number of musquets of the old and new pattern amounting already to seven hundred and sixty thousand. There is a quantity of artillery, too, of every calibre, far exceeding the demands for it. In this estimate what is with the regiments is not included.

VI. Transmission of artillery and munitions to Hungary.

I have myself heard some one assert that he had seen one hundred and forty pieces of cannon† pass the Danube at Presburg, whereas, on enquiry, it is found that this expedition was limited to ten pieces of a new construction, and in which the wind of the ball had been diminished: they are destined for trials in the plain of Pest.

As, according to the regulation, a pound of powder for exercise is allowed annually to each soldier of infantry, and two hundred and forty rounds for each company of artillery, it is easy to calculate that every year more than eight hundred quintals are necessary for all the troops, as well in Hungary as in Sclavonia, the Banat, Transylvania, and the regiments colonised on the frontiers. Part of this powder is manufactured in Hungary; but the greater part is sent from hence, on account of the facility of transport by the

* It is, therefore, acknowledged that, with regard to the infantry, the Landwehr, the cavalry, and the harness, the armed force had been much neglected; and that simultaneously these four branches were re-organised.

† This explains the rumours of the transmission of artillery. They may assert as they please that embarkations always take place at night.

Danube, and taken from the magazines situated between Laxemburg and Neustadt.

If we add to this account those articles which deteriorate through time, and which must necessarily be replaced in the supplies of the fortresses, it will be easily understood that a considerable quantity of munitions must be annually required in Hungary, without having any hostile intentions whatever.

It is certain that articles of artillery have not been embarked by night, unless the operation has been protracted till evening, or been commenced very early in the morning, which may have given rise to the supposition of nocturnal expeditions. It would be impossible to attempt to send secretly such articles beyond the frontiers of the monarchy, the population of Sclavonia being entirely composed of disunited Greeks.

VII. The assemblage of the greatest part of the Commandants-General at Vienna was purely accidental,* as is proved by their requests for leave, the originals of which I have the honour to transmit. The Commandant of Gallicia, the Prince of Hesse Homburg, was returning from the army; Count de Giulay came from Bohemia to consult Doctor Marenzeller about the health of his wife; Prince Lichtenstein from Moravia, because his brother-in-law, Count Harrach, was dying; the Archduke Ferdinand to see his mother, who was ill. Fresnelles went into Gallicia to see his estates, without passing through Vienna. Tomassich, from Dalmatia, is not, to this moment, arrived.

* Their meeting was accidental, it is evident; but why not say that they had no conferences? It is true, they could not agree on the subject submitted to their deliberation, the idea of substituting for the Commandantships-General corps militarily organised; but the deliberations did, nevertheless, take place.

Frimont was only summoned to sit on a special commission, and not till after the departure of the other Generals. Thus does all appearance of a combined plan vanish.

VIII. The augmentation of the Hungarian regiments has not taken place.* According to a decree of the last Diet, the voluntary enrolment decreed by the Diet of 1807 is to continue. It is barely sufficient to cover the successive diminutions in time of peace.

IX. Assembly of troops in Transylvania.

According to the statement of the dislocation of troops from this province, drawn up by the Commandant-General himself,† out of the three national regiments which belong to it (Mescery, Wacquant, and Leiningen, formerly Splenny,) there are there but one entire regiment, (Wacquant), two battalions of Leiningen, and one battalion of Mescery; in all, six battalions of infantry; one regiment of dragoons, and one of hussars, permanently stationed in the country. But, furthermore, when the moveable corps of Italy was placed in provinces where its maintenance was less expensive, and the Aulic Council proposed to send the battalion of the regiment Splenny into Transylvania, in order to bring into Temeswar the regiment Benezur, which had there replaced the regiment Mazuchelly, the latter being brought nearer to its canton of enrolment in Gallicia, his Majesty did not confirm this proposition, any more than the sending of the regiment Veyder to its canton of enrolment.

It is, then, evident that nothing has taken place to justify

* It was not said that it *had* taken place, but that there had been thoughts of effecting it; and it was only given up from the acknowledged impossibility of increasing the voluntary enrolments at the expence of the Comitats, according to the original intention.

† General Krasinski possesses a copy of this statement of dislocation, the original of which, returned to Prince Metternich, was signed by General Mohr, and dated November 12, 1828.

suppositions of hostile intentions on our part; and that we have, on the contrary, avoided with care all that could give rise to them.

In the course of this year the cavalry will not even be concentrated for the purpose of exercising.

In the annexed papers, A. and B., in answer to the first question, your Highness will find marked in red the date of the order of his Majesty to take into consideration the modification of the system of enrolment, the date of the conferences which took place in consequence, and the questions proposed by his Majesty. They prove that all which took place under this head was arranged long before the circumstances occurred, to which people would now attribute these measures.

The first page contains these indications, and renders the reading of the whole Protocol unnecessary.

The paper B. proves that the recruiting commenced in 1827, before the war of Russia against Turkey; and that no extraordinary sums were allowed for what it was necessary to acquire. These documents are but copies; but it is easy to see that they have not been invented to serve as a refutation to the questions which have been proposed to us.

The annexes, which refer to the question No. 2, contain underlined in red the most remarkable passages: *a*, the notice of the advanced age of two chiefs of battalions in the Landwehr, to prove that the Landwehr is by no means ready to march; *b*. An imperial resolution of 1825, which commanded several reductions, among others the abolition of the practice of placing officers in the twenty-second battalions of the Landwehr.

Both these documents are originals. Next, I will request your Highness to cast your eyes over the sheet annexed to page 6 of the Protocol mentioned in the first question.

No. IV. proves that the principles of the regeneration rest on a general measure, and one in no wise calculated for the present moment.

If one would support, by documents, the answer to the third question, it would be necessary to extract from the acts too voluminous documents to be easily collected. The same is the case with the answers to questions 4, 5, and 6. If, however, your Highness should wish to possess them, I can send them to you afterwards.

The annexes to No. 7 contain the originals of the requests for leave of absence of the Commandants-General, and the decisions of his Majesty with regard to them.

To prove, in answer to question 8, that the Hungarian regiments are not reinforced, I must have annexed the resolutions of the last Diet, and I had them not at hand. They are, however, printed, and by no means secret.

In the statement of the dislocation of troops, in answer to question 9, as well as in the decision of his Majesty, which refers to the corps withdrawn from Italy, those passages which serve as proof are marked in red, to spare the trouble of reading the whole.

In hastening to reply thus to the orders of your Highness, I entreat you to be pleased to return to me my documents; and I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) KAVANAGH,
Colonel.

CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF NOVOSILTZOFF.

[Comte de Novosiltzoff, President du Conseil de L'Empereur de Toutes Les Russies, Conseiller intime actuel, Conseiller President du Comité des Ministres, Membre de la Commission des Requêtes, &c., &c.

Such is the official title of the keeper of the conscience of the Emperor of Russia, who has recently arrived in England, with Admiral Mordwinoff, a Member of the Ministerial Council at St. Petersburgh, charged with a special Mission to this country.

The communications we have received on the subject of this eminent functionary sufficiently attest the importance attached to his Mission by the different Courts of Europe.

We sincerely trust that there may be no mistake in the manner of his reception here.

Lord Durham in his letter of the 5th of May informs us that the Emperor is determined "to act *spontaneously* and cordially with us in the maintenance of the peace of Europe."

His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs proceeds to preserve the peace of Europe by cordially separating England from Russia, at the same time that he is determined spontaneously to support the Russian Faction in Greece with the third instalment of the loan.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer exhibits his proficiency in the Diplomacy which he has learnt from Lord Durham, by his ingenious reply, on Thursday night, to the Noble Member for Arundel.

In the midst of these difficulties, we can only cordially and spontaneously recommend the Chancellor of Russia to the hospitable attentions of that straightforward and liberal statesman, the President of the Board of Trade.]

Extract from "*Coup d'Œil sur l'Etat politique du Royaume de Pologne sous la Domination Russe, par un Polonois.*" Paris, 1832. p. 115.

We know not the motive that induced Alexander to call precisely Novosiltzoff a second-rate diplomatist, conjointly with Lanskoy, to the function of member of the provisional government of the Duchy of Warsaw, in 1813. A dissolute spendthrift, inexhaustible in trickery, clever at subterfuges, he had all the vices

of a corrupt courtier and a harsh satrap. After the erection of the kingdom, he was the only one of the Russians who remained about the new government. His character of imperial commissioner was never ostensibly announced to the public, from motives which we have stated elsewhere, and it was only under the colour of favour, of concession to the wishes of the Polish government, that permission to sit in the council of the ministers was granted to that emissary.* For six years he never ceased to exercise a decisive influence over all the branches of the administration, and the indolent lieutenant of the kingdom, Prince Zayonczek, as well as his weak colleagues, did not hesitate to yield submissively to his opinions and his will, whenever he pretended to express the sentiments of the sovereign. At soon as Lubecki had contrived to withdraw from him one of the most important branches of the administration—that of the finances—Novosiltzoff, either out of revenge or from a desire to prove that he was of some use, fell, with all the fury of his malignity, upon the system of public instruction and police; and as he could no longer be an active minister, he coveted the paltry glory of those ancient proconsuls of Russia, who, during the long period of the death-struggle of Poland, bowed down both king and nation under their iron yoke.

There was a time when his baleful plans obtained the confidence of Alexander; and it was just then that this ambitious sovereign, alarmed by the events of which the west of Europe was the theatre, resolved to throw off his mask of liberalism, and to stop the alarming progress of civilization. Accordingly, Novosiltzoff received *carte blanche* to seek out the germs of revolution, of the existence of which he had had the hardihood to assure him. The

* The following is the tenor of the official note addressed to him on this subject by Count Grabowski, the minister secretary of state, in the name of the Emperor, dated Petersburgh, June 29, 1816.

"The lieutenant of the kingdom having communicated to his majesty the unanimous wish of the administrative council that you, sir, should be authorised to be present at the meetings of the said council, to watch its labours and to assist it with your intelligence, his majesty has ordered me to inform you, sir, that he grants you the authority requisite for this purpose."

most heinous attacks were made on individual liberty; gloomy dungeons rang with the groans of the victims of suspicion; but the results of these horrors did not answer the expectations of authority, which reaped from them nothing but disgrace and universal indignation. This first check of Novosiltzoff's deprived him of great part of his ascendency over the mind of the sovereign. "I do not believe," wrote the minister secretary of state to Lubecki, under date of August 2, 1823, "all those grand revelations of Novosiltzoff's; they have so often proved false, that certainly they are no better this time. He is striving with all his might to render himself indispensable, and it is by these means alone that he in some measure retains his influence; but he possesses no esteem, and is not therefore to be feared: at any rate he can do no mischief, and which he labours to do with all his power."

In proportion as Novosiltzoff lost the favour of the Emperor, he contrived to make himself amends for it by insinuating himself more and more into the good graces of Constantine; and he at length gained such an ascendency over that prince that he fancied he was not safe without his presence and support. What, in fact, is easier than to excite terror in a despot, to torment his mind with the shades of immolated victims, to raise their vengeful daggers against him! Such were precisely the means employed by Novosiltzoff to secure the entire confidence of the master of the Belvedere, and the office of grand inquisitor of the kingdom. His perfidious and underhand dealings were, nevertheless, still without satisfactory success. Soured by continual reverses, alarmed at the great responsibility for which he foresaw that he should soon have to account, he took the desperate resolve to declare himself openly the sworn enemy of the nation. It was no longer merely against suspected persons, against public disturbers, but against the whole Polish race and nation, that he now directed his attacks. There were no reproaches, however absurd, no calumnies, however infamous, but what he dared to launch against us. According to him, our schools, though watched by hosts of spies, were but revolutionary nurseries, our

professors, Jacobins, our relatives, factious people; the very blood that circulated in our veins, the milk that we sucked from our mothers' breasts, were infected with a poison, that prevented us from ever being loyal subjects, friends of order, citizens worthy of enjoying all the blessings of the civilization and liberty of a representative government. It was by means of such accusations that he aimed at the overthrow of the constitutional edifice, at the transformation of the kingdom into a Russian province, in order to reap exclusively the fruit of such a change and to gratify his shameful rapacity. The extensive national domains had still an irresistible attraction for him; and when Lubecki solicited from the Autocrat the authority requisite for their sale, it was not in the charter which guaranteed the inviolability of the public property, it was not in the chambers, but in Novosiltzoff that he encountered the strongest opposition to such a measure. With what zeal and with what anxiety did he not inquire into the arrangements of the law which seemed to condemn this design! With what energy did he not appeal to the respect due to the attributes of the national representation, to the liberties guaranteed by the charter! Lastly, with what skill did he not paint the despair of the peasantry, and the dangers which would result to the throne from a just indignation of the people! And yet the sole motive of so obstinate a resistance was but the fear of letting slip the object of a good salary for the projected immolation of our name and our liberties. It must be confessed that if the emperor Alexander, towards the conclusion of his reign, paid Novosiltzoff by evident marks of his coldness, Nicholas wholly deprived him of his confidence. What most contributed to this effect was the rapid and the more and more frequent triumphs of Lubecki, as well as the unexpected result of the great trial instituted against the patriots, which only served to compromise the sovereign.

The aversion of Nicholas for Novosiltzoff was carried to such a pitch, that, though he allowed him to retain his post of imperial commissioner in Poland, and guardian of the privileges of the throne, after his accession, he never once summoned him to St.

Petersburg, or granted him a single confidential audience—conduct which, towards a person charged with so important a mission, did not fail to astonish the public. And it was merely out of a remnant of respect for the grand duke, that he endured his presence in receptions of ceremony.* Novosiltzoff was not only the sworn enemy of the order of things in the kingdom, but likewise the executioner, the commissioner, of the wretched, Lithuanian provinces, where, after the disgrace of Prince Adam Czartoryski, he seized the supreme direction of the department of public instruction, and where a vicious administration opened a wider field for his abuses. It is to Novosiltzoff that the Poles must attribute the most baneful obstructions to the progress of knowledge; the introduction of an odious police authority into the schools; the most arbitrary censorship; the organization of the most infamous espionage; the prevotal courts; the demoralization and degradation of the high public functionaries; the numberless insults offered to the national honour; the distrust kept up between the government and the governed; the tears of innumerable victims, the curses of mothers, and the despair of citizens. Such are his claims to their affection!

* * * * *

In other countries the welfare of the nation depends, in a great measure, on the more or less happy composition of the administration: with us, as we have already remarked, the Ministers were but the organs of a foreign and secret power, of which, in

* During the coronation, the whole imperial family was assembled at Warsaw. A ball was one day given, at which the empress, after dancing the Polonaise with all the chief dignitaries of state, designedly forgot Novosiltzoff. This circumstance did not escape Constantine, who feeling himself hurt, and trembling with rage at the mere idea of the gratification which this slight humiliation would afford to the Polish public, abruptly grasped Novosiltzoff by the hand, led him to the empress, and thus addressed her: "Madam, I bring you my best friend; be pleased to honour him with your favour." The empress could not refuse the invitation of so powerful and so importunate a patron; and the supple diplomatist obtained permission to present his hand to her—a favour for which he would at the moment have sacrificed half his life.

process of time, Constantine and Novosiltzoff became the leaders. Without confidence, without energy, and without authority, the Ministers had accomplished much if they could but lay the storm, and prevail upon the mighty conquerors to slacken the pace of a profoundly meditated system. The nation, aware of their impotence, felt thankful for their very imperfections; for it soon perceived, that, with a hostile master supported by a million of bayonets, ministerial responsibility was to the people a safeguard equally vain and ridiculous; and if there was a time when it sought to have recourse to that safeguard, it was to complete the rupture between the affections of the people and those of the Sovereign, by that constitutional formality.

* * * * *

From the very outset of his mission, Novosiltzoff never ceased to cry his "Delenda est Carthago," war against the prosperity, war against the constitutional liberties granted to Poland. He was thoroughly aware of the danger which would arise for Russia, from the patriotism and love of independence of a nation so formidable as the Polish — a patriotism which he was pleased insidiously to denominate a fondness for agitation and innovation. At the present day, Nicholas, convinced of the correctness of Novosiltzoff's system, acts accordingly, and makes war upon the prosperity and the liberties of Poland. The struggle is at least open. There are but two chances for Poland—extermination and independence. The question, therefore, is, whether Europe, sufficiently enlightened by the avowal of the Autocrat himself, will suffer the horrid spectacle of massacres and cruelties exercised upon a nation of twelve millions of souls to be exhibited to the world, or will unite its efforts for restoring to that nation those rights which divine and human justice have so long claimed.

DESPATCH OF PRINCE LUBECKI TO THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

Defence of Prince Lubecki against the misrepresentations of M. Novosiltzoff, Commissioner of the Emperor of Russia in the kingdom of Poland, now Chancellor of the Empire, and on a Visit to England; * *addressed to the Emperor Nicholas.*

Dec. 28, 1828.

Authorised by your Imperial and Royal Majesty to address myself directly to you, whenever I should consider it expedient for the public service to do so, I felt the necessity of pursuing this course, both in my character of minister and of subject, as well when I had only conjectures to rely upon, as when positive facts placed me in a situation to express myself in a more formal manner. I embrace then with ardour this occasion, to express to your Majesty all that my conscience would reproach me for concealing. By a natural impulse of the noble disinterestedness of his character, his Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Czarewitch (Constantine) has just charged the General Roznieckі to intimate to me how much he disapproved of my conduct in the affair of "the High Court;" † conduct which he attributed principally to the necessity in which I felt myself to

* M. Novosiltzoff and Admiral Mordwinoff arrived in London in the present month of July, on an extraordinary and unexplained mission.

† By the Constitution of Poland, of 1815, parties accused of high treason were tried by the Senate. This body had recently acquitted eight Poles, charged by the Moscovite government with being parties to a *Russian plot* against the life of the Emperor Alexander. Nicholas, dissatisfied with the sentence, called for the opinions of his *Polish* Ministers upon it, with a view to set it aside. Prince Lubecki incurred the Imperial displeasure by defending, in this instance, the constitutional privileges of the Senate.

conciliate that public opinion which my fiscal measures had excited against me, at a moment when (as it was alleged) the finances had fallen into a complete state of disorganization, if not into a bankrupt condition, under my management.

In addition to this, his Imperial Highness caused to be expressed to me the opinion he entertained, that a favourable opportunity was alone wanting to your Majesty's Polish subjects, to declare themselves your Majesty's enemies; but that all these designs, as well as my conduct, would not remain concealed from the Sovereign.

Discovering in this communication a flattering proof that his Imperial Highness intended to offer me a means to *soften*, if possible, the unfavourable impressions which he had received, I began by manifesting to the General the gratitude which I felt for so much kindness. Then, grappling with the subject matter itself, I declared that the written and oral communications of the Imperial Commissioner always made me dread lest he should take advantage of the better feelings of his Imperial Highness: and that I beheld these painful forebodings realized with greater regret, because nothing could be more easy than to demonstrate *the falsehood of every statement that he had advanced.* In fact, the question seemed to me to separate itself into two principal divisions.

1. That which concerns the management of the finances, and my individual opinion of the affair of the High Court.

2. That which has reference to the little reliance which can be placed on the *loyalty* of the Polish nation.

First. Monseigneur thinks that I have disorganized the finances. But, as up to the present time neither the civil service nor the army has experienced any delay in receiving their pay, and as these administrative details are not brought under the cognizance of his Imperial Highness by the Council, this notion of disorganization must have been suggested

to him by the only person whose office it is to carry to him what is passing.

To ascertain how far this accusation can be maintained, it is necessary to examine what was the state of the finances before I joined the ministry; and, without going farther back, we need only cast a glance on the accounts of the year 1821—an epoch at which the whole financial machine moved under the impelling power of the Imperial Commissioner himself. It will at once be apparent that the salaries of the civilians and the pay of the troops were a month and a half in arrear,—that the deposits and securities placed by individuals in the public chest were exhausted,—in short, that the receipts were insufficient to cover the expenditure. Such was the *order* maintained *then*. As to the disorganization of the present time, not only do the stated accounts prove that since 1822 the receipts have constantly increased by bringing into the treasury of the state sources of revenue which were previously appropriated to individual purposes; but the elements of prosperity are such, and show themselves so distinctly in every department, that an increase of comfort in the whole country may be confidently predicted, while the government, by a series of operations, will succeed in discharging its debt without augmenting the burden of taxation. In matters of this sort, phrases and words are not the things to be dealt with. Arguments, insinuations, criminations, have nothing to do with figures. Let the books be examined—let the chests be opened—and facts will speak for themselves. Well! it is just the facility of such a verification which must have induced his Imperial Highness to give credence to that which the Imperial Commissioner told him. *How could it be believed that a man clothed with the confidence of the Monarch, and who, step by step, traces every movement of the Government, should not see things as they really are?* How could it be suspected that he would dare

to give to the august brother of his master fictions for realities? *Honesty does not suspect falsehood when it presents itself with the boldness of truth.* In addition to this, the acts of my administration sufficiently prove that I have ever preferred the well-being of the public service to an ephemeral popularity; and, if I am charged with any responsibility whatever, I by no means seek to avoid it, and I take upon myself all the consequences. As to my opinion in the affair of the High Court, I should have considered that I betrayed the Monarch, if I did not obey the dictates of my conscience; and my documents are at hand, to explain the opinion I gave.

Secondly. His Imperial Highness sees, in the Polish nation, a mass of disaffected men, who only wait a favourable opportunity to declare themselves enemies of their sovereign. When no act of the subjects of the kingdom of Poland which bears this criminal character has come to the knowledge of the government, how can I avoid recognizing the type of the opinion thus expressed by his Imperial Highness, in the words pronounced in full council by the Imperial Commissioner, when he declared that revolt was an innate vice in the Poles, and that sons inherited it naturally from their fathers? If I now examine what the sovereign has done to excite his subjects to so black a defection, I see that his first engagement to the Poles was a pledge for *the preservation of the institutions* which the Emperor Alexander of glorious memory had magnanimously granted to unsuccessful heroism. The better to preserve the remembrance of a generosity so touching, your Majesty has willed that the current money of Poland shall record it from reign to reign, with the likeness of the regeneration of the kingdom.*

* This coin has since been called in, and a new one has been issued, on which the arms of Poland adorn the black eagle of Russia jointly with those of the Asiatic provinces of the empire: viz., Georgia, Grusia, Siberia, &c.

The aberrations of a few individuals cannot have changed these paternal feelings, and the delinquents have been delivered to the tribunal which the Constitution has exclusively provided for them. The judgment of this tribunal (it would appear) is of a nature to displease* your Majesty; but, previously to superseding its sentence, your Majesty asks of your council to what motive can be attributed this defective decree, in a matter which had threatened the institutions of which your Majesty has declared yourself the inviolable guardian. Finally, amid the toils of a destructive war, a benevolent feeling escapes your Majesty on behalf of your Polish subjects. Your Majesty has desired that a monument, erected in Warsaw, should prove that an affront received under the walls of Varna by a king of Poland has been recently washed out in Ottoman blood by one of his successors.† These, Sire, are the auspices under which the Poles have learnt to know their monarch. From whom could they possibly expect greater benefits? To rebel against such a master would be the height of ingratitude, or an undoubted symptom of insanity, whether we consider the subject with reference to their personal interests or political rights.

* * * * * *

In this matter, as in that of the finances, the Imperial

* The eight persons accused were acquitted; but the "displeasure" of the Emperor still followed them; two were carried off to Siberia, and the remainder were placed under the surveillance of the police. Their judges—the Polish senate—were placed under arrest in Warsaw.

† Prince Lubecki here alludes to some cannon taken by the Turks from the Poles, in the year 1444, under the King Ladislas Jagello, who was killed in the battle in which they were lost before Varna They were retaken by the Russians in the campaign of 1828. Nicholas, in a fit of magnanimity or vanity, caused a column composed of these cannon to be erected in the arsenal. This act deserves to be recorded, for it is the only one in which he ever condescended to seek popularity, by appealing to the national feelings of the Poles.

Commissioner endeavours to give an authentic character to that which is erroneous; but events which are past afford a correct index to those which are present, inasmuch as I have always observed the Imperial Commissioner pursuing the same dissatisfied and suspicious course. Permit me to cite a few instances.

In 1821, at a moment when the cutting remarks of the decision of the 25th of May still rang in our ears, and when an empty treasury, squandered deposits, and arrears of pay, indicated sufficiently the wounds which had been inflicted on the public welfare, those who pointed them out were called alarmists, and the prudence which retrieved the finances was represented as a means adopted to compromise the government. Who conveyed these false impressions to the sovereign? THE IMPERIAL COMMISSIONER.

In 1822, I submitted for the sanction of the supreme government a Budget, in which the receipts exceeded the expenditure, accompanied by a plan to augment the resources of the treasury. The monarch was pre-admonished that this Budget had not attained a degree of maturity which would secure any practicable results, and that the plan proposed was only calculated to excite enemies against the government. Who, against all evidence, advanced these assertions, the erroneousness of which was established by the decisions of the supreme authority? THE IMPERIAL COMMISSIONER.

In 1823, the Administrative Council* had already *sketched a petition supplicating the sovereign to annul the Constitution*, as no means could be found to carry the 146th

* The Administrative Council was the executive government, composed of officers of state, appointed by the Emperor during pleasure, and paid by the Treasury!

article* into execution. Who discovered this unheard of plan to remove an imaginary obstacle? THE IMPERIAL COMMISSIONER.

In the following years, the system of public credit to individuals, and the introduction of licenses, were warmly opposed. By whom? BY THE IMPERIAL COMMISSIONER.

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Finally, in the matter of the High Court, I will not again recall all that the Imperial Commissioner has asserted, because I believe the written documents which I deposited in the council for transmission to your Majesty sufficient to counterbalance the suggestions and criminations, which spring continually from his opinions. Doubtless it would be a very interesting inquiry to endeavour to discover the *motives* which prompt the Imperial Commissioner *to sow the seeds of disunion* between the monarch and his children. It may be assumed that interests the most powerful, or a blindness the most complete, must have contributed to render it a pleasure to falsify the paternal language of the first, and to criminate even the very thoughts of the second. As for myself, I do not undertake to expose these motives; I content myself with stating facts.

And now, Sire, I ought to tell your Majesty that I should perhaps have maintained silence, as I had done up to the present day, if the errors of the Imperial Commissioner were alone in question; because a deliberate inquiry would have protected the throne in this instance, as it has done in so many others. But, when I perceive that these errors have

* The following is the 146th Article: "There shall be civil tribunals and tribunals of the police in every commune, and in every town, to take cognizance of transactions not exceeding 500 florins." Well may Prince Lubecki exclaim against the abolishing of the constitution, because some formal difficulties were experienced in carrying such an article into operation!

been of sufficient weight to produce an untoward effect on the loyal feelings of his Imperial Highness, my duty is to speak out. The representative of an august prince, who professes so ardent an affection for truth, would throw too great a weight into the opposite balance; and I perceive but too clearly in how deplorable a dilemma the monarch would be placed between that natural confidence which he reposes in his people and the criminations of so august and beloved a personage. But, when once the tendency to error in the Imperial Commissioner's disposition is unveiled, the effects of such conduct are no longer to be feared. They will exercise no greater control over the mind of the sovereign than over the feelings of gratitude and devotion of his people. An unmerited distrust will not open the door to the instigations of a foreign influence.

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PRINCE METTERNICH AND "THE PORTFOLIO."

To the Editor of the Portfolio.

Frankfort, 20th July, 1836.

SIR,

I hasten to transmit to you, as soon as possible, the details of an event which personally interests the Editor of the "Portfolio," and which ought, doubtless, to interest, in the same degree, the whole British Public, since it is of a character to throw a great deal of light on many eminent personages in Austria; on the policy of that power; and particularly on the efforts of Russia to increase her influence at Vienna.

Some time ago, Prince Metternich, pressed by the solicitations of the Russian Embassy, formally prohibited the introduction and the perusal of the "Portfolio." Up to that period, your publication had neither been put forward by the booksellers, nor announced in the lists of publications; it was to be found amongst the works which the booksellers are in the habit of reserving for the privileged purchasers, particularly for the nobility, and the higher order of merchants of Vienna; but, in consequence of a pressing note from the Russian Embassy, Prince Metternich ordered the police to declare to the booksellers that the sale of the "Portfolio" would be punished with a fine of a thousand florins (about £100), and that the booksellers would run the risk of seeing their trade suppressed.

This prohibition at first transpired nowhere but at Court; but there it produced a great sensation; and perhaps wounded very sensibly the feelings of many persons of that Court, which, from their having been often represented as the uncompromising allies of the Russians, apparently contains men who have the power of being good Austrians, without yielding to all the caprices of M. de Tatistcheff and his Embassy.

However this may be, a gentleman of the Court, M. de Clam, aide-de-camp of the Emperor Ferdinand, the same who replaced M. d' Apel, went to the Minister of Police, M. de Sedlenitzki, and begged him to lend him this prohibited publication. On the refusal of this Minister, he declared that he would procure it, notwithstanding his opposition, and he proceeded to a bookseller, who made difficulties; but M. de Clam threatened him with never again setting foot in his house, and assured him that he had nothing to fear; so that the bookseller, finding himself placed between two fires, decided on fulfilling the wishes of M. de Clam in selling him the numbers of the "Portfolio," and, at the same time, another prohibited work, the novel of Wally by Gutzkow, against which the German Diet had launched its thunders.

In his delight at having outwitted the police, the aide-de-camp went in haste to M. de Sedlenitzki, and showed the numbers to the astounded Minister. The prayers, the intreaties, of the latter, that he would give the name of the bookseller entirely failed; but he had recourse to another means; he gave his word of honour that the bookseller should have nothing to fear, upon which the aide-de-camp, with the good faith of an officer, and in order to prove that it was at Vienna that he had procured the "Portfolio," conceived himself at liberty to name the bookseller. A quarter of an hour afterwards, the police agents broke into the shop, seized some prohibited books, to the value of four hundred florins, exacted the fine of a thousand florins, and left the unfortunate bookseller under the ban of still graver threats. Indignant at this proceeding, he hastens to M. de Clam and recalls to him his promise; M. de Clam, equally indignant, runs to M. de Sedlenitzki to remind him of his word of honour, on which the Minister coldly replied that, in his position, he conceived himself above the obligation of a word of honour.

The following day M. de Sedlenitzki received an autograph note from the Emperor Ferdinand, in which, after having expressed to him his displeasure, His Majesty commanded him immediately to restore the books and the thousand florins. At the same time, in order to calm entirely the fears of the bookseller, the

Emperor named him publisher of the Court, a great mark of favour in Austria. Prince Metternich, apprized of what had passed, did not hesitate to make representations to the Emperor, but without success; and every thing leads to the belief that the "Portfolio," without being publicly displayed, will continue to be read in Austria.

The Cabinet of Vienna is not fond of the transmission of political correspondence to foreign countries; it would even suppress it at the Post Office. But now, that I find myself beyond the Austrian territory, I think it my duty to transmit to you these facts; and, for still further security, I no longer confide them to the ordinary post.

The English reader will perhaps be surprised that M. de Sedlnitzki, after the autograph letter, drawn up in very energetic language, should have been able or willing to retain his situation. In Austria this surprises no one. The Austrian functionaries are *very immoveable*. The late Emperor Francis was one day dissatisfied with his Minister of War, because the soldiers at a review passed in a disorderly manner before the Emperor, in consequence of a pool of water, which the rain had formed in the street. For this light cause, he wrote to the Minister a fulminating letter; but the Minister kept his place, and keeps it still.

I shall take another opportunity of speaking to you about the Emperor Ferdinand, and of characterising this Prince, of such simple habits, who is the object, in the European press, of such complicated commentaries. I shall limit myself to stating, on this occasion, that the Emperor has a will of his own, and that Russia would deceive herself, were she to think herself able to dictate to him orders through the channel of an Austrian minister. I dare not pretend, in so hasty a letter, to sketch the portrait of Prince Metternich: but I venture to affirm that he does not sufficiently appreciate the strength of an empire such as Austria, and that he is too forgetful of the true interests of this empire, in listening, oftentimes with a complacency which resembles obedience, to the counsels, the notes, the threats, of the Russian embassy. Perhaps the aversion of the Prince to publicity has contributed as much

as the Russian note to his order to the booksellers; but, in this particular case, does he not see himself at least exposed to having his policy misinterpreted? As regards M. de Sedlenitzki, I leave him to the reflection of the public, to think of him as they like.

It is not the first time, however, that an imperial note in Austria has afforded a remedy for the scandalous proceedings of the Russian embassy. Under the reign of Francis—the story is somewhat old, though unrecited—an aristocratic assembly used regularly to meet at this embassy, and a noble foreign lady, famous for her liaisons with an Hungarian nobleman, was the soul of the party. I do not like to engage in polemics against the fair sex, and I shall not designate this lady by name, but I shall mention that, in the midst of her acts of levity, she allowed herself to propose a raffle for a young negro, brought up with her son, and his intimate companion. The noble society bought the tickets, and the Ambassador committed the crime of making his residence the theatre of these shameful transactions, the profits of which were to enrich the lady. The Emperor heard of it. An autograph letter obliged M. de Sedlenitzki to take his measures, and they got out of the scrape by supplying the place of a negro with a statue of him imitated in chocolate.

Many of my friends were in the Rhenish provinces during the journey of the French Princes. Their highnesses the Dukes of Orleans and Nemours were too much in society and travelled too rapidly to be able to study very deeply the positions of the countries which they traversed. But they must have perceived that the Prussians on the Rhine are animated with liberal ideas; that they long for a Constitution, and that they are opposed to the Russian Alliance. I abstain from citing the proofs, for the functionaries might take advantage of them. The prisons and the fortresses on the Rhine are already too well filled.*

The French Princes conducted themselves admirably, and have distinguished themselves by a delicacy entirely French. At Coblentz, General von Borstell, commanding the 8th corps of the

* See Despatch of General von Borstell, No. 25 of the "Portfolio."

Prussian army, attached to them a superior officer to accompany them to Cologne, and to remain with them in that city. In taking leave of this officer, the Duke of Orleans said to him that he was unprepared to offer him any adequate return for his politeness, but begged his acceptance of a pencil as a token of remembrance. A short time after the departure of the Princes, when the officer showed the pencil to his brother officers, they discovered that it opened at the end, and they found there a diamond of the value of a hundred louis. The Prussians were charmed with this conduct. It was impossible to offer a present to an officer in a more delicate manner.

CONVENTION

BETWEEN HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY, HIS MOST CHRISTIAN MAJESTY, THE EMPEROR OF ALL THE RUSSIAS, AND THE KING OF BAVARIA; RELATIVE TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GREECE. SIGNED AT LONDON, 7TH MAY, 1832.

The Courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, exercising the power conveyed to them by the Greek nation, to make choice of a Sovereign for Greece, raised to the rank of an independent State, and being desirous of giving to that country a fresh proof of their friendly disposition, by the election of a Prince descended from a Royal House, the friendship and alliance of which cannot fail to be of essential service to Greece, and which has already acquired claims to her esteem and gratitude, have resolved to offer the crown of the new Greek State to the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria, second son of His Majesty the King of Bavaria.

His Majesty the King of Bavaria, on his part, acting in the character of guardian of the said Prince Otho during his minority, participating in the views of the three Courts, and duly appreciating the motives which have induced them to fix their choice upon a Prince of his house, has determined to accept the crown of Greece for his second son the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria.

In consequence of such acceptance, and for the purpose of agreeing upon the arrangements which it has rendered necessary, their Majesties the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the King of the French, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Bavaria, on the other, have named as their Plenipotentiaries, viz.—

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honourable Henry John Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a Member of His

Britannic Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, a Member of Parliament, and his Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs :—

His Majesty the King of the French, the Sieur Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, Prince-Duke de Talleyrand, Peer of France, His said Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Britannic Majesty, Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, Knight of the Order of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stephen of Hungary, of the Order of St. Andrew, of the Order of the Black Eagle, &c. &c.

His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the Sieur Christopher Prince of Lieven, General of Infantry in His Armies, His Aide-de-Camp General, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Britannic Majesty, Knight of the Orders of Russia, Grand Cross of the Black Eagle and of the Red Eagle of Prussia, of the Royal Order of the Guelphs, Commander Grand Cross of the Sword of Sweden, and Commander of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem ;—And the Sieur Adam, Count Matuszewic, Privy Councillor of His said Majesty, Knight of the Order of St. Anne of the 1st Class, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Wladimir of the 2nd, Grand Cross of the Order of the Red Eagle of Prussia of the 1st, commander of the Order of Leopold of Austria, and of several other Foreign Orders :—

Aud His Majesty the King of Bavaria, the Sieur Augustus Baron de Cetto, His Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to his Britannic Majesty :

Who, after having exchanged their Full-Powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following Articles :—

Art. 1. The Courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, duly authorized for this purpose by the Greek nation, offer the hereditary sovereignty of Greece to the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria, second son of His Majesty the King of Bavaria.

II. His Majesty the King of Bavaria, acting in the name of his said son, a minor, accepts, on his behalf, the hereditary sovereignty of Greece, on the conditions hereinafter settled.

III. The Prince Otho of Bavaria shall bear the title of King of Greece.

IV. Greece, under the sovereignty of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, and under the guarantee of the three Courts, shall form a monarchical and independent State, according to the terms of the Protocol, signed between the said Courts, on the 3rd of February, 1830,* and accepted both by Greece and by the Ottoman Porte.

V. The limits of the Greek State shall be such as shall be definitively settled by the negociations which the Courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, have recently opened with the Ottoman Porte, in execution of the Protocol of the 26th of September, 1831.†

VI. The three Courts having beforehand determined to convert the Protocol of the 3rd of February, 1830, into a Definitive Treaty, as soon as the negociations relative to the limits of Greece shall have terminated, and to communicate such Treaty to all the States with which they have relations, it is hereby agreed that they shall fulfil this engagement, and that His Majesty the King of Greece shall become a Contracting Party to the Treaty in question.

VII. The three Courts shall, from the present moment, use their influence to procure the recognition of the Prince Otho of Bavaria as King of Greece, by all the Sovereigns and States with whom they have relations.

VIII. The Royal Crown and dignity shall be hereditary in Greece; and shall pass to the direct and lawful descendants and heirs of the Prince Otho of Bavaria in the order of primogeniture.

In the event of the decease of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, without direct and lawful issue, the Crown of Greece shall pass to his younger brother, and to his direct and lawful descendants and heirs, in the order of primogeniture. In the event of the

* See Protocol of Conferences in London, No. 23.

† See Protocol of Conferences in London, No. 36.

decease of the last-mentioned Prince also, without direct and lawful issue, the Crown of Greece shall pass to his younger brother, and to his direct and lawful descendants and heirs, in the order of primogeniture.

In no case shall the Crown of Greece and the Crown of Bavaria be united upon the same head.

IX. The majority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece, is fixed at the period when he shall have completed his 20th year: that is to say, on the 1st of June, 1835.

X. During the minority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece, his rights of sovereignty shall be exercised, in their full extent, by a Regency, composed of three Councillors, who shall be appointed by His Majesty the King of Bavaria.

XI. The Prince Otho of Bavaria shall retain the full possession of his appanages in Bavaria. His Majesty the King of Bavaria moreover engages to assist, as far as may be in his power, the Prince Otho in his position in Greece, until a revenue shall have been set apart for the Crown in that State.

XII. In execution of the stipulations of the Protocol of the 20th of February, 1830,* His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias engages to guarantee, and their Majesties the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the King of the French, engage to recommend, the former to his Parliament, the latter to his Chambers, to enable their Majesties to guarantee, on the following conditions, a loan to be contracted by the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece.

1°. The principal of the loan to be contracted under the guarantee of the three Powers shall not exceed a total amount of 60,000,000 of francs.

2°. The said loan shall be raised by instalments of 20,000,000 of francs each.

3°. For the present, the 1st instalment only shall be raised, and the three Courts shall each become responsible for the payment of one-third of the annual amount of the interest and sinking fund of the said instalment.

* See Protocol of Conference in London, No. 26.

4°. The 2nd and the 3rd instalments of the said loan may also be raised, according to the necessities of the Greek State, after previous agreement between the three Courts and His Majesty the King of Greece.

5°. In the event of the 2nd and 3rd instalments of the above-mentioned loan being raised in consequence of such an agreement, the three Courts shall each become responsible for the payment of one-third of the annual amount of the interest and sinking fund of these two instalments, as well as of the first.

6°. The Sovereign of Greece and the Greek State shall be bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of such instalments of the loan as may have been raised under the guarantee of the three Courts the first revenue of the State, in such manner that the actual receipts of the Greek treasury shall be devoted, *first of all*, to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for any other purpose, until those payments, on account of the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee of the three Courts, shall have been completely secured for the current year.

The diplomatic Representatives of the three Courts in Greece shall be specially charged to watch over the fulfilment of the last mentioned stipulation.

XIII. In case a pecuniary compensation in favour of the Ottoman Porte should result from the negotiations which the three Courts have already opened at Constantinople for the definitive settlement of the limits of Greece, it is understood that the amount of such compensation shall be defrayed out of the proceeds of the loan which forms the subject of the preceding Article.

XIV. His Majesty the King of Bavaria shall lend his assistance to the Prince Otho in raising in Bavaria a body of troops, not exceeding 3,500 men, to be employed in his service, as King of Greece, which corps shall be armed, equipped, and paid by the Greek State, and be sent thither as soon as possible, in order to relieve the troops of the alliance hitherto stationed in Greece. The latter shall remain in that country entirely at the disposal of

the Government of His Majesty the King of Greece, until the arrival of the body of troops above-mentioned. Immediately upon their arrival, the troops of the alliance already referred to shall retire, and altogether evacuate the Greek territory.

XV. His Majesty the King of Bavaria shall also assist the Prince Otho in obtaining the services of a certain number of Bavarian officers, who shall organize a national military force in Greece.

XVI. As soon as possible after the signature of the present Convention, the three Councillors who are to be associated with His Royal Highness the Prince Otho by His Majesty the King of Bavaria, in order to compose the Regency of Greece, shall repair to Greece, shall enter upon the exercise of the functions of the said Regency, and shall prepare all the measures necessary for the reception of the Sovereign, who, on his part, will repair to Greece with as little delay as possible.

XVII. The three Courts shall announce to the Greek nation, by a joint Declaration, the choice which they have made of His Royal Highness the Prince Otho of Bavaria as King of Greece, and shall afford the Regency all the support in their power.

XVIII. The present Convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged, at London in six weeks, or sooner if possible.

In witness whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London the 7th day of May, in the year of our Lord, 1832.

(L.S.) PALMERSTON. (L.S.) A DE CETTO.
(L.S.) TALLEYRAND.
(L.S.) LIEVEN.
(L.S.) MATUSZEWIC.

EXPLANATORY ARTICLE, *signed at London, 30th April,* 1833.

The Courts of Great Britain, Bavaria, France, and Russia, acknowledging the advantage of more exactly defining the sense,

and of completing the arrangements of Article VIII., of the Convention signed between the said Courts at London, on the 7th May, 1832, have agreed as follows:

The succession to the Royal Crown and dignity in Greece, in the line of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece, as also in the lines of his younger brothers, the Princes Luitpold and Adalbert of Bavaria, which lines were contingently substituted for that of the said Prince Otho of Bavaria, by the VIIIth Article of the Convention of London of the 7th May, 1832, shall take place from *male to male*, in the order of primogeniture.

Females shall not be capable of succeeding to the Crown of Greece, except in the event of the entire failure of legitimate male heirs in all the three above-mentioned branches of the house of Bavaria: and it is understood that, in such case, the Royal Crown and dignity in Greece shall pass to that Princess, or to the legitimate descendants of that Princess, who, in the order of succession, shall be the nearest to the last King of Greece.

If the Crown of Greece shall devolve upon a female, her legitimate male descendants shall, in their turn, be preferred to females, and shall ascend the Throne of Greece in the order of primogeniture. In no case shall the Crown of Greece be united on the same head with the Crown of any foreign country.

The present explanatory and supplementary Article shall have the same force and validity as if it were inserted word for word in the Convention of the 7th May, 1832. It shall be ratified, and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, the 30th day of April, in the year of our Lord, 1833.

(L.S.) PALMERSTON. (L.S.) A. DE CETTO.
(L.S.) TALLEYRAND.
(L.S.) LIEVEN.

Act of the British Parliament, "to enable His Majesty to carry into effect a Convention made between His Majesty and the King of the French and the Emperor of all the Russias, and the King of Bavaria."

[2 & 3 Will. 4. cap. 121.] [16th August, 1832.]

WHEREAS, by a Convention made and signed at *London* on the 7th day of May, 1832, between His Majesty and the King of the *French* and the Emperor of all the *Russias* on the one part, and the King of *Bavaria* on the other part, the hereditary sovereignty of *Greece* was offered by the Courts of *Great Britain, France,* and *Russia,* to the Prince *Frederick Otho* of *Bavaria,* second son of His Majesty the King of *Bavaria,* and the same was accepted by His said Majesty the King of *Bavaria,* acting in the character of guardian of the said Prince *Otho* during his minority: and whereas an Article was agreed upon between the said Contracting Parties to the following effect: (that is to say,)

Article XII.—[See Page 57.]

And whereas it is expedient that His Majesty should be enabled to carry into effect the said Convention: be it therefore enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that it shall be lawful for His Majesty, his heirs and successors, and they are hereby authorized, to guarantee the loan to be contracted by Prince *Otho* of *Bavaria,* as King of *Greece,* upon the terms and conditions specified in the said 12th Article of the said Convention; and that, for the purpose of giving effect to the said guarantee, the Lord High Treasurer, or the Commissioners of the Treasury of the United Kingdom of *Great Britain* and *Ireland,* or any three or more of them, for the time being, respectively shall be, and he and they is and are hereby empowered from time to time, out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom of *Great Britain* and *Ireland,* to cause to be issued such sums of money as shall be required for the payment

of any interest or sinking fund agreed to be paid by His Majesty under the said Convention, as and when the same may from time to time respectively become payable, and so long as the same should be payable conformably to the tenor of His Majesty's engagements as specified in the said Convention.

II. And be it further enacted, that the said Lord High Treasurer or Commissioners of the Treasury for the time being shall cause to be prepared, and shall lay before both Houses of Parliament within 20 days after the commencement of every Session of Parliament, an account, up to the 31st day of *December* then next preceding, of the total sums, if any, which shall from time to time have been issued and applied by virtue of this Act for paying and satisfying any interest on the said part of the said loan so agreed to be guaranteed by his said Majesty, or towards paying and satisfying any principal thereof.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD INSTALMENT OF THE GREEK LOAN.

THE papers which were presented a few days ago to the House of Commons on the subject of the Greek Loan are entitled to the most serious consideration, not only of every member of both Houses of Parliament, but of every Englishman who retains the slightest interest in the honour of his country, and in the character of her foreign policy.

It will appear, on an attentive perusal of the Convention of May 7th, 1832, inserted in this number, that the questions involved in the correspondence now laid before Parliament have a more or less direct bearing on the international interests of England, Russia, France, Bavaria, Greece, and Turkey. It is matter, therefore, of regret that his Majesty's government should have postponed to so late a period of the session a question the solution of which is thrown entirely upon the responsibility of the Legislature, whilst the means of judging of its

importance have been very imperfectly furnished by his Majesty's ministers.

To enable our readers to understand the merits of the question, we must first point out to them the various instances in which the Convention of May the 7th has been violated, either by the nonfulfilment of some of the stipulations, or by the perversion of others.

VIOLATION I.

ARTICLE VI stipulates that the Protocol of the 3rd of February, 1830, was to be converted into a definitive Treaty, to which the King of Greece was to become a contracting party.

Now, this Treaty has never been framed, and the only Treaty that exists regulating the relation in which the Greek Monarchy stands towards the Three Courts is that which we are commenting on, and in it, besides the Three Powers who were parties to the Treaty of the 6th of July, we observe only the name of Bavaria, whose Monarch could not stipulate any thing in the name of Greece, which by these presents was to be erected into an independent Monarchy, (Article 4,) nor, consequently, in the name of its sovereign, whom he

had emancipated from paternal authority, by allowing him to be placed at the head of an independent kingdom.

We shall observe hereafter the consequences that the violation of this article has entailed.

VIOLATION II. ART. IX.

"The majority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece, is fixed at the period when he shall have completed his 20th year; that is to say, on the first of June, 1835."

ART. X.

"During the minority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece, his rights of sovereignty shall be exercised *in their full extent* by a Regency composed of three councillors, who shall be appointed by his Majesty the King of Bavaria."

In the Protocols which accompanied and explained the Treaty, it was stated that Count Armansperg, M. von Maurer and General Heydeck, were to be the "*permanent* and *definitive* government of Greece," until the majority of the King. They were constituted an independent power, yet the King of Bavaria, in July, 1834, removed one

of the councillors, and substituted another in his place. This was a complete violation by a foreign Potentate, who was himself a party to the convention, of the independence of the Regency, and consequently it was the subversion of the independence of the sovereignty of Greece.

VIOLATION III. ART. XVII.

"The Three Courts shall announce to the Greek nation, by a joint declaration, the choice which they have made of his Royal Highness the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece, and shall afford the Regency all the support in their power."

We have shown in our last number how that support was given to a minority in the Regency against a majority; whereas one of the Protocols determined that "*the majority of votes in the council of the Regency thus constituted should decide on all state affairs.*"

It is singular that the Monarch of a kingdom, which has so few interests in common with those of Greece, was allowed to interfere in the affairs of that country unimpeded by the allied Courts, who had promised the Regency the whole of their support.

If, therefore, that sovereign has acquired the power of interfering on one occasion, what guarantee is there for his not interfering again? If there be no guarantee, as it would appear that there is none, is not the independence of Greece at an end, without the formal union of the two crowns on one head, which the negotiators seemed so very anxious to prevent? And if no guarantee for its independence, what guarantee for the money advanced by the three powers being applied to objects Bavarian and not Greek?

VIOLATION IV. ART. XII. 6o.

"The Sovereign of Greece, and the Greek state, shall be bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of such instalments of the loan as may have been raised under the guarantee of the three Courts, the first revenues of the state, in such manner that the actual receipts of the Greek Treasury shall be devoted, *first of all*, to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund; and shall not be employed for any other purpose, until those payments on account of the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee

of the three Courts shall have been completely secured for the current year.

"The Diplomatic Representatives of the three Courts shall be specially charged to watch over the fulfilment of the last mentioned stipulation."

This stipulation was violated. Now, on whom does the responsibility fall? It was stated by several Members from various parts of the House during the debate, that Greece had violated its engagements; and yet it never made any engagements whatsoever, *the Treaty between the three Courts and the King of Greece*, stipulated in Art. VI., *having never been drawn up*. The whole responsibility, therefore, of the non-fulfilment of this article rests upon the allied Courts, and on their Diplomatic Representatives in Greece, who did not take care that the interest and sinking fund should be raised out of the first revenues of the Greek state. It was because Greece was not a party to the Convention of May the 7th, that the charge was especially handed over to the Diplomatic Representatives in Greece, to watch over the fulfilment of the last mentioned stipulation.

But, in the same article, 6°. we find mention made of two parties—the Sovereign of Greece, and

the Greek state, who were "to be bound," &c. It is clear from two parties being mentioned, that it was the original intention that Greece should be constituted in such a manner, that there was to be some peculiar body distinct from the King, which was to represent the nation; that in fact Greece was to be governed constitutionally. Of course it was not for foreign nations to define what kind of institution was best adapted to the Greek state, or what forms would secure the voice of the nation being best heard; but, as the *Greek state* was required to perform certain functions, and those functions, too, of a financial character, it is natural to infer that there was to be a constitution to control the expenditure of the King; a constitutional body, before whom were to be laid the public accounts. All official authorities upon the subject have said that a constitution would be advisable for Greece. The Ambassadors at Poros declared in their conference that it would be "unjust," and even "dangerous, to deprive the Greeks of their municipal and representative rights, which they had enjoyed even under the Turks." And, in the declaration addressed to the Greek nation by the Plenipotentiaries of the Conference of London, the Greeks

were called upon to "rally round the throne of their new Sovereign, to aid him with true devotedness in the work of giving to the state a definitive constitution."

It is evident, therefore, that the interpretation to be given to this term, the "Greek state," is some constitutional authority — some body representing the Greek nation, independently of the Sovereign, which body does not hitherto exist, and the non-existence of which is a violation of the Treaty, because this body could not execute functions when it was never called into existence; and yet, if the Regency had exhibited symptoms of preparing a constitution, or of calling together any body which might have been called the *Greek state*, what would have been the opposition of the King of Bavaria may be gathered from our preceding narrative. The non-existence of this body, whilst it shows on the one hand a culpable neglect on the part of the four contracting powers, England, France, Russia, and Bavaria, may, on the other, give the Greeks grounds for resisting the debt altogether.

It is clear, then, that the different Members of the House of Commons, when they talked of the

breach of contract, were wrong in accusing Greece of having been false to her engagements, since Greece, neither in the person of her "Sovereign," nor of the "Greek state," had ever had the opportunity of contracting any engagements whatever. The culpability devolves alone upon the Allied Courts and their Representatives in Greece, who, further, as we have remarked before, failed in an important duty, equally indispensable for the internal good government of Greece, its public credit abroad, and the security of the loan itself; for we hesitate not to assert, that if the Diplomatic Representatives in Greece had fulfilled their duty, the Regency would have been obliged to have framed the annual budget more in conformity with the revenues of the country, and, consequently, would have been obliged to govern Greece more in accordance with the spirit of the nation. Besides, the credit of the country would have been thus unimpaired, and saved from the accusations brought against it by the Russian Minister, whose accusations we thus see in some measure recoil upon himself.

We now come to the resolution proposed by his Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

which is in direct contravention of Article XII. 4°. of the Convention of May the 7th, in which it is stipulated "that the second and the third instalments of the said loan may also be raised, according to the necessities of the Greek state, *after* previous agreement between the three Courts and his Majesty the King of Greece."

Now, so far from independent action being admissible, as Russia insidiously pretends, there is not a word in the Treaty that gives such a right.

But there are many points necessary to be cleared up: First, as to whether France is with England or with Russia.

It would appear from Lord Palmerston's letter to Lord Durham, intimating that England "would act without the concurrence of her Allies," that France is really siding with Russia. If it had been otherwise, as there is a French Plenipotentiary in London, it would surely have been a more natural proceeding to have sent a joint application to St. Petersburgh on the part of England and France.

Secondly, it would be desirable also to know whether the King of Greece would, or whether he could by his coronation oath, admit of an English

Secretary of State violating an engagement by which was guaranteed the independence, and even existence, of the Greek monarchy.

Has M. Tricoupi, who has hitherto addressed, and been instructed to address, the Representatives of the Conference of London, full powers to address, or confer with, the British Secretary of State separately from the Conference on a matter in which their concurrence is indispensable?

If he has those instructions, why is not his separate application to the King of England laid before Parliament?

If he has not that authority, the whole proposition of Lord Palmerston falls to the ground, because the arrangements necessary to be made previously have not been entered into.

The previous infractions which we have remarked were grave; for what violation of international engagements must not be so? but the proposed infraction is fraught with consequences of the most serious character, for it altogether contravenes the principle on which not only this treaty, but also the alliance of the three powers respecting Greece, reposes.

Hitherto, the three Powers acted in concert, and

although, like children, they made and unmade, still there was no room for separate action. But here we afford Russia a precedent for independent action, which she has so long courted, and which we have made so many sacrifices to prevent;—sacrifices, too, which were not called for on our part by any stipulations or treaties whatever. Therefore, when Greece is again under the necessity of demanding funds, a necessity which, by the acknowledgment of the Greek Minister, must almost immediately recur, she will have to demand them either from Russia or from France, and these Powers will be able to make *separate* engagements, as suits their separate or conjoint interests, by which they will be enabled even to destroy every national object for which we combined with those two Powers to secure the independence of Greece.

But we not only afford Russia a precedent for separate and independent action respecting the loan, but on every occasion where it may suit her interest. Thus Lord Palmerston's proposition is diametrically opposed to the very principle of the Treaty of July the 6th, which was framed with the intention of preventing Russia, by means of an alliance, from exercising a separate interference

in the affairs of the Levant, and particularly of Greece.

In the course of the debate, Lord Palmerston eulogized the general ability and financial talents of Count Armansperg. His lordship described the Count, who was in a minority during the first eighteen months, as having been impeded by his colleagues, and therefore unable to distinguish himself. Let us see what financial abilities Count Armansperg displayed, when these impediments were removed.

According to Lord Palmerston's statements, the expenditure in 1833 amounted to thirteen millions. This was the first year of the Regency, when every thing was to be created, and the whole organization of the country commenced, and when the expenditure might naturally have been the greatest. In the second year, when M. de Maurer and M. d'Abel were expelled, the expenditure was 20 millions. The third year, when the King came to his majority, and when Count Armansperg was made Archchancellor, it was 16 millions; and this year, (1836) 15 millions.

If, therefore, Count Armansperg had proceeded even with the economy of a preposterously extra-

vagant government, viz., the first, but whose extravagance was excusable on account of their position, there would have been a decreasing excess of expenditure of from 6 to 4, thence to 3, and this year to 2 millions. But, if any one is to be responsible for the extravagant expenditure, even of the first year, it is Count Armansperg, who, by a private arrangement among the Regents to distribute the labour, was charged with the financial department: and, further, we should be inclined to suspect that all the waste of the public funds during that first year is traceable to him alone, as we observe in subsequent years expences augmented instead of decreasing.

It must be observed that Count Armansperg has undertaken none of the works of which Greece stands so much in need. Neither roads nor communications have been made. No works of public utility have been undertaken. The marshes of the country have nowhere been drained. No army has been organized, no fleet equipped, no regular troops formed, and, in fact, none of those objects for which the loan had been contracted have been effected. But the most extraordinary part of this Greek question is, that, notwithstand-

ing the length of time which has elapsed since Greece applied for the third instalment, no Budget of the public expenditure has ever been made, nor any account given to the Greek Nation of the expenditure of sums for which it has been rendered responsible by the Convention.

Count Armansperg's integrity respecting money matters does not stand above suspicion; but one would think that, when such an insinuation was publicly made through means of the press in Germany, Count Armansperg's honour was concerned in publishing a statement which might at least be intelligible. It is rather extraordinary that we should find Count Armansperg, who is said to be such an accomplished financier, and who has had able financial assistants sent out to him from Germany, has never been able to make a clear account of the items of the revenue and expenditure of a state whose revenues, after all, do not greatly surpass the annual income of the Duke of Buccleugh.

But it was said that, if the English share of the third instalment be withheld, we must take upon ourselves the responsibility of plunging Greece again into anarchy.

This has been ever the argument by which we were led on step by step to support Capodistrias in an antinational career which led to his assassination.

The country is not to be saved from anarchy by our supporting a government which cannot conciliate the nation; which is obliged to throw itself on foreign support and protect itself by a party of Capitani, with their irregular Palikari, who have been ever the instruments or the causes of all the anarchy of Greece.*

Moreover, anarchy is the certain and inevitable result of the separation of the Three Courts. It was shown to be so by the unfortunate events of 1832, when the three Powers, professing to act in accordance, allowed money to be given separately, and the historian of that day terminates the sad history of that epoch by accusing the Conference

* The Capitani mentioned in Sir Edmund Lyons' despatch of April 6th, (see page of Parliamentary papers 18), are some of them Klephtic chiefs, who were implicated in the conspiracy of Colocotroni, and have been invariably celebrated throughout the history of Grecian anarchy as the chiefs of the Russian faction.

Zavellas was made responsible for the British property which he destroyed at Patrass, which is to be repaid, with other claims of British subjects, out of this very instalment. See "Portfolio," No. 25.

of London of having plunged Greece into a state worse even than that in which the war of the Turks, or the devastation of the Arabs, had left it.

In our preceding numbers, we showed the effect of the Powers favouring a disunion in the council of the Regency, and thus creating individuals in that council round whom the friends of anarchy could rally. We have shown how this produced anarchy in the country. But how much greater will be the chances of the independence and internal tranquillity of Greece being sacrificed and the stability of the throne being subverted by a measure which affords a precedent for annulling the Conference of London, and allows each of the contracting Powers publicly to avow that they act independently, and as their separate interests dictate, is obvious to any person who reasons on the subject with impartiality.

Such a course must necessarily lead the Three Courts, more undisguisedly than they have hitherto done, to encourage factions in the state, and to teach the Greeks no longer to consider themselves as subjects of King Otho, and citizens of the Greek state, but as partizans of England, France, and Russia.

This, however, will inevitably be the result of the present scheme, and England must be either prepared to advance the whole of the deficit calculated upon by the Greek minister of ten millions, (not calculating unforeseen difficulties and counteracting circumstances,) or else she must be prepared to use the terrible word War, to maintain any sort of influence in a country for which she has made so many political and financial sacrifices.

We suspect that Count Armansperg has been all along in collusion with Russia. Those who have followed our preceding narrative will doubtless see that our suspicion was not without reason, and, if it be with his concurrence, although we are at present left in ignorance whether he will accept of our portion of the instalment granted to him in a manner that violates the Treaty; if it is at his desire that Lord Palmerston has made this proposal, our suspicions are further corroborated, knowing that Russia would purchase at any price the right of interfering in the affairs of Greece, independently of the alliance. If Count Armansperg be Russian, and if on the one hand his entreaties and the insidious opposition of Russia

Herself urge Lord Palmerston to plunge into the net which we consider prepared for him, what disastrous conduct may not follow this rash and fatal act!

There is one argument against this proposition that we hope will never be made to Englishmen in vain, namely, that our national honour is pledged; that we engaged ourselves only to make the third instalment after previous agreement between the three contracting parties and the King of Greece.

But the strict and faithful observance of the sanctity of a treaty, is, of all human obligations, the most solemn: and, if England can be pointed out by the powers of the world as a nation whose pledged honour is not to be trusted; if we are the first to break off from our treaty engagements; what chance can we have of preserving those allies whom Lord Palmerston is so proud of having acquired?

The propositions of Russia are preposterous. They are to the effect that "Greece shall consider the national domains and their revenues as a general mortgage for the loan of sixty millions, and shall promise that, before the expiration of that

term, no other loan shall be contracted upon the mortgage of the same domains, whether with foreign capitalists, or with a loan bank established in the country. And the three Courts shall interpose no obstacle to *the measures which the Greek government has already taken, or shall desire to take.*"

Is not here evidence of Count Armansperg having been in collusion with Russia? The measures Count Armansperg "*has taken*" were to put up to auction those national lands which were already mortgaged to British capitalists. In former Numbers, we accused our foreign Minister of having thus sanctioned the sacrifice, by a foreign government, of the inalienable rights of Englishmen to more than three millions sterling. We repeat our accusation, and we have documentary evidence to prove its truth.

The proposal of Russia goes counter also to the stipulation previously contemplated by the three contracting powers, that part of the national domains should be set apart for the support of the crown; (See Protocol) and is a violation of the Treaty which provided for the loan specifically, in a manner which did not suit that double-minded power to avail herself of.

It is not, therefore, because we approve of the Russian proposition, which would altogether invalidate the independence of Greece, that we look with horror upon the proposition of Lord Palmerston, but because we foresee that, in a very short period, Greece, according to her own calculation, will be compelled to accede to the Russian proposal, on account of the portion of money which she will be obliged to beg as soon as our supply is exhausted, or to pay, as interest, and sinking fund of her former debt to Russia, and the allowing to Russia the right of a separate and independent action, will place those lands at her disposal.

There are many other points for consideration.

It is singular that a British Secretary of State should bring charges, in public documents, against men of honour in Germany, who are debarred by the censorship of Germany from replying to the calumnies of a minister, and that these accusations tally exactly with those of Count Pozzo di Borgo, whose policy Lord Palmerston thought he was opposing, as well when he connived in the removal from the Regency of M. von Maurer on the plea of his being Russian upon the present occasion.

It seems that both persons are interested in

throwing as much odium as possible on the Regency of 1833. Thus Count Pozzo di Borgo states, (page 30), that, in 1833, *after the Regency* had squandered the first and second instalments of the loan, Prince Soutzo received orders to ask for the third series of the loan, and "that the three courts, after having *at that time* taken into consideration" this wanton expenditure, resolved to suspend the payment of the third instalment.

If, therefore, in such an early stage of the monarchy of Greece the three Courts disapproved of this wanton expenditure, why did not the Conference and their Representatives in Greece watch over the first revenues of the state, and oblige the Greek Government to apply them to the specific purposes for which they were destined by the Treaty, and which they were bound by the Treaty to watch over, thereby necessitating the Regency to be more economical the second year; and, therefore, to govern the country according to national principles? The reason of the peculiar expense in Greece was because the system of government was anti-national.

The true state of the case, as regards the application of Prince Soutzo for the third instalment in 1833, demands examination.

It is evident that Count Pozzo di Borgo stated that which was not the fact, as is proved as well by Lord Palmerston's figures, as by Count Pozzo di Borgo's own contradictions. Comparing the revenue with the expenditure in 1833, we find an excess of only 6 millions; and Count Pozzo di Borgo himself states, in a few paragraphs afterwards, that the dissensions in the Regency were the cause of the tranquillity of Greece being disturbed, which continued up to the middle of 1834, when the King of Bavaria put an end to these dissensions by removing one member. It was not, he says, on account of want of money "that the troubles in Greece and their consequences arose," for the Treasury was full, viz. up to 1834.

We do not wonder at Lord Palmerston in his reply gliding delicately over this point. But we consider that there is matter here for the House of Commons to investigate, as to why that Regency to whom they had entrusted the forty millions of francs could be remodelled, and its constitution changed, by a power that had nothing to do with the loan whatever; and why Lord Palmerston suffered this change, transferring thereby a considerable portion, if his own figures be correct, of the

first and second instalments of the loan from a body that had been recognized by Parliament, to another body of which that Parliament had no official cognizance. Lord Palmerston, in allowing the Regency to be removed, no matter for what cause, to say nothing more, *violated the Act of Parliament, and broke faith with the Legislature.*

We conjure an English House of Commons to pause in this grave matter, and to bear in mind that a Minister of the Crown has pledged the King to a course of policy, the responsibility of which hitherto rests entirely with the Executive.

We intreat them to lay aside all vague disquisitions as to whether a republican, a federative, or a monarchical government is best adapted for Greece.

Our long connection with that country enables us to assert positively that the Greeks do not puzzle themselves with questions of theory; they look alone to practice; that they are careless about the means, and care only for the end, viz., good and economical government; and any person who looks to the events of the seven years' war in Germany must be convinced that economy is not incompatible with a monarchical form of government.

We entreat them to look only to the responsibility that they take upon themselves, by lending their sanction in this manner to the present and past infractions of a most solemn treaty.

We are firmly convinced, that from the time of the accession to the Foreign Office of his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, England, under a liberal administration, has been made the tool of Russia, to promote her own separate and exclusive policy towards Greece; that to this end our navy, our finances, our diplomacy, the whole weight of our moral support, has been applied. We are convinced that English policy towards that unhappy land has been the exclusive encouragement of a Faction planted there by Russia, systematically upheld and supported against the whole of the patriotic primates of Greece.

In our former articles we have shown that every one of the Protocols of the Conference of London bears distinct evidence that this has been the case; and, further, we pledge ourselves to prove,—provided an investigation into these dark deeds takes place,—that England has been made the dupe of the most fraudulent and infamous con-

spiracy that it has ever entered into the mind of man to conceive.

We assert, then, that Russia has guided England throughout the whole of this eventful and most tragic drama; that, possessed of Supreme Power in Greece, she made England and the Conference of London support her tool, the King of Bavaria, to establish her own designs in Greece, and that, so far from the Convention of May the 7th having been a triumph of England and France, to establish, in concert with Russia, a Constitutional and Independent Monarchy in Greece, Russia, Bavaria, and the Russian Faction which governed Greece with Lord Palmerston's support, were a majority of three against England and France; that England was made, in 1834, through fear of French influence in Greece, to accomplish Russian ends with all the zeal and energy which the British cabinet could display. Those ends being accomplished, the same conspiracy exists, and its present object is, under a pretence of putting an end to an anarchy which is the necessary consequence of our whole policy, to impose upon the best feelings of our nature, and to make England pay for arming Greece against herself.

The gravest responsibility rests with every Member of the British House of Commons. That assembly must remember that the public opinion of this country watches with intense anxiety their decision on a matter, which involves every chance even of the dreaded phantom, War.

But, in so great a cause, we trust that the same Providence which has enabled us hitherto to unmask the implacable hostility of Russia to this country, may yet interpose its shield in favour of the innumerable victims of Russian infamy and British ignorance.

THE PORTFOLIO;

A COLLECTION OF

STATE PAPERS,

AND OTHER

DOCUMENTS AND CORRESPONDENCE,

HISTORICAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND COMMERCIAL.

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LONDON:
F. SHOBERL, JUN., 4, LEICESTER STREET,
LEICESTER SQUARE.
1836.

onths have elapsed since the attention of Parliament was
'ie military occupation of the city and territory of
·eign troops, in the name of Prussia, Austria, and

.y of His Majesty's Secretary of State to the ques-
ɔ him by Sir Stratford Canning on this subject, it ap-
that not only had his Majesty's Allies made no commu-
ı whatsoever to the British Government of the causes of the
ion of Cracow, but that the Secretary of State for Foreign
had no official cognizance of the fact that the occupation
en place.
universal sympathy excited in favour of a small but op-
State, whose freedom and independence had been gua-
at the Conference of Vienna by the whole of Europe,
se, a month afterwards, to a motion on the part of Mr.
Stewart, that a Diplomatic Agent should be forthwith
Cracow.
reply of the Government was a request that the Member
caster would withdraw that part of his Motion, since the
f it was in the course of being accomplished; and, on this
ɔf the Government, approved of as it was by the unani-
ınction of the House of Commons, the Motion of Mr.
Stewart was withdrawn.
t that period we heard, from an authentic source, that
'ozzo di Borgo had informed some of the nobility of this
that the appointment would be wholly useless, since the
r was determined that an English agent should not reside
ɔw, and that, indeed, he would not be admitted to present
entials.
bstained from quoting the fact at the time, although expe-
ıad shown us that the predictions of Russia are generally

:e at once intimated her desire to imitate the example of
l, which would doubtless have been followed by Spain,
l, and Sweden, who were all equally pledged with our-
ɔ maintain the obligations of the treaty of Vienna.
ırprise was not very great on finding, as time elapsed, that
jesty's Government thought it expedient, previous to
ʒ the step to which this country was pledged, to enter into

negociations on the subject with the very powers whose violation of the independence of Cracow so loudly called for the appointment in question. The answers of those Courts to the overtures of England it is unnecessary for us to characterize, as the non-fulfilment of the pledge of his Majesty's Ministers sufficiently indicates what they were.

Setting aside for the moment the commercial importance attached to the maintenance of all the stipulations regarding Poland and Cracow, we confine ourselves for the moment to a remark on the danger of the policy of England in not acting up to her engagements.

The language of Count Pozzo di Borgo was addressed to the diplomatic body in London, and probably communicated by them to their respective Governments in Europe and America, whc are thus enabled to form an impartial opinion on the comparative moral influence of England and Russia.

But, unfortunately, this is not the first instance in which the interference of Russia in the exercise of the royal prerogative in England has been passed over unresented.

In 1833 the Emperor refused to receive at his Court an English ambassador, in whose selection his Imperial Majesty had not been consulted.

On the debate which ensued on the appointment of Lord Londonderry, no single member of the House of Commons rose in his place to defend the Majesty of the Crown from the insult offered to it by the refusal of the Emperor to receive Sir Stratford Canning.

What was the lesson thus taught to the Representatives at St. Petersburgh, of every independent state in the two hemispheres?

Might they not address each other in the following terms?

How vain must be henceforth every attempt to maintain the interests, the rights, the independence, of our respective countries? If the Emperor of Russia can command the choice even of an ambassador from England, and make independence of character and patriotic principles the certain obstacle to his favour, and a means of ruining, individually, in every Court of Europe, those whose only fault is the maintenance of justice, the very principle on which international law reposes is here overthrown, and the only career henceforth open to diplomacy must be servility to the Autocrat of Europe.]

NOTE FROM THE CONFERENCE

OF THE

RESIDENTS OF THE HIGH PROTECTING COURTS

TO HIS

EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND THE PRAISEWORTHY SENATE OF CRACOW.

Cracow, June 2, 1836.

The Undersigned, Representatives of the High Protecting Courts, had the honour to inform the President and the Senate of the free city of Cracow, by their communication of the 14th of April last, what were the points which it appeared indispensable to the Protecting Courts to see properly regulated, before they could allow the town of

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La Conference des Residens des Hautes Cours protectrices à S. E. M. le President du Senat et au louable Senat.

Les soussignés Representants des Hautes Cours protectrices ont eu l'honneur d'informer Mr. le President et le Senat de la ville libre de Cracovie par leur office du 14 Avril dernier, quels sont les points, qu'il à semblé indispensable aux Cours Protectrices de voir reglés convenablement, avant de pouvoir faire évacuer en-

Cracow to be entirely evacuated by the troops which they have been under the necessity of leaving there. His Excellency the President manifested in his note of the 16th of April, in reply to the Undersigned, his desire to know the bases on which the re-organization of the militia and of the police of Cracow (which made the two principal points of the demands of the Undersigned) ought to be effected.

The Undersigned, having been careful to take on this point the orders of their high Courts, find themselves enabled at present to satisfy the demand of his Excellency, the President, M. de Haller, in transmitting to him in the accompanying annexes the principles which the Courts propose to the adoption of the Senate relative to the re-organi-

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tièrement la ville de Cracovie par les troupes, qu'elles ont été dans la necessité d'y laisser. S. E. Mr. le President à temoigné dans sa note responsive aux soussignés du 16 Avril le desir de connaître les bases sur lesquelles la réorganisation de la milice et de la police de Cracovie (ce qui formait deux points principaux des demandes des soussignés) dut être effectuée.

Les soussignés, ayant eu soin de prendre à cet égard les ordres de leurs hautes Cours, se trouvent, à l'heure qu'il est, à même de satisfaire à la demande de S. E. Mr. le President de Haller, en lui transmettant dans les annexes les principes que les Cours proposent à l'adoption du Senat relativement à celle de la police, en

zation of the police, adding the clauses which ought necessarily to be inserted in the law for regulating the admission of strangers into the state of Cracow, a law emanating from the most simple rules of a good police, and which the three Courts judge equally important to guarantee the state of Cracow and their own adjoining provinces against the return of the disorders and the dangers which had formerly excited the attention of the three Protecting Courts, and had necessitated their active intervention in the affairs of Cracow. In abandoning to the mature deliberation of the Senate the communications which the Undersigned have the honour to make to it in the name of their Courts, they cannot refrain from adding to it the reflection that, in *granting an existence* to the state of Cracow in

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y ajoutant encore les clauses, qui devraient entrer nécessairement dans la loi à émettre pour regler l'admission des étrangers dans l'Etat de Cracovie, loi qui découle des règles les plus simples d'une bonne police et que les trois Cours jugent également importante pour garantir l'Etat de Cracovie et leur propres provinces avoisinantes contre le retour des désordres et de dangers, qui tantôt avoient excité l'attention des trois Cours protectrices et avoient exigé leur intervention active dans les affaires de Cracovie. En abondonnant à la mure déliberation du Senat les communications que les soussignés ont l'honneur de lui faire au nom de leurs Cours, ils ne sauraient s'empêcher d'y ajouter la reflexion, qu' en

the middle of their possessions, the august Sovereigns, protectors of this state, have certainly not intended to create in it a focus of conspiracies against the tranquillity of their neighbouring provinces—a point of refuge for the revolutionists and evil-disposed persons of every description, and a continual subject of alarm to their neighbours, such as Cracow had latterly become. As the laws and the institutions in vigour in this state have not been able to guarantee it from the evils and dangers above indicated, it becomes absolutely necessary to introduce into them the modifications required by circumstances. It is only, therefore, in the adoption and frank execution of the measures which the Courts propose that they imagine they

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donnant l'existance à l'Etat de Cracovie au milieu de leurs possessions, les Augustes Souverains protecteurs de cet Etat n'ont certainement pu avoir l'intention d'y créer un foyer de conspirations contre la tranquillité de leurs provinces limitrophes, un point de refuge pour les révolutionnaires et les malveillans de toute espèce, et un sujet continuel d'inquietude pour les voisins, comme Cracovie l'était devenu en dernier lieu. Les lois et les institutions en vigueur, en cet Etat, n'ayant pu le garantir des maux et des dangers ci-dessus indiqués, il devient absolument nécessaire d'y apporter les modifications que les circonstances éxigent; or, ce n'est que dans l'adoption et la franche exécution des mesures que les Cours proposent, qu'elles croyent trouver le remède au

find the remedy for the evil, and an assurance that the Government of Cracow sincerely intends to fulfil its duties towards its protectors; and, one may add, towards the very state whose existence and prosperity are confided to it. The Undersigned cannot finally be silent on the fact that their high Courts will consider, as a pledge of the sentiments of the Senate of Cracow, the care which it will take in the choice of the functionaries in all the branches of the public service; for it is not in seeing individuals employed even in influential posts, who are compromised by their previous history and were partizans of the last revolution, that confidence can be inspired in the Courts.

The Undersigned embrace this opportunity to renew to his Excellency the President, and the

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mal et une assurance que le Gouvernement de Cracovie à sincèrement l'intention de remplir ce qui est dans ses devoirs envers les Protecteurs, et l'on peut ajouter envers l'Etat même dont l'existance et la prosperité lui sont confiées. Les soussignés ne peuvent enfin passer sous silence, que leur Hautes Cours considereront encore comme un gage des sentimens du Senat de Cracovie les soins qu'il apportera au choix des employés dans toutes les branches du service publique. Car ce n'est point en voyant en fonctions, même dans les places influantes, des individus compromis par leurs antécedants et partisans de la dernière révolution, que les Cours pourront prendre confiance. Les soussignés

praiseworthy Senate, the assurances of their high consideration.

(Signed) HARTMANN.
E. BON. STERNBERG.
LIEHMAN.

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saisissent cette occasion pour renouveler à S. E. Mr. le President et au louable Senat l'assurance de leur haute consideration.

(Signé) HARTMANN.
E. BON. STERNBERG.
LIEHMAN.

Cracovie, le 2 Juin, 1836.

[We feel it hardly necessary to insert the original of the annexes.]

ANNEXE A. IN THE PRECEDING DESPATCH.

PRINCIPLES RELATIVE TO THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITIA.

The two principal points in question, are:

1. The nomination of a commandant of militia, in such a manner as that he may be a person who knows how to inspire perfect confidence by his *political sentiments,* and who possesses, at the same time, the necessary qualities, by which one may trust to him relative to the detail of all objects.

2. The composition of the militia, as regards the officers and the soldiers. The protecting Courts thought it right to fix, as the first condition of being either commandant, or officer, or

soldier, in the militia of Cracow, the fact of the candidate having taken no part in the last revolution of Poland; and, second, in order to be commandant, or to enter first in the character of an officer into the militia, the *having served in the armies of one of the three protecting Courts,* and having regularly obtained permission to pass into the service of Cracow

The mode of enrolment should be preserved for the militia; and the officers and soldiers of the old militia, which still exists, and against whom there should be no objection, should form the nucleus of the new militia. An augmentation should be allowed of these troops to four hundred and fifty men and forty horses, to wit: two companies of one hundred and fifty men each, including the charges; a company of soldiers of police of one hundred and ten men, and forty mounted gensdarmes. The commandant of the militia should examine and judge of the qualifications of the individuals who should present themselves to become officers of militia; and the Senate, when called upon to that effect, should name them. In order to become a soldier or a subaltern in the militia, one must belong either to the State of Cracow, or *be a subject of one of the three powers,* be at least of the age of twenty-five, and accept

an agreement for at least six years. An individual who would fulfil these conditions, who, besides having never taken part in the Polish revolution, should be found physically fit for the service, and against whose morality there could exist no unfavourable record, might be enrolled by the commandant, for a moneyed engagement to be fixed beforehand. It would be essential to settle the pay of the soldiers and officers of the militia of Cracow, in such a manner as to present some attraction for the service; and provision should be made for the case of ill-health and retirement. A Commission, to be named by the Senate, and in which the new commandant of militia should take part, would regulate the other points of detail for the formation of the militia, which the Conference of the Residents would have to sanction.

It would equally be a question of drawing up a regulation for the service, and a regulation of discipline and of punishments, for the militia of Cracow. As the definitive evacuation of the State of Cracow depends principally on the new formation of the militia on these bases, the three Courts expect to be informed as soon as possible of the progress of its being formed; and, in the event of its desired end not being attained, it would be for the Senate to indicate the obstacles which impede

it, in order that means may be devised for applying a remedy.

(Signed) HARTMANN.

ANNEXE B. IN THE PRECEDING DESPATCH.

PRINCIPLES TO SERVE FOR THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE POLICE.

As the police, in order to be well administered, requires unity of will, prompt execution, and a responsibility not to be shared, the Three Courts are of opinion that the supreme direction of the affairs of the police of Cracow, and especially the police for strangers, ought to be concentrated in the hands of the President, and that for this end the 16th Article of the organic statute of the Senate, which only reserves to the President the affairs of the *high police*, ought to be modified by an extension of this reserve to the affairs of the police in general. It would also be for the President, with the concurrence of a committee of the senators, to be chosen by himself, that the nomination of the commissioners and assistants of the police should be reserved; and as, according to Article VI. of the constitution, these nominations belong to the Senate, the Three Courts intend to modify on this point the article in question. The nomination of the director of the police would remain

with the Senate, but the Three Courts *expect* that its choice will previously be communicated to their Residents, in order to be certain whether there be no objection on their part, because the Courts would never consent to see at the head of a branch of the public service so important, even for the safety of the state of Cracow, and for that of the neighbouring provinces, a man who, besides the qualities required for that post, would not afford by all his preceding conduct a perfect guarantee for the *rectitude* of his political sentiments. The nomination and the destitution of the subaltern functionaries of police would belong to the director, because he is also responsible for the execution of all the measures of police judged necessary. In order to facilitate the surveillance of the police over the whole territory of Cracow, subaltern functionaries dependent solely on the director of police must be placed in each district. The director of the police ought to obtain funds proportioned for the *secret service* which has hitherto been wholly wanting, and for which he would only be accountable to the President. The salary of director of the police, at present fixed at 5000 Flor. crt. of Exchange, ought to be augmented on account of the greater responsibility.

ANNEXE C. IN THE PRECEDING DESPATCH.

THE NEW LAW OR DECREE RELATIVE TO THE ADMISSION OF STRANGERS INTO CRACOW OUGHT TO COMPRIZE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

1. That no permission shall be given to foreign subjects to visit the territory of Cracow without being furnished with a regular passport.

2. That, in addition, no stranger should be permitted to remain who should be unprovided with regular papers. The subjects of the three protecting Courts would in this case be sent back to the countries to which they belong, and the other strangers in the direction whence they came.

3. That there should be pronounced, in the event of such law not existing, the punishment applicable to falsifying passports, certificates, &c., &c., to which he who should produce falsified passports should be subjected in the state of Cracow: after which the guilty party, if he be a subject of the protecting powers, should be placed at the disposal of his government, and be sent out of the territory of Cracow, if he belongs to another country.

4. That the punishment for those who should receive individuals not furnished with regular passports, or who should neglect to denounce them to the police, should be increased. The protecting

Courts do not, however, mean to comprize in the obligation to produce the passports inhabitants of the frontier when they are known, and do not stop more than three days in the territory of Cracow. Nor do they mean to give to this law a retrospective effect, relative to the persons who should previously have settled in Cracow and work in their trades, on condition, however, that a term should be fixed for these persons to conform to the regulation. Finally, the protecting Courts mean to lend every facility compatible with their police regulations, as well to receive the individuals who should be sent away from the territory of Cracow, as to furnish passports or certificates to those of their subjects who might wish to enter for valid reasons into the state of Cracow. One cannot admit that a law such as that proposed, which is founded on the simplest rule of a good administration of police, can be contrary to Article 8 of the Constitution for the state of Cracow; since, most certainly, one would neither be inclined, nor have the power, to impose on the government of Cracow an obligation to receive and tolerate criminals, evil-disposed people, and vagabonds who might take refuge in their territory whenever they should not be claimed.

THE GERMAN DIET.

[The following Memoir on the composition of the Diet of Frankfort has been transmitted to us by a ci-devant Member of the Diplomatic Body.]

The Congress of Vienna, in its arrangements relative to the affairs of Germany, had as little responded to the wishes of Austria as to the hopes of Prussia. They had not agreed upon the question of knowing whether they should divide the supremacy in Germany between them, or whether for the sake of form they should place themselves on a level with the other members of the confederation. In fact, the two parties thought themselves obliged to have recourse to the expedient of all political philosophers, who do not know how to extricate themselves from a difficulty — they thought it necessary to wait. This policy may have its inconveniences, but it is inviting to most men, and they never know how to act otherwise on occasions when decision and prompt execution appear difficult.

The first years after the Diet had been consti-

tuted elapsed without affording this assembly the opportunity of displaying any great activity. They did not as yet know how to use the excellent opportunity offered to them by the Amphictyons of Frankfort. They concerned themselves but little with the individuals composing the Diet, and seemed to care but little whether this or that person represented Austria, Prussia, or any other state. Thus it happened that an opposition to the views of Austria and Prussia developed itself in the councils of the Diet; an opposition the more vexatious, as it was founded on a liberal basis. The most distinguished member of this opposition was the Minister of Wirtemberg, the Baron de Wangenheim, who appeared more particularly calculated to represent a Prince who had the juvenile caprice of choosing to be liberal, and choosing, in concert with other constitutional states of southern Germany, to form an opposition against Austria and Prussia. Count Buol-Schauenstein, at that time Minister of Austria at the Diet, appeared in his simplicity and in the confidence with which he was inspired by the superiority of the power by whom he was commissioned, not to perceive the real nature of this opposition in the Diet. The

Prussian Minister, Count de Goltz, had given it some attention, but he thought it too insignificant to attach to it any importance in his communications to his Court. Nevertheless, the *rôle* which the King of Wirtemberg intended to play could not remain a mystery to the Cabinets of Austria or of Prussia.

Austria had placed in the military commission of the Diet General Langenau, Member and President of the Commission. Endowed with a more than ordinary talent for judging and directing secret intrigues, he possessed the confidence of Prince Metternich, who employed him in all affairs relating to Germany. An attentive observer, he had perceived the peculiar position which the Diet had taken in 1822 and 1823, without any fixed project, or without being aware of what it was doing. He had warned Prince Metternich of it, adding his own suggestions respecting the official functionaries at Frankfort.

At this same epoch (1822) Baron de Berstett, formerly Minister at the Diet, was Minister of State in the Grand Duchy of Baden. He had on various former occasions shown his aptitude in business, and his penetration in judging the cha-

racter of individuals. In 1822, we do not know with what view, he drew up a Memoir, in which the Envoys to the Diet were minutely portrayed in their official positions, and in their mutual relations, in a manner which could easily be recognized. The manuscript, in which the different personages were designated by ciphers, was first circulated among the Members of the Diet, several of whom received it without knowing whence it came, or what was its origin. However, the accredited opinion named the Baron de Berstett as its author, so much so that he was able in confidential conversations to avow his work. As this Memoir could not remain a secret from the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, more attention was directed to the Diet, and no other means were found to stifle the spirit of opposition which threatened to become dangerous, than that of remodelling the assembly itself, in the principal members who composed it. In the exchange of notes which ensued between the Courts of Berlin and Vienna, the Cabinet of Austria insisted upon the importance of these considerations, viz. that "Prussia and Austria, directed by the same principles of government, could not tolerate the manifestations

in the secondary states of Germany of a spirit of opposition—a spirit so much the more dangerous, inasmuch as it was caused or provoked by the liberal mania; that already the most important situations in certain states were occupied by men whose principles did not offer a sufficient guarantee for the maintenance of the *statu quo*, and for securing tranquillity and order; that it had become almost impossible to remove all these people from their places, and to find others who would unite ability to the character which would be desirable; that Austria and Prussia ought, therefore, to aim, more especially by means of the Diet, to put a curb and an end to these inconvenient efforts, and to extinguish opposition. But, in order to attain this end efficaciously, the only sufficient means would be a regeneration of the Diet itself, as it was more than probable that the opponents among the Ministers at the Diet added farther by their individual views to the force and to the extent of the official opposition." Prussia adhered to all these remarks of Austria, and the two Courts decided upon sending in the place of the representatives they had hitherto employed, on the part of Austria, Baron Münch-Bellinghausen;

and, on the part of Prussia, the Post-master General de Nagler; they also agreed to induce other states to send Ministers to Frankfort whose presence should occasion no uneasiness, instead of the dangerous or equivocal personages then in office. The two principal Courts thought they could easily induce the secondary states to acquiesce in the changes which they wished: they succeeded in fine, as they have done generally, without any essential exception, in all that they have undertaken in concert against the other German Princes.

We shall not here enter into details on the activity of the Diet from the time of this change till 1832, but we must now examine the men destined to represent Austria and Prussia at the Diet.

The Baron de Münch-Bellinghausen was at the time he was sent to Frankfort between thirty and forty years of age, distinguished in his appearance and even imposing, whenever he thought it necessary to be so. He has an equal power of assuming elegant and easy manners, and a repulsive and aristocratic deportment, and can be prepossessing and agreeable, or haughty and rude, as an Austrian. He is not married; and is fond of the

table and the fair sex. Sometimes he gives bachelor suppers to the ladies of Frankfort, to which the first and most attractive ladies esteem it a high favour to be invited. *Au reste*, the Baron, or, since 1833, the Count Münch, (he received the title of Count as a recompense for his proceedings in the affair of the insurrection of Brunswick — an affair in which he was ordered to espouse decidedly the part of Duke Charles) is orderly in the management of his household, and measured in his expenses. Possessed of no fortune at the outset of his public career, he has already acquired by the fruits of his economy fine estates and manors in various provinces of Austria, and principally in Bohemia.

In public affairs M. de Münch-Bellinghausen is experienced and skilful; he has the talent of working with facility, without detriment to the value of the labour — he has a quick perception, and he is peculiarly apt at presiding over a great assembly, were it even differently constituted than the Diet is. He will never be too precipitate in any affair —he will never impose upon his colleagues by his authority as presiding Minister: he knows always how to return skilfully to his own views and pro-

jects, and to persuade the other Ministers, by repeating his propositions under the most varied forms, that an ulterior opposition to the designs of Austria would be unsuitable. It is true that, by an arrangement, by means of which a copy of all propositions and demands emanating from different states is to be sent to him at latest the evening before the sitting, he has a great advantage and much assistance in the direction and the presidency; he can prepare himself when it is necessary, and thus he cannot be exposed to the embarrassment of being surprised. Count Münch has constantly shown the most delicate consideration for his colleague, M. de Nagler; and, on many occasions, when their relative position in the assembly was a very difficult one, on account of the diversity of interests, he has known how to reply to the animated expressions of the enraged Prussian Minister by a calmness as polite as it was cold, which has always secured to him the advantage in the discussion.

Formerly, Count Münch had been a Councillor of Government at Prague, then Captain of the same city (Stadthauptmann), and from his youth he had attracted the attention of Prince Metter-

nich, who employed him in the commission for the navigation of the Elbe, and afterwards in the interior of his Cabinet. In this respect, and with regard to the principles which the presiding Minister professes, and the manner in which he knows how to make them prevail, he may be called a pupil of Metternich's; many people think, in fact, that he is destined to be his successor. In a word, Count Münch is an accomplished Austrian statesman, whose talents and aptitude in affairs must be acknowledged, though he has no extraordinary virtues to be recorded, or though one may be obliged, like the author of this memoir, to hate his political principles, and to cast a deserved stigma upon the application which he makes of these principles. Count Münch is the man whom Austria requires at Frankfort, and perhaps no power can boast of being better represented by a Minister in any place whatever.

Let us now turn our attention to the Prussian Minister, the Postmaster-General de Nagler. Born of a Bourgeoise family, he commenced his administrative career in the principalities of Franconia. Formerly M. de Nagler may have had a prepossessing, an interesting exterior, as is said at least

by those who knew him when assessor at Baireuth. The art of making the most of his personal advantages, and of enhancing them by obliging, and, as need requires, submissive manners, drew upon the youth the attention of his superiors, who, doubtless seeing in him some talent for business, favoured him above other persons of the same age. But the fortune of M. de Nagler only dates from the epoch when Prince, then Baron, Hardenberg was sent by Prussia into the principalities of Franconia as first administrator, with the title and rank of Minister. The young Nagler managed to attach himself to the new Minister, and to gain his affections to an extraordinary degree by every kind of attention. Thus Nagler advanced rapidly, and became a Privy Councillor of the Government, and First Councillor and Reporter to the Minister, at an age when formerly these places were not accessible, and especially not to a commoner. When Hardenberg took the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nagler followed him to Berlin, and received the office of Councillor Reporter to the Minister, with the title and rank of Privy Councillor of Legation. In this quality he delivered over, as Commissioner,

the principalities of Franconia to the provisional French Administration, whence they passed afterwards to Bavaria. When the King of Prussia quitted Berlin in 1806 to go to Königsberg, Nagler, who had made himself conspicuous at Court, followed the King, and revised, during some time as Secretary of the Cabinet, the private correspondence of Queen Louisa. From that period may be dated the favour which he has ever since enjoyed with the Royal Family, with all the children of the King, and particularly with the Hereditary Prince. Evil-disposed people have asserted that Nagler owed this favour more particularly to the Queen, who is said to have been not entirely indifferent to the attentions of her Secretary, and had recompensed his devotion as it deserved.

However this may be, it seems certain that prospects were then opened to Nagler, and that promises were made to him, which could only be realized later after the death of the Postmaster-General, Segebarth. It is at least pretended that a proof of this opinion may be found in the fact that the Queen, among other presents, gave her Secretary a brooch, ornamented with a post-horse in diamonds.

After the re-organization of the kingdom of Prussia, which, in consequence of the Peace of Tilsit, succeeded through the united efforts of the most distinguished men, Nagler became Councillor of State, preserving at the same time his former position in the department of Foreign Affairs. When Hardenberg was forced to retire from the administration, on the demand of Napoleon, the favourite did not think himself called upon to share the disgrace and retirement of his protector. He kept his place—Hardenberg never forgot this want of gratitude, or of the interest which he thought himself entitled to expect from him. Thus it happened that, on the return of Hardenberg to office, the services of the Councillor Nagler were dispensed with, and he was obliged to remain patiently in this situation till 1821, when the department of the Posts was confided to him. But, for this apparent return to the favour of the Chancellor of State, he was forced to submit to the painful condition of seeing his department subjected, in a special and direct manner, to the Chancellor of State. He who knows well the character of Nagler can alone judge how painful this relation must have been to him, which, how-

ever, was soon terminated by the death of Hardenberg. His most dangerous adversary being gone, Nagler began once more to breathe more freely, and so well did he know how to take advantage of his position as Postmaster-General, by means of which he had the power of performing little services for high and august personages, that he had reason to hope to see soon a wider field open to his ambition. The first distinction granted to him by the King, after he was again employed, was his elevation to the rank of nobility, a favour which had a high value for him who desired nothing more than to see his plebeian name preceded by the ennobling syllable. But the new nobleman aimed at ulterior and higher views. A change of the Envoys to the Diet was then in agitation, and consequently a position was to be conferred, which, besides its external éclat, afforded a large revenue; two considerations which could not remain out of sight. And M. de Nagler sought the situation with such assiduity, that the King decided at length upon sending his Postmaster-General by Vienna to Frankfort. In this residence (Vienna), were then assembled (in 1824) the Envoys of the great States of the Confedera-

tion, in order to agree upon the definitive regulation and organisation of the federal army, on the construction of the federal fortresses, &c. &c. The easy and agreeable manners of M. de Nagler made him popular. Prince Metternich, soon penetrating his insignificance, granted him an apparent favour, designated him in his notes to the Court of Berlin as a skilful statesman, and persuaded the Emperor Francis afterwards to bestow on him, as a proof of his approbation, the Grand Cross of the order of Leopold. Since that time M. de Nagler has played a *rôle* at Frankfort, which we are about to characterize. His first task was to get rid of every coordinate position which he might find there: for nothing could be more annoying to his incapacity in great affairs, or to his intrigues, than the presence of any man who could penetrate or control his actions. To this end he immediately sent away the resident Minister whom Prussia had at Frankfort, by causing it to be observed that not only was this place useless, and that in case of necessity he would himself fulfil its duties, but also that the five thousand thalers which the Minister received might be applied to other purposes. There was nothing to be objected to in this reasoning; and

M. de Nagler, in ridding himself of an inconvenient observer, gained the credit of having also spared an expense. Next, he opposed the peculiar position which the Councillor of Legation was to occupy, according to the first intention of the Ministry. This position being in some respects distinct from all other places which can be occupied under an Envoy by a member of the Legation, it will be proper to say a few words on the subject.

In general, the superior members of legations consist, independently of the Envoy, of several secretaries, among whom the senior, or the seniors, may bear the title of councillors of legation, without, however, having any advice whatsoever to give for or against any measure. The Envoy has full power to act independently and without advice, and is only responsible for his actions to the foreign minister. But, at the Diet, both Austria and Prussia had the intention to attach to the Envoy a councillor who should be more than a simple secretary, and destined to assist his chief in case of need, not only to execute his orders or to draw up his despatches. M. de Nagler endeavoured to designate this situation as embarrassing and superfluous; and, on this occasion as on others,

he declared that he alone would suffice for all affairs, and that he only required copyists. Now, those who, as employés, come in contact with him, know how little he is capable of terminating even the most insignificant affair without assistance from others. M. de Nagler is so worn by business and generally so confused that it would be impossible for him clearly to develop an opinion verbally, or in writing to deduce from it reasons in a strictly logical order. Under the feeling of his weakness, he has not hesitated sometimes to copy in his own hand the minutes which were laid before him, and to make a parade of the labours of others, as if they had been his own. Inefficient as he is in business, no person better knows how to assume the appearance of a zealous importance, while in reality all his activity consisted mostly in correcting the letters of the minutes, in improving the forms of an L, an E, or a T, the heads of the D's, or in adding to other letters their suitable tails. If an historian could in future times search the archives of the Prussian Legation at the Diet, he would be astonished at the activity displayed by an Envoy nearly reduced to the necessity of giving lessons of calligraphy to his secretaries.

But it will be asked: How is it possible that such a man has not only been able to maintain himself in his situation, but to gain a certain renown as a statesman? Many a member of the Diet or other Diplomatist, if he wishes to be sincere, would easily explain it. The Prussian Legation at Frankfort has always possessed gentlemen skilful enough to be free from all embarrassments even in state papers and documents of difficult argumentation. The Envoy was only required to make the introductions and reports in person. Every body knows that this is not a difficult matter at Frankfort, especially for the Envoy of so considerable a power as Prussia.

And it is precisely in questions of individuals that the power of M. de Nagler lies. If he does not exercise any imposing influence by his own individuality, he can acquire this influence over important personages by rendering them a thousand little services which only cost a word to the Envoy Post-Master General. Thus it is that he has acquired the reputation of a polite and obliging man of business, and that he has been able, without possessing any great qualities, to pass in the opinion of the world for more than an ordinary man.

We will not examine in detail the merits of M. de Nagler as Post-Master General; we shall only say that, according to well informed persons, these merits are limited to the circumstance that the Post-Master General on his entrance into office did not reject any of the essential projects of re-organisation which were proposed to him by the Privy Councillor of the Posts, Schmückert. This is, at least, one merit.

But, as Envoy to the Diet, M. de Nagler was null, and his nullity was discovered even by the greater part of his colleagues, who were by no means distinguished for their sagacity and ability. Such an individual must necessarily have been agreeable to Austria; and it is astonishing how they could be blind enough at Berlin to allow, during eleven years, the Prussian interests towards Austria to be represented by a man so little fitted for his situation. In this sketch we cannot sufficiently prove this assertion, which, besides, will at the present hour be considered less presumptuous even at Berlin. The various transactions, unknown to the public, cannot be touched upon, excepting in a more detailed exposure, in a history of the Diet.

To this complete incapacity was superadded the unmeasured vanity and the petty ambition of the Prussian Envoy, who was so much flattered by a polite letter of Prince Metternich as to be induced to view, in a light more favourable to Austria, a pending contest between Berlin and Vienna. On the other hand, when it was a question of obtaining applause at Berlin, or that M. de Nagler was excited by circumstances or individuals, he confronted the fire with so desperate a courage that he generally became invisible on the days succeeding the sitting of the Diet, and kept his bed from an attack of migraine.

However, M. de Nagler had no small pretensions, and he has often complained with bitterness that he, a rich man, and continually gaining large sums by speculations, had not yet received from the king, as a reward for so many loyal services, a domain, or, at least, the order of the Black Eagle.

To mention all the other weaknesses of this man would lead us too far, and the author would run the risk of incurring the apparent suspicion of being swayed by prejudice or passion. Suffice it to have traced, in general, the character and activity of M. de Nagler. These remarks, and those which

we shall subsequently add, may explain how the Austrian Cabinet has been enabled to thwart Prussian policy, to contribute systematically to render it unpopular in the German nation, and to obtain for herself, in opposition to Prussia, if not affection, at least, a milder judgment of the acts of the Austrian government.

The remainder of the individuals composing the Diet were for the most part insignificant and ordinary men, and answered so exactly the views and the wishes of Austria that one may believe the choice of every Envoy to the Diet to have been owing to the special influence of the Cabinet of Vienna. Amongst those who still deserve to be mentioned here, we must first cite the Bavarian Minister, Baron Lerchenfeldt, who enjoyed the reputation of a certain degree of liberalism not alone amongst a portion of the public. The motive of the good opinion here and there entertained of him was to be found perhaps in his former administration of the finances in Bavaria, in certain speeches in the Diet, and above all in the circumstance that the sons of M. Lerchenfeldt attached themselves at the universities to the liberal party of the German youth. The Bavarian Envoy

to the Diet seemed also, by his character and affections, to lean more towards a liberal system; he only wanted the necessary energy to remain faithful to his views and convictions when, an opposition to superior orders might have threatened with danger the continuance of a situation without care. For M. Lerchenfeldt is a man without fortune, and we think we may thus explain to a certain degree his acceptance of a position in which he was obliged to render his better judgment subordinate to a superior will. He placed the duties of father of a family above those of a citizen, or he preferred the splendour of a high situation, under every circumstance, to an honourable retirement. We believe, however, that M. Lerchenfeldt many a time felt all the painfulness and burden of his situation.

The Wurtemburg Minister, Baron Trott, must not be passed over in silence, because formerly he had distinguished himself by a blind submission to the orders of his superiors. He had been prefect under Jerome Buonaparte; and, even when the allies approached, he had shown so decided an attachment to the fugitive Monarch, that the Elector of Hesse, on his return, thought proper to

keep him in prison for some time in the Castle of Marbourg. Afterwards, Baron de Trott entered the service of Wirtemburg, and after the recall of Baron Wangenheim, that Government had named him Envoy to the Diet. But, as at that time the measures of the King of Wirtemburg gave rise to mistrust, the Courts of Austria and Prussia looked with no favourable eye on the mission to Frankfort of a man who in every case could not fail to excite suspicion, inasmuch as it appeared almost impossible to make him bend to the wishes of Austria and Prussia. These Courts succeeded in bringing about an immediate opposition, on the part of the Diet, to the admission of M. de Trott, on the ground "that it was not proper that a man, who had formerly been, as it were, an active partizan of foreign tyranny against the cause of Germany, should now appear at the Diet as representative of a German Prince, to deliberate on the interests of the German Fatherland." This argument shows at least that it is easy for these gentlemen to make a sentimental parade of the national honour of Germany, whenever such an attitude appears useful to their temporary egotistical views. Nevertheless, the opposition in question could not maintain its

ground against the opposition of the King of Wirtemburg, who made the admission of the Envoy an affair of personal honour, and thus triumphantly succeeded. Subsequently, M. de Trott richly repaid the aversion which certain powers showed towards him, and, by vexatious opposition, which he frequently manifested in the affairs of the Diet, and especially with regard to the federal fortresses, he either rendered fruitless or at least modified or delayed many a measure conceived by Austria and Prussia.

The Minister of Baden, Baron de Blittersdorf, under the favour of different circumstances, might have played an important part at the Diet, in the year 1832, if he had not preferred his own interests to those of his country, and the part of a pusillanimous betrayer to the more honourable but difficult task of a bold opponent. We do not mean by this opposition an antagonism founded on principles, but merely a line of conduct which ordinary prudence ought, at that time, to have dictated to the Envoy as well as to the Government of Baden. But both one and the other wished to save, at any price, an ignoble but comfortable existence.

The Netherlands, as representing the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, had, at the Diet, Count Grünne, who, if he possessed any aptitude for his situation, employed it rather in the interest of Austria, to which country he belonged by birth and by other ties, than for the advantage of his Government. Circumstances made him play a more miserable part even than might have been expected.

In order to watch over him, to a certain degree, the Netherlands had attached to the military commission General Tengnagel, who certainly would have been better fitted to play the part of an Envoy than Count Grünne. In other respects, he was a man, who, like many of his cotemporaries, cared as little about the progress of liberalism as about that of absolutism.

The Danish Minister (for Holstein and Lauenburg) Baron Pecklin, made himself conspicuous by a decided inclination towards the last mentioned political principles. He was a man of a decided character, who remained always pretty nearly the same under all circumstances, and who was not without some importance as a reporter in various commissions, and especially in the affairs of the

press. On the receipt of the intelligence of the affair which broke out at Frankfort, on the 3rd of April, 1833, it was said that he made all his arrangements with calmness. He armed his domestics, and assigned to them their different posts in case of an attack upon his house. He was resolved to sell his life dearly, if it should be attempted.

The Envoy of Nassau and Brunswick, Baron Marshal de Biberstein, was likewise of a decided character, and his principles were those of absolutism.

The other Envoys, who in 1832 formed part of the Diet, were only richly paid agents, of no importance in the march of political affairs, and political oracles to those only by whom they were commissioned, to the Princes of Reuss, Hohenzollern, &c. These little Princes, in their political nullity, have a great degree of political curiosity, and, to amuse their leisure hours, carry on amongst themselves the same gossip which one hears in the little towns of Germany. From the epoch of the Diet of Ratsbon * (Regensburg) they knew

* The following extract from two instructions from Prince Metternich to the Austrian Presiding Minister at Frankfort, on

nothing more amusing, under other circumstances, than the communications of their Envoys, who, themselves imperfectly informed on all affairs of any importance, managed, by diplomatic arts, and, perhaps, by the talent of combination, to compensate for what they were ignorant of in their subordinate situations. At Ratisbon, as well as at Frankfort, the Envoys of the petty German Princes were sure to be found, wherever there was any thing to be discovered, and wherever an interesting piece of news or a bon mot was to be purchased at a cheap price.

On the part of the great Powers of Europe, only three Envoys were then accredited to the German Diet, those of England, France, and Russia. These Embassies were, in reality, superfluous, as the same states were diplomatically represented at the courts which essentially form the Germanic Confederation. At Frankfort, nothing particular can be learnt, which is not to

acquired at least as accurately, and, perhaps, with less difficulty at Berlin and at Vienna, or at any other of the principal Courts of Germany. The representation, therefore, of these powers seems to be only a formality, or the result of an opinion which may have been entertained formerly that more extended plenary powers would be given to the Diet, and that the German Confederation, as such, would become more important than the result has proved.

Sweden, which formerly had an Envoy at the Diet, soon recalled him when she perceived how superfluous the appointment was, especially as, perhaps, she may not, like England, Russia, and France, have had the means to incur a considerable expense for a useless representation.

With regard to the Envoys of the two first mentioned Powers, their official activity may, in fact, be reduced to zero, though, no doubt, they failed not to address numberless reports to their Governments. During the whole lapse of time between September 1832 and the end of the year, they had no official communications to make to the Diet, excepting, 1st, a protest against the decrees of the Diet of the 28th of June and the

6th of July, 1832; and, 2ndly, a note on the affairs of Belgium; but both of them uselessly and unsuccessfully. As regards the self-styled protest, we shall mention it more particularly, in order that its true signification may be appreciated.

Shortly after the publication of the July ordinances of Germany, about the beginning of August, 1832, the Cabinets of France and England simultaneously addressed themselves by their Envoys to the Courts of Vienna and Berlin, to make the declaration that being jointly guaranteed the treaties of Vienna, they must protest against the above-named decrees, inasmuch as they were derogatory to several of the stipulations of the act of the Congress of Vienna, and even to the federal act of Germany, and that they encroached upon the rights and the liberties of the German nation. They were answered very politely from Vienna and Berlin, that such a protest could not be accepted, as it concerned the general affairs of Germany, which could not be decided alone by the Cabinet of Austria or by that of Prussia. That if England and France intended to make the decrees in question the subject of any declaration, it could only be made at Frankfort to the Diet, the legal

organ of the Germanic confederation, and that they must address themselves to that body. At the same time, as might be expected, the necessary instructions were sent from Berlin and Vienna to M. de Nagler and to Count Münch to the effect that in case the Envoys of France and England should, in consequence of orders from their governments, take a step similar to that of the Plenipotentiaries at Vienna and Berlin, they were to be rejected laconically and in the most decided manner. To save appearances, the above named governments caused their protest to be repeated at Frankfort; it was rather roughly rejected by the Prussian Minister, and rather more politely by Count Münch. They signified to them that the Germanic confederation could not acknowledge in any foreign power a right to interfere in its internal affairs, and that consequently they could receive no such protest. In the public journals, the two parties then boasted of their exploits, though we are persuaded that, in fact, both of them only made this manœuvre in order to flatter public opinion, and to laugh at those who were sufficiently imbecile to believe in the sincerity of such actions. The representatives of

England and France at the Diet, in 1832, were on the part of the first power, Mr. Thomas Cartwright, and on the part of the other, Baron Alley de Cipreye. Mr. Cartwright did not concern himself much about diplomacy, abandoning it as much as possible to his lady by birth, Countess Sandizell. The French Envoy was more fitted for business, and was not wanting in the fine tact and cleverness which distinguish his nation in general.

He seemed to aspire to a higher embassy in Germany, and for this purpose had acquired a proficiency in the German language very uncommon in a Frenchman. The absolutist position of the Russian Envoy, Baron d'Anstett, was rather strongly contrasted with his previous rather jacobinical opinions. Born in Alsace, he had in the first years of the French revolution devoted himself with zeal to agitation — he was by profession an advocate; like his friend Schöll, he recovered from his mania. During the reign of terror, he took refuge at Strasburg, and entered into the Austrian service and then into the Russian. Like almost all those who then wished to rise in Russia, he followed the military career and distinguished himself several times. He was already a

general when the war in 1812 broke out. As a Russian diplomatist in Germany, he was perhaps still more in his place. From his residence at Frankfort, he watched over several of the emperor's plenipotentiaries of the second order, as well as over all the Russians of any consequence who resided during a shorter or a longer time in southern and western Germany. For this especial purpose the councillor of state, Bestieff, had been attached to him, who, without any official character, shewed himself sometimes at Frankfort, sometimes elsewhere. As to the personal qualities of M. d'Anstett, we can only add to those which we have already noticed, the semi-diplomatic, and by no means unimportant qualification of being an accomplished *gourmet*, and that his table was, in every respect, preferred even to that of Count Münch.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE INSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL CHURCH OF GREECE.

EXTRACTED FROM "THE GREEK PEOPLE IN THEIR POLITICAL, ECCLESIASTICAL, AND CIVIL RELATIONS." BY GEORGE LOUIS VON MAURER, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL REGENCY OF GREECE, &c. &c. &c.

SINCE the breaking out of the struggle for Grecian independence, the Greek Church had fallen into disorder and confusion; many bishoprics were entirely vacant, others only occupied by vicars; others again, contrary to the original institution, had been united with other bishoprics. The greatest ignorance prevailed amongst the clergy. Scarcely ten amongst a thousand priests could write their names, and those who were able to do so were and are considered learned men; and, as a sign of their learning, carried at their side a small inkstand. Indeed, during the first months of our arrival, several priests were ordained by the bishops for money; in general, they were married peasants.

This was the state in which King Otho and the Regency found the Greek Church. Reform

was urgently requisite, and demanded from every side.

The Regency, therefore, in the first months of its administration, appointed a commission, for the most part consisting of the clergy, to verify the real state of the Greek Church; to propose means for improving its condition, especially that of the higher and inferior clergy, as well as for the formation of a permanent synod for ecclesiastical affairs, and to draw up a report on the result of their deliberations. They were but little inclined to the half measures which Capodistrias had preferred, and least of all in this the most important affair of the Greek people.

The report of the commission gave a most wretched picture of the melancholy state of the Greek Church and of its clergy. It was the universal opinion that the only road to improvement was by the entire emancipation of the Church from its Turkish dependence under the Patriarch of Constantinople.

It is true that the liberty of the Greek Church is in reality due to the efforts of the struggle for freedom. In the same manner as the Greeks

strove in a political sense to be free from Ottoman subjection, they also struggled for religious freedom, that is to say, for freedom from a patriarch under the Sultan. This freedom had, in fact, subsisted a long time. Still we did not desire to adopt so important a measure,—perhaps the most important of all measures, as regards the future welfare of Greece, without the most mature deliberation of the advantages and disadvantages that might result,—without having previously consulted the high dignitaries of the Church.

I therefore gave orders to Mr. Tricoupi, at that time Minister for Religious affairs, and to the Ministerial Councillor, M. Constantine Schinas, to write privately to all the bishops, archbishops, and metropolitans exercising their functions in Greece, in order to ascertain their opinions. In their written answers they expressed themselves unanimously in favour of the independence and institution of a Holy Synod, to be nominated by the king.

Nevertheless, this important measure would not have been so quickly adopted, nor so speedily executed, had not secret overtures given rise to

and thereby rendered impossible the former nduct of the Patriarch, favourably disposed he then was to Greece.*

Scarcely had the rumour gone abroad that e Greek government was occupied with the eek Church, when intriguers of every descrip-n, with whom unfortunately Greece richly ounds, put themselves in motion to throw

* The Regency have repeatedly been reproached with omitting negotiate, as before, with the Patriarch. According to theory, reproach is just. But, theoretically speaking, the conduct of er the Great, with regard to the Russian Greek Church, is not be justified! Quite as little can the revolt of the Greek people inst the Ottoman yoke be justified!! Was it necessary, there-e, that it should not have taken place? But the Greek Church fered under a similar oppression with the Greek people. The uggle for freedom, therefore, did not aim at political freedom ne, but at religious independence. It was, in reality, a religious r! But, with political freedom, religious freedom was also fac-ously, at least, acquired. The one could not permanently sub-st without the other, and therefore was of no value. The inde-ndence of the Greek Church had therefore become indispensable r the existence of the monarchy! Now, if the Greek State and e Greek Church were really to be free, it was impossible to act herwise than we did, without again putting every thing on a estionable footing. If, however, according to strict theory, at which has been effected with so much labour is to be esteemed unjust, let the Greek Church return again to Abraham's bosom, der the knout! and let the negotiations be then recommenced cording to strictly scholastic forms! I may then, at least, live witness, not indeed the emancipation of the Greek Church, but rhaps *something very different!!*

suspicion on the beneficent views of the government. Even foreign monks came to assist in increasing the accumulating difficulties. Amongst these, a monk of Mount Athos, of the name of Procopius, made himself particularly notorious. He was a man known in early times for his profligate life. He preached under the very eyes of the Regency, in Nauplia itself, resistance to their measures; saying to some that the intention was to make every thing Catholic, to the others that all were to be made Protestants. Just about this time arrived a person, who had been archbishop of Adrianople, and who had been deeply implicated in an infamous conspiracy against his legitimate sovereign, at the taking of Adrianople by the Russians. He had fled to Russia, and from that time forward had enjoyed a large pension from the emperor. He also sought to influence the Greek bishops; and, as he was the inmate of the house of the Russian minister, M. Catacasy, his words had great weight. To this were added expostulations of the Russian Envoy himself, which were understood, at least by the Greek bishops to whom they were addressed, as incitements to

resistance. The public journals also at length began to mix in these affairs. The "Times," the journal of the self-styled Capodistrian faction, spoke entirely in the sense of the prelate who had come from Russia, and of the monk from Mount Athos, against the measures resolved upon. The other journals were in favour of them, but they wished that not only the bishops should be summoned, but the archimandrites, and even the representatives of the priests, the monks and deacons. They also suggested that the deliberations should be public. Several indeed demanded the convocation of a national assembly, in order to decide on this most important matter.

It was clear to the tranquil spectator, that, with all this officiousness, the well-being of the country and of religion had no share in guiding people, but that party views were the springs of their actions. For the intrigues I have mentioned were in marked contrast with what had been told to us in this respect before our arrival, and with what had been constantly desired during the whole of the contest for freedom. But, as just at this time a circumstance

took place, of which there had been no instance since 1821, and which even Capodistrias did not tolerate, viz. the nomination at Constantinople of a bishop for emancipated Greece, who had arrived at Zeitoun to take possession of his diocese, it was time to put an end to these manœuvres, and to bring the affair to a speedy decision.

For this purpose all the metropolitans, archbishops, and bishops in Greece were summoned to Nauplia on the 15th of July, 1833, when they unanimously drew up the Declaration of the Independence of the Greek Church.

On the 6th of August, 1833, the first synod was named, and two days afterwards it was solemnly instituted. The participation in this National Church Festival was very general. Not only the Greek people thronged to it with the loudest acclamations, but, of the foreign missions and officers of the ships of war in the Bay, not a single individual was absent. The Russian embassy and the Russian officers, however, staid away.

The non-participation of the Russian functionaries in a ceremony so important for the

future welfare of Greece had a very powerful effect. For, amongst many good qualities of the Greeks, we must place in the first rank their nationality. Every Greek was proud to belong to a free and independent church. Every man felt to what point a free Greek Church must necessarily lead the Greek state itself;—a state which possesses that which no other state has ever possessed, a *Church which bears the same name with the State!*

DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE GREEK CHURCH.

OTHO, BY THE GRACE OF GOD, KING OF GREECE.

According to the unanimous wish of the Metropolitan, Archbishops, and Bishops, of our Realm, that we should proclaim the independence of the Greek Church and institute a permanent Synod, we have decreed, by the advice and with the approval of our Ministers, and we do decree as follows:—

Art. 1. The orthodox Eastern Apostolic Church, in the Kingdom of Greece, whilst it acknowledges no other spiritual head than the Founder of the Christian Faith, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and recognises, in regard to the guidance and administration of the Church, the King of Greece for its superior, is free and independent of every other power, without prejudice to the unity of the dogma as it has been always recognised by all orthodox Eastern Churches.

Art. 2. The highest spiritual power is vested under the supremacy of the King, in the hands of a permanent holy Synod.

The King indicates, by an organic decree, the department of State which has to exercise this right of supremacy, and to which the Synod is in this respect subordinate.

The Synod holds its sittings in the department of State, and has a seal of its own, the arms of which are the Greek Cross of the Seal of State, with the words, "*Holy Synod of the Kingdom of Greece.*"

Art. 3. The Synod consists of five members.

These are a President and at least two Councillors. The two other members may be equally Councillors; the Government of the State, however, reserves to itself, according to its judgment, to appoint one or two Assessors in their place.

Besides these, one or two Assistant-Councillors or Assessors may be named, who, however, will only act in the event of the impediment of an active member.

The nomination rests with the Government.

Art. 4. The President and the Councillors must be Metropolitans, Archbishops, or Bishops; the associates, however, Presbyters, or Hieromonarchs.

Every year a new nomination is to take place. The old members may, however, be nominated again.

Each acting Councillor and Assessor receives, besides the salary due to him from his ecclesiastical office, a sum of money according to the duration of his functions.

Art. 5. The march of business is collegial.

In the deliberations the majority decides.

When the votes are equal, the President has a deciding voice.

All the members have to sign the decree.

If one or more member should differ in opinion, they may record their difference of opinion in the protocol of the sittings.

Art. 6. With the Synod are associated a Procurator and Secretary, named by the Government.

The remaining functionaries of the Chancellery are to be appointed by the Synod, but must be confirmed by the Government.

Art. 7. The Secretary is President of the Chancellery of the Synod, and conducts the Protocols of Proceedings.

He is empowered to take a part in the deliberations, without, however, having a deciding voice.

The State Procurator must assist at all the sittings, and represent the Royal Government in them.

Every decree resolved upon in his absence is ineffective.

He has also the right to lay before the Synod, on demand of a Royal Functionary or Magistrate, propositions on which the Synod must, without delay, deliberate and decide.

Art. 8. The following oath must be taken by the President, the Councillors, and the Assessors.

"I swear fidelity to the King, obedience to the laws of the Kingdom, a conscientious administration of the office entrusted

to me, a faithful maintenance of the rights and liberties of the orthodox Eastern Apostolic Church in the Kingdom of Greece, the maintenance of its independence of every foreign power, a conscientious promotion of its welfare, with a careful removal of any temporal views, and the punctual fulfilment of all and each of the duties belonging to my office."

The usual oath of office is to be taken by the State Procurator, the Secretary, and the other officers of the Chancellery.

The President, the Councillors, and Assessors, the State Procurator and the Secretary, take the oath in the hands of the King, but the remaining functionaries at a sitting of the Synod.

Art. 9. In all the internal affairs of the Church, the Synod acts independently of the temporal authority.

With regard to the supreme superintendence of the Government over all acts, and incidents, and relations within the State, it is justified in taking cognizance of what is done, and no resolution of the Synod can be made known or acted upon without the previous consent of the Government.

In the preamble of such resolutions, the consent of the Government thereto is always to be mentioned.

Art. 10. To the internal affairs of the Church belong, under Articles 11, 12, 17, the following provisions.

1. The doctrine of faith. 2. The form and ceremonies of the divine service. 3. The direction of the duties of the Priesthood. 4. Religious instruction. 5. The discipline of the Church. 6. The examination and ordination of the servants of the Church. 7. The consecration of the vessels, &c., and edifices destined to the service of God. 8. The exercise of jurisdiction in purely spiritual matters, namely, in affairs of conscience, or the fulfilling of the duties of religion and of the Church, according to the dogmas, the works on the dogmas, and the constitution founded on them.

Art. 11. The Synod watches over the preservation of the purity of the received dogmas of the Eastern Church, and over the contents of the books sold for the use of youth or destined for that of the Priesthood and treating of religious matters; and endeavours, when it learns with certainty that any one is en—

deavouring to injure the Church of the Realm through new doctrines or proselytism, or, in any other manner, to apply the temporal power, according to the temporal laws, to remedy the evil.

Art. 12. The Synod watches furthermore over the exact obedience to spiritual ordinances and uses, over the good order of the Church and of the Church ceremonies, and especially over the rites of the Church. It has the direction of all that refers to the preservation of the dignity of the Priesthood, and to its improvement, and has to take care that the Priest does not violate the spiritual and temporal laws by interfering in temporal matters.

Art. 13. All ecclesiastical affairs, having reference to the Church but not to its doctrines, but which rather (without exactly belonging to purely temporal affairs) relate to the State and to the temporal welfare of its inhabitants, come within the cognizance of the Synod, but no partial regulation of their's can be carried into effect without the participation and approbation of the Government. The Government is even authorised, not only to take cognizance of the regulations of the Synod, but even by their own ordinances to prevent what might be injurious to the welfare of the people.

Art. 14. Amongst such subjects of a mixed nature (Art. 13.) are more particularly,

1. Regulations with regard to external worship, the time, place, frequency, &c., of the same. 2. The institution, suppression, or limitation, of convents. 3. The regulation, limitation, or suppression, of those ceremonies, processions, fêtes, &c., which do not belong to the essential part of worship. 4. The distribution of the offices of the Church, and the permission to consecrate Priests and Deacons. 5. The distribution, in the dioceses, of the Church orders. 6. Regulations respecting the institutions for spiritual improvement, instruction, and punishments. 7. Matters of health; discipline, in so far as it has reference to the regulations of the Church. 8. Extraordinary Church ceremonies—when these occur on work days and outside the Church. 9. Laws of marriage, in so far as they do not concern the civil contract.

Art. 15. Decrees respecting affairs of a mixed nature, concluded by the Synod and approved by the Government, have the force of laws, and as such are to be published by the Government in the Government Gazette.

Art. 16. All the Bishops of the Realm are under the superintendence of the Synod, receive commands from it, and inform it of all that affects the efficacy of the Synod. The number and extent of Bishoprics is to be regulated by the Government, according to the representation of the Synod. The Bishoprics shall be endowed in a suitable manner, and the Archbishops and Bishops shall be named by the Government on the recommendation of the Synod; on the representation of the Synod, in matters referring to canonical cases, they may be punished by removal or entirely deposed. With respect to the distribution and endowment of livings, as well as the nominations to them and to other spiritual offices, particular regulations will be framed.

Art. 17. In purely spiritual matters, the Synod exercises the highest jurisdiction over the whole Priesthood, and, according to the regulations of Art. 10, also over the Laity. Its decisions, however, can only be carried into effect after the approbation of the Government, and in conformity with the existing laws. In worldly matters, the Priests are under temporal laws, and subject to temporal civil punishment.

Art. 18. We may enumerate as temporal matters, and to be judged by temporal laws, and exclusively to be ruled and judged by temporal authority,

1. Contracts, testamentary deeds, and other civil acts of the Priests. 2. Regulations with respect to moveable and immoveable goods, rents, profits, and other rights of the Church, convents, or spiritual persons. 3. Decrees and deeds of recognition upon all acts of the ecclesiastics which may be considered as common breaches of law, crimes, or errors. 4. Laws of Marriage, so far as they do not affect the civil contract or its operation. 5. Arrangements with regard to the institution of registries of births, deaths, and marriages; and, farther, to the regulation

and authority of the Church books, and other ecclesiastical documents; and, finally, 6. All kinds of rules respecting the obligation for the building and maintenance of Churches and ecclesiastical edifices.

Art. 19. Neither the Synod, nor any other assembly of ecclesiastics, nor any individual priest, may enter into correspondence, or maintain any immediate relations with any foreign, civil, or ecclesiastical community. All such correspondence must pass through the competent Minister of State.

Art. 20. As long as the ecclesiastical authority does not overstep the sphere of its operation, it has a right to the protection of the civil power; and all the provinces of the realm are bound on its appeal to protect and support it, on any injury offered to its rights.

Art. 21. Every Greek who considers himself injured by the ecclesiastical authority, by a breach of the existing regulation, is authorized to appeal to the civil power. Complaints against the abuse of the ecclesiastical power may be brought directly before the Government, or before the civil power in any other place. It is to be investigated by the competent department of State, and only to be decided upon after the cognizance of it by the Synod, excepting in urgent cases, in which the disputed point can be arranged by the ministerial department, before the Synod takes cognizance of it.

Art. 22. The Government can, on solemn occasions, by informing the Synod of it, order public prayers and festivals of thanksgiving. It is also entitled to call upon the general assembly of the Church, under the Kingly protection, to make temporary regulations, viz. to name its presidents and secretaries, without, however, interfering in its dogmas.

Art. 23. The President, State Procurator, and the Councillors of the Synod, not excepting the assistant Councillors, have the rank of Councillors of State, the Assessors and Secretaries that of Ministerial Councillors. The President and State Procurators have, according to the collegiate order, precedence over the Councillors.

Art. 24. At all Church ceremonies, the Bishops are to pray first for the King, and then for the Synod, in these words:— "Lord, remember, first, our holy Synod, which thou," &c.

The department of the Secretary of State for religion and instruction is charged to make known and carry this into execution.*

Nauplia, 4th August (23 July) 1833.

In the name of the King,

THE REGENCY.

Count Armansperg, v. Maurer, v. Heideck, the Secretaries of State, S. Tricoupi, President. A. Mavrocordato, G. Psyllas, G. Praides, J. Coletti, v. Schmalz.

MINUTES OF THE ACTS OF THE GREEK PRELATES ASSEMBLED IN NAUPLIA.

PROCLAMATION.

The Secretary of State for religion and instruction gives notice that, by a decree of 13th July, a commission will be named, consisting of the Minister of State for religion and instruction, and the two councillors of the said ministerial department, in order to direct the negociations with the Metropolitans, Archbishops and Bishops of the Kingdom, summoned and respectively invited under the decree of the 13th July.

To this end, four sittings have already been held, at which were present thirty-six prelates, viz. all those who have hitherto arrived, and who have unanimously decided upon the independence of the Greek Church of the Kingdom, and upon the establishment of a permanent Synod. The Protocol of these sittings, signed by the above-named Commissioners, is inserted

* In the event of the subjects of King Otho in London being desirous of knowing the footing on which they stand in a religious point of view they may see a copy, in Romaic, of the institution of the Holy Synod, the Portfolio Office.

herewith, according to the order of the day, so that in the signatures, the order is followed in which the Prelates signed their names, (without any prejudice to the relations of rank.)

Record of the Opinion of the Metropolitans, Archbishops, and Bishops, of the Greek Church of the Kingdom of Greece, on the political independence of the Greek Church, and the establishment of a permanent Synod.

This day, the 15th (27) July, the undersigned Metropolitans, Archbishops, and Bishops, appeared at 10 A. M. before the Commission, summoned by the Royal Rescript, consisting of the Secretary of State for Religion and instruction, S. Tricoupi; the two Ministerial Councillors, Constantine Demetrius Schinas, and Scarlatos Byzantios. The reason for their summons and invitation was first explained to those present by the Chairman of the Commission, and then by the two Ministerial Councillors; and it was minutely explained to them that "The Government intends to ameliorate by every means the situation of the Greek Church, and to secure it in perpetuity. That the Government aims at restoring to the Greek Church that necessary outward dignity, which it possessed before the conquest of the country, and must again of itself assume, in the interests of the Greek religion; and the principal means to attain so great an end, and in a manner, the foundation of all others, are the two following. 1. The solemn and immutable declaration of the de-facto independence of the Greek Church of every foreign power, with regard to its external deportment (without injury to the unity of the Dogmas, as they have been hitherto acknowledged, by every Church of Eastern rites.) 2. The establishment of a permanent holy Synod, to be named by the King, as the highest spiritual power, after the example of the Russian Church. Although the Commission established under the decree of 15th (27) March, for the investigation of the state of the Greek Church,

as also the entire Cabinet have unanimously resolved upon this, yet the Government intends to take no steps before having the advantage of the opinion of the reverend Prelates, as the spiritual representatives of the Church, upon both of these questions, und this is the reason of their summons and invitation."

After the undersigned Metropolitans, Archbishops, and Bishops had listened to all this, they considered the thing at length.—Upon this, the Secretary of State for Religion and Instruction remarked to the assembled gentlemen that they might consult peacefully and alone upon this subject, because it was necessary that their opinions should proceed from a clear conscience and full conviction; and for this purpose the members of the Commission retired from the Council Chamber. On the invitation of the assembly, after a long time, the Commission returned, and gave new explanations of the subjects upon which they were to consult, which were admitted by the assembly itself, which, however, demanded to reflect alone again upon the questions laid before them. The Commission once more retired, returned again after a length of time, and received for answer from the assembly that the questions laid before them were fully acquiesced in; that in consequence the assembly ardently desires that the Government should solemnly declare,—

1. That the Orthodox Eastern Apostolic Church of the kingdom of Greece, as it spiritually acknowledges no other head than the founder of the Christian faith, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, is free and independent of every other power, with a reservation of the integrity of the dogmas, as they are acknowledged by all Eastern and orthodox Churches. In so far as regards the direction and government of the Church which appertain only to the royal throne, it acknowledges, as no ways interfering with the laws of the Church, His Majesty the King of Greece as her supreme head. 2. That a Synod, composed only of Prelates, and to be named by the King, may be established, which, according to the laws of the Church, shall conduct the affairs of the Church.

This Protocol was read before them by the Councillor of State, C. D. Schinas, and approved and signed by all present.—The Session ended at 4 P. M.

Nauplia, 15 July, 1833.

Kyrillos, Metr. of Corinth.
Jacob, M. of Eubœa.
Parsios, M. of Thebes.
Gerasimus, M. of Egina and Hydra.
Dionysius, M. of Rheon and Praestos.
Kyrillos, late M. of Larissa.
Nicodemos, M. of Kea and Thermia.
Jonas, B. of Damala.
Neophytos, Bishop of Talanda.
Agathangelos, late M. of Autrysa.
Makarios, late M. of Silivria.
Dionysios, M. of Tripolis.
Kyrillos, B. of Karyoupolis.
Ignatz, B. of Adramedion.
Paisios, B. of Elaa.
Meletios, B. of Metra.
Anthimos, B. of Heliopolis.
Joannikios, B. of Bethymna.
Gregorios, B. of Eudokias.
Prokopios, S. Bishop of Paramytha.
Gregorios, J. B. of Mendenitza, for the Bishop of Meschonisi.
Bartholomeus, Metropolitan of Larissa.

(Signed) The Commission, S. Tricoupi.
C. D. Schinas.
Scarl. D. Byzantios.

RUSSIAN CATECHISM.

The following is a Literal Translation of the New Catechism prepared for the use of the Schools and Churches in the Polish Provinces of Russia. It was published by Special Order of the Russian Government, and printed at Wilna, the Capital of Lithuania, in the year 1832.

Quest. 1. How is the authority of the Emperor to be considered in reference to the spirit of Christianity?

Ans. As proceeding immediately from God.

Quest. 2. How is this substantiated by the nature of things?

Ans. It is by the will of God that men live in society: hence the various relations which constitute society; which for its more complete security is divided into parts called nations; the government of which is entrusted to a prince, king, or emperor; or, in other words, to a supreme ruler: we see then that, as man exists in conformity to the will of God, society emanates from the same Divine will, and more especially the supreme power and authority of our lord and master the Czar.

Quest. 3. What duties does religion teach us, the humble subjects of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, to practise towards him?

Ans. Worship, obedience, fidelity, the payment of taxes, service, love, and prayer, the whole being comprised in the words, worship and fidelity.

Quest. 4. Wherein does this worship consist, and how should it be manifested?

Ans. By the most unqualified reverence in words, gestures, demeanour, thoughts, and actions.

Quest. 5. What kind of obedience do we owe him?

Ans. An entire, passive, and unbounded obedience in every point of view.

Quest. 6. In what consists the fidelity we owe to the Emperor?

Ans. In executing his commands most rigorously, without examination; in performing the duties he requires from us, and in doing every thing willingly without murmuring.

Quest. 7. Is it obligatory on us to pay taxes to our gracious Sovereign the Emperor?

Ans. It is incumbent on us to pay every tax in compliance with his supreme commands, both as to the amount and when due.

Quest. 8. Is the service of his Majesty, the Emperor, obligatory on us?

Ans. Absolutely so: we should, if required, sacrifice ourselves in compliance with his will, both in a civil and military capacity, and in whatever manner he deems expedient.

Quest. 9. What benevolent sentiments and love are due to the Emperor?

Ans. We should manifest our good will and affection, according to our station, in endeavouring to promote the prosperity of our native land, Russia *(not Poland)*, as well as that of the Emperor our father, and of his august family.

Quest. 10. Is it incumbent on us to pray for the Emperor, and for Russia our country?

Ans. Both publicly and privately, beseeching the Almighty to grant the Emperor health, integrity, happiness, and security. The same is applicable to the country, which constitutes an indivisible part of the Empire.

Quest. 11. What principles are in opposition to these duties?

Ans. Irreverence, disobedience, infidelity, malevolence, treason, mutiny, and revolt.

Quest. 12. How are irreverence and infidelity to the Emperor to be considered in reference to God?

Ans. As the most heinous sin, the most frightful criminality.

Quest. 13. Does religion, then, forbid us to rebel and overthrow the government of the Emperor?

Ans. We are interdicted from so doing at all times, and under any circumstances.

Quest. 14. Independently of the worship we owe the Emperor, are we called upon to respect the public authorities emanating from him?

Ans. Yes; because they emanate from him, represent him, and act as his substitutes; so that the Emperor is everywhere.

Quest. 15. What motives have we to fulfil the duties above enumerated?

Ans. The motives are twofold—some natural, others revealed.

Quest. 16. What are the natural motives?

Ans. Besides the motives adduced, there are the following:—The Emperor, being the head of the nation, the father of all his subjects, who constitute one and the same country, Russia, is thereby alone worthy of reverence, gratitude, and obedience: for both public welfare and individual security depend on submissiveness to his commands.

Quest. 17. What are the supernaturally revealed motives for this worship?

Ans. The supernaturally revealed motives are, that the Emperor is the Vicegerent and Minister of God, to execute the Divine commands; and, consequently, disobedience to the Emperor is identified with disobedience to God himself; that God will reward us in the world to come for the worship and obedience we render the Emperor, and punish us severely to all eternity should we disobey and neglect to worship him. Moreover, God commands us to love and obey from the inmost recesses of the heart every authority, and particularly the Emperor, not from worldly consideration, but from apprehension of the final judgment.

Quest. 18. What books prescribe these duties?

Ans. The New and Old Testaments, and particularly the Psalms, Gospels, and Apostolic Epistles.

Quest. 19. What examples confirm this doctrine?

Ans. The example of Jesus Christ himself, who lived and died in allegiance to the Emperor of Rome, and respectfully submitted to the judgment which condemned him to death. We have, moreover, the example of the Apostles, who both loved and respected

them; they suffered meekly in dungeons conformably to the will of the Emperors, and did not revolt like malefactors and traitors. We must, therefore, in imitation of these examples, suffer and be silent.

Quest. 20. At what period did the custom originate of praying to the Almighty for the prosperity of the Sovereign?

Ans. The custom of publicly praying for the Emperors is coeval with the introduction of Christianity; which custom is to us the most valuable legacy and splendid gift we have received from past ages.

Such is the doctrine of the church, confirmed by practice, as to the worship and fidelity due to the omnipotent Emperor of Russia, the Minister and Vicegerent of God.

PERSECUTION OF CATHOLICS IN POLAND.

Warsaw, 1835.

If our august clergy is, with very few exceptions, worthy of admiration, that of Lithuania is sublime, and really one can desire nothing better. The exaltation increases, energy develops itself in proportion as the danger augments. In every age, persecutions have been the period of the triumph of religion. This grand truth makes itself felt as much as ever, and the manly fervour of the sermons attracts crowded assemblies of the faithful. They are simple, religious, frequently full of unction, but bold, going straight to the end; alluding unceasingly to the perishable grandeur of the Nebuchadnezzars of the age; the evil that God permits, but sooner or later punishes; the rewards due to patience, to resignation, which alone can appease and shorten the punishment of our faults and of those of our fathers. The rewards will be immense, the wicked will yield up their places to those who were suffering and persecuted; in fact, the persecution is such that it re-tempers our courage, and stirs up all the powers and the depths of the hearts of those least susceptible of fanaticism or exaltation. It is a rich and powerful mine of gold in a constant course of exportation, to which there is nothing to be added. It is native gold. In fact, all moderation has ceased, no terms whatsoever are kept.

Besides the individual persecutions of the past days, a prohibition was issued against singing in the churches anthems to the Virgin, or mentioning the names of St. Stanislaus, St. Vladislas, St. Albert, St. Casimir. I shall speak to you no more of the Church of the Piarists, which was seized upon to be converted into a Cerkiew (Greek Church). In all the small towns they are now constructed. Where there are two churches, one is taken, and

always that of the Piarists is preferred, wherever one is to be found. We wished that the Piarists should celebrate divine worship in the old dilapidated church which had been assigned to them (that formerly occupied by the Jesuits).

They did not dare to do so, although it would have produced a grand effect amongst the broken ruins and shattered panes.

The Archimandrite, the Bishop of Warsaw, is here. He is the only one we have, Woronioz not having been replaced.

The Bishop Pawtowski gave the Archimandrite a dinner, at which he presented to him all our clergy, which, taken by surprise, was extremely mortified. In the small towns priests have been established, although without any cure, or any church, but with the mission to watch over several charities. That of Lowicz, for example, gives dinners every Friday to all the poor of the country. A splendid repas maigre is served to them, with a profusion of beer, spirits, and even wine. The priest serves in person, with all the humanity of the primitive ages, but with much less temperance, for both host and guests are all dead drunk after the banquet. Before separating, large alms are distributed, with an injunction to meet again the following Friday, and bring fresh guests.

In Lithuania the persecution is active and ostensible in a very different manner. The resistance also is energetic in a very different mode. Nevertheless, the higher classes, as with us, do not seek martyrdom, but, on the other hand, the inferior clergy is sublime; and what is surprising, the United Greeks show great attachment and an unlimited fidelity to the Chief of our Church; an attachment which exposes them to many dangers, which they brave with a courage and a devotion truly pious. These are the persons who for the present are the most persecuted and most exposed to direct and indirect attacks. They are ordered to establish in their churches what are called Imperial Gates; to place there the great Altar, almost in the middle of the church, a distinctive mark indispensable to the schismatic service. Very few have consented. Many have been deposed. The Bishop says to them, "You will

not do this, others will, and you will go without bread." The schismatic Missals (expressly printed in Russia) which have been sent to them have been unanimously sent back, and no one knows yet what will be the result. But the fact at present is, that prayers are offered up more ardently than ever to the Almighty Father.

I send you herewith the petition presented by fifty united curates to their bishop; the five who were charged with this mission were sent to Siberia, but they were aware in undertaking it to what they exposed themselves. In White Russia, in a large village, the priest of the place, more careful of the favour of the government than that of Heaven, having arranged his Church according to the new decrees, prepared on a Sunday last autumn to celebrate the mass according to the schismatic ritual.

He began therefore what are called the *Prostrations*. The peasants, the moment they perceived it, and understood its purport, went out one after the other; when they found themselves all outside, they closed the gates of the Church, set fire to it, and burned it to the ground, together with the priest, whom they would not allow to escape. This is an averred, well known fact, which the authorities, however, and the evil-disposed, take care to conceal and to deny. In Lithuania, of seven Catholic parishes only one now remains, so that sometimes the people have to go fourteen miles to be able to have a child baptized, or to assist a dying relation. They marry and baptize their children amongst each other, and only go once a year to some distant Church to be confirmed, to the confessional, and to communion, thus avoiding the Schismatic Churches; the essential point being not to set foot in them.

You see that the clergy labours in the vineyard of the Lord. Muravieff did all in his power to effect the fusion of the Churches. He has established everywhere the *Imperial Gates*, and this at the expense of the proprietors. Sometimes consent is obtained by force, but more easily because this kind of ornament, which is indispensable to the schismatic worship, has nothing in it essentially

contrary to the ritual of the united Greeks; but the *prostrations* and the altar in the middle of the Church are still obstinately objected to.

You surely have heard mention made of a certain Szymanski, of such unfortunate celebrity, who arrived here *in order to make the guerillas rise*, with passports from Pozzo di Borgo, and who threw into the extreme of misery more than three hundred families, whom he denounced, whether truly or falsely, as having given him asylum or even a glass of water. Amongst this number were three priests, one of whom, having received him poor and an orphan, had educated him from his childhood, clothed him, and sent him to the army in 1831. Szymanski, on his arrival in the country, immediately addressed himself to his adopted father. Welcomed as his child, he had frequently taken up his abode with the good curate. The moment having arrived, he denounced him to the authorities as the man at whose house he had alighted, and who had, as it were, allowed him to establish his head-quarters there. The curate was immediately seized, with two of his companions and neighbours, and carried off at the exact moment when he was about to celebrate the fiftieth year of his priesthood. Convicted, condemned to death by the court martial, the punishment of father Adamowicz was commuted into perpetual exile and to *forced labour*. Dzieduszycki and Ziclonka, of less advanced years, were clothed in the livery of crime and sent to Siberia.

At Wilna they underwent their condemnation with all the fortitude and strength of mind which might have been expected from three apostles of the faith and the gospel.

Bishop Ktagicwicz, although he fainted three times in concluding the iniquitous and sacrilegious ceremony of depriving them of the sacrament (which he had no effective right to do), although he had not the courage to do his duty in refusing entirely this office, could not however refrain from pronouncing the following words:—

"Touched by the finger of God, thou departest, brother, for a land where the faith which thou confessest is unknown. Thou

wilt not find there the altar on which thou didst depose thy pious offerings during fifty years. Thou wilt find there no associate to bring consolation to thy afflicted soul. It is in thine own heart that thou must find the faith, the altar, and the consolation—and to this end I give thee my pastoral benediction."

He again fainted away. Yet he finished the ceremony, and the three old men departed—Father Adamowicz to Nerczynsk, and the two others destined to repeople the frozen deserts.

I abstain from all reflections, but an eyewitness having recounted to me all this, I attest its authenticity.

CAPITULATION GRANTED BY OMAR,

LIEUTENANT OF MAHOMET, AND AFTERWARDS HIS IMMEDIATE SUCCESSOR UNDER THE TITLE OF CALIPH,

TO THE CHRISTIANS OF JERUSALEM AND ITS DEPENDENCIES,

AT THE TIME OF THE CONQUEST OF PALESTINE, IN THE 15TH YEAR OF THE HEGIRA.

[As a contrast to the conduct of the head of that Church, which by *courtesy* is termed Christian, we call the attention of our readers to a document by which may be seen the spirit that animates Islamism.]

In the name of the Beneficent and Most Merciful God.

PRAISE be to God, who has allowed us to be born in Islamism, and who honours us by the Faith, who has taken pity on us in sending to us his prophet Mahomet. Peace and the blessing of God be on him who purifies our hearts, who grants us the victory over our enemies, habitations in pleasant places, and who inspires us with love for our brethren! God be praised by his servants for this favour, for this infinite mercy.

This is the writing of Omar, Son of Chattab, which was given as a pact and a convention to the pontiff Sephyrinus, revered by all his people, Patriarch of the royal orthodox sect at Jerusalem, on the Mount of Olives.

This Convention comprises the Subjects, the Clergy, the Monks, and Nuns, and grants to them safety and protection in whatever spot they may be.

We, Chief of the true believers, and our successors, ought to guarantee the safety of the Christian subjects, if they fulfil their duties as subjects.

This Convention shall not be broken except by their own fault, in the event of their choosing to withdraw from obedience and submission.

Let security be equally granted to their churches, their dwellings, the places of their pilgrimage, as well within as without; that is to say, to the Church Kamaneh (the Holy Sepulchre);

to the birth-place of Jesus at Bethlehem; to the great Church of the Cavern, with the three gates, towards the south, the north, and the west. Let security be granted in the same manner to the other Christians in those places; to the Georgians and Abyssinians, the Nestorians, the Jacobites, and to all those who belong to the prophet Jesus.

They all merit respect, because they were already formerly honoured by the Prophet* with a document, furnished with his seal, by which he exhorts us to succour them and grant them security. For which cause, we, Chief of the true believers, are disposed to show ourselves benevolent towards them, in order to honour him who has already shewn them his kindness.

They must be relieved from the capitation tax, and that of the tolls, in all the countries and on all the seas of the Mussulmans. On their entering Kamaneh (the Holy Sepulchre) and during the remainder of their pilgrimage, no taxes whatever shall be imposed upon them.

The Christians who visit the Holy Sepulchre must depose for the Patriarch, one drachm and a half of silver money.

The true believers of both sexes are to follow this law (the Sultans and the Chiefs not excepted), and they must submit to it whether they be rich or poor.

Given in presence of all the disciples of the Prophet.

Abdallah, Osman, B. Afan, Saad, Abdor-Rahman, Ibn Auf.

Let faith be given to this writing, which must remain in the hands of the Christians. Let the blessing of God be granted to the Prophet and his disciples.

Let us praise God, the King of the worlds, on whom we repose as on the Prophet, our advocate with him. The 20 Ribuel, Euel of the XV year of the Hegira.

He who reads this Rescript, and who acts in a manner contrary to what it prescribes, from this day until the day of the last judgment, breaks the Convention of God and of his well-beloved Prophet.

* Such is the rigid respect the Mussulmans have ever testified to the *engagements* and treaties they enter into.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COURTS MARTIAL IN GEORGIA.

In answer to the "Frankfort Journal," denying the existence of a war of the Caucasian population against Russia, we have only to quote a recent Imperial Ukase, by which, from reasons portending no very peaceable condition of those provinces, which the Reader shall find explained in that instrument, civil tribunals are superseded by a Court Martial.

In consequence of a representation made by General Baron de Rosen, Commander of a separate corps of the Caucasus, to the effect that the Nomadic Tartars of the districts Bartshalinsk, Kasacks, and Shamshadilsh, in Georgia, who compose the majority of the population in those provinces, continue, in defiance of all the measures adopted by the Government, to rob and plunder travellers; and that, according to the prejudices prevailing amongst them, all such crimes are looked upon by them as deeds of valour, and the guilty never fail to meet with protection; His Imperial Majesty has most graciously ordered that such offenders shall not as heretofore be delivered over to the civil tribunals for trial, but that, as the General may think requisite, they may be brought before a Court Martial: and that the latter shall institute an inquiry into the cases with the utmost possible speed, in order that punishment may be inflicted on such criminals without the least delay.

We cannot help confessing, that the state of those provinces must be far from satisfactory, if General Rosen,

whose character for humanity is so generally known, found himself compelled to apply to the Autocrat for such an atrocious instrument — which, placed in his hands, renders him the sole arbiter of life and death of the whole population. The consequences of such Ukases are incalculable We have before us one which was issued during the Polish war in 1831, establishing a Court Martial for the purpose of stifling the insurrection in Lithuania. In consequence of it the inhabitants of that province were doomed to have their properties confiscated; numbers of the inhabitants transported to Siberia; parents were held responsible for their children; the latter were dragged off to military colonies and capital punishment was inflicted on the slightest cause of suspicion. The whole country was then made a theatre of woe and misery, which, after the lapse of five years since the provinces have been pacified, cannot be put an end to. Is the same course to be pursued with respect to Georgia?

To comprehend the whole extent of calamity implied in any of these measures, when they are connected with political objects, of which the Government is extremely jealous, we adduce a specimen of an Ukase of the year 1832, prohibiting the Lithuanians from speaking on politics.

The military Governor of Wilna, Prince Dolgorouki, being convinced from *trustworthy reports* addressed to his Highness and from his own experience, that notwithstanding all the publications with respect to the surveillance of public order, and the police *(blogoczynija)*, in the government graciously entrusted to his care, and in contempt of all the measures dictated by moderation for establishing quiet and public security in every quarter of his government: in fine, that, notwithstanding several *proclamations* made by the local authorities, and *read in churches*, with the view of warning those who disobey the commands of the authorities *from responsibility to the law*, frequent instances of *dissemi-*

inventors of false reports and dangerous doctrines are found here and there amongst the people; an act the more culpable, and the more deserving severe and ignominous punishment, as these inventors of idle reports and groundless stories are not *common people (prostoludij)*, who, after taking notice of the folly of such agitators, *remain quiet at home*, but rank rather among the *nobles and functionaries (dwaranij, czynownki)*. As these are *but few* and insignificant in number, it would have been better not to take any notice of them; yet, thinking it requisite that the *incorrigible* reporters of all foolish stories should be *persecuted (presladowanij)*, and, as dangerous people, *expelled* the government, the Prince Governor has deigned by his Ukase of June 10, No. 1460, to make all the authorities acquainted that it be their duty to watch over their *subalterns* and *clerks* in their respective *bureaux*, and to observe their *moral conduct* in *private and public*, as well as their *family connexions, their friends*, and all with whom they associate. Be it also remarked, that it is also their duty, if the report be founded on *suspicion*, to accompany it by *remarks and opinions of their own* for my notice, that according to the degree of their guilt they may be either *suspended* from their office, or *dismissed*, or brought before the *tribunal*, or put under the *surveillance of the police*, or imprisoned, or *shut up in a fortress*, or sent into the *interior of Russia*, or to *Siberia* (!!) On the other hand, if his Highness should himself obtain intelligence of an unsuitable conduct, absurd judgment, or propagation of *dangerous notions respecting politics*, or, in short, of premeditated and unsuitable (*nieblagonamierennom i nieblagonaduznom*) behaviour of any of the *employés*, in all these cases the *chief* of the latter, and the *head* of the department to which he belongs, shall be most severely examined as to the *motive they had for concealing the misdemeanor of their subaltern*, and thus neglecting to *accuse* him; they, in consequence, will themselves incur the punishment as *incapable for their office*, be dismissed from it, and *tried* and *punished* in proportion to the importance of the delinquency, which will be seen from the inquiry instituted against them. His Highness has also desired to extend the same watchfulness and *responsibility to*

the law, on the citizens, proprietors of villages, and
In noticing it, I command immediately to employ
measures for the literal execution of his Highness's U
ing in particular your attention and surveillance on th
servants of the *bureaux*, no less than on all other pe
under your authority, and that all may know the seve
vocable responsibility to the Ukase. You are to inf
mediately of all those who might *already have spread*
or absurd doctrines, or have manifested political opi
general, whose conduct may not be altogether prude
able; and let your report be accompanied by an anne
testible facts and sufficient evidence, that I may infor
ness of it, with the view of *fixing the kind of pun*
effecting its execution.

(Signed) DOPPEL
Substitute of the Civi

Would not the most tyrannical Pacha of Turk
seeing such a document as this? It speaks for
abstain from all comment on it. We only allow c
add, that the consequences arising out of the rec
issued for the Georgian districts will ultimately
disastrous and deplorable as they have proved to
patriots. The Imperial Order needs only to be a
to be equally mischievous, and this it can be to
when once issued as it has been. Pursuant to a
which General Rosen is permitted to bring whon
thinks requisite before a Court Martial, he is
every thing, and to execute his decrees by the b
his *corps, if he can.*

We conclude by repeating, that the adoption o
of rigour in Georgia similar to those which have
upon in Poland, is not in the least consistent with
of tranquillity and order, which the "Frankfor

is anxious to make the world believe to prevail at the Caucasus.

The Nomadic tribes of the Tartars appear to have united and made common cause with the Tcherkesses against their Russian oppressors.

THE DIET OF WURTEMBURG.

Stuttgardt, 29th July, 1836.

The session of the Diet of Wurtemburg, of January to Jul 1836, has been principally distinguished by the struggle agains the Upper Chamber, (Standesherren Kammer) a struggle in whic the Deputies were supported by the government, and whic tended to authorize the abolition of the payment of many ancie feudal charges. This discussion was the more difficult of sol tion, as the constitution only allows to a certain extent the gover ment of Wurtemburg to modify the opinion of the Upper Cham ber, by the creation of new peers. However, some concessio have been obtained. As regards other important questions wi which the session was occupied, and especially that which regar the press, no result has been arrived at.

This session has had ninety-four sittings, and terminated t 16th July. At this date, the definitive vote on the Budget h occasioned, according to custom, the expression of the *motives* which the votes were founded; and these speeches have, to certain degree, characterized the political colour of the assemb Nineteen votes were opposed to it. Seventy votes were in favo of the Budget. This is done at Stuttgardt by terminating t votes by *no* or *yes*.

Two remarkable speeches were delivered, one by the Depu Schmid, who declared for its adoption because the governme had not spontaneously oppcsed many ameliorations, or abolish abuses, but that doubtless circumstances had impeded it. F insisted on the necessity of maintaining towards foreign powe and the Diet the independence of Wurtemburg. This speech m be inserted in the journals of the country.

The speech of M. Pfizer, a Deputy celebrated for his work entitled "Correspondence between two Germans," will only be published later in the voluminous collection of the accounts of the Chambers. The substance of M. Pfizer's speech was as follows:—

"If the state of the finances presented to the Chamber was only to be considered in a financial point of view, I should say *Yes*; for I do not seek celebrity in a systematic opposition. But the Minister of the Crown, who has declared, in the discussion of the Budget, that the right of refusing the supplies was only a theory, might have added afterwards the experience of these later years, that the whole of our constitution is a theory, which will not be put into practice so long as the absolute powers weigh on Germany as heretofore. In order to protest against a system which is apparently imposed upon us, against a system which would shake all faith in the sanctity of right and the inviolability of oaths; in order to protest against a line of policy disastrous to dynasties and the people; in order not to put the stamp of approbation on the inefficacy of the charter and the weakness of the representation:—for these motives I say *No*."

In consequence of proceedings in Switzerland against the members of "*Young Germany*," many persons have been arrested even in Germany, among others, a Frankforter who has resided for some time at Offenbach, in Hesse-Darmstadt. Brought before the authorities at Offenbach, he was conducted to Darmstadt, and put in prison. Researches are making at the Universities.

ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRUSSIA.

To the Editor of the Portfolio.

Leipzig, July 16, 1836.

SIR,

Public opinion (at least in Germany) is one thing, and Cabinet Policy is another. I have been endeavouring to prove, that the attempts to reason the people of the Constitutional States into a persuasion of the blessings of absolute power have been unsuccessful, and that the blame does not rest with that portion of the German people, if hitherto they have not been able to enjoy the undisturbed possession of their newly recovered liberties, or if the Germanic League has not yet assumed an independent attitude of foreign policy. If on this subject a doubt should still remain, I may simply ask, whether the English people were to be held answerable for the disuse of Parliaments and the misrule of Charles the Second, and whether, from their long suffering in this and similar instances, a settled distate for representative government is necessarily to be inferred. I might further allude to the disgraceful transactions between Charles the Second and Louis the Fourteenth, and proceed to ask, whether the English people are on that account to be charged with having thrown themselves into the arms of France, when it is upon record, that even the Duke of York, with all his bigotry and his love of arbitrary power, was at times alive to a sense of danger, and when, in the Cabinet Council, he was heard to declare, "it was plain that France aimed at the Universal Monarchy, and that none but his Majesty could hinder them from it, in the posture that Christendom stood?" (Memoirs of Sir William Temple, part 2nd.) Sir, I confess that I have not been led into this parallel by chance, but I do think it deeply illustrative of the present position of European affairs. Never, since the death of

Louis the Fourteenth, has the world witnessed so vast a scheme, so deeply laid and so artfully promoted. I will not even allow to be quoted as an exception the plans of him, who, in our own days, has overshadowed Europe with "the gloom of his glory;" for Bonaparte acted by open force rather than by intrigue. Louis the Fourteenth stands convicted of intriguing with all parties; he is known to have attempted Russell and Sidney, and he taught the Republicans of Holland to mistrust the policy of the Prince of Orange, the only man in the world capable of arresting his progress—even your own *William the Third, the Deliverer, not of England alone, but of Europe.*

I might now go on to analyze the policy of the Constitutional Governments. But I shall dismiss them for the present, to say a few words on the foreign policy of Prussia. It will hardly be necessary to characterise it more minutely; it cannot, I fear, be controverted, that the ties of relationship with Russia are strengthened by a similarity of political principle. A suspicion has of late been entertained, that the earnestness of this alliance has been exaggerated. It is to be wished that this suspicion may in the event prove true, though there are no visible symptoms yet of its being founded in fact, and it is certainly not the interest of Russia to exaggerate in this sense, if she meant to quiet the jealousy of other powers. But a mistake appears to prevail with regard to the state of public opinion in Prussia, which is commonly considered as favourable to the Russian alliance. Give me leave to state that nothing can be more gratuitous than this assertion. The Prussians, if any of the divisions of the German people, are alive to a sense of national honour. They are not, they cannot be, indifferent to the charge brought against their government of subserviency to a foreign power. Even the military spirit which pervades the nation would scorn the idea of being made the willing instrument of foreign ambition. Such sentiments are not whispered in secret; they are openly avowed in Berlin, where, whatever may be the foibles of this capital, greater liberty of speech is certainly allowed than is elsewhere imagined. No more is it a secret, that the

Prussian officers have received at Kalisch an impression very di-ferent indeed from that of the gallant general mentioned in [illegible] last—that they returned *disgusted* with the exhibition, and [illegible] from entertaining any high opinion of the danger to be app[illegible] hended from the Russian army. Nor do the king's advis[illegible] appear to be unanimous in recommending an absolute concurre[illegible] with Russian views; at least one should suppose, it was not [illegible] nothing that M. Ancillon was, on one occasion, (playfully it is sa[illegible] dubbed the "Mussulman." The Crown Prince to be sure has been described as "a stout Russian?" Has he ever been see[illegible] to pay his court to Russia? It is not likely that the heir of [illegible] Crown should willingly consent to its humiliation—and, no[illegible] being his own act, it would be felt as such by any Prince of even moderate parts. But the Crown Prince of Prussia is a man of mind; he is reputed a wit, and, what is more, he is considered to have a political opinion of his own. He will certainly not be mistaken for a liberal—"*son métier est d'être Royaliste.*" I am not aware if he would, with von Raumer, call his father "the greatest Reformer in Europe;" but he is said to be of opinion, that some of these Reforms have been introduced in rather [illegible] summary way; and it is very possible that those of the Nobility in whose society he is known to take pleasure, may have co[illegible] firmed him in this view. It must be granted, that great me[illegible] sures of Reform, emanating solely from the royal will, a[illegible] executed by a still expanding circle of *employés*, depending up[illegible] the king's pleasure, that such Reform, in a country where th[illegible] is no national representation, *may* sometimes appear partial some classes and oppressive to others. But an opposition to present *bureaucratic* system, or, as it is called, to the hiera[illegible] of the *Beamten-Welt*, does not by any means imply a cont[illegible] of right, or an unwillingness to consult the inclinations [illegible] people.

As to the king himself, I need not say that he is one most popular Monarchs of Europe. His people do feel affection for him. Affliction has endeared him to them, a[illegible] have stood by him through good report and evil report.

not of opinion that the king *can* do no wrong; but they firmly believe, that he *will* not do wrong. But for this, they would hardly have submitted, without grumbling, to promises advanced by one administration, and silently set aside by the next; nor to *Cabinet-Orders*, for some of which it appears, that "*la religion de sa Majesté a été trompée;*" nor to other matters, among which stands foremost that same great friendship with Russia. What might the king of Prussia be, if, grown grey with the honest fame of an upright, though sometimes mistaken, policy, he were to conquer for once his inclination, and allow his people to believe that their shield of honour shall shine for ever bright, their royal eagle shall soar undaunted by any mightier presence, and that the dignified, the *truly impartial*, mediation of their king shall be instrumental in preserving the liberties and the peace of Europe! For, be it recollected, it is peace that we want, not war. Only we want *a peace* that shall be both *honourable* and *safe*.

There are not wanting those, who contrast the present ostensible policy of Prussia with the destination imparted to her by the master-mind of the Great Frederick, and defined by the penetration of Herzberg. This intelligent statesman, in the preface to the last volume of his Memoirs, laid down the following principles: "Cette médiocre Monarchie Prussienne (1795) est plus propre que toute autre puissance en Europe, elle est même principalement appellée par sa position geographique, et par ses intérêts à maintenir l'équilibre de l'Allemagne et par conséquent celui de l'Europe *contra quoscunque*." Again: "La Prusse est une puissance trop médiocre, pour qu'elle puisse vouloir être ambitieuse et injuste, et s'aggrandir injustement, ce dont elle serait toujours empêchée par des voisins préponderans; mais elle est assez puissante, pour qu'elle puisse empêcher les desseins injustes et dangereux, au bien général de *tel ou autre voisin trop ambitieux et préponderant*, et dans ces cus pareils, elle peut être sûre de la confiance, du suffrage, et même de l'assistance des autres Etats et Puissances, qui sont avec elle dans les mêmes intérêts." Herzberg was also fully aware of the importance of the Ottoman Empire

being preserved intact; he prided himself in the Convention Reichenbach and the subsequent treaty; he said of the kin whom he describes as the principal mover of them: "Par c moyens il a assuré pour long tems l'existence de l'Empire Ott man en Europe, et de cette manière il à rétabli et garanti ve l'Orient cet équilibre du pouvoir," &c. And Johannes Müll spoke of the two systems placed at the option of the king Prussia in the following terms (Fürstenbund, 251): "Prus might join the greater powers, or some of them, to make co mon cause with them against the minor ones; that is, she mig so far disregard the honour of the Prussian name and her ov interests, as to take the law from the stronger, and give it those who might be so utterly abandoned by God and by the selves, as not to find salvation either in their own resolution, in a great man taking the lead. In this last case, *Prussia wou be sacrificed by the greater powers.* In the most fortunate eve Prussia would be among the first powers the last, the most odic of all, and sure to fall a prey to the others, whenever they m take up a humour of conquest, without an arm being stretch out in defence of her." The other system he describes as tl adopted by Frederick the Great, and experimentally tried in t course of forty years (he wrote in 1787) "the dedication the national energies, not to the selfish purposes of dark ambitic but to the cause of German and European liberty."

GERMANICUS VINDEX.

ERRATA.

Vol. IV. page 2, line 4, for "those islands," read "the Ionian Islands."
83, line 24, for "Russian upon," read "Russian, as upon."

THE PORTFOLIO;

A COLLECTION OF

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AND OTHER

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LONDON:
F. SHOBERL, JUN., 4, LEICESTER STREET,
LEICESTER SQUARE.
1836.

Ve are induced to lay the accompanying Despatch before our ers earlier than we had originally intended, on account of ıt events in Switzerland, on which it is calculated to throw : light.

will doubtless afford to the reader as much matter for re- on as to ourselves, to see the degree of importance which ia attaches to a small spot of territory, so distant from her dominions, and with which she has no direct natural con- on, whilst we, on the other hand, are in the habit of looking witzerland as the lowest in the scale of European States, and ıving hardly any weight whatever in the political balance.

ıt this Despatch is not the first indication we have of Russia g conscious of the advantages to be derived from Switzerland, on account of her geographical position and her republican tutions.

ne of her ablest and most confidential Diplomatists, Capodis- , was the predecessor of M. de Severin, and he remained in zerland until he had succeeded in raising a ferment in favour reece, which rapidly spread over the Continent, the results of h were, the Treaty of July the 6th, and the nomination of odistrias to be President of Greece.

ı this, Capodistrias and the views of Russia were supported he liberals, who were duped into thinking that Russia had principles whatever, and who were led to imagine that Ca- strias was liberally inclined.

ıt, whilst caressing that party, Russia was not unmindful that had Conservative Allies, whose hostility it was necessary to m, and who, if roused against her, might have interposed no ıary obstacles to the objects she had in view. Hence the ervative tenor of the present Despatch; and, if our readers to see this idea further developed, we refer them to a er number, wherein we published the instructions from ıt Nesselrode to M. de Tatistcheff, the Russian Ambassador ienna.

'e conceive it to be a great mistake, although very generally rtained, to suppose that Russian policy is conservative. The

war of opinion in Europe is necessary to Russia. By this she is enabled to play off one party against the other. The cessation of that struggle would considerably diminish her power, and would afford the Governments of Europe leisure to see the crisis she is preparing for them, and to unite for the purpose of averting it.

It has been aptly said that Russia has ends, not principles; but, if she has principles, we consider that they have been much better designated by the Berlin Gazette, wherein they are called destructive.

The most important reflection to which this Despatch gives rise is the expression that "Switzerland is *the key to three important Kingdoms.*"

We feel that we should do injustice to the sagacity of our readers if we were to offer any comment on the profound views contained in this short sentence.

It may help to explain the subserviency of the Court of Turin to the views of Russia, her influence at the Diet of Frankfort, and why the discontents against the Government of Louis Philippe have been studiously fomented in the south-eastern provinces of France.]

INSTRUCTIONS FROM COUNT NESSELRODE TO M. DE SEVERIN,

ENVOY OF RUSSIA TO THE SWISS CONFEDERATION.

St. Petersburg, Jan. 14, 1827.

SIR,

The confidence which the Emperor reposes in you calls you to the honour of representing him in Switzerland; and herewith you will receive the letters which accredit you to the authorities of that country. It is unnecessary to add instructions to these letters. Your long labours in the department of Foreign Affairs, the services which you have rendered in that department, the knowledge which you have thus acquired of the principles which govern the policy of the Russian Cabinet, relieve us from the necessity of explaining

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pie de l'instruction pour Mr. de Sévérin, St. Petersburg, le 14 *Janvier*, 1827.

Monsieur,

La confiance de l'Empereur vous appele à l'honneur de le re-
Esenter en Suisse, et vous trouverez ci-joint les lettres qui vous
créditent auprès des autorités de ce pays. A ces lettres nous
: pourrions pas ajouter d'instructions.(Vos longs travaux au
inistère des affaires étrangères, les services que vous y avez
ndus, la connoissance que vous y avez acquise des principes qui
ésident à la politique du Cabinet de Russie, nous dispensent

to you those general maxims, with which you have been long imbued, and which you have, moreover, studied with a view to their particular application to Switzerland, from the time when I had the pleasure of announcing to you your new and honourable destination. If, then, at the moment of your departure, we trace for you a rapid sketch of the intentions of His Imperial Majesty in regard to his relations with the Helvetic Confederation, it is less with the view of giving you directions than in order to afford you, by expressing to you the wishes of our august Master, a proof of the kind interest which he will always feel for you.

By her geographical position, Switzerland is the key of three great countries. Her intelligence

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du soin de vous developper des maximes générales dont vous êtes pénétré depuis long temps et que vous avez, au reste, etudié dans leur application particulière a la Suisse, depuis le jour ou j'ai eu le plaisir de vous annoncer votre nouvelle et honorable destination. Si donc, au moment de votre depart, nous vous traçons un rapide aperçu des intentions de Sa Majesté Imperiale relatives à ses rapports avec la Confédération Helvetique, c'est moins pour vous donner des directions que pour vous fournir, en vous exprimant les voeux de notre auguste maître, une preuve de la bienveillante sollicitude que vous ne cesserez de lui inspirer.

Par sa position geographique, la Suisse est la clef de trois

and her character give her a distinguished rank in the scale of European civilization. Finally, by the acts of the Congress of Vienna and of Paris, she has obtained a guarantee for her present organisation, for her neutrality, and for her independence.

These few words suffice to point out the interests over which you will have to watch, in the exercise of your functions.

From the time that diplomacy, taking a part in he ameliorations of every kind which were taking place in Europe, made it the aim of its deepest nd most useful combinations to establish among he different Powers such an equilibrium as might ecure the continuance of peace, the independence f Switzerland became one of the first axioms of

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rands pays. Par ses lumières et ses moeurs elle occupe un rang istingué dans la civilisation Européenne. Enfin, par les actes s Congrès de Vienne et de Paris, elle a obtenu la garantie de n organisation présente, de sa neutralité, et de son indépenance.

Ce peu de mots suffit pour caractèriser les intérêts auxquels us aurez à veiller dans l'exercice de Vos functions.

Dés que la diplomatie, participant aux améliorations de tout nre qui s'opéroient en Europe, eut pour but, dans ses combiisons, les plus profondes et les plus utiles, d'établir entre les dirses puissances un equilibre qui assurat la durée de la paix, l'in-

policy. It was consecrated by the Treaties of Westphalia; and it is easy to prove from history that it has never been violated without Europe having to deplore universal wars and calamities.

At the time of the French Revolution, Switzerland sensibly felt the shock which convulsed the two hemispheres. Her territory was invaded, armies passed through it, and battles deluged with blood a soil which the discords of states had long respected. At the time of the dominion of Buonaparte, Switzerland had her share of the despotism which reigned over the continent. Finally appeared the alliance with its noble triumphs; and Switzerland, which had been overthrown during the revolutionary storm, and enslaved during the reign

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dépendance de la Suisse devint un des premiers axiômes de la politique. Les Traités de Westphalie la consacrèrent, et il est facile de prouver, l'histoire à la main, qu' elle ne fut jamais violée sans que l'Europe n'eût à gémir de guerres and de calamités universelles.

Lors de la révolution française, la Suisse éprouva fortement la secousse qui vint ébranler les deux mondes. Son territoire fut envahi, des armées le franchirent, et des batailles ensanglantèrent un sol que les discordes des Etats avoient long temps respecté. Lors de la domination de Buonaparte, la Suisse eut sa part du despotisme qui pressoit sur le continent. Finalement apparut l'Alliance, avec ses nobles triomphes, et la Suisse qui avoit été

of conquest, became once more independent and neutral, from the day when the rights of nations recovered their empire, and when peace was the wish of the Monarch, of whom this change was the salutary work. It was then that the Helvetic Confederacy occupied the mind of the Emperor Alexander, of glorious memory; and then, also, that its independence received a solemn sanction by the acts of 1814 and 1815, which completed and secured the firm re-establishment of general tranquillity.

One may, consequently, assert that Switzerland is one of the points upon which the equilibrium of Europe depends; the form of political existence which she enjoys constitutes one of the elements of the

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bouleversée pendant la tourmente révolutionaire et asservie pendant le régime des conquêtes, rédevint indépendante et neutre du jour ou les droits des nations recouvrèrent leur empire, et ou la paix fut le voeu du Monarque dont ce changement etoit le salutaire ouvrage.

Ce fut alors que la Confédération Helvetique occupa la pensée de l'Empereur Alexandre de glorieuse mémoire, et alors aussi que son indépendance recut, par les actes de 1814 et 1815, une sanction solennelle, qui completa et assura la retablissment solide de la tranquillité générale.

La Suisse est par conséquent, on peut le dire, un des points sur lesquels repose l'equilibre de l'Europe: le mode d'existence poli-

conservative system, which has succeeded thirty years of storms; and it must be the desire of Russia that this State should continue to cling to and depend upon no other system. She is interested in this, as a power, whose principles and whose sense of her own welfare incline her to wish for peace. She has a right to be so, as a power who has signed the acts of 1814 and 1815.

These considerations will guide you, Sir, in your relations with the Federal authorities. You will find no difficulty in convincing the Magistrates and the most influential men in Switzerland, that our wishes will always be in accordance with their's, for the maintenance of the political prerogatives of their country; that the solicitude with which she inspires the Emperor is hereditary,

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tique dont elle jouit forme un des elémens du systéme conservateur qui a succédé à trente années d'orages, et la Russie doit souhaiter que cet etat continue à ne relever et à ne dependre d'aucun autre.

Elle y est intéressée comme Puissance que ses principes et le sentiment de son propre bien portent à vouloir la paix. Elle en a le droit comme Puissance qui a signé les actes de 1814 et 1815.

Ces considérations vous guideront, Mr. dans vos rapports avec les autorités fédérales. Vous n'aurez pas de peine à convaincre les magistrats et les hommes plus considérés de la Suisse, que leurs voeux s'accorderont toujours avec les nôtres pour le maintien

and that, in order to be conformable to the wishes of our august Monarch, the relations which you are charged to maintain with her must be relations of friendship and of mutual confidence.

But it is not only the external independence of the Helvetic Confederacy, for which the acts of 1814 and 1815 have stipulated. Like all other countries, Switzerland could not avoid the struggle which the French Revolution has created between old and new ideas.

The principles which constitute its Government have felt its effects. A more equal division of power between the different Cantons of which it is composed was the necessary consequence of this influence; and, from the epoch when Switzer-

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des prerogatives politiques de leur patrie, qu' elle inspire à l'Empereur une sollicitude héréditaire, et, qu' afin de se trouver conformes aux désirs de notre auguste Monarque, les relations que vous êtes chargé d'entretenir avec elle doivent être des relations d'amitié et de mutuelle confiance.

Mais ce n'est pas seulement l'indépendance exterieure de la confederation Helvetique que les actes du Congres de 1814 et 1815 ont stipulée. Comme tous les autres pays, la Suisse n'avoit pu se preserver de la lutte que la révolution française a ouverte entre les idées anciennes et les idées nouvelles.

Les principes constitutifs de son gouvernement s'en etoient ressentis. Un partage plus égal de pouvoir entre les divers cantons dont elle se compose fut l'effet nécessaire de cette in-

land placed herself under the liberating banners of the Allies in 1813, it became evident that the internal organisation which had formerly existed there would be no longer applicable; that the last twenty years had brought to light interests which justly claimed respect; and that a wise compromise between the past and the present could alone restore peace and happiness to these countries. This was effected; the basis of a new Federal Convention was laid; and this Convention, formally guaranteed by the treaties concluded at the Congress of 1815, and thenceforth as inviolable as these treaties themselves, was for the future to be considered as forming an integral part of the new European system.

Russia, then, is under the obligation of contri-

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fluence, et, dès l'epoque ou la Suisse se rangea en 1813 sous les drapeaux libérateurs des Alliés, il devint évident que l'organisation intérieure qui y avoit existé autrefois n' y seroit plus applicable, que les 20 dernières années y avoient mis au jour des intérêts qui réclamaient de justes égards, et qu' une sage transaction entre le passé et le présent pouvoit seule rendre à ces contrées le repos et le bonheur. Elle eut lieu; les bases d'un nouveau pacte fédéral furent posées, et ce pacte revêtu d'une formelle garantie dans les Traités négociés au Congrès de 1815 et désormais aussi inviolable que ces Traités mêmes, dût être considéré dès-lors, comme faisant partie intégrante du nouveau système

buting, as much as she possibly can, *(but without exercising a right of interference, which she will never assume, in affairs which do not directly concern her)*, to the stability of the present régime of Switzerland; and your first care, Sir, must be to prove that Russia acknowledges and fulfils this obligation. Your explanations on this subject with your colleagues, the representatives of other Courts, as well as with the functionaries of the country, must be as positive as the clauses to whose authority you are to appeal. They will leave no doubt, with regard to the intention of the Emperor, that the Helvetic Confederacy should maintain itself and prosper, such as it has been definitively constituted by the acts of 1814 and 1815.

Européen. La Russie est donc dans l'obligation de contribuer, autant que cela lui est possible, mais sans exercer un droit d'ingérance, qu' elle ne s'attribuera jamais dans les affaires qui ne la concernent pas directement, à la stabilité du régime actuel de la Suisse, et votre premier soin, Mr. sera de prouver que la Russie reconnoit et remplit cette obligation. Vos explications à ce sujet avec vos collégues, les représentans des autres Cours, comme avec les fonctionnaires du pays, seront aussi positives que les clauses dont vous invoquerez l'autorité. Elles ne laisseront aucun doute sur l'intention de l'Empereur, que la *Confédération Helvétique se soutienne et prospère telle que les actes de* 1814 *et* 1815 *l'ont définitivement constituée.*

But Switzerland is threatened by two dangers, of which our wish to co-operate in her welfare induces us to warn her, through your agency, and with perfect frankness. Placed in the midst of States where the leaven of revolution still ferments; between Piedmont, where the events of 1821 have but too clearly revealed the secret and the power of a party, the enemy of all legitimate order; France, *where numberless exciters of disturbances are active in diffusing the spirit which agitates themselves; and the South of Germany, where are to be found the ramifications of the same plot:* Switzerland, with her republican forms, will always have to fear that these miserable men will seek to establish in her bosom the focus of their guilty activity, and that, reckoning upon the

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Mais il existe pour elle deux écueils que notre désir de cooperer à son bien-être nous engage à lui signaler par votre organe, et avec une entière franchise. Placée entre des états ou fermentent encore des levains de revolution, entre le Piémont, où les évènemens de 1821 n' ont que trop révélé le secrét et la puissance d'une secte ennemie de toute ordre légitime, la France où de nombreux artisans de troubles s'efforcent de communiquer le mouvement qui les agite, et le Midi de l'Allemagne, ou se retrouvent les ramifications du même complot; la Suisse, avec ses formes républicaines aura toujours à craindre que ces hommes de malheur ne cherchent à établir dans son sein le foyer de leur activité cou-

institutions by which she is governed, and upon the neutrality of her territory, they may flatter themselves with being able to prepare there, without interruption, for the accomplishment of the plots which they form against nations and kings.

The attention of the principal Cabinets of Europe has been already drawn to this danger by the representations of the Sardinian Government at the Congress of Verona. They pointed out the serious inconvenience that would ensue from the sojourn in Switzerland of men obliged to fly from a country *whose ruin they had conspired*; and the Protocols of the Congress, as well as the subsequent decisions of the Conference of Paris, have laid down principles with regard to these points,

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pable, et que, comptant sur les institutions qui la régissent, et sur la neutralité de son territoire, ils ne se flattent d' y preparer sans inquietude l'accomplissement des projets qu' ils trament contre les peuples et les Rois.

Déjà, au Congrés de Verone, les reclamations du Gouvernement Sarde ont appelé sur ce danger l'attention des principaux Cabinets de l'Europe. Elles ont demontré les graves inconvéniens du séjour que feroient en Suisse des hommes contraints de fuir une patrie dont ils avoient conspiré la ruine, et les Protocols du Congrès, ainsi que les décisions subsequentes de la conférence de Paris, ont fixé à cet egard des principes que les autorités Helvé-

which the Helvetic authorities cannot apply too scrupulously or too strictly.

We must here do them the justice to say, that the steps taken towards them, in consequence of the wishes expressed by the Court of Turin, have been crowned with success; that all the representations of your predecessor, on this occasion, and in several cases of a similar description, have met with a favourable reception; and that the answers which he has transmitted to us on the subject of the communications with which he was charged concerning the discovery, the judgment, and the punishment of the horrible plot which had been formed in Russia, breathed sentiments, the expression of which is honourable to the views and spirit of the federal government. But, at the same time,

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tiques ne sauroient appliquer avec trop de scrupule et d' exactitude.

Nous leur rendons ici la justice de dire que les démarches faites auprés d'elles à la suite des voeux enoncés par la Cour de Turin ont été couronnées de succés; que toutes les réprésentations de votre prédécesseur, dans cette occasion et dans plusieurs cas de même genre ont reçu un favorable accueil; et que les réponses qu'il nous a transmises aux communications dont il avait été chargé, concernant la déccouverte, le jugement, et la punition du complot horrible qui s'etait formé en Russie, respiraient des sentimens dont l'expression honore les vues et l'esprit du gouvernement

we must say, that the apprehensions of the states friendly to peace, with regard to the revolutionary plots which were carried on in Switzerland, are not yet entirely dissipated; and though no decided proof has yet attested that she is, without her own knowledge, perhaps, the centre of secret societies which meditate insurrection and regicide, it is, nevertheless, true that repeated warnings, and presumptive evidence of more than one kind, do not allow us to regard this opinion as devoid of all foundation. You will not fail, Sir, to observe, with an attentive eye, any indications of this new danger. You will not fail to point it out to the vigilance of those magistrates whose duty it is to prevent it. Declare to them, with that energy which

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fédéral. Mais nous le dirons egalement, les appréhensions des etats amis de la paix à l'égard des menées revolutionnaires qui se poursuivaient en Suisse ne sont pas entièrement dissipées, et si aucune preuve materielle n'atteste encore, qu'elle est, à son insçu, peut-être, la centre de sociétés secretes qui méditent et l'insurrection et le régicide, il n'en est pas moins vraie, que des avertissemens répétés et des présomptions de plus d'une espèce ne nous permettent pas de regarder cette opinion comme dénuée de tout fondement. Vous ne manquerez pas, M. de suivre d'un oeil attentif les indices de ce nouveau péril. Vous ne manquerez pas de le signaler à la vigilance des magistrats appelés à le prévenir. Déclarez leur, avec toute cette force que donne la conscience d'in-

the knowledge of good and pure intentions inspires, that, as a pledge for the stability and prosperity of Switzerland, her existence must be inoffensive. Make them understand that it would no longer bear this character, if Helvetic liberty were to further the efforts of the genius of revolution; if the causes of the uneasiness which is manifested were not sifted to the bottom; if the friendly voice of the Cabinets which express it were not listened to. Finally, you are to remark to them, and to all those who preserve a sincere patriotism in Switzerland, that the interests which they have most at heart, the interests of their independence and of their national institutions, are in accordance with our counsels; that Switzerland would be the first victim of the machinations, whose progress

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tentions bienveillantes et pures, que, pour offrir le gage d'une heureuse durée, l'existence de la Suisse doit être inoffensive. Faites leur comprendre qu'elle ne porterait plus ce caractère, si, les libertés Helvétiques devaient protéger les efforts du génie des révolutions, si les motifs des inquiétudes qu'on manifeste n'etaient pas approfondis, si la voix amicale des cabinets qui les expriment n'était pas écoutée. Observez leur enfin, et observez à tous ceux, qui conservent, en Suisse, un sincère patriotisme, que les interêts qui les tiennent le plus à coeur, les interêts de leur indépendance et de leurs institutions nationales, sont d'accord avec nos conseils, que la Suisse serait la première victime des machinations dont

she had imprudently allowed; that a frightful democracy would take place of the wisdom and intelligence of the government which now presides over her destinies: it is, then, of urgent necessity to probe the wound, and to heal it, to take account of all criminal plots, and to suppress them with energy.

Add to this, that on these conditions Switzerland may feel sure of finding in the Emperor Nicholas the affectionate sentiments of the Emperor Alexander, the same support in the day of danger, the same resolution to guarantee to her the peaceable enjoyment of *the rights accorded to her by treaties.* If this language should rally well-intentioned men, if it should encourage them to

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elle aurait imprudemment tolerée le cours, qu'une democratie hideuse remplaçerait la sagesse et les lumières du gouvernement, qui préside aujourd'hui à ses destinées, qu'il est donc urgent de sonder la plaie et de la guérir, de constater les menées criminales et de les reprimer avec énergie.

Ajoutez qu'a ces conditions la Suisse peut être sûre de trouver dans l'Empéreur Nicholas les sentimens affectueux de l'Empéreur Alexandre, le même soutien aux jours de danger, la même résolution de lui garantir la jouissance paisible des droits que les traités lui accordent.

Si ce langage rallie les hommes de bien, s'il les détermine à étendre de tout leur pouvoir le cercle des opinions moderées qu'ils

extend with all their power the influence of the moderate opinions which they profess, and to oppose the progress of the spirit of change and disorder, the good cause, and the Helvetic confederacy itself, will be indebted to you for a great service.

The Emperor is not ignorant that, in some of the cantons, symptoms of another threatening reaction have been remarked; and it appears beyond a doubt, that a party exists there which endeavours to modify the present, not in order to effect innovations, but to recall the past, and to revive the forms of administration and the constitution which governed Switzerland nearly forty years ago. His Imperial Majesty can no more favour such intentions as these, than the attempts which we have

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professent, et à s'opposer aux progrés de l'esprit de changement et desordre, la bonne cause, et la confédération Helvétique elle-même, vous seront redevables d'un grand service.

L'Empéreur n'ignore pas qu'on rémarque dans quelques uns des Cantons les symptômes d'une autre réaction ménaçante, et il parait hors de donte qu'il y existe un parti qui cherche à modifier le présent, non pour réaliser des innovations, mais pour ramener le passé, et pour faire revivre les formes administratives et la constitution qui gouvernerent la Suisse il y a prés de quarante ans.

Sa Majesté Impériale ne saurait favoriser de telles intention plus qu'elle ne favorisera jamais les tentatives dont il a eté que-

mentioned above. The policy of Russia is to be found *entire in her treaties*, and *in a juste milieu between extreme opinions. Now, these treaties do not allow of this retrograde march*, which, under the present circumstances in which Switzerland is placed, would itself be *a revolution;* and, besides, it would be vain to endeavour to conceal from one's-self that such projects, the abuse of all that is most sacred among men, of *a religion essentially conservative*, in order to spread them, the means put in operation to induce those governments to accede to them, or in order to execute them in spite of their opposition, would directly lead Europe to the results prepared for her by the labours of the revolutionists, and that to encourage the former would be to assist the latter.

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tion plus haut. La politique de la Russie est tout entière dans ses traités, et dans un juste milieu entre les opinions extrêmes. Or les traités n'admettent pas cette marche retrograde, qui serait aussi une revolution dans les circonstances où la Suisse est placée, et d'ailleurs on se dissimulerait en vain que de tels projets, l'abus fait pour les répandre de ce qu'il y à de plus sacré parmi les hommes, d'une religion essentiellement conservatrice, les moyens mis en oeuvre pour engager ces gouvernemens à y souscrire, ou pour les executer malgré eux, conduisent l'Europe tout droit aux résultats que lui préparent les travaux des revolutionnaires, et qu'encourager les prémiers c'est prêter la main aux seconds.

Thus, sir, you will show equal disapprobation of that tendency which has the triumph of democracy for its aim, and of that whose object is to re-establish in Switzerland an order of things which henceforth would not be consonant either with her wishes or her wants, or with those acts which have pacified the world.*

Such are the instructions which the Emperor has desired us to address to you; we have limited ourselves to general observations, because at this moment we have no particular interest to discuss, no special negociation to pursue, with the Helvetic confederacy.

Ainsi M. vous désapprouverez également et la tendance qui aurait pour bût le trionphe de la democratie, et celle dont l'objet serait de rétablir en Suisse un ordre de choses qui ne s'accorde désormais ni avec ses voeux et ses besoins, ni avec les actes qui ont pacifié le monde.

Telles sont les instructions que l'Empéreur nous charge de vous adresser. Nous nous sommes bornés à des observations genérales, parceque nous n'avons pour le moment aucun interêt particulier à

* How does this determined interference in the affairs of Switzerland accord with the previous assertion in this Despatch, that Russia disclaims "the exercise of a right of interference, which she will never assume in affairs which do not directly concern her?" See page 187.

Russia's anxiety to preserve the independence of Switzerland according to Treaty, is very much akin to her respect of Treaties with regard to Cracow.—Ed.

It will not be difficult for you to show that the orders with which you are furnished are dictated by a sincere and lively desire to secure the tranquillity and prosperity of Switzerland; and you will perceive, sir, that they confer a real importance upon your functions. This importance is still farther augmented, if we consider that you are about to occupy a post, where the south of Germany, the north of Italy, and the eastern provinces of France, will be under your eye; and where, indeed, they ought constantly to excite your attention; and from whence you cannot but find occasions of transmitting to us useful information.

We doubt not but that you will prove yourself

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discuter, aucune negociation spéciale à suivre, avec la Confédération Helvetique.

Il ne vous sera pas difficile de démontrer que les ordres dont vous êtes muni sont dictés par un sincère et vif désir d'assurer la tranquillité et la prospérité de la Suisse et vous concevrez aussi M. qu'ils donnent une importance réelle à vos fonctions. Cette importance augmente encore si l'on considère que vous allez occuper un poste où le midi de l'Allemagne, le nord de l'Italie, et les provinces orientales de la France se présenteront à vos regards, où ils doivent même les attirer constamment, et où vous ne pouvez que trouver l'occasion de nous transmettre des informations utiles.

Vous justifierez, nous n'en doutons pas, la confiance de sa Ma-

deserving of the confidence of his Imperial Majesty, and, like your predecessor, you will acquire, in the execution of the duties of your office, new claims to the approbation and to the esteem of our august sovereign.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

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jesté Impériale, et, ainsi que vôtre predecesseur, vous saurez acquérir par votre gestion de nouveaux titres à la satisfaction et à l'estime de notre auguste souverain.

Recevez, &c.

PRUSSIAN MEMOIR

ON THE

INTRODUCTION OF A LESS RESTRICTED PUBLICITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE DIET.

The German Diet, immediately after its first meeting, in its full assembly of November 14, 1816, pursuant to a previous secret deliberation, resolved unanimously, and particularly with the expressly declared full agreement of the Imperial Austrian Court, " that the publication of the deliberations of the Diet shall be established as a rule, with the exception only of those deliberations which, on each occasion, may not be intended for publicity." Hereupon the question, Within what space of time is it most convenient that this publicity shall each

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PREUSSISCHE DENKSCHRIFT.

Die deutsche Bundes-Versammlung beschloss, gleich nach ihrem ersten Zusammentritt in der Plenar-Sitzung vom 14. November 1816, auf den Grund der vorausgegangenen vertraulichen Berathungen, einhellig und namentlich mit dem ausdrücklich erklärten, vollkommenen Einverständnisse des kaiserlich-österreichischen Hofes, " dass die Bekanntmachung der Bundestags-Verhandlungen durch den Druck als Regel festzusetzen sey; die der Publicität nicht zu übergebenden Verhandlungen hingegen jedesmal besonders auszunehmen wären." Hierbei kam die Frage, in welchem Zeit-Momente diese regelmässige

time be effected? was only so far taken into consideration, that the Envoy of the free town of Bremen observed, that it ought to take place four days after the distribution of the printed minutes to the respective embassies. Perhaps it would have been better to have determined at once, at that time, *more distant* and *less frequent* periods for the regular recurrence of the publication of the deliberations of the Diet. But, instead of this, the practice arose of publishing the minutes of the Diet a week after each meeting, and of noticing the whole of its deliberations, without exception. The bookseller, Andrä, obtained the privilege of publishing these minutes in a quarto edition, which, alluding in the preface to "the high importance to all Ger-

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Bekanntmachung jedesmal am angemessensten zu bewirken sey, nur insoweit zur Verhandlung, als der Gesandte der freien Stadt Bremen bevorwortete, dass derselben erst vier Tage nach der Vertheilung der den Gesandtschaften zukommenden Abdrücke der Protokolle, statt gegeben werde. Vielleicht hätte man wohlgethan, gleich damals spätere und seltenere Termine für die regelmässig wiederkehrende Bekanntmachung der Bundestags-Verhandlungen zu bestimmen. Anstatt dessen aber entstand die Praxis, noch vor Ablauf einer Woche nach jeder Bundestags-Sitzung, das Protokoll derselben—in der Regel mit allen darin aufgenommenen Verhandlungen—öffentlich im Drucke erscheinen zu lassen. Die Andrä'sche Buchhandlung erhielt die Vergünstigung zur Herausgabe und dem Verlage einer 4to Ausgabe der solchergestalt publicirten Protokolle, welche in ihrer Vorrede, mit Hinweisung auf "die hohe Wichtigkeit der Verhandlungen des Bundestags für ganz

many of the deliberations of the Diet," shows that the particular object of the book is " to satisfy, by this *authentic collection* of its acts and minutes, the desires of the public, as well as the claims of cotemporary history." The legitimacy of such a desire, and the existence of such a claim, were both acknowledged by the Diet itself, when the Imperial Austrian presiding Ambassador declared, in his first speech, on the 11th November, 1816,—

" All Germany now looks forward with anxious expectation to ascertain the spirit which our deliberations will display."

And afterwards, when adverting to Art. X. and XI. of the federative Constitution, he adds—

" These are the articles by which the German confederation will be chiefly consolidated, and the

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Deutschland," ihren Zweck dahin aussprach, " durch authentische Sammlung der dazu gehörigen Aktenstücke und Protokolle dem Verlangen des Publikums und dem Bedürfnisse der Zeitgeschichte Genüge zu leisten." Die Rechtmässigkeit eines solchen Verlangens und das Vorhandenseyn eines solchen Bedürfnisses waren in der Bundes-Versammlung selbst anerkannt worden, als die kaiserlich-österreichische Präsidial-Gesandtschaft in ihrem, am 11 November 1816 gehaltenen, ersten Vortrage bemerkte:

" Ganz Deutschland sieht jetzt mit gespannter Erwartung dem Geiste entgegen, der unsere Berathungen beleben wird."

Und hiernächst, auf die Artikel X. und XI. der Bundes-Akte übergehend, die Aeusserung hinzufügte:

" Diese Artikel sind es, wodurch der deutsche Bund seine Haupt-

special welfare of the community, as well as that of each individual, will be promoted. The public attention of Germany is, with confidence, attracted to these prominent topics. Our exertions shall tend to do homage to the just expectations of public opinion, and to satisfy it."

In settling the final acts of the Congress of Vienna, which has secured, through its complementary and illustrative principles, an appropriate development to the decisions of the federative constitution, by which alone the confederation was also completed—it was thought necessary to abolish the rule established by the resolution of November 14, 1816; yet the abovementioned mode of its application was maintained for about eight years, notwithstanding the just apprehension it had created.

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grundlage erhalten soll; sie sind es, welche vorzüglich eben so das Wohl der Gesammtheit, als zugleich auch selbst jenes der einzelnen Deutschen, bezwecken. Mit Vertrauen beschäftigen diese ausgehobenen Gegenstände die öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit in Deutschland. Unser Bestreben wird es seyn, gerechter Erwartung der öffentlichen Meinung zu huldigen, ihr zu entsprechen."

Bei Feststellung der Wiener Schluss-Akte, welche den Bestimmungen der Bundes-Akte, durch ergänzende und erläuternde Grundgesetze, eine zweckgemässe Entwickelung und hiermit dem Bundes-Vereine selbst die erforderliche Vollendung gesichert hat, fand man sich veranlasst, jene durch den Beschluss vom 14. November 1816 angenommene Regel aufzuheben, ja selbst die oben bezeichnete Art und Weise ihrer praktischen Anwendung behauptete sich, ungeachtet der mit Recht dawider erhobenen Bedenken, beinahe acht Jahre lang.

Doubtless these apprehensions deserved mature examination and discussion, on the part of all the confederated governments; in consequence of which, adequate provisions ought to have been concerted for the purpose of settling a convenient mode of executing the rule in question.

This general examination and discussion was, however, anticipated by the proceedings described in the minute of the nineteenth sitting of July 1, 1824, § 116, which totally changed the whole state of the question.

"The President," so it is recorded, "observed, on occasion of a special notice relative to a reduction of the military contingents of the confederation—it appears that deliberations which concern the defensive measures of the confederation are

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Allerdings verdienten jene Bedenken eine reifliche Prüfung und Erörterung von Seiten aller Bundes-Regierungen, auf deren Grund demnächst die erforderliche, hinlänglich vorbereitete Vereinbarung wegen eines angemessenen Verfahrens bei Ausübung der fraglichen Regel zu treffen gewesen wäre.

Dieser allseitigen Prüfung und Erörterung kam die im Protokoll der neunzehnten Sitzung vom 1. July 1824, § 116, verzeichnete Verhandlung zuvor, indem sie die ganze Lage der Sache veränderte.

"Das Präsidium—heisst es daselbst—bemerkte auf Anlass eines zur Sprache gekommenen, die Erleichterung der Bundes-Militär-Contingente betreffenden, speciellen Falls: es scheine, dass Verhandlungen, welche das Vertheidigungs-Wesen des deutschen Bundes betreffen,

not, from their nature, suited to be embodied in protocols of the formal meetings destined for publicity. In general, the Diet might indeed find it expedient to order several deliberations, which hitherto have been embodied in the formal protocols, merely to be printed *loco dictaturæ*.

"The practice hitherto pursued of giving publicity, with very few exceptions, to the whole of the deliberations of the Diet, has occasioned many an abuse, which certainly every well-disposed individual deprecates, but which for this very reason must be put a stop to. The German Diet is a permanent Congress of Ministers, representing the aggregate of the members of the confederation: in this assembly an amicable exchange of ideas relative to topics of general interest is to take place

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ihrer Natur nach, zur Aufnahme in die zur Publicität gelangenden Protokolle der förmlichen Sitzungen nicht geeignet seyen. Ueberhaupt dürfte die Bundes-Versammlung sich veranlasst finden, mehrere Verhandlungen, welche seither in die förmlichen Protokolle aufgenommen worden sind, blos *loco dictaturæ* in Druck legen zu lassen.

"Die bisherige Uebung, die gesammten Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestags, wenige Ausnahmen abgerechnet, der Oeffentlichkeit zu übergeben, habe zu Missbräuchen Anlass gegeben, welche jeder Gutdenkende gewiss missbillige, denen aber eben darum ein Ziel gesetzt werden müsse. Die deutsche Bundes-Versammlung sey ein permanenter Ministerial-Congress der Repräsentanten sämmtlicher Bundesglieder; in dieser Versammlung würden vorzugsweise die Ansichten

between the divers federative governments, and, after a profound discussion and proper reconsideration, resolutions are enacted. That *the result of these deliberations*, according as it might be of general or individual interest, should be made known, was a matter of unconditional necessity; but the preparation of subjects, the labours of the committees, and the various views of the different governments, these were epochs of the transactions of business, which were utterly unfit for publication. In military matters, or in contestations between the federative princes, among themselves or with their Diets, this is now particularly the case."

The President would beg, therefore, to invite the assembly to order matters of that description to be printed in special protocols, *loco dictaturæ*,

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der verschiedenen Bundes-Regierungen über Gegenstände des gemeinsamen Interesses freundschaftlich ausgetauscht, und nach vorheriger gründlicher Erörterung und Wiedererwägung die Beschlüsse gefasst. Dass das Resultat dieser Berathungen, je nachdem es für Alle oder für Einzelne von Interesse sey, bekannt gemacht werde, dies sey unbedingte Nothwendigkeit,—aber die Vorbereitung der Gegenstände, die Arbeiten der Comités, und die verschiedenen Ansichten der einzelnen Regierungen, dies seyen Epochen der Geschäfts-Verhandlungen, welche zur Oeffentlichkeit durchaus nicht geeignet seyen. Bei Militär-Angelegenheiten und bei Differenzen der Bundes-Fürsten unter sich oder mit ihren Ständen, sey dies vorzugsweise der Fall."

Das Präsidium erlaube sich daher, die Versammlung einzuladen, Gegenstände dieser Art in eigene, *loco dictaturæ* zu druckende Proto-

considering that, in settling the provisional rule of business, it has already reserved to itself to indicate on each occasion the transactions which shall be excepted from being made public.

These suggestions of the President having been supported and illustrated by the Ambassadors of Prussia, Hanover, the Grand Duchy of Baden, Electoral Hesse, &c., all the votes joined in the proposition from the chair, and it was resolved—

"To proceed with regard to the drawing up of the Protocols in the sense of the above proposition from the chair, and to direct the chancery of the Diet to dispose in future for each meeting, according to the nature of the subjects that had been debated, two sorts of protocols, namely, such as are to be published, and such separate ones as are merely to be printed *loco dictaturæ*."

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kolle aufzunehmen, so wie sich dieselbe, bei Annahme der provisorischen Geschäftsordnung, ohnehin vorbehalten habe, die Gegenstände jedesmal zu bezeichnen, welche ausnahmsweise der Publikation entzogen werden sollen.

Nachdem der k. preussische, k. hannover'sche, grossherzogl. badische und kurfürstl. hessische Herr Gesandte diese Ansichten des Präsidiums näher motivirt hatten, vereinigten sich sämmtliche Stimmen mit der Präsidial-Proposition, und es ward beschlossen:

"Bey Abfassung der Protokolle im Geiste obigen Präsidial-Antrags vorzugehen und der Bundes-Kanzley-Direktion aufzugeben, künftighin nach Maassgabe der verhandelten Gegenstände zweierlei Protokolle jede Sitzung aufzunehmen, und zwar öffentliche und separat—blos *loco dictaturæ* zu druckende Protokolle."

The Prussian government, without thinking of making posterior objections to this resolution, for which no anterior instructions had been requested, although, in many respects, objections would not have been out of place—thought it better, nevertheless, when it became acquainted with the changes it had brought forth, to suspend its judgment, until further experience should have settled it upon a substantial basis.

Consequently, five years had elapsed before it was placed under the necessity of taking up this subject with more particular attention, on account of a special report of the Prussian Ambassador at the Diet, of October 29, 1829, expressly requesting instructions on the matter in question.

Ohne über diesen Beschluss, welchem keine Instruktions-Einholung vorausgegangen war, etwaige Erinnerungen nachträglich äussern lassen zu wollen, wozu derselbe schon damals in manchen Beziehungen Anlass gegeben haben dürfte, glaubte die k. preussische Regierung, als sie von der dadurch herbeigeführten Veränderung Kenntnisss erhielt, ihr Urtheil darüber suspendiren zu müssen, bis dasselbe durch die weitere Erfahrung eine genügende Basis gewonnen haben würde.

Hiernach kam sie erst nach Verlauf von fünf Jahren dadurch in den Fall, sich mit dem vorliegenden Gegenstande näher und gründlicher zu beschäftigen, dass der selbe in einem eigenen Berichte des k. preussischen Bundestags-Gesandten Herrn von Nagler, vom 24 October, 1829, sehr ausführlich und mit dem Ersuchen um diesfällige Instruktions-Ertheilung zur Sprache gebracht wurde.

As to the contents of this report, the Prussian Minister accompanied it with a memoir of Dr. Michaelis, professor of law in Tübingen, which then made its appearance, under the title of "Political Considerations on the Protocols of the German Diet," the tendency of which is indicated by the following motto:

"On peut opposer à tous les principes politiques des exceptions, mais il ne faut pas, pour éviter cet inconvenient, vouloir fonder des principes politiques sur des exceptions."

To give a more complete idea of this production, written with modesty and in a laudable spirit, we shall quote the accompanying remarks of the Prussian Minister: "The author has attempted to establish that the public is evidently craving after a *less* restricted publicity of the pro-

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Was den Inhalt dieses Berichtes anlangt, so überreichte Herr von Nagler mit demselben eine eben damals erschienene Druckschrift des Professors der Rechte Dr. Michaelis zu Tübingen "Die Protokolle der hohen deutschen Bundes-Versammlung, eine publicistische Betrachtung" betitelt, deren Tendenz sich im Allgemeinen durch das Motto ankündigt:

"On peut opposer à tous les principes politiques des exceptions; mais il ne faut pas, pour éviter cet inconvénient, vouloir fonder des principes politiques sur des exceptions."

Zur nähern Charakterisirung dieser, mit Bescheidenheit und in einem löblichen Geiste abgefassten Schrift dient die, von Herrn von Nagler hinzugefügte Bemerkung: "Der Verfasser habe darin auszuführen gesucht, dass bei dem in neuerer Zeit von verschieden her kund gege-

edings of the Diet, and likewise after a settled isprudence of the laws of the German conleracy, which assuredly must also prove a welne assistance to those who have diplomatic ties to discharge; and finally, the wish exssed by several federative governments, with pect to the encouragement of a common Gerin patriotic spirit.

But the report in question treats chiefly of a tition which was then presented to the Diet by bookseller Andrä, of Frankfort on the Maine, l which had given occasion to some preliminary cussion. This petition claimed from the Diet permission of issuing the continuation of the rth edition of the public Protocols of the Diet, virtue of the privilege granted him in the year

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n Verlangen nach einer minder beschränkten Publicität der Bunags-Verhandlungen zunächst die Rechtswissenschaft, in Beziehung eine richtige Fortbildung des deutschen Bundes-Rechts, die selbst den mit diplomatischen Verhandlungen beauftragten Staatsbeameine willkommene Unterstützung seyn dürfte,—sodann aber auch von mehreren Bundes-Regierungen gewünschte Erhöhung eines einsamen deutschen Vaterlandssinnes, betheiligt sey.

auptsächlich aber handelte der fragliche Bericht von einer bei der des-Versammlung damals eingereichten Vorstellung der Andräen Buchhandlung zu Frankfurt am Main und den dadurch veranlassvorläufigen Erörterungen. In dieser Vorstellung hatte die gedachte hhandlung gebeten, die Fortsetzung der 4to Ausgabe der öffentlichen desstags-Protokolle, deren Herausgabe und Verlag ihr im Jahr

1816, in a less narrow compass than the small number of public Protocols, with hardly any contents, would admit of. The Ambassador endeavoured to show how absolutely the prospect of a considerable sale held out to the bookseller upon his originally undertaking the publication had been overthrown through the measures passed by the Diet, on the 1st of July, 1824; on which occasion he presented a copy, subsequently published, of the said fourth edition. Now, as this edition, as he added, only records extracts of the federative Protocols referring to objects of minor interest to the public, such as the legitimation and substitution of ambassadors, the appointment of commissions, and the election of ambassadors, some diplomatic notions already published by the jour-

1816 verstattet worden war, in einem minder beschränkten Umfange, als es die geringe Zahl der fast inhaltlosen öffentlichen Protokolle zulasse, veranstalten zu dürfen. Wie sehr die bei dem Unternehmen der Andräischen Buchhandlung ihr eröffnete Aussicht auf einen bedeutenden Absatz in Folge des Bundestags-Beschlusses vom 1 July 1824 verschwwunden sey, suchte der königliche Bundestags-Gesandte durch Vorlegung eines Exemplars von den spätern Jahrgängen der betreffenden 4to Ausgabe anschaulich zu machen.—" Da sich solche," bemerkte er dabei, " fast nur auf einen Extract aus den Bundestags-Protokollen beschränkt, welcher nur die für das allgemeine Interesse minder wichtigen Anzeigen über die vorgekommenen Legitimationen und Substitutionen der Gesandten, über die Bestellung von Commissionen und die Wahl der Gesandten, über einige schon aus öffentlichen Blättern bekannte

nals, the Protocol of presentation, some definitive resolutions, mainly with regard to pecuniary contributions — it cannot be surprising that the said bookseller, in continuing *such* an edition, should fail in receiving any further support from the public.

With this was connected the development of the view of the Envoy at the Diet of the Grand Duke of Baden, Baron von Blittersdorf, who, as a member of the committee for the examination of claims, had undertaken to report upon the petition of the bookseller, Andrä, and considering at once the whole question relative to the publication of the Protocols of the Diet, says "it seems that the resolution of 1824 has carried us further than was intended. The abuses, to which the speech of the presi-

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diplomatische Mittheilungen über das Einreichungs-Protokoll, und, einige definitive Beschlüsse, besonders wegen der Geldbeiträge, enthält; so scheint es nicht auffallend, dass die genannte Buchhandlung bei Fortsetzung einer solchen Ausgabe, keine weitere Unterstützung Seitens des Publikums mehr findet."

Hieran knüpfte sich die Auseinandersetzung der Ansichten des grossherzoglich badischen Bundestags-Gesandten, Freiherrn von Blittersdorf, welcher als Mitglied der Reklamations-Commission den Vortrag über das Ansuchen der Andräischen Buchhandlung übernommen, dabei die Oeffentlichkeit der Bundestags-Protokolle im Allgemeinen in's Auge gefasst und sich in dem Entwurfe des gedachten Vortrages dahin ausgesprochen hatte, "es scheine, als ob der Beschluss vom Jahr 1824 in seinen Folgen weiter geführt habe, als damals beabsichtiget worden

dent had alluded, had been almost exclusively committed by public journals and periodicals, against which the resolution had been chiefly directed. It can, in fact, excite no small apprehensions when deliberations like those of the Diet should become the subject of daily politics, so as to interfere at every moment with the proceedings of the deliberations, whose guidance must, in all well regulated states, rest exclusively with the Cabinets. Although, however, the Diet, by its resolutions of July the 1st, 1824, meant to obviate the abuses of political journals, periodicals, and pamphlets, it was by no means its intention, by secreting its Protocols, to set down as a rule that a thorough and learned discussion upon the interior political

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sey; die Missbräuche, deren in dem Präsidial-Antrage Erwähnung geschehen, wären fast ausschliesslich von den öffentlichen Blättern und den Zeitschriften begangen worden, und gegen diese sey auch der Beschluss vorzugsweise gerichtet gewesen. In der That habe es keine geringe Bedenken, wenn Verhandlungen, wie die bei der Bundes-Versammlung sind, zum Gegenstande der Tages-Politik gemacht würden und dadurch Gelegenheit gegeben werde, jeden Augenblick in den Gang der Berathungen einzugreifen, deren Leitung in allen geregelten Staaten ausschliesslich den Kabinetten anvertraut werden müsse.— "Wenn gleich aber die Bundes-Versammlung sich vorgesetzt, durch den Beschluss vom 1 July 1824 den Missbräuchen polictisher Journale, Flug-und Zeitschriften vorzubeugen, so habe es wohl keineswegs in ihrer Absicht gelegen, gründliche und wissenschaftliche Diskussionen über Gegenstände des innern Staatsrechts des Bundes durch Geheimhaltung der Protokolle, als Regel, unmöglich zu machen, und über-

.w of the Diet should be made impossible, and, ı general, to withhold from the knowledge of ıe German nation deliberations relating to the ›mmon interests of the confederacy, even when e indicated abuses are no longer to be apprended. It is but too evident that it can be no her than desirable to the highest and high memrs of the confedération that the system of the nfederation should be more and more improved ıd its real nature duly appreciated. For this very ason there cannot be any objection to the publition, from time to time, of the deliberations of e Diet—in so far as no positive interest absolutely joins their being kept secret, for the purpose of ch scientific examination and appreciation untaminated by the politics of the day — in the rm of a collection of State Papers.

ıpt der deutschen Nation die Kenntniss von Verhandlungen, welche s gemeinsame Interesse des Bundes betreffen, selbst alsdann noch zu tziehen, wenn der bezeichnete Missbrauch nicht mehr davon zu fürchten stehe. Es liege zu klar am Tage, dass es den höchsten und hen Bundesgliedern nur erwünscht seyn könne, wenn das System s Bundes mehr und mehr ausgebildet und seinem eigentlichen Wesen ch begriffen würde. Eben desshalb dürfte auch kein Anstand obwalı, wenn die Verhandlungen der Bundesversammlung, insofern kein sitives Interesse deren Geheimhaltung ein für allemal gebiete, zu dem :hufe solcher wissenschaftlichen, durch die Tages-Politik nicht getrübı, Prüfung und Würdigung, von Zeit zu Zeit, in Form einer Sammıg von Staatsschriften, herausgegeben würden."

When communicating the special proposals of Baron von Blittersdorf, regulated upon the above views, relative to the introduction of a less limited publicity of the transactions of the Diet, M. von Nagler, his Majesty's Envoy to the Diet, accompanied them with his own opinions, coinciding in the sense of this object; and, at the same time, submitted them to the decision of this Court.

A thorough investigation of the matter was immediately ordered to be instituted, and the result was a conviction that the views of Baron von Blittersdorf, recommended by M. von Nagler, and in the essentials of which Baron von Berstett, Minister of State to the Grand Duke of Baden, declared his acquiescence, were supported by too many sound arguments to be peremptorily rejected

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Unter Mittheilung der nach obigen Ansichten bemessenen speziellen Vorschläge des Freiherrn von Blittersdorf, wegen Einführung einer minder beschränkten Publicität der Bundestags-Verhandlungen, begleitete der königliche Bundestags-Gesandte, Hr. von Nagler, dieselben mit seinen eigenen, im Sinne dieses Zweckes abgefassten, gutachtlichen Aeusserungen, indem er sie dem Urtheile des hiesigen allerhöchsten Hofes unterwarf.

Man liess sich hier eine gründliche Prüfung der Sache sofort angelegen seyn, und überzeugte sich bald, dass den von Hrn. v. Nagler bevorworteten Ansichten des Freiherrn von Blittersdorf, womit sich auch der damalige grossherzoglich badische Staatsminister, Freiherr von Berstett, im Wesentlichen einverstanden erklärte, zu viele triftige

and not taken advantage of. By means of the instructions given in consequence to M. von Nagler, he was empowered to enter into closer preliminary consultation, not only with the Grand Duke of Baden's Envoy to the Diet, but also with the other more influential Envoys, on this question; — whether, without restoring the practice of the public promulgation of the Protocols of the Diet, observed till the year 1824, and avoiding all the dangers that had been connected with it, agreeably to fixed principles to be previously adopted, and also with due regard to the necessity of scientific cultivation of German national law, it would be advisable to publish at the end of every year such of the deliberations of the Diet which

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Gründe zur Seite stehen, als dass sie schlechthin von der Hand zu weisen und unbenutzt zu lassen wären. Mittelst den dem Hrn. von Nagler hiernach ertheilten Instruktionen, wurde derselbe ermächtiget nicht allein mit dem grossherzoglich badischen Bundestags-Gesandten, sondern auch mit den übrigen einflussreichern Bundestags-Gesandten in vorläufige nähere Berathung darüber zu treten, ob nicht ohne Wiederherstellung des bis zum Jahre 1824 beobachteten Gebrauchs der öffentlichen Bekanntmachung der Bundestags-Protokolle und unter Vermeidung aller damit verknüpft gewesenen Gefahren, nach bestimmten im Voraus festzusetzenden Principien, auch mit Rücksicht auf das Bedürfniss wissenschaftlicher Fortbildung des positiven deutschen Staats-Rechts, am Schlusse jedes Jahres eine Herausgabe derjenigen im Laufe desselben vorgekommenen Bundestags-Verhandlungen zu veran-

had taken place during the course of it, as by a committee of the Diet, to be appointed for that purpose in accordance with those principles, should be declared adapted and sufficiently mature for publication?

The result of these consultations during the last two years was, that M. von Nagler was enabled long before to communicate the assurance that the *majority* of the Envoys to the Diet acknowledged the necessity of again introducing, under certain regulations, the publicity of the transactions of the Diet, and in general the propriety of the following proposals, to be submitted to this end to the Diet:—

1. The Diet shall not make known, during its ordinary sittings for the year, any of its delibera-

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stalten seyn dürfte, welche von einer dazu anzuordnenden Bundestags-Commission in Gemässheit jener Grundsätze, als zur öffentlichen Bekanntmachung geeignet und reif geworden, anerkannt worden seyen?

Diese Berathungen führten innerhalb der letzten zwei Jahre dahin, dass der Hr. von Nagler schon vorlängst die Versicherung ertheilen konnte, von der Majorität der Bundestags-Gesandten werde die Nothwendigkeit einer unter bestimmten Maassgaben wieder einzuführende Publicität der Bundestags-Verhandlungen und im Wesentlichen auch die Zweckmässigkeit folgender, zu diesem Ende bei der Bundes-Versammlung zu machender Vorschläge anerkannt:

1. Die Bundes-Versammlung hat im Verlaufe ihrer gewöhnlichen

tions during that time, except what from its peculiar nature demands such immediate publicity, in order to its due observance.

2. At the commencement of the usual long vacation, all deliberations brought to a close during the sittings of the preceding year, to which likewise belong all those that have no further results, shall be regularly published at once as the collective acts of the Diet. Under these deliberations are to be understood the Protocols themselves, complete and verbatim.

3. Exceptions to the rule 2 are formed fundamentally by

a. All deliberations relating to disputes between members of the Confederation, which

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Jahres-Sitzungen von den darin vorkommenden Verhandlungen nichts bekannt zu machen, als was seiner besondern Natur nach einer solchen unverweilten Bekanntmachung zur gebührenden Nachachtung bedarf.

2. Beim Eintritte der gewöhnlichen grossen Ferien werden in der Regel alle, während der vorhergegangenen Jahres-Sitzungen geschlossenen Verhandlungen, wozu auch diejenigen gehören, welche keine weitere Folgen haben, als gesammelte Akten des Bundestags auf einmal der Publicität übergeben. Unter diesen Verhandlungen sind die Protokolle selbst nach ihrem vollständigen und wörtlichen Inhalte zu verstehen.

3. Ausnahme von der ad 2 aufgestellten Regel bilden grundsätzlich:

a. Alle Verhandlungen, welche sich auf die unter dem 11 Artikel

may arise upon the 11th Article of the Act of Confederation, and Article 21 of the Act of the Congress of Vienna.

b. All deliberations on military matters, and

c. On such subjects, for which it is provided by a special resolution, that they shall be withheld from publicity.

4. The above-mentioned exceptions, however, by no means involve an unconditional and unalterable exclusion of the deliberations comprehended under them; on the contrary, those deliberations especially referred to in 3 a, on disputes between members of the Confederation, may be made public before their final termination, if all the Governments concerned give their consent to it; but the final result of them, whether it be by compact,

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der Bundes-Akte und Artikel 21 der Wiener Schluss-Akte zu subsumirenden Streitigkeiten zwischen Bundesgliedern beziehen.

b. Alle Verhandlungen über Militär-Angelegenheiten, und

c. über solche Gegenstände, für welche ein besonderer Beschluss festsetzt, dass sie der Publicität entzogen bleiben sollen.

4. Die angeführten Ausnahmen involviren jedoch keineswegs eine unbedingte und unabänderliche Ausschliessung der darunter begriffenen Verhandlungen; vielmehr können die ad 3 a. näher bezeichneten Verhandlungen über Streitigkeiten zwischen Bundesgliedern auch schon vor ihrem endlichen Abschlusse, wenn sämmtliche dabei betheiligte Regierungen ihre Zustimmung dazu geben, öffentlich bekannt werden, das endliche Resultat derselben aber, mag es nun durch Vergleich,

compromise, or arbitration, shall be withheld from publicity only in case all the States concerned unanimously and expressly desire it. With that result the deliberations of the Diet which preceded it shall also be published, so far as this has not been done already; but on condition that a *selection* of the deliberations adapted for publication shall be made by a committee of the Diet, with the consent of the disputing parties; in which particular regard must be had, for the benefit of science, to the communication of the discussions which have taken place, and the respective views of the parties, as far as it possibly can be.

In regard to the exceptions mentioned in § b, and c., after the final termination of the matters in

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Kompromiss oder Austrägal-Entscheidung herbeigeführt seyn, darf der Publicität nur alsdann entzogen bleiben, wenn sämmtliche dabei betheiligte Staaten solches einhellig und ausdrücklich verlangen. Mit jenem Resultate werden die demselben vorausgegangenen Bundestags-Verhandlungen, so weit es nicht schon früher geschehen ist, ebenfalls, jedoch unter der Beschränkung, publicirt, dass durch eine Bundestags-Commission, mit Zuziehung der bisher streitenden Theile, eine Auswahl der für die öffentliche Bekanntmachung geigneten Verhandlungen zu treffen ist; wobei, im Interesse der Wissenschaft, für Mittheilung der stattgehabten Erörterungen und gegenseitigen Ansichten der Partheien, so weit es geschehen kann, insbesondere Sorge getragen werden muss.

Was die ad 3, b und c angegebenen Ausnahmen betrifft, so soll, nach

question, it shall be determined, according to the opinion of a committee of the Diet, whether any or what part of the deliberations upon them may and shall be submitted to the public.

5. The discussions to be undertaken according to Article 30 of the Act of the Congress of Vienna, do not belong to the exceptions specified in No. 3, and must in every case be made public as soon as they are concluded, out of regard for the interests of the private persons making claims, with the next annual publication of the Acts of the Diet, together with the result, whether it be by compact, compromise, or arbitration; yet in this instance also, a selection of the deliberations adapted for publication shall be made by a com-

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völliger Erledigung der dahin gehörigen Angelegenheiten, auf das Gutachten einer Bundestags-Commission, beschlossen werden, ob und was auch von den darüber gepflogenen Verhandlungen zur Kenntniss des Publikums gelangen kann und soll.

5. Die unter dem Artikel 30 der Wiener Schluss-Akte zu subsumirenden Verhandlungen gehören zwar nicht zu den ad n° 3 aufgeführten Ausnahmen, und müssen, sobald sie geschlossen sind, wegen des dabei vorwaltenden Interesses der reklamirenden Privatpersonen, bei der nächsten jährlichen Publikation der Bundestags-Akten, nebst dem Resultate, mag dasselbe in einem Vergleiche, Kompromisse oder in einer Austrägal Entscheidung bestehen, jedenfalls öffentlich bekannt gemacht werden, jedoch wird auch hierbei eine Auswahl der für die Publicität geeigneten Verhandlungen, mit Zuziehung der betheiligten Bundesglieder, unter der oben gedachten Berücksichtigung des wissenschaft-

mittee of the Diet, conjointly with the members of the Diet concerned, with the above-mentioned reference to the interests of science.

6. The Resolutions 2—5 relate equally to subjects of every kind decided since 1824. Individually, and chiefly with respect to No. 2, it is to be remarked, that nothing but as complete a publication as possible of the Protocols themselves fulfils the object for making them public; since the Protocols alone, not partial and frequently scanty extracts from them, can be instructive to the public, and furnish satisfactory materials for science.

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lichen Interesses, durch eine Bundestags-Commission zu veranlassen seyn.

6. Die Bestimmungen unter nº 2—5 gelten nicht minder für die seit 1824 erledigten Gegenstände jeder Art. Im Einzelnen, und zunächst ad nº 2 ist zu bemerken, dass eine möglichst vollständige Publikation der Protokolle selbst dem Zwecke der öffentlichen Bekanntmachung allein entspricht, indem nur die Protokolle, nicht aber einseitig und oft dürftig gemachte Auszüge derselben, für das Publikum belehrend seyn, und für die Wissenschaft befriedigenden Stoff darbieten können.

(To be continued.)

OPINION OF THE "PORTFOLIO" IN THE AUSTRIAN STATES.

We present to our readers the following passage extracted from the "Augsburg Gazette," in order that they may see the estimation in which the documents of the "Portfolio" are held by the conservative part of Germany. From the commencement of our labours, we anticipated that the documents we revealed would be better understood on the Continent, and particularly in Germany, than in our own island. This may be accounted for; first, because the facts alluded to are more familiar to the continental than to the English reader; secondly, because the danger of the crisis is more immediately felt abroad; and thirdly, because statesmen, and those who give themselves up to the study of politics in Germany, have their attention less divided. Public men in England have their attention drawn to such a variety of objects, that it is scarcely possible for them to bestow much more than a hasty glance on each. The subject which we have taken upon ourselves to elucidate requires a peculiar study; and whilst our public men devote themselves entirely to domestic, local, and party questions, they must necessarily remain behind our continental neighbours in their knowledge of those important interests which connect us with the great family of mankind.

We cannot help expressing our regret that, in this great commercial nation, there should be so few public men at all acquainted with the interests which a commercial country has necessarily at stake abroad; and we are the more sur-

prised at the circumstance, when we consider that England, as a commercial nation, presents the readiest means of acquiring the knowledge so necessary for the protection of her national prosperity.

Extract from the Augsburg Gazette, No. 229.

None of the Numbers of the Portfolio exceed in importance and interest the two last which have appeared, especially No. 27. In publishing the Cabinet Despatch of the Emperor of Russia to the Emperor Francis, of blessed memory, dated 10th of February, 1829, as well as the Despatches of Count Nesselrode to M. de Tatistcheff, of the 12th of February, the editors of the work proclaim themselves to be the devoted friends of Austria, which they do not hesitate, indeed, explicitly and constantly to repeat. They point out how wisely and justly England would act, in remaining ever faithful to her old and well-tried ally. We cannot, indeed, conceal from ourselves, that there is in the English nation an inclination towards the Austrian State, founded on historical associations, which assuredly brings forth its fruits at every crisis, when antagonistic principles do not forcibly obtrude to neutralize the good. Another very remarkable document is, the defence of Prince Lubecki, former Minister of Finance in Poland, of the 20th December, 1833, addressed to his Sovereign against Novosiltzoff, who has lately appeared on a special mission at the Court of St. James's.* Not less deserving of attention are the remarks on the consequences of the separate guarantee by England of her portion of the third series of the Greek Loan. The author justly draws attention to the consequences of this separation—viz., that Russia will thereby acquire the right, at a future period, to enforce separate guarantees from Greece, in any future pecuniary advances.

The importance which that Power attaches to the proposal of

* It appears that this is the Functionary just appointed by the Emperor of Russia to compliment the Emperor Ferdinand on his coronation!—Ed.

pledging the national lands shows, perhaps, that this anxiety is not without foundation.

Two other very attractive documents have also appeared of late. The representation of events before the battle of Jena, supposed to be by Gentz, from his manuscripts, which are said to be in the possession of the United Service Journal, is deeply interesting, and very important, even at the present day. We must not omit to mention the report of Colonel Chesney to the Duke of Wellington on the Russian campaigns in the last war with Turkey.

ON THE ACCESSION OF HAMBURG TO THE PRUSSIAN CUSTOMS' UNION.

EXTRACTED FROM THE HAMBURGISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR POLITIK HANDEL UND HANDELSRECHT.

"The Senate of Hamburg here lays claim, even in the provisional state of the commercial relations of Germany, and in the relation of all Germany towards foreign countries, to the same liberal principles which the Royal Government of Prussia indicates as the definitive aim of all its exertions,—'*within*,' however, '*the limits of the Union.*'"

Protocol of the Diet of 10 January, 1833.

FREEDOM of trade and intercourse in the different states of the Union is the principle and the object which Prussia prominently put forward when she gradually entered into negociations with several states respecting the conclusion of the Customs' Union; and, in the course of seven years, the barriers and Custom Houses were successively removed, which had hitherto closed to East Prussia the road to the Prussian Rhenish Lands, which had impeded the intercourse of the Germans living in Bavaria, Wurtemburg, the Hessian and other territories. Even those countries, whose commerce and manufactures suffered often more even than those of Prussia from the oppression of vexatious frontier tolls, must have welcomed the opportunity of extending those frontiers and affording to their subjects greater liberty of commerce. Saxony, also, although hitherto paying homage to the system of freedom of commerce, was at last so cramped by the toll-united lands, that it was obliged to throw itself into the arms of the Union in order not to be overwhelmed by its own superabundance of manufactured articles. With regard to these countries, then, the above mentioned object of the Union may have been attained; by acceding to the Union, they were relieved on one, two, or on all sides from the burdensome fetters of the prohibitive system, and

brought nearer to the wished-for aim of universal freedom of commerce in the same proportion as they saw these impediments disappear. But the question presents itself in a different, and indeed in a wholly opposite, point of view with regard to a state, which, having already outgrown all restrictions of commerce, and being liberated from all the plagues of Entrance, Exit, and Transit Duties, is not enclosed by the cordon of the Customs' Union, and which leans on one side on the free element which treaty and the rights of nature and of nations forbid to be closed. Such a state, by being enclosed in the bond of the Toll Union, would lay chains on itself, the non-existence of which makes its prosperity, and by subscribing to the Customs' Union Convention would act in opposition to the first principle of that Union, which promises to the subject "the benefits of a *free* trade." Such a state, however, is Hamburg; and, notwithstanding this, is there really any one who would wish to give himself the useless trouble of putting forward and investigating the question, whether an adherence of Hamburg to the Union is advisable?

The shortest way would certainly be to negative the question at once; and here on the spot, at least, we should hardly expect that such an answer would be open to contradiction. But the question is one of such extraordinary importance, of so universal a German interest, that every aid to its investigation, every introduction of arguments for and against it, must be welcome. Still we should be glad to abandon the investigation of the subject to abler pens and to more practical experience, if it had not been for the appearance just at this moment of a work of high authority, which puts forward the opposite view of this subject, and to leave which unanswered, one may almost say, patriotism forbids.

The most profound and the most detailed work, which has hitherto appeared on the Customs' Union, is doubtless the work which appeared last year,

The German Customs' Union, its System and its Prospects. By Dr. C. F. Nebenius, &c. &c. &c., Carlsruhe, 1835.

M. Nebenius, whose above-mentioned title sufficiently explains

his high position, is well known to be one of the most zealous adherents of the Prussian League, and one of the most active co-operators in Baden for the accession of that country to the Union. His work, although partly based on the principles of the system of protective duties, and always proceeding from the conviction that the German Customs' Union is a benefit to the world, and therefore sometimes not entirely impartial, still affords a clear insight into the essence, the object, and the institution of the great Union of which it treats, and contains, with an abundance of national, financial, and legislative wisdom, a rich treasure in collected notices and details on the commercial and industrial relations of Germany. It is not our object to enter into a particular notice of its contents, or even a critique of this work. We leave every thing else aside for the moment, in order to quote the following passage, word for word:—

"The situation of the North German free towns appears to us to be of such a character, that their perseverance in a state of isolation towards the Union can bring them no advantages, but must on the other hand bring them disadvantages. Their accession can only be advantageous to them. The experience of other countries teaches, that a high Tariff of Customs is perfectly compatible with the prosperity of the sea towns, which receive on the one hand what the market of the interior has to offer to the distant foreign country, and on the other what foreign countries transmit to them in the way of import and export, commission or transit trade. So far, however, as the high duties of the Tariff diminish the foreign commerce of the market in the rear, such a disadvantage affects the German maritime towns in exactly the same manner, whether they be united with that market territory under one system of tolls, or whether, excluded from the same, they form only one small territory. On the other hand, the state of isolation entails upon them losses which they can avert by acceding to the Union. In every case the Tariff Union will limit the sale of all products of their own manufacturing industry. This disadvantage cannot be unimportant, since such states as prosper by commerce always carry on other separate branches of industry

with success, and in a larger extent. The facility of the communications, the convenient exchange of raw materials, the greater cheapness of capital, are advantages which manufacturing industry does not leave unutilized. We must add, however, to the influence of the Customs' Tariff on the particular productions of the Hanse towns, the dependence in which also their transit trade is so far placed, from the fact of their sharing with several other places the furnishing of the Union market with transmarine goods, and the Union possesses many means of favouring to their disadvantage the freight of wares from other places. The more intimate union with the countries on the neighbouring coasts and with the Union would be of great value to the German maritime towns for their export and import and coasting trade in the whole territory of their *natural market;* their competition with foreign ports would in every direction be variously favoured by the improvement, which might be more easily expected in such an union of the means of communication and by other effectual measures. The Union would lend them the weight of its support on foreign markets; they would earn in rich proportion the costly fruits of the greater *universal* freedom of commerce, which we contemplate as the grand object of the German Commercial League, whilst, by their accession, they would strengthen the power of the Union, and materially contribute to the attainment of that object. Their intimate adherence to the Union, enlarged by the accession of the remaining North German countries on the Weser and the Elbe, would be a great step to the formation of a German marine. In the same manner they would derive advantage for their maritime trade, their commission and coasting trade; the German towns would derive great advantage for the various branches of their own industry from acceding to the Union. They possess tobacco factories, sugar-refineries, spinneries, calico and linen printing, woollen factories, leather, whalebone, and glue factories, &c. The advantage of the protecting duties, united with the free communication, on the German market, would secure to them not only their former sale, but would restore what they have latterly lost, and would allow many branches to gain an extent hitherto

not attained. They would in this manner be able to utilize completely the advantage which the cheapness of capital, and in certain branches of industry the convenient choice of raw stuffs, afford for every undertaking. One of the most important branches of industry, the *sugar refineries*, which have suffered a considerable check by the Union Tariff, would quickly recover, and, in the course of averting foreign competition, would easily obtain a sale on the German market, which would make them less sensible of the losses already incurred by the closing of the Russian markets against them. The Hamburg market in the latest period received about one hundred millions of pounds of raw sugar annually. Before the French invasion, the free town had four hundred and fifty refineries; at present there are only two hundred, and, looking to the future, the operation of a duty of 3 to 4 rxd. per cwt. will far outweigh all the advantages of the locality of this place, and the greater skill of production acquired by a long course of time, and almost entirely exclude their competition on the Union market. In earlier times the Dutch refineries principally rivalled Hamburg in furnishing Western Germany. Liberated from this competition, this place would the more easily maintain its natural preponderance in that branch of industry, and extend its market towards its earlier limits. The direct consequences of a more intimate union of the German ports with their natural market territory would assuredly also be displayed in the increase of the direct trade of Germany with Trans-European countries."

So much for that portion of the work of Counsellor Nebenius which particularly regards the Hanse towns and Hamburg. The result, M. Nebenius remarks, is, that our father town ought to desire to be annexed to the Union. Exactly the contrary opinion prevails here. In order to come to a definitive decision between these opposite views, to arrive at a sound judgment, we require amongst other things to possess many materials which are not yet collected. On the one hand, we ought to have detailed reports on the effects hitherto produced by the new system in the toll-united lands. Reports which hitherto have been limited to sepa-

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rate branches of individual localities found dispersed in the public papers; and on the other hand, also, statistical notices and documentary views on the commerce of Hamburg, especially with regard to the transit and export trade, would be necessary, as also on the number, the value, and (what is the most important) the place of destination of the exported goods; whereas hitherto we have had complete lists only of the imports. Without entering into such details, which it appears impossible to exhaust, we will attempt to bring into view the principal points which come in contemplation in judging of the question, whilst we contemplate the consequences of the accession of Hamburg, 1st, in a financial, 2dly, in an industrial, and, 3dly, in a commercial point of view.

It is unnecessary to offer any excuse for passing over in silence the interests of agriculture, when it is a question of our small state; just as little need we be exposed to blame for not dwelling here in detail on the national financial operation of the Union on Germany, to which Dr. Nebenius devotes the 6th chapter of his first book. These consist partly in the further consequences arising from increased industry in agriculture, manufactures, and fabrics, partly in the advantage which the improvement of the institutions promoting trade and intercourse, means of communication and exchange, uniformity of money, measures, weights, &c. might carry with them. Those consequences, however, can be of no material importance to a single state, which in its nature is neither agricultural nor contains any real manufacturing towns; and when, again, we are called upon to contemplate the moral effects of the accession to the Union, we cannot but see in them an immoral tendency, namely, the smuggling trade with all its abominations, which an increased duty always and every where carries in its train, and which here, where foreign Douaniers once watched our frontiers, are still too fresh in our remembrance that we should desire to see the new control, however amiable and friendly the collectors of the Union might be. On the other hand, as regards the means of improving the trade, Banks, Assurances, Union of Exchanges, &c., our institutions leave us nothing

to desire; uniformity of moneys, weights and measures, one might imagine could be attained in Germany, even without a union of taxes or imposts; and if, finally, our arrangements for communication with the countries around us are not as efficient as they ought to be, an improvement therein depends less upon ourselves than upon our neighbours. Even the accession of Hamburg, Holstein, and Hanover, to the Customs' Union, would, of itself, incline the two latter states just as little to allow us to lay down a railway to Lubeck and Harburg, as our non-accession would prevent Prussia from promoting as much as possible the railway between Hamburg and Magdeburg.

One might wish also to contemplate the affair from a higher, or, as has been done by many adherents of the Prussian Customs' Union, from a national, point of view; one might sufficiently desire the adherence of the Hanse towns to the Union as a matter advantageous to the father-land of us all, "because, (as H. Nebenius expresses himself,) by their accession they would materially assist in strengthening the power of the Union and the attainment of its object (greater universal freedom of trade); and because their ultimate accession to the Union, enlarged by the accession of the other North German Lands on the Weser and Elbe, would be a great step to the formation of a German marine." Whether it would be a useful object of the German Diet, after having, during twenty years, at length attained the organization of an army of the confederation, to spend some twenty years more, not exactly as hitherto to form, from separate already existing corps, an army, but to form a German confederate marine out of nothing, to step into the arena in opposition to other maritime powers, may remain a proposition for superior wisdom to investigate. In every case, however, the founding and keeping up of so expensive an institution in peace time, so burdensome to the smaller states, and only useful in the certainly very remote contingency of a confederation war, even if at any time it were feasible or necessary, could be attained, without the ports, which always remain confederation towns, acceding to the Customs' Union. Then further, "to come nearer to the great aim of

universal freedom of commerce," to sacrifice our own freedom of commerce would be to make such a sacrifice as one is not accustomed to expect in these latter times of German patriotism, and one, certainly, which we are not justified in making. If, however, by such a sacrifice, however easy it might be, the prosperity of the Hanseatic trade were to be undermined, but little service would, in that case, be rendered to our common fatherland, inasmuch as the latter must find a guarantee and condition of its own well-being in the greatest possible freedom and prosperity of the commerce of its northern ports, which furnish the issue to the products of Germany seaward, and procures the supply of its wants. Moreover, it is not Germany to which this sacrifice would be made, but only to Prussia, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Hesse, &c. &c. Let us hear no more of German unity, German confederation. Certainly the Decree of the Diet contains one article, the 19th, in which "the Members of the Union reserve to themselves, on their first meeting at Frankfort, to enter into deliberations with regard to trade and intercourse between the different States of the Union," and thereby to make German commerce an affair of the Diet. When, however, long after the first meeting in the year 1832, Hanover proposed at the Diet the introduction of common measures for the facilitation of trade in Germany,—who was it that opposed this desire! It was Prussia, and Hesse, Bavaria, Wurtemburg. They preferred regulating the intercourse between the States of the Union, not by a decree of the Union, not by a law common to all, but by single particular conventions. By this, the affair ceased to be an affair of the Diet. Here, then, a German no longer speaks to a German, but the Prussian, the Hessian, speaks to the Hanseatic. The former said: Shut your ports against English manufactures, then we will give you free intercourse with us; but the answer is: We prefer freedom of commerce with all the world to free intercourse with you alone; our ports, however, which are open to you as to all the nations of the earth, will thus be most advantageous to all.

The grander considerations of national benefit, therefore, we here at once leave out of the question, and we specially occupy

ourselves only with the advantages and disadvantages which Hamburg as a separate state will have to expect from acceding to the Union; and as the proverb, that "Every man is his own nearest neighbour," is never more appropriate than in political questions, we shall specially have to take into consideration—

1st. The financial point of view.

We consider that opinion to be the soundest, which sees in the Union nothing more than a financial measure, *id est*, a means, not indeed of a scientific guidance of commerce, or of the improvement of native at the expence of foreign industry; but only a means of increasing the revenues of the state, which otherwise would have to be levied in other, perhaps more burdensome, ways. The Prussian system will find in the raising of the tolls those three objects united, but it naturally lays no small weight on the financial point of view. It may be deduced from the first view of the very nature of the thing, that, by throwing down the toll barriers which formerly traversed Germany in all directions, the frontiers to be watched will be considerably shorter, the expense of watching and levying the dues will be so much diminished, and thus the net return of the duties will be increased. As, further, the toll is in reality a tax which in the end affects the consumer of the taxed goods, and the amount of it must, therefore, be an advantage to each separate state in proportion to the amount of its consumers who pay the tax, so, according to the system of the Union, the amount of duty under the united states is to be divided according to the supposed number of the consumers; that is, according to the proportion of the population. From this rule there is no exception in the hitherto known conventions, and even of the conventions to be concluded with Frankfort and Nassau, we know not that they are to contain an opposite provision. If, therefore, the question here arises, how the coffers of Hamburg would stand after acceding to the Union? we can only found our answer on the previous supposition, that, if we adhere to the same convention, the above-named principle will be followed.

Now, under this supposition, it appears there can be no doubt that Hamburg's state revenue from the toll, notwithstanding the

disproportionate height of the Prussian tariff in comparison with the one subsisting here, (half per cent Court of Banco, on the value of the goods) will not be increased at all; but, on the contrary, will probably be diminished. Materials are wanting to enable us to form accurate calculations, by which this can be maintained and proved; the present total income from duty is as little publicly known as the total amount of the Union tolls. Meantime, one can form a probable idea of the result which such calculations would afford, if one were to receive the following, certainly not quite incorrect principles, as made out:—The lands of the Customs' Union receive by far the greatest part of their transmarine articles of necessity through Hamburg. Hamburg sends by far the greatest portion of the goods which it imports from beyond sea into the territories of the Union. What the Customs' Union receives from other lands (Bremen, Antwerp, Rotterdam, &c.) is not much more than that which Hamburg sends into other than the toll united lands; therefore, the total transmarine imports into the Customs' Union are not much greater than the imports into the Hamburg harbours alone; and, indeed, one can set down, according to the measure of the population of the lands here coming under consideration, the proportion of the one to the other as of three to two. If, further, we reckon that of the goods here imported one-third (in value) enjoy, as despatched goods, the freedom of transit; two-thirds, on the contrary, are taxed (and, indeed, this duty amounts to about $\frac{1}{200}$ of the value) one receives, if one marks the value of the total imports, for the sake of brevity, with X, for the value of imports into Hamburgh $\frac{2}{3}$X, and for the present amount of duty $\frac{\frac{1}{3}X}{200} = \frac{1}{450}X$. The population of the Union territory (Baden, Frankfort, Nassau, and Hamburg included) is estimated at 25,480,000; the population of Hamburg (according to the table of the Diet) at 130,000. Hamburg, therefore, by acceding to the Customs' Union, would receive of the total amount of the toll, which, for brevity's sake, we mark with Y, $\frac{Y}{196}$. If, now, it be required that our state revenue, after acceding to the Union, should remain equal even to its present receipt, that, therefore, it be $\frac{X}{450} = \frac{Y}{196}$ then Y must be $\frac{196X}{450} = \frac{98}{225}$ X; in other words, the

amount of toll of the Union must be Y $\frac{98}{225}$, or about 43 per cent. of the value of the total import X. But, as now the Prussian toll, with all its high rates, still has not attained so extravagant a height, the reverse is to be deduced therefrom; viz. that our toll-revenue after the accession will not be equal to its present amount, but will be much less; and, indeed, less in the same proportion as the average amount of the Prussian toll rates is lower than 43 per cent of the value of the goods: the future amount of the duties could only become equal to the present when we should raise our present toll from $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the value to an average of 43 per cent of the value—a measure which would border on insanity.

Another part of the financial question has relation to the division of the state revenues. It will be represented as one of the merits of the Customs' Union, that a greater uniformity of taxation will thereby be introduced into Germany. If there be essentially an advantage in this, still in relation to the direct taxation this operation of the new system will always belong to the remote and problematical, if it cannot be overlooked in weighing the grounds for and against the acceptation of the same. But, as regards the indirect taxes, it lies in the nature of things that these, by the introduction of the new Customs' Union, will experience an important modification. The duty on goods, or, more properly, only the import duty—for the export and transit duty is more a burdening of the foreign country, and of certain internal fabrics in favour of the state — presents itself to the state which levies it essentially as a tax on the consumer. Therefore, in preparing the import duty tariff, we must principally consider whom that consumption tax affects, who are the consumers, who ought to pay from their consumption a duty to the state. M. von Nebenius has devoted to this subject from page 191 to 248 of his book. He begins with laying down the principle, that justice requires that by each tax the higher income must be taxed in a greater proportion in favour of the state, than the income of minor importance. To satisfy this demand completely would be very difficult, perhaps impossible; an approximation to the same

would consist in the acceptation of the Prussian toll tariff, which in its applications responds in a great measure to that demand.

If we now take, as certainly every one would gladly do, that superior principle of the Toll Union as the fairest and most just; if, furthermore, we admit that the applications of the Prussian tariff, in their relations to each other, are principally adapted to that principle, still the remark obtrudes itself, that the acceptation of the Prussian system of duties can clearly be only an approximation to that principle; therefore, in this view, can only be an improvement, where, before the acceptation of the new system, we were further removed from it; and then the question arises, as it is a question alone of the state or city of Hamburg, how the matter at present stands with regard to the repartition of duties. Does it correspond with the above asserted principle, that the higher income must be taxed higher than the lower, or is it opposed to that principle?

In order to contemplate the question briefly, we have among our four direct duties three which are based exactly on that principle, to which, therefore, they respond in a certain degree. The property and income tax (introduced by the Council and Burgher decree of 11th July, 1831,) is adjusted, as its name indicates, according to the income; is raised according to a certain per-centage of the same, and, therefore affects, exactly as the luxury tax united with it, that which is to be paid for country houses, riding horses and domestics, according to its nature, each inhabitant paying according to the proportion of his income. The same holds good of the tax for demolishing the fortifications, which, although destined for a special temporary object, cannot be left unremarked upon among the rubrics of the income budget. It is calculated on the thousand of the fortune, or where there is no fortune, of the property, and, indeed, according to different classes, so that from the larger fortune there is also more derived per thousand than from the smaller—an income of 1000rxd. pays 1rxd. an income of 10,000, not 10, but 60.

Finally, the *guard money* tax, to pay the cost of the Burgher military from those who are dispensed from service, or are free by

age or sex, is adjusted according to the rent; and as this is the rule, can be regarded as the surest measure of income (or of consumption) directly again according to this. There, then, remains the *ground tax*. Here, indeed, one may object, and justly, that this tax, if reckoned according to the amount of the ground tax, is not regulated according to the latter, as the revenue of a house is by no means generally in harmony with the income of the possessor. However, one must allow at least, that, according to the rule, house proprietors do not belong to the poorer classes, that hence the ground tax does not affect in the rule the income of inconsiderable amount, and in so far does not respond to the above indicated principle. But, here we must take into consideration another argument. The principle, that the higher incomes must be burdened with higher taxes, is not the only one on which the system of apportioning the taxes should be founded. Not only greater income, but greater rights in the state, can justify the putting on higher burdens. If the former principle responds more to the requirements of equity, one may say of this latter one, that it satisfies more the demands of strict justice. The Burgher has not to thank the state for his larger income, but he undoubtedly owes to the state the enjoyment of greater state rights; these latter are founded on the constitution of the state, the former not: thus, with regard to his state rights, and not on account of his fortune, is he bound to higher sacrifices to the state. But, in our state, the ground proprietors are exactly those who enjoy the benefits of all political rights. They make the laws, they fix the taxes; they may, therefore, be the first to fulfil the former, to pay the latter. Almost all the other citizens and inhabitants, however, some functionaries excepted, abstain from making use of their political rights; and however much they were to pay in taxes from their incomes — however they might be distinguished by talent and knowledge—and however much they may have worked by their activity in favour of the universal good, they have no voice in the high questions of the legislation and taxation of the budget. Hence, in our constitution lies the justification of the ground tax, which has been exposed to so manifold

attacks of late. If these are to be altered, the former must first be altered.

The result, therefore, is, to come back from this digression, that, as regards the direct taxes, no hope of improvement can be expected from acceding to the Prussian system of tolls:—1. Because our applotment of direct taxes is already much more adapted to the principle it aims at attaining than that system itself:—2. Because, even if it were not so, the acceptance of the new system of indirect taxes would not operate visibly on the modification of the direct taxes. Both, therefore, apply to us essentially as regards the duties subsisting with us;—for example, of inheritances, changes of property, auctions, public amusements, &c.;—not, however, in the same manner, but only the one of the Excise. This, indeed, affects the most necessary wants of life of the poorest classes equally, although proportionally in much smaller degree, as the costly productions of the table. Without, however, entering here into an investigation whether a modification of the Excise would be possible, necessary, or advisable; so much is at least certain, that a change therein would not be effected by an adherence to the Prussian Toll Union. This, even according to the nature of the thing, and the words of the Convention of 1834, essentially refers only to the duties which have been hitherto raised on the passing the frontiers; not, however, to those Excise duties to be paid in the interior of the state on the markets of separate communes. Only in so far would, perhaps, an exception here find place, as our Excise Tariff taxes some objects higher when coming from abroad than when coming from our own territory; for if, for example, for fruit vinegar, that which comes from the territory pays 1½, but that which comes from abroad pays 4ß per quarter in Excise; there lies clearly in these 4ß an import duty of 2½ß in favour of home against foreign interest. These questions are, however, so little important, that they require no particular notice. The main question remains the real toll tariff.

The Prussian Tariff, as above said, is praised, because it follows the principle which establishes the higher taxation of the greater income as a rule. Here, then, we must compare that

tariff with our's; and then will become apparent, above all things on the opposite side, under the applications of the Prussian Tariff (Nebenius, page 195) the entrance duties on southern fruits and foreign wines. The high duties on these two articles are paid neither directly nor indirectly from the income of the less affluent classes, inasmuch as this class knows not those enjoyments, or only seldom allow themselves these enjoyments by way of exception; and as the increase of the prices of these articles of luxury exercises direct, or no sensible, influence on the cost of production of any necessary of life. Here, then, the Prussian Tariff may be good, but our's is not on that account worse. These very two articles are treated as exceptions, even according to the regulation already subsisting in Hamburg; if even we cannot, indeed, elevate ourselves to the extraordinary height of the Prussian Tariff. On citrons and oranges there is paid an import duty, by us, of 4 β the chest, in the toll union of 2 rix-dollars for the cwt. Here we pay for wine, besides the entrance duty of one half per cent. on the value, by the consumer himself 1 β more for the bottle, whilst in the toll union a duty is levied on foreign wine of 8 rix-dollars for the cwt., which in the rule makes a duty of 40 rix-dollars for the measure. With reference to all other articles, however, as soon as we come to compare the Prussian Tariff with our own, and especially with regard to the question, which of the two corresponds better with the principle of the higher taxation of the greater income; another important consideration arises, namely, that in the Toll Union the entrance duties are only raised according to the weight of the goods, without distinction of their value in the special case, whilst by us the toll is reckoned only according to the value of the goods.

By laying a certain per centage on goods, according to their price in the market, he who consumes more expensive articles pays indirectly to the state a higher impost than he who contents himself with cheaper ones. As, therefore, consumption is regulated by income, and the dearer and therefore higher taxed articles are for the most part for the use of the more wealthy, this mode of raising duties corresponds better with the above men-

tioned principle than the other way of taxing by weight. The value of goods may be taken into consideration in the calculation of the Prussian tariffs, and in individual propositions, but it is impossible that all the gradations of the quality of one and the same article can be calculated, and the most disproportionate results follow. For instance, in the Prussian tariff all foreign wines bear a duty of 8 rix-dollars per cwt. The man of the middle rank of life must therefore pay for every bottle of common French table wine, which he drinks, as the rich man does for his Madeira and Champagne, namely, about 7 β per bottle. In general, therefore, our tariff of duties corresponds much better with the financial aim proposed to us by Prussia, than does the Prussian system itself. Some few imposts may, however, be here specially noticed.

Every man wears linen, and almost every male inhabitant of a city wears woollen cloth. With us, linen is free from all import duty. According to the Prussian tariff, it is subject to a duty, which (according to Becker) is not less than 10 to 15 per cent. of the value. The Hamburg duty on woollen goods is one half per cent. of the value; the Prussian tariff encumbers it with 30 rix-dollars the cwt. (according to Becker), on an average 15 to 20 per cent. on the value. The use of cotton is more limited to the respectable classes, and that of silk goods more so still; the former, by the Prussian tariff, bears a duty of 10 and 20, the latter only 7½ per cent. of the average value: whereas the duty here of one half per cent. on the market price remains the same.

It is true that those gradations of duties, which seem to be so unjust in the Customs' Union, have their advantage. It is reckoned that Germany can do best without foreign linen, almost as well without foreign woollen stuffs, only partly without foreign cotton manufactures, and, less than all, without foreign silks. And as, at all events, the less affluent classes are accustomed to be satisfied with the stuffs manufactured within the limits of the Customs' Union, no very great hardship at least is comprised in this respect in the tariff. On the other hand, it manifestly constrains indirectly the subjects of the states of the Union to restrict themselves to the use of German produce; and to this restraint Hamburg also

would be forced to submit, were she to unite with the Union. If the preference is given here to foreign cloth or to English cotton goods over the German ones, it is a proof that in this place they are obtained better for the same price, or that the same quality of the former is to be had cheaper than of the latter. By the pressure of the Prussian system we should be constrained, by disproportionately high duties, to buy the common necessaries of life either dearer or worse than heretofore; a restraint which certainly nothing could justify. Another article, rice, if not necessary to all, is so certainly to most classes of the people, and it only grows beyond the limits of the league. A duty is at present raised here upon it of one-half per cent. of the value, that is, according to the average price of the middling quality, reckoned at 2½ β the cwt.; the Prussian tariff requires 3 rix-dollars, that is, more than fifty times as much. Coffee may be reckoned an article of luxury. There are few even of the poorer and poorest people who deny themselves this enjoyment. The duty here is, according to the present system, one-half per cent. value, that is, according to the average price of the middle quality, about 3 β court. per cwt. The Prussian tariff requires 6 rix-dollars 20 gr., that is, nearly ninety times as much. But here arises a particular consideration. Herr von Nebenius, to prove that a higher duty on consumable colonial produce, coffee, tea, sugar, is in general just, shows, among other things, by very accurate statistical tables and calculations, that, in Paris, on the sugar annually consumed, 12 kilograms; on coffee annually consumed, 4½ kilograms; fall on each inhabitant; whilst, after deducting the consumption of the capital from the total consumption of the country, there fall on each of the remaining inhabitants, per head, $1\frac{6}{10}$ kilograms of sugar, and $\frac{16}{100}$ kilograms of coffee. According to this, the consumption of one family in the capital is, of sugar, ten to eleven times, and, of coffee, twenty-eight times, more than in the rest of the country. If we now consider that the consumption in all great towns approaches the proportion of the capital, we may, for two millions of the inhabitants of the most populous cities of the kingdom, almost reckon the half of the sugar consumption of the country, and assume that

these two millions of town inhabitants have paid just as much for sugar as the sixteen-fold greater population of the remaining country; and still more favourable is the proportion of the taxation, as regards coffee, for the flat country. The further inference will now very justly be drawn, that, in about the same manner, the proportion of the consumers in other countries in Germany, for example, prevails; and that thence, as by far the greater majority of the people are not inhabitants of great towns, in the higher taxation of the consumable colonial goods will be only found the higher taxation of one single, on an average, well conditioned class. This holds good, in reality, pretty nearly for all the states of Europe; only it is clear that just the contrary must prevail in those states which in reality consist of one great town. Here the tax would affect just the majority, viz. almost all classes of the population; thus, in regard to the above named articles, the introduction of the Prussian toll system would be nothing more than the higher taxation of those who really belong to the state, for the advantage of foreign countries.

We believe that, by what we have already said, we have done enough to satisfy our readers that Hamburg, by acceding to the Union, can neither augment her revenues nor improve the applotment of her taxes, therefore can gain nothing in a financial point of view; on the contrary, doubtless the reverse of both will be the case. We shall now proceed to consider whether, by acceding to the Customs' Union, any advantages would accrue to Hamburgh in an industrial point of view.

II. Of the industrial point of view.

The principal aim of the Prusso-German, as well as of every other coercive, system of duties is, that high duties are to raise native industry at the expense of foreign industry. As, however, the circulation of foreign produce in the interior employs the inland trade, and therefore as the latter must suffer from the exclusion of the former, and especially from the imposition of high duties, it matters little whether foreign trade be injured, provided always, industry is thereby favoured. If, by such a system, industry be really favoured, it can only happen at

the expense of trade; and for this very reason, we, a simple trading city, has certainly grounds enough not to adopt such a system. If, on the other hand, the premise is erroneous, that inland industry is increased by high duties on foreign manufactures, then the whole system falls to pieces, and there would be a double ground for not adopting it. The question has, indeed, been much agitated and investigated, whether high protecting duties are really advantageous to industry — and to discuss it anew is not our object here. Abstractedly and theoretically presented, the proposition sounds very plausible: if inland manufactures be kept under by foreign competition, exclude the productions of foreign industry by high duties, and the whole matter is finished. But the question must first be considered whether the introduction of foreign goods be really an impediment? and is this the only impediment?—and then must follow, if this impediment be obviated by high duties, do not they, themselves, bring new impediments with them? And, in fact, the proposition teaches government this lesson, not for example, let your manufacturers work better or cheaper, in order that your subjects may purchase their goods advantageously; but the reverse: order your subjects to buy worse or dearer, in order that the manufacturers may get rid of their goods. However prudent the lesson may be, it will never appear to us to be a just one. And if we consult experience, two examples offer themselves close at hand. Saxony has never known a restricting system, with the exception of some moderate imposts at Leipsig; duties of acknowledgment, rather than duties on foreign produce. Commercial freedom reigned there until the introduction of the Prussian system into Germany. And yet the manufacturing interests attained a development in Saxony almost unknown in any State in Germany. It is well known, likewise, how industry has flourished in Switzerland for many years; without harbours, without canals, Switzerland has seen Zurich become the most dangerous rival of Lyons; and yet she has no system of protecting tolls, no tariff of duties, but perfect freedom of trade. Let us assume, however, that the protecting system be a good and a practical one, yet the application of it to the peculiar circum-

stances of the State of which we are now speaking is a matter of well-grounded doubts. In larger countries, where naturally only by far the smallest part of the inhabitants finds a livelihood in trade, the remaining part is even by nature, (excepting the agriculturists,) necessarily destined to manufacturing industry; and this branch of industry must not be neglected for others by the Government. To a small State, however, which consists solely of a great trading town and some surrounding villages, which provide it with milk and vegetables, to such a State, it appears to us, that manufacturing industry is no longer so indispensable as to require the advantageous protection of the Government. If manufactories are formed there, that is, without any protection from the higher authorities, if they maintain themselves and increase, so much the better. Their flourishing state must be welcome to all; labour and capital are well bestowed, and a number of useful men provided for. If they do not prosper, however, or if after a short trial they succumb, it is a proof that they are not adopted to the existing circumstances, and the loss is easily submitted to; because trade will always offer opportunities enough for a better employment of the capital and labour that was employed there. If the Government were to interfere in such a matter, and wished to alter and improve, by means of art, it would only do mischief. It is the less called upon to do so, because, considered in a national financial point of view, in a State of so small extent, and a foreign trade so disproportioned to that extent, commerce must be as plentiful a source of riches to the people as manufacturing industry would be. Our many calico manufactures of former times are now diminished to very few; has the well-being of Hamburg suffered in consequence? Since Russia denied access to our refined sugars, has the number of sugar-refineries very sensibly diminished? Is Hamburg the poorer for this? Has not, on the contrary, her trade reached a still higher degree of prosperity? and is it not still increasing? As we consoled ourselves under these losses, so shall we still survive the farther wounds which the Customs' Union, as it exists at present, may inflict: the loss will never reach such a degree of importance, that we shall feel

ourselves obliged, in order to avoid it, for the sake of our refineries, to fetter our trade with the Prussian system of duties; and were we even voluntarily to chuse these fetters, it would always remain problematical whether they would be strong enough artfully to draw back those branches of industry which through other circumstances were transferred to, and had become indigenous in, other lands. Another consideration is not to be left out of sight. The votaries of the protecting system distinctly require, in order to favour inland industry, not only that the import of foreign manufactures should be made difficult, but that every possible facility should be given to the imports of foreign raw materials for inland manufactures. The Prussian tariffs of duties has now, it is true, as its defenders say, "very low" rates for the import duties on raw stuffs: but this "very low" is only to be understood in a relative sense, namely, as compared with the very high duties on manufactured goods (which are more than twice as high,) or as compared with duties which formerly, perhaps, in other countries impeded the importation of raw materials. In comparison, however, with the import duties here, these very low duties appear to be very high. While our manufacturers pay for the hundred weight of raw sugar ($\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.) about $1\frac{3}{4}$ β duty, they would, on the other hand, after adherence to the Union, pay for every cwt. 12 mks. 8 β; and if they altogether annually refined five hundred thousand cwt. they would pay more than six millions mks. in duties alone. Such an impost would at least very much embitter the joy which the manufacturers might feel at the facility offered for their sales in the interior, through their adhesion to the Union. Thus cotton yarn, which is now imported free, would be subjected to an import duty of 2 to 6 rxd.; which, according to Becker, makes about three per cent of the value of the average numbers drawn from England.

Tobacco leaves, equally the material of an important branch of industry, which now bear here an import duty of per cent (the average price of the middle sort taken at 14 mks. Bco. for the cwt.), of 1 B. court. for the cwt., would be subject to an impost of about 13 mks. court. (5 rxd. 15 g.) For wood, to be worked for furniture,

1 rxd.; for leather, 6 to 8 rxd. the cwt. would be the amount of the import duty. Let it be considered, likewise, that no small portion of the industry of this place, for instance, the last-mentioned branches, find their sale not in the countries of the Customs' Union, but in those beyond the sea, and therefore would gain but little from the facilitated inland exchange; and we shall arrive at the conclusion that in an industrial point of view, an adherence to the Customs' Union would, for some individual principal branches of our manufactures, bring a greater sale by the opening of a freer inland market, and would thus prove advantageous; but, on the other hand, even in these branches of industry, as in most others, the increase of price of the raw material would impede manufactures, and again be disadvantageous; and the gain to those individual manufactures is not important enough to the whole State, to make it desire an adhesion to the Customs' Union, if her finances and her trade are to suffer from such a step.

III. The commercial point of view.

One preliminary remark is here indispensable, which may have been hitherto overlooked in what has been said before. Hamburg is surrounded by States which have not united themselves to the Prussian system of duties. Hannover on one side, Holstein on the other, divide our country from the great Customs' Union; it is, therefore, in the nature of things that the conduct of these two countries towards the Customs' Union must be an important precedent for the policy of Hamburg. It might even appear as if the concurrence of the last State were impossible, without that of one of the two others. This is not so, however. Hamburg might serve as the North Sea harbour for the Prussian customs dominion, without immediately touching the remaining territory of the Union. It would so far adhere to the system of duties, as it would adopt the whole system, and then the wares which were exported into the united countries, or the reverse, would be subjected to no duties of export or import. The transit dues on the adjoining but not allied country would be, indeed, inconvenient, but would be no serious impediment. They would, probably, not be immediately high in Holstein, where, according to

all probability, an improvement of the system of duties will take place simultaneously with the constitution of the Diets; but in Hannover and Brunswick, however, where, according to the new Hannoverian and Brunswick Union tariffs, it is fixed at 4 gr. the cwt., it would be but very trifling, on account of the well-understood interests of the two united lands: and, in the worst case, the water carriage of the Elbe is always open, which by treaty and the laws of the Diet cannot be closed. The concurrence of Hamburg in the Prusso-Germanic Customs' Union is thus no ways conditional on that of Hannover or Holstein. Much less would the concurrence of the two latter States make that of Hamburg necessary. If the whole of Germany were girt with the lines of the duties of the Prussian restrictive system, yet the Hanse towns might still lay claim, and, with right, to remain as free harbours of Germany, excluded from those lines, as likewise Holstein would certainly never permit the freedom of the port of Altona to be taken away from her. As the concurrence of Hamburg in the Union is thus made neither conditional nor necessary on the concurrence of her neighbours, it was not necessary in the two former sections in which we treated of the relations over which the resolution of the same could exercise no material influence, to take any special view of the further policy of those countries. In a commercial point of view, however, we ought, on no account, to overlook the steps of our nearest neighbours. Whether a concurrence with the Union were advantageous to these or not is not here the question: thus much is certain that, under the relations in which the newly-bound Hannoverian and Brunswick Union stands towards England, and the Duchy of Holstein and Lauenburg towards Denmark, the accession of these four countries to the Prussian Customs' Union (as long as these relations last) is highly improbable. The situation in which Hamburg, as the most western German North Sea harbour, is placed towards the commerce of the world, may be seen by the first glance at the map. That part of the European Continent which is confined between the Rhine, the Vistula, and the Southern High Mountains, forms the natural dominion of its land

commerce. The goods which are exported or imported by sea from or into this tract of land come or go for the most part through Hamburg, whether they be on account of the traders here or elsewhere. With regard to this question, it is only necessary to distinguish, throughout that natural domain of commerce, three different countries. 1. The countries of the Customs' Union; 2, those on this side of them; 3, those on the farther side of them.

Among the first we reckon the Grand Duchy of Baden, the Duchy of Nassau, and the free State of Frankfort, of whose accession to the Customs' Union scarcely a doubt now remains; to the last belongs principally the Austrian territory, as far as the domain of the Elbe; and Switzerland as far as the domain of the Rhine reaches. With respect to the countries of the Customs' Union, the observation of Herr von Nebenius is true, but true only of them alone. So far as the height of the tariff diminishes the foreign trade of the market lying behind, such a disadvantage will equally affect all the German ports, whether they be connected with that market by the same system of duties or not. If, for instance, Prussia should endeavour to diminish the imports of English manufactures, by an immoderately high duty upon them, the trade of Hamburg in these articles with the countries under the Customs' Union must, of necessity, suffer in both cases. The traffic with countries which do not belong to the Union will, however, remain unaffected by the Prussian duties, so long as Hamburg keeps herself free from the Prussian system. If, then, it is not to be denied that, through the adhesion of Hamburg to the Customs' Union, her trade with the countries of the Union would not diminish, and that we should lose nothing in this respect; so, on the other hand, it is as true that, in this respect, we should gain nothing. Goods from the Colonies destined for Hamburg and Magdeburg pass through Hamburg now, as they did before the existence of the Customs' Union; and there is no reason for supposing that more of these articles would pass through Hamburg after acceding to the Customs' Union, since the duties of the Union remain always the same, whether they be raised in

Magdeburg or Hamburg. Levying the duties in the last-named place, with all the impediments and difficulties connected with it, would, however, bring a great inconvenience with it; namely, the enormous outlay which would fall upon the coffers of Hamburg, and the want of money, which must necessarily arise from it: this observation applies equally to the trade of this place, and not merely to that with the countries connected with the Union, of which we are now speaking. An accurate idea may be formed of the considerable amount of these expenses of duties, when we consider only some principal articles. The yearly imports of coffee into Hamburg, which would pay duty after an accession to the Customs' Union, may be said to amount at least to forty-seven millions lbs. The Prussian duty requires 6 rxd. 20 slbr. gr. the cwt.; the duty to be paid, then, annually at Hamburg, would amount to about five millions six hundred thousand mks. Bco. Thus in raw sugar import ninety-two millions lbs. duty at 5 rxd. per cwt.: eight millions three hundred thousand mks. Bco. Wine: about thirty thousand hogsheads; duty 40 rxd. the hogshead; two millions four hundred thousand mks. Bco., which in coffee, sugar, and wine, makes above sixteen millions mks. Bco. For these three articles then, only, the sum is enormous. Still, the duties on manufactured goods would rise in a still greater disproportion. That so considerable an increase of expenditure of ready money, without any apparent increase of trade, and therefore of gain, must have an important influence upon the finances of Hamburg is evident, and that the effect would be disadvantageous is more than probable; for if the capitalists might find themselves the better for it, and would receive higher interest and discount, the other traders would meet with many embarrassments; and in every case the capital, which the tolls, that is to say, the revenues of Prussia, Bavaria, and Hesse, swallow up, would be withdrawn from the trade of Hamburg, which could make a better use of it, and not only for its own advantage, but for the support of German trade in general. The trade of Hamburg would then obtain no advantage by her accession to the Commercial Union, but might, from the above-named reasons, be injured.

2. With regard to the trade with the countries beyond the commercial League, the goods which pass through Hamburg to or from Bohemia go either up or down the Elbe, without paying the proper land duties, or they take the land way by payment of the existing transit duties. In the first case the duties to be paid on the Elbe, and in the other, the transit duties between this and the Prussian frontier, and, finally, the import duty on the Bohemian frontier, do not come into consideration here, because they would not be diminished by the accession of Hamburg to the League. Through this accession the transit dues in the countries of the Union would give place to the import and export duties established by the League. As, however, the first outlay, 15 sil. gr. the cwt., is beyond all proportion smaller than the last, there is not the slightest doubt that, as soon as Hamburg unites herself to the League, the goods to and from Bohemia will be sent through a port not in unison with the League. The trade, then, of which we now speak, would go from Hamburg away to Altona, if the latter remains a free port, or even to Harburg, if Hanover remains excluded from the League; and only in the event, which, as we have said, is very improbable, of the two neighbours of Hamburg joining the League, would Hamburg not suffer from joining the League with respect to her trade with Austria. Nearly the same thing is applicable, under a different name, to the goods which pass through Hamburg to, or from, Switzerland, only that these would without ceremony be transferred to the Dutch and Belgic ports, where the greatest part of them is already in a great measure fixed: so that here, likewise, Hamburg would in both cases be a loser, whether the neighbouring states joined the League or not.

3. Those German countries, finally, which lie on this side the boundaries of the League, offer to the trade of Hamburg no unimportant field. These countries are the United States of Hanover and Brunswick, the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg, and the two Mecklenburgs; Oldenburg is by natural position so connected with Bremen, that here, where the question regards Hamburg only, it will not come any farther under consideration.

Let us suppose that Hamburg had joined the League, her trade with Hanover and Brunswick would, (under the improbable case of this Customs' Union leaguing itself with the other,) by analogy with what has been said before of the leagued countries, *gain nothing*: and in the probable case that both would remain unconnected with the League, she would lose very considerably, as by far the greatest part of the Hanoverian and Brunswick trade would be withdrawn, if not even to Harburg, (the situation of whose harbour may still remain a project in the air, as it has done for the last hundred years,) at least to the Belgic ports; which by railways from Antwerp to Cologne and Minden, and finally to Hanover, will be brought as near to this state as Hamburg is by nature. The trade of the latter to the German States of Denmark would gain nothing, if these were united to the League; in the opposite case, all would be lost, to the advantage of the neighbouring free ports, and finally, as far as regards Mecklenburg, there are three cases to decide upon, either that she alone, or in union with Holstein (Altona), or that neither of the two, would join the League: in the two first cases, Hamburg could, by what has been above said, gain nothing by herself joining the League; whereas in the last case she must lose all. We have only spoken here of the peculiar trade of Hamburg to those parts of the Continent which we consider as the natural domain of its land trade—in so far as the trade beyond the seas, and the trade with Denmark, Sweden and Russia, is not identical with the former, or is not inseparable from it, in so far as its increase or decrease must depend upon the increase or decrease of the land trade, in so far would this foreign trade, if all impediment, such as high duties, levying of tolls, the above-named increase of payments in ready money, &c. be thrown in its way, necessarily suffer throughout, and under this point of view Hamburg would be again a loser. To reckon the near amount of all probable loss is beyond our power, for want of sufficient data. It could only be reckoned by detailed export lists for Hamburg, which are not known to exist, and by as detailed import reports from all the before-named states. That which, however, results beyond a

doubt from all that has been said seems to us sufficient, viz. that Hamburg, by a union with the League, could, as far as regards *financial and commercial* interests, in *no case* be a gainer, and in many above-mentioned cases she might lose very considerably. The uncertain prospect of partial advantage, in an industrial point of view, is not inviting enough to induce us to decide, to venture upon the very hazardous leap from a system of perfect freedom of trade into one shackled by every sort of oppression.

MORAL STATISTICS OF RUSSIA,

FROM THE

OFFICIAL STATEMENT DRAWN UP BY C. F. HERMANN,

ST. PETERSBURGH.

The portion of Russia investigated is the western part of the central provinces of the empire, commonly called the plateau of Oka, which includes both the capital and province of Moscow; the years to which the tables refer are 1821 and 1822, and the immediate subjects of inquiry are suicides and homicides.

In the year 1821 the population was 10,593,251, and the number of proved suicides 520—doubtful (*non constatés*) suicides 132.

In 1822 there were proved suicides 505, doubtful 168.

The homicides, in 1821, were 223; and, in 1822, were 200.

Taking the mean of both years, it appears that there was one suicide for every 16,000 inhabitants, and one homicide for every 50,000; and, consequently, that the suicides were three times more numerous than the homicides. On examining the separate provinces, it appears that suicides and homicides are proportionably greater in the province of Moscow, where the population is most dense, and both are least in the province of Kostroma, which is the most thinly populated. The number of doubtful suicides is greatest in the provinces along the Volga, and those bordering on the steppes of Tartary.

The next head of inquiry is the sex of those who committed suicide; in 1821 there were, of proved suicides, 428 men, 92 women; in 1822, 406 men, 99 women; whence, taking the mean of both years, the proportion of male to female suicides is as $4\frac{3}{8}$ to 1.

Of proved suicides there were, in 1821, 111 men, 21 women; in 1822, 146 men, 22 women; whence, taking the mean, it appears that the proportion of male to female in this class is nearly as 6 to 1. And, combining both classes of suicide, the proportion is as $4\frac{5}{9}$ to 1.

The interest of these details increases when we come to investigate the class of life in which these suicides were committed.

Peasants *(glebæ ascripti)* in 1821, 387 men, 71 women, total 458; in 1822, 400 men, 98 women, total 498; mean amount for both sexes, during the two years, 478.

Merchants, traders, and freemen, in 1821, 77 men, 22 women, total 99; in 1822, 77 men, 16 women, total 93; mean amount for both sexes, 96.

Soldiers, in 1821, 57 men, 17 women, (soldiers' wives and suttlers we presume) total 74; in 1822, 53 men, 6 women, total 59; mean amount for both sexes, $66\frac{1}{2}$.

Nobles of every grade, in 1821, 15 men, 3 women, total 18; in 1822, 17 men, 1 woman, total 18; mean term for both sexes, 18.

Clergy, in 1821, 3 men, no women; in 1822, 5 men, no women; mean term, 4.

It is obvious that, in order to apply these tables, we should know the proportion of these classes to the bulk of the population, but this is very difficult to be ascertained. Mr. Hermann, however, calculates, from data which appear tolerably exact, the following table of the classes of population in these provinces: — Peasants, 8,000,000; middle class, 2,000,000; nobility, 200,000; soldiers, 200,000; clergy,

100,000. If this be, as we believe it will be found, a tolerably close approximation to accuracy, we have, among the peasants, 1 suicide in 16,757½; middle class, 1 in 20,833½; soldiers, 1 in 3,009; nobility, 1 in 11,111; clergy, 1 in 25,000. Hence it follows, that the clergy and middle classes are the persons most satisfied with life in the Russian empire; that the peasants, though serfs, are not very discontented; that the nobility have a more difficult station; and that the soldiers are in the worst state of all.

With respect to the kind of death, it appears that the rope is the favourite instrument of self-destruction in the middle and lower classes, and the pistol among the nobility and soldiery. Drowning is very rarely attempted; there were but seven cases of it, and of poison only three.

Let us now turn to homicides; the mean terms for the two years are, men 141, women 33, children 37½; whence we obtain the following proportions:—men to women as $4\frac{8}{11}$ to 1; men to children as $3\frac{4}{5}$ to 1; women to children as 1 to $1\frac{1}{7}$; both sexes to children as $4\frac{1}{5}$ to 1.

The next examination is as to the classes. The mean terms for the two years were, among the peasantry, 101½ men, 25½ women, 31 children, 158 total; middle class, 19½ men, 3½ women, 2 children, 25 total; soldiers, 10½ men, 1½ women, 3 children, 15 total; nobles, 6 men, 2 women, no children, 8 total; clergy, 3½ men, ½ woman, 1½ children, 5½ total. The principal remark on this statement is, that child-murder is most common among the peasantry, and more rare among the soldiers than might have been expected.

The greatest number of men slain were the victims of anger or intoxication, and were killed by blows of the fist or a cudgel; the number of persons slain by sharp weapons was on the average of the two years 26½ men, 6 women, no children, total 32½; being little more than a fourth of those who fell by the fist or cudgel. The number murdered by

fire-arms was only four men and one woman. The cases of poisoning were six in the two years, and three of these are believed to have been accidental.

With regard to family connexions, we must take the two years together. One father was murdered by his son; one mother was murdered by her son; five husbands were murdered by their wives; twenty-three wives were murdered by their husbands; one son was murdered by his father; three men were slain by their brothers. Nearly all these domestic crimes occurred in the class of peasants: three, however, belong to the clergy.

Out of the 413 homicides committed in the two years, the perpetrators of 206 only have been discovered and brought to trial. It is known, however, that there were 127 murders committed by peasants; 20 by discharged soldiers and deserters; 7 by merchants and traders; 6 by the clergy, or persons in their employ; and 4 by noblemen. Further, that 80 murders were committed by women, viz. 72 mothers murdered their children; 5 wives killed their husbands; 3 uncertain cases. Among these murders there were only six of masters by their slaves, domestic or rural.

As far as we are enabled to judge from former inexact statistical tables, it would seem that crimes of violence in this division of Russia are diminishing.

Soldiers' Children. — The "St. Petersburgh Journal" states, that 160,105 children of soldiers and recruits were educated at the expense of the Crown in the year 1832. During an interval of eight years, 4,343 such children were brought up as clerks in offices; 2,308 as assistant-surgeons; 452 as land-surveyors; 586 as shipwrights; and 120 as musicians.

Artillery.—This branch of the military department has been placed upon the subsequent footing, by virtue of an Order of the Day, issued under the Emperor's sign-manual on the 11th of March last. The "Horse Artillery of the Guard" is to consist of one battery of heavy and two of light guns; and the "Horse Artillery of the Line" of seven brigades, one to each of the seven regiments of light cavalry; besides three divisions of the same arm, to be attached to the three corps of "Cavalry of Reserve," and a separate corps in reserve. The "Foot Artillery of the Guard" to be composed of three brigades; and that of the "Line" to consist of a division of "Grenadier Artillery," of six divisions, each composed of three brigades; of the division of the "Caucasus;" and the nineteen brigades attached to the troops at present quartered in Finland. Major-General Soumarakow is placed in command of the whole corps, excepting the "Artillery of the Guard;" and Colonel Ganitshew of the "Guards," of the "Horse Artillery of the Guard."

Synoptical Table of the State of Education in Russia, according to the Budget for the Year 1832-33.

Universities.	Number of Professors and others employed.	Number of Students.	Number of Students who have left the Universities. Taken Degrees.	Not taken.	Lyceums and Gymnases.	Other Schools.	Professors and School-Masters.	Number of Scholars.
	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
t. Petersburgh	54	206	36	6	8	207	417	8781
oscow . .	113	541	110	34				
arkow . .	52	464	87	50	7	179	515	10,267
zan . .	209	209	38		9	159	501	7778
rpat . .	67	589	120	93	4	270	806	8471
ew . . .					7	54	168	4609
itepsk . .					9	118	423	8766
dessa . .					5	68	190	3115
ities, for Caucasus and Georgia . . .					2	12		
eria . . .								
Total .	495	2009	391	183	51	1067	3020	51,787

The University of Kijew, destined to replace that c Wilna, suppressed since the Revolution, has not yet been re organized.

The kingdom of Poland is not included in the budget c Mr. Uwarow. It is not very probable that the budget c the public instruction of that unfortunate part of Polan will be published; it is to be regretted, for, if it were, it woul be a document very little conformable to reality: unique i its kind, the greater part of the data of this table woul consist of negations; we should find the following detail The University of Warsaw, the only institution for th high sciences which was given to a population of 7,000,00 of inhabitants, is irrevocably suppressed; as, likewise, al the military schools, viz. that of Artillery, School of Cadets School of Application, of Cavalry, and of Infantry, &c. &c

In all the Lyceums, the number of classes are reduced fron six to four.

The Primary Institution, suppressed by the Lieutenant du Roi, late General Prince Zaionczek, interdicted a hitherto.

The same document informs us that astronomy, meteorology, and magnetism, are the sciences which occupy particularly the Russian authors.

The following notes we think necessary to throw more light on the actual state of the public education:—

1. The University of Kijew, destined to distribute scientific instruction in the governments of Volhinia, and in the ancient Polish provinces of Podolia, is not yet organized.

2. It is the same with the University of Witepsk, destined to replace that of Wilna, suppressed since the last Polish revolution, in which were instructed the Polish youths of the governments of Grodno, Minsk, and Bialystok.

The projected institutions for the instruction of the inhabitants of Caucasus and Siberia are not yet realized. It is

the respective governors who are charged to take the initiative.

The communications of Mr. Uwarow do not give the necessary explanations for us to form any idea whatever of the system of education adopted by the Russian government, which has felt the laconism of her ministry, and seems desirous that the public opinion should not mistake the tendency of her system and rules, which ought to lead to the point she proposes to attain.

The following article, which was inserted in the Berlin "Gazette d'Etat," lately the Russian "Monitor," has brought to light the good intentions of the Russian government for the instruction of her subjects.

An article sent from St. Petersburgh, and inserted in the Prussian "Gazette d'Etat," explains and unfolds the first communication of Mr. Uwarow, Minister; and, in this point of view, it merits the most serious attention of the philanthropist and statesman.

"To give a national direction to the public instruction, without depriving it of the influence of European civilization, all the establishments of education have undergone eminent improvements during several years, and all the others are being reorganized in the same manner. The Russian youths, debtors to foreign genius, are henceforth to take another direction."

To obtain this end the Russian government has recently taken the following measures:—

1. It is formally prohibited to all Russians to frequent foreign Universities. Exceptions to this rule will not be granted but in cases very rare, and the Imperial authorization is indispensable.

2. The sciences, which will be henceforth the object of the public instruction, are the literature and history of Russia, and the geography and statistics of that empire.

3. A Committee has just been established, destined to exercise an active and continual inspection over the public schools, and to suppress those which are defective; it is only in urgent cases that new ones can be established.

4. To be a tutor, you must previously obtain an authorization from a University, and also a certificate of moral and scientific capacity.

Several military schools have been established for the education of the sons of noblemen, civil and military officers, who have rendered services to the state in different parts of the empire.

At present there exist:—

At St. Petersburgh, one school of cadets, one of engineers, one of pages, one of nobles, and the corps Paulowski, (this last institution was founded by the Emperor Paul.)

At Czarskoy-Selo, a school for pupils, in compensation for the Lyceum suppressed in 1829.

At Moscow, the military schools are named the Corps of Novogorod, and the Corps of Nobility.

The towns of Tula, Tombar, and Orenbourg, have each a military school.

All the military schools are under the direction of the Grand Duke Michael.

By an ordinance recently published, military schools are going to be established

1. At Polock for young nobles residing in the governments of Witepsk, Mohilow, Smolensk, and Minsk.

2. At Tula ditto, for the governments of Tula, Wazar, Faro, Tau, and Orel.

3. At Tambau ditto, for the governments of Tambau, Persa, Simbirsk, Woronesk, and Saratow.

4. At Pultawa ditto, for the governments of Pultawa, Czernegow, Katerinoslaw, Karkow, and Kursk.

5. At Kijew ditto, for the governments of Kijew, Kamieniec, Podolski, Cherson, and Tauride.

The military schools already existing at Tula and Tambau are exclusively reserved for sons of noblemen.

The "Journal of St. Petersburgh," of a very recent date, published a synoptical table of the actual state of public instruction, presenting results little different from those published in the "Berlin Gazette;" the difference is not serious, only the last publication is more complete than the preceding, where neither the schools nor scholars are mentioned in the government of Moscow.

To be able to make the comparison, we have united in the same table the results of the two successive communications.

A periodical paper of St. Petersburgh ("Abeille du Nord,") gives a comparative table of the establishments for public instruction for the years 1830 and 1831, which proves a sensible decline in education. The following extract relates to the Polish provinces of Wilna, Grodno, Minsk, and Bialystok.

Denomination.	Institutions.		Professors.		Students.	
	1830.	1831.	1830.	1831.	1830.	1831.
	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.
Universities .	1	1	116	95	1321	120
Lyceums . .	1					
Gymnasia . .	12	7				
Secondary Schools	59	22	880	306	19,079	6654
Primary ditto .	261	45				
Boarding ditto	60	17				
Total .	394	92				

In comparing the number of students in the four Polish provinces, containing at most 3,000,000 inhabitants, with those of the students in the Russian empire, we obtain the following result:—

	Universities.		Other Schools.	
	1830.	1831.	1830.	1831.
	No.	No.	No.	No.
Russian Empire .	3412	2295	79,429	68,367
Polish Provinces	321	120	19,079	654
Proportion	$\frac{1}{5}$	$\frac{1}{23}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$

This table proves:—

1. That if public instruction has not prospered in the Russian empire, it has been totally suppressed in Poland.

2. That in 1830, before the revolution, instruction was proportionably more spread amongst the Poles than the Russians. The Russian government has since employed every means in her power to place instruction in Poland beneath its natural proportion. (See the "Abeille du Nord" of the 6th and 7th October, 1833, Nos. 226 and 227.)

I. Synoptical Table of the state of public instruction in Russia, published by Mr. Uwarow, Minister of public instruction, extracted from the "Journal of St. Petersburgh" and the "Gazette of Berlin:"—

	1832.	1833.
Universities	5	6
Lyceums	4	3
Gymnasiums	64	65
District Schools	392	408
Parish and Village Schools .	552	582
Private Boarding Schools .	369	404
Total .	1386	1468

II. Number of masters and students:—

Denominations.	Masters and Functionaries.		Students.	
	1832.	1833.	1832.	1833.
	No.	No.	No.	No.
Universities . .	347	400	2072	1834
Pedagogic Institutions	39	44	80	136
Lyceums	78	84	734	777
Schools	4372	4026	68,511	67,839
Total .	4836	4554	71,397	70,586

III. Libraries belonging to the Minister of Public Instruction:—

Libraries.	Number of Volumes. 1832.	1833.
	No.	No.
Public Library of St. Petersburgh .	278,212	287,650
Academy of Sciences . . .	87,303	89,104
Russian Academy	2500	3550
Romianzow Museum . . .	31,290	32,202
Universities	139,462	178,086
Pedagogic Institutions . . .	2392	2844
Lyceums	8488	12,810
Institution of Nobles of Moscow .		2910
Minister of Public Instruction .	30,000	30,000
Total number of Volumes .	579,647	639,156

Three Polish libraries were carried off in the reign of Catherine; three also since the last Revolution, that is to say, of the University of Warsaw, of the Society of Friends of the Arts and Sciences, and the greatest part of the Library of the Prince Czatoryski; all have been transported to St. Petersburgh by the Cossacks, who neglected every precaution necessary for the conservation of this inestimable treasure.

PROGRESS AND PRESENT POSITION OF RUSSIA IN THE EAST.*

Scarcely more than a year has elapsed since the remarkable pamphlet, "England, France, Russia, and Turkey," came at an opportune moment to awaken the Statesmen of this country, from a torpor of twenty years, to a sense of the danger with which all the interests of civilization were threatened by the progress of Russian aggression in the East. The interest which that extraordinary publication excited, not only in England, but in every portion of Europe, could hardly fail to exercise a powerful influence on the policy of this country.

To this cause may be attributed the increase in our naval establishment, and the adoption of a line of foreign policy more consonant with our national character, and the station we are called upon to maintain, by our position in the world.

The beneficial results of this change in our system have been apparent in the ascendency acquired by our Ambassador at Constantinople, and the moral support which the Sultan has thereby derived for the prosecution of his reforms in the internal administration of his empire.

* London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1836.

The firmness and consummate judgment displayed by Lord Ponsonby, amidst difficulties of no ordinary character, are matters for national congratulation. His success in obtaining the dismissal of Akif Effendi was due to his personal qualities alone, and the just confidence which is generally felt in England in the Embassy at Constantinople is in itself an additional support to our national influence in Turkey.

Yet, notwithstanding the numerous and able articles which have appeared of late on the East, it is evident that our public men have shrunk from the task of examining into the whole question of our foreign relations.

It has been objected to those who have so strenuously advocated the defence of the Ottoman Empire against Russian ambition, that it shows a narrow-minded and prejudiced view to consider Russia as a power inimical to Great Britain, and that the apprehensions entertained against Russia are exaggerated, unfounded, and absurd.

We cannot, therefore, but rejoice at the appearance at this moment of a work which presents to view the entire historic series of Russian encroachment, from the time of Peter the Great down to the present hour, illustrating, in the most temperate language, with the most beautiful method, and in the most condensed form, the whole tissue of fraud by which that Power has been marching onwards during the last century and a half to universal dominion.

We regret that time prevents us from offering, in our present number, an analysis of this deeply important work.

To every one interested in the prosperity of England, and in the preservation of those advantages for which peace is alone desirable, this publication cannot fail to present attractions of the highest order, and matter for the most serious reflection.

ERRATA.

Page 131, lines 14 and 15, instead of "England, Russia, and France," read "England, France, and Russia."

Page 132, line 11, for "being," read "having."

THE PORTFOLIO;

A COLLECTION OF

STATE PAPERS,

AND OTHER

DOCUMENTS AND CORRESPONDENCE,

HISTORICAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND COMMERCIAL.

VOL. IV.

No. XXXI.—OCTOBER 1, 1836.

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LONDON:
F. SHOBERL, JUN., 4, LEICESTER STREET,
LEICESTER SQUARE.
1836.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

We have to apologize to many of our Correspondents for not having sooner replied to the different contributions we have received. But, in many cases, the time absolutely indispensable for studying the papers which we have received has made us extremely unwilling to do injustice, by transmitting a hasty reply.

AFFAIRS OF CIRCASSIA, PERSIA, AND TURKEY.

Constantinople, September 1st, 1836.

EVENTS are transpiring in this quarter calculated to excite alarm, and arouse, if any thing can, the British Government and nation to prompt measures for their own protection. A Russian force of twelve thousand men has just succeeded in carrying, by assault, the Castle of Silgik, on the coast of Circassia, between Anapa and Ghilingik; thus giving a most distressing blow to the hopes and efforts of the Caucasians, in whom we have the only remaining check to Russia's free ingress into Asia Minor and Persia. From Persia herself our own arms are turned against us—that country which we sought to uphold as a barrier for the security of India from the North. To save it from anarchy—a necessary duty in pursuit of this object — British officers aided the reigning Monarch in putting down all his rivals, among whose partizans in the Southern provinces were the most attached adherents to a connexion with us. The error was not here, but it arose from Russian

preponderance being allowed to counteract all our wisest precautions in the East. The Shah of Persia, encouraged by an unprincipled minister, who has stirred up on his side all the warlike spirit and pride of the people, was about to employ all his strength in an attack on Herat.* The Russian minister had offered to join the expedition as colonel of a regiment in the service of the Persian Monarch. This sufficiently explains its origin and objects, which are to flatter Persia in projects of conquest on which she requires the countenance of Russia, and to pave the way for the latter to accomplish her ulterior ends. Mr. Ellice, our minister at the Shah's court, has formally protested against the expedition. Thus we have distinct evidence that it is opposed to British interests; in fact, that India is at last menaced, that Persia is not under the influence of our counsels, but against us.

Again, combinations have arisen, by which France has separate interests from ourselves, who wish to maintain the integrity of all the dominions

* "As soon as the resources of Persia shall have been placed at the disposal of Russia, and Herat shall thereby have become her southern frontier, there will no longer be any insuperable impediment to the invasion of India." —*Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East.*

The conquest of Herat will nearly coincide with the arrival of General Allard, in a French frigate, at the mouth of the Indus, on his way to Lahore!—Ed.

of the Porte. The interference at Tunis has irritated the divan, but its weakness reduces it to silence. We are in imminent peril of losing that concurrence or co-operation on the part of France for the settlement of the East, which the necessity or desire of maintaining a connexion with us might yet insure. As France gets deeper engaged in her African policy and new prospects — which may extend even to open Egypt to her people—our continued inaction will compel her Cabinet to secure for itself a counterpoise to the occupation of Constantinople, which devolves to Russia. The success of the Captain Pacha against the insurgents on the coast of Tripoli will only tend to mortify the Porte at being baffled in more important objects at Tunis, which it wished to re-unite to the empire.

From the delay in sending an answer on the affair of Mr. Churchill, it would seem that our Cabinet is divided, or finds great difficulty in coming to a decision on the subject. This is looked for here with intense anxiety, as, unless happy resolutions are adopted, the great change wrought in public opinion, and the well-repaid labour of the last three years to establish our influence at the Porte,

may be rendered nugatory, and the work will have to commence anew. The task of our ambassador has necessarily been to counteract Russia in all the tortuous windings of her policy — to expose the past, and indicate its tendency, with the remedy for the future. Successful in every measure he has attempted to carry with the divan up to the memorable occurrences in May, the degree of support he may now receive from the Government will be weighed not in mere relation to the circumstances themselves, but as a proof of our having made an election not to push the Porte to extremity in a contest of influence with Russia, or to withstand the trial.

Neither the Turkish Court nor the people are indifferent to the discredit attached to two of their leading ministers being implicated in this case towards a foreign power. Yet, instead of betraying resentment at the magnitude of the reparation expected by Lord Ponsonby, the language of the Porte is that of courtesy, with every facility and condescension shown in the transaction of business. This becomes easily understood, when, from high to low, one common sentiment is expressed:— "England is the only country on whose friendship

we can rely, because her interests are identical with our's. She covets not our territory, and cannot seek to do us an injury." A Reis Effendi, the foreign minister, has been deposed, not avowedly, but in reality, to propitiate our displeasure, before any formal demand was made. We may thus judge what effect a message from our government would produce in regard to the other principal in the offence. Achmet Pacha, as Commander of the Arsenal, detained Mr. Churchill in a loathsome prison for nearly four days, loaded with irons, and in opposition to the request of several of his colleagues for the sufferer's release. The main point now at issue is—whether this Pacha shall retain his post near the Sultan's person, as a grand military counsellor and confidential member of the divan? Lord Ponsonby, on his own responsibility alone, has declared to the Porte that he ought not to remain—leaving to his Majesty's Government, as the ultimate judges, the liberty of deciding.*

In this purely national question of justice be-

* His Majesty's Government will doubtless remember, on this occasion, that the indecision of the administration after the Battle of Navarino led to the subsequent withdrawal of the British Embassy from the Ottoman territory, in December 1827;—an event which the British Government had been led to anticipate, and the responsibility of which rested, therefore, entirely with the Government and not with the Ambassador.—Ed.

tween England and the Porte, Russia has stepped forward to shield the offender, first through her minister here, then by a direct message to our Cabinet, and *she constitutes herself an arbiter of the reparation we ought to accept.** While the affair was pending, the king's ministers could make no appeal to the country, but they have doubtless resented the indignity of the intrusion, and proved that, where the honour of England is concerned, she ever acts for herself. It happens, also, that the individual for whom such interest is displayed is caressed by Russia as her supporter, and loaded with favours and presents from her court. The dismissed Reis Effendi had the reputation of similar predilections, arising from the use of the same means; but the ægis of his patrons failed to save him, and I cannot believe that they have won the *real* attachment of any Turk alive. The Sultan, from the natural pride of a sovereign, may be averse to the sacrifice of both his ministers, though this would be no excuse to us for the denial of any just satisfaction: nor is it easy to suppose that this consideration would balance the loss of our favour. In the more intimate connexion which would follow between

* This exhibits a progress in Russian audacity which we were hardly prepared to expect.

the two countries, we can render him services, offering a compensation far more solid and flattering to his dignity than the value of all he would yield.

Our sole complaint against Achmet Pacha is in his character of a high officer of the Porte—that he is defended as the protegé of a foreign power. We might be inclined to show the more lenity towards him, out of regard for the personal feelings of the Sultan, of whom he has long been a favourite, and is by many considered a devoted servant, according to his own sincere opinions. The exercise of this courtesy is now restrained by its liability to be held up as a tardy and reluctant concession, wrung from our Cabinet, at the instance of Russia. The Ministry may despise such intrigues, and trust to the real dignity of the country. But the use which Russia can make of her familiar weapons is not a matter of such indifference, nor the impression which would be produced on the public mind, by any circumstances tending to weaken the high consideration enjoyed by our Ambassador, and render his position untenable.

The prestige of power is power itself—above all

in Eastern countries; once destroyed, it can only be restored by the display of physical means in action. The eyes of Europe are upon us, and the agents of Russia ready to avail themselves with haste and exultation of the slightest advantage presented to them in the course which our Government may pursue. Her constant game is to intimidate and usurp, when others are likely to be content with looking on. Resolutely met and resisted, she is never ashamed to recede. Witness her recent abandonment of the toll on the Danube, and her quarantine regulations in jeopardy, by which she had the effrontery to appropriate to herself illegally the sovereign control over the navigation of that river. Should her sinister counsels prevail over the Sultan to induce him to reject our terms—for matters must surely come to an open and determinate issue—it may, perhaps, be the result most to be desired. Any recourse to the violent employment of force as an alternative would, I think, be a groundless apprehension. We should only have to overcome the resistance of a court party flattered and encouraged by Russia, but whose aid it cannot invoke to enter into a contest with England, against the

universal sentiments of the people. And would Russia, uncalled, venture to violate the Ottoman territory, in presence of a British force, ready to back that people in their defence, and by whom it would be welcomed as sent, not to impose, but to deliver the country and Sovereign from a foreign yoke? Our triumph in every way entails only the trouble of exchanging our protection for that of Russia, to work out the effectual regeneration of Turkey under our fostering auspices.

The opportunity may be allowed to pass without achieving such a splendid consummation of our utmost aims. The attitude and conflicting views of other Powers may deter us from the attempt; the prevention of foreign collision by every expedient may be regarded as the perfection of our policy, the ne plus ultra of ability in our external relations. Party schisms and factions may continue to engross the attention of our rulers, impede their action, and paralyze the energies of the country, in regard to our station and interests abroad. There is a point, however, at which war is inevitable, or peace impossible, without degradation and irreparable loss; and to which the affairs of Turkey, abandoned to herself a few years more,

must infallibly lead. When will the maxim, so fatal to nations as in private life, be thrown aside, that we are always in time?

Turkey possesses life, adhesiveness, and resources, but not immutability. She is struggling, not with decay and anarchy, but with a renovated flow in her veins, against evils originating from without. She is cheered on in her task by England, without any certainty of final repose, or of rising to independence through her exertions. The master of Egypt and Syria, formidable by our errors, drains, plunders, and depopulates these unhappy countries, to do the work of the common foe. While extensive salutary reforms open to the rest of the empire prospects of order and increased security of property, the exigencies of the day lead to impolitic and vexatious taxes. The evil genius of Russia thwarts every development of the products of the soil, which interferes with her own. Abuses are tolerated which the Sultan can scarcely venture to probe, so long as he knows not in what quarter to look for support. Germs of discontent are perpetuated between him and the people, from the absence of all grounds of confidence in the ultimate destinies of the country, or

consolation for past disgraces. The military conscription for the regular army, which falls exclusively on the Mussulman youth, presses heavily, amidst other burdens, on many provinces of Asia Minor. Disappointed, as Turkey has been, in every instance when her hopes of assistance were wound to the highest pitch; bound down to keep the peace against a rebel within her bosom; unable alone to escape from her difficulties; exposed to the demoralizing action of Russia on her administration and her raya subjects, and the Government urged to greater efforts to concentrate all its strength, exhaustion must follow the protracted struggle. The remedy lies in one word—SECURITY. Grant Turkey this, and her afflictions cease. There are weeds to be eradicated—but no institutions are subverted which require to be replanted. No parties, no classes, or privileged interests, stand in the way of the general good.

The subjects may combine and successfully resist the errors or abuses of power; they cannot control the march of the Government in the career of amelioration. Strangers to European forms of liberty, or the jealousies of their rulers, no abstract theories of rights distract the population into fac-

tions—no spies disturb their privacy, and watch over their actions and thoughts. A community of local interests is the vital principle of unity in the empire. It proffers for cultivation one of the noblest fields ever presented to the genius and labours of man; and with us it rests whether it shall flourish in fertility, or be exposed to ravages which will convert it into a waste.

Turkey stretches out to us her hand; her ports are open to all our products; she demands reciprocity for her own, under a guarantee only that no malignant power, to which her prosperity gives umbrage, shall be allowed to take revenge. Then will her antiquated restrictions on some native productions be removed, and new channels opened for an interchange of commodities, which I scruple not to predict would in five years double our present exports of two millions, without limits to their progressive increase. Then will European civilization indeed be a boon to the East, and the East return the benefit. Then shall we have made to recoil within his congenial regions the northern Briareus, whose arms, like icebergs detached from the polar mass, are extended to invade and chill more benignant climes.

REPORT OF COLONEL LAZAREW

TO THE

ADJUTANT-GENERAL COUNT PASKEWITCH ERIVANSKI,

COMMANDANT OF THE DETACHED CORPS OF THE CAUCASIAN ARMY.

[In our last Number we inserted the Proclamation of Colonel Lazarew, enticing the Armenians of the Province of Azerbijan to emigrate into Russia. The following report shows how this measure was effected. Russia has stated that her policy is explained in her Treaties. In the Treaties of Turcomanchai and Adrianople we shall perceive that her policy consists in sowing treason amongst the subjects of the Powers she attacks, and then enforcing pardon from their outraged Monarchs, thus holding up in perpetuity an encouragement to all the malecontents of neighbouring States to consider foreign interference the greatest of earthly blessings.]

In the year 1827, in the midst of the brilliant victories of the detached Caucasian Corps, your Highness saw the devotedness of the Armenians, who took an extraordinary interest in the success of the Russian arms. When I filled the office of commandant of the City of Tabreez, I employed myself, agreeably to your instructions, in making preparations for the emigration of this people. As an esteemed brother in the faith of the Armenians, I frequently laid before your Highness their feelings of veneration for the holy name of the Russian Monarch, who is the author of the well-being of my brethren.

After the very glorious peace for Russia, concluded by you in the year 1828, your Highness judged me worthy to carry into execution a project most useful to your native country, formed by you, namely, to effect the emigration of the Christians from the Persian dominions into the districts of Nakshivan and Erivan, lately acquired by Russia, and now, through the favour of the monarch, called the Armenian Provinces.

After the subjection under which the Armenians and their church have laboured during nearly four hundred years, the first step towards the union of this people under the protection of the mighty Russia, and of her mild and wise laws, is indeed the commencement of a great event. And this proceeded from you. On me likewise, as a Russian officer, so flattering a commission, given to me by your Highness, confers great honour, and, as an Armenian, perfect happiness.

To me, as well as to many others, the thing appeared at first to be free from all difficulty, particularly as before the conclusion of the peace with Persia some Armenians and Nestorians came of their own free will with entreaties to your Highness to fix them in the Russian dominions. However, subsequently, when they were to bid adieu to their houses and to the graves of their industrious forefathers, who had left to them great and fertile lands, as an inheritance; when the time came to leave their establishments of so many years standing, with all the comforts belonging to them, and to exchange present security for future insecurity; the Nestorians first required that they should receive compensation for the goods they had left behind them, and then the Armenians petitioned that at least a part of the value of their fixtures should be given to assist them in their first establishment in their new home.

Notwithstanding all these impediments, more than eight hundred Armenian families have been conducted by me into the new Russian Armenian dominions. Although I have unceasingly endeavoured to persuade the Nestorians likewise to emigrate, and have offered them more assistance in money; though I afforded two Nestorian meliks,* Sarchoseh and Almerdi, whom I settled, very considerable assistance;

* Thus are now called the Overseers, as well the Armenians as the Nestorians. The word Melik is, without doubt, of Semitish origin, and meant originally as much as King.

yet, out of the numerous resident Nestorians, I only succeeded in persuading about one hundred families to emigrate. The Nestorians distinctly declared that they would not stir from the place until the Russian Government should have indemnified them for the immoveable property they must leave behind them.

For the removal of these impediments and the rapid success of the emigration, I have to thank the confidence of the Armenians and the zealous assistance of the Staff and other superior officers who were with me, and most punctually fulfilled all my directions, and which, at the end of the report, I consider it my duty to mention.

On the 26th of February, 1828, I received from your Highness instructions with respect to the emigration of the Armenians, and of the other Christians residing in the province of Azerbijan, into the districts of Erivan and Nakshivan. According to the instruction, I immediately made a selection of the staff and superior officers, which was also confirmed by your Highness.

Of the sixteen thousand ducats assigned by your Highness for the support of the emigrants, I received in a short time eight thousand, and applied myself immediately to the fulfilment of the orders which had been given to me.

The Lieutenant-Colonel of the 41st Regiment of Chasseurs, Prince Melikow, was to take charge of the emigration of the Armenians from Orim and the surrounding country. The Lieutenant-Colonel of the Georgian Regiment of Grenadiers, Prince Argutinski Dolgoruki, I left in Tabreez, to assist the emigration of the Armenians from that city and from the surrounding villages. Several officers were placed under his orders, and money was given to him for the support of the poor. I myself, with several officers, started on the 29th of February for the Chanat of Maraga, and arrived on the 1st of March in the city of the same name.

During the whole time I was taking charge of the emigration, several Persian and English agents were with me. The emigration was effected in the following manner. I took pains to assure myself of the real inclination of the Armenians for emigration; and for this purpose I visited all the towns, and the principal villages in which Armenians resided. After I had selected the persons around me best fitted for the purpose, I committed to each of them the charge of conducting a particular division of the emigrants. I put under their command some younger officers, and I gave them a sum of money for the support of the poor. These officers made registers of the families who wished to emigrate, and distributed to them money for their support, taking a receipt for the same. When one division was ready for the journey, the officer who presided over the emigration from the Chanat (according to circumstances) either went with them himself, or appointed one of the officers who were with him to do so. With each division was an escort of Cossacks, or of infantry; failing this, a number of armed emigrants supplied the place of this armed escort.

I was almost always present at the departure of eac[illegible] division, or else I reviewed them on their march. Wher[illegible] received from your Highness, in the little town of Sofiani[illegible] verbal permission to act according to my own discreti[illegible] with regard to expenses, and when I saw among the em[illegible] grants maimed soldiers, burdened with families; when[illegible] saw women and widows who had no means to purch[illegible] cattle, I gave assistance to these unfortunate persons, whi[illegible] was the largest portion of the expenditure of the extraor[illegible] nary sum.

The overseer conducted the column entrusted to him [illegible] perfect order, as far as the frontiers of Russia; he th[illegible] committed them to the charge of the local officer. As so[illegible] as the latter was informed of his arrival, reports of t[illegible]

number of the emigrant families, and of the sums distributed, with the acknowledgments of those who received them, were laid before me.

When I applied myself to the work, the greatest impediments came in my way. The Armenians, it is true, sincerely wished to emigrate; but all their wealth consisted *in houses, fruit gardens, and well cultivated fields.* As they were now to leave all behind them, they firmly believed that the Russian government, in consideration of *their great loss,* would indemnify them for the fixtures which they had abandoned, and that they would thereby be enabled to establish themselves comfortably on the frontiers of Russia, as well as more easily to settle in their new country.

Your Highness believed that the Armenians would be able to sell their fixtures to the Christians who remained in their home or to the Mahometans. Your Highness ordered, in case of too sudden a journey, that full powers should be left behind. This, however, was not carried into effect. The Persian government secretly forbade their subjects to purchase such possessions, and thought thereby to detain the Armenians. Were this, however, not to be the case, and should the Armenians still emigrate, the government would gain the possessions which were left behind, and acquire thereby considerable sums. Some Persians had already agreed upon the price which they would give for certain possessions of the Armenians; they however immediately drew back again, as soon as the purchase was to be actually completed. If, then, the Armenians under the protection of our troops could arrange nothing, it was still less possible for those to whom they had given full powers to do so. *The possessions of the Armenians were very considerable,* and the sum to be given to them was not to exceed *ten silver roubles for the whole family!* * Following

* About £2.

strictly the directions given to me by your Highness, I did not deceive the Armenians with empty promises: on the contrary, I told them plainly that they would not at once find in the Russian dominions all that they left behind them in Persia; that they would, however, under the protection of a benevolent and Christian government, secure the welfare of their posterity, as well as their own peace. These administrations, assisted by the zeal of the officers with me, were attended with such extraordinary success, that, at first, the Armenians of the Chanat Maraga, and then the Armenians of the whole of Azerbijan, decided upon leaving all behind them; they emigrated almost at the same time into the Russian dominions. Even from the distant Chanat Caswin, several families came without any escort of our military, and joined the emigrants. *Almost all the Armenians were impoverished by such an unheard-of sacrifice, and were in want of assistance in money.** Although I was obliged to distribute money to almost all of them, I still observed the strictest economy; the sum which was given to each family is *on an average less than five silver roubles.* The Armenians of Maraga gave the first proof of devotedness. However, in the beginning of March, the snow lay still on the fields, and I feared that the cattle of the emigrants might thereby suffer for want of fodder. This induced me to delay the expedition, and to travel myself to Tabreez, in order to make a personal report to your Highness

After I had thus made all the necessary arrangements, and had given the charge of the emigration of the Armenians of the Chanat of Maraga to the College Assessor, Hamason, and to the Staff Captain of the Koslowschen regiment of infantry, Womikow, I left Maraga on the 7th of

* It is hardly possible to imagine the sufferings to which these unfortunate people were reduced. The greater part of them died of starvation, and perhaps, their fate was happier than that of those who survive to regret their native land.

March, and was with your Highness at Sofiani on the 10th, where I received from you a very flattering approval of all I had hitherto done, and many verbal orders, which guide my subsequent undertakings. On the 10th of March, I returned to Tabreez, arranged every thing for the emigration of the Armenians residing there, and then went to the Chanat Salmas.

About this time the emigration commenced in earnest; from various parts of Azerbijan numerous divisions set off, and took their way to the Araxes. The Mahometans showed that they were animated by the greatest hatred against the emigrants; they followed them with imprecations, and even often threw stones at them. The overseers were almost always employed in repressing the just hatred and revenge of the emigrants, by which means the apparently almost inevitable bloodshed was spared. With regard to the Persian Government, it appeared to bestow no attention upon this outrageous conduct of their subjects. Perhaps they might hope that the Armenians would be alarmed by it, and that the emigration might thereby be prevented. On the 21st I arrived at the fortress of Dilman; I visited the Armenian villages, and was received with indescribable rejoicings and with marks of the greatest confidence. As I had no officers with me, I commissioned the most worthy Enoch to prepare the register of the Armenians in the Chanat of Salmas. I again started on the 22nd, and arrived on the 23rd at Ormi; from whence I ordered the Lieutenant-Colonel Prince Argutinsky Dolgoruki to leave Tabreez, and to conduct the emigration of the Armenians from Salmas. I placed myself, at the same time, in communication with the Major-General Pankratieff, of whose assistance I was more than once in need; he always, as far as possible, met my wishes.

Among the Armenians of the Chanat Ormi I perceived

the same zeal and the same confidence. The Persian Government perceived the progress I was making, and failed not to place new impediments in the way. They saw that, contrary to almost all probability, almost all the Armenians emigrated, and they felt how great would be the loss of so large a number of industrious subjects. In opposition to all union on the subject, the different local authorities, and the agents who were with me, began to whisper to the Armenians much evil against the settlement among the Russians: they assured them that, immediately on their arrival in the Russian dominions, they would be made serfs, and would thereby lose all means of obtaining a comfortable existence; that the young people would be taken for soldiers, &c. &c.; that, on the contrary, if they would remain in Persia, they should, for a long time, be free from all taxes. In order to retain the Armenians in their homes, the Persian authorities offered them more money than I could give them for their emigration, which I already remarked to your highness when I had the honour of speaking to you. Notwithstanding this, I made all the arrangements depending upon me, and the Armenian people remained firm in their intention to emigrate.

When I arrived at Ormi almost all the Russian troops had already withdrawn. I gave to the College Assessor, Hamason, (who had returned from Maraga) the charge of the emigration of the Armenians from this Chanat, with the exception of four villages, which were entrusted to the care of Major Prince Schalikow. I despatched the Sub-Lieutenant Isskritzki to the fortress of Choi, in order to prepare the Armenians for emigration. Much earlier I sent from the Chanat of Maraga trustworthy officers to Kurdistan. They succeeded with the greatest danger in conducting over some families, but the malice of the Kurds was thereby raised to the highest pitch. They fell, even in day-light, on the small corps of emigrant Armenians, plundered and

detained them. I applied to Major-General Pankratieff, and the violence of these robbers was in some degree subdued.

On the 5th of April, I learnt from Major-General Pankratieff that, of the contribution laid upon the Persians, one crore had already been received at Tuman in Tabreez, and that probably on the 20th the Russian troops would evacuate Ormi. This forced me to hurry on the emigration as much as possible.

The Persian Government now took refuge in their last hold. Mahmmed Takir Khan came to me with a paper from Abbas Mirza, and complained as if he had heard himself, from one of the four hundred families of the division of Armenians, that we had forced them to emigrate. I wished to prove his falsehood before his face, and started from Choi with a son of Askar Khan's on the 12th. A mile from thence we overtook the division of Armenians who were said to have declared that they had been forced to emigrate, and asked them the question. "We would rather eat Russian grass than Persian bread," they replied to the son of Askar Khan. I had this answer attested in writing.

On the 13th I returned to the fortress. Choi made the necessary arrangements there, charged Major Prince Schalikow, and the Sub-Lieutenant Isskritzki, with their execution, and returned on the 18th to the fortress of Dilman.

On the 20th of April, Mirza Massud, first Secretary to his Highness the Persian Crown Prince, arrived at Dilman. He was to be present at the emigration of the Armenians from the Chanat Salmas, and he presented to me a paper from Abbas Mirza, in which the Prince reproached me for constraining the Armenians to emigrate. I replied immediately to his Highness, and proved that his officers made false reports to him with respect to me, while I added the testimony of the son of Askar Khan to my despatch. Mirza Massud satisfied himself in person of the uprightness of my conduct. As I had need of more money for the prosecution of

my undertaking, I borrowed three thousand ducats of General Pankratieff, and from other persons I borrowed about two thousand ducats, which I repaid with the money received from your Highness.

On the 20th the Russian troops evacuated Ormi. The families who were still obliged to remain there suffered much oppression from the Persian Government, and made their complaints to me. This circumstance obliged me to despatch the Armenians from the Chanats of Salmas and Choi as expeditiously as possible, that they might not encounter the same persecutions: and thus I hastened the emigration. One division followed another, and the population of the province Azerbijan diminished sensibly. Already had more than five thousand families approached the Araxes, when I received the first report of the provisional province of the Armenian Government, wherein they declared that from *utter destitution they were not in a condition to afford to the expected emigrants the necessary assistance;* they, therefore, begged me to detain them till harvest time. Soon after, viz. on the 8th of May, I received orders from your Highness of the 24th of April, the purport of which was that I should persuade the greatest part of the emigrants, and especially the poorest, to go to Karabach, where they would be provided for, to detain others in their homes, and not to allow those to emigrate who had no means of their own. These orders were fulfilled by me in such a manner, that those who expressed a wish to emigrate, but who were, however, poor, received no more assistance in money. On the 9th of May I left the fortress of Dilman, and arrived on the 10th at Choi.

At the same time, Major-General Pankratieff announced to me the determination of your Highness to leave four staff officers, or other trustworthy officers, in the Chanats of Ormi, Salmas, and Choi, for the defence of the Armenians. I immediately announced this favour of your Highness to all

the emigrant Armenians, and to those who would still emigrate; and commanded the Lieutenant-Colonel Prince Argutinski Dolgoruky not to hasten the departure of the remaining divisions of the Armenians; on the contrary, to endeavour to detain them until harvest time.

I immediately afterwards received intelligence from the Chanat of Nakshivan that the Armenians who had arrived remained *encamped, and were in want of every necessary of life.* I determined to try if I could not lessen their distress by my personal presence there. I left Choi, therefore, on the 17th of May, and came on the 19th to Nakshivan. As soon as I had visited the Armenian camp, I despatched the College Assessor, Hamason, to Erivan; and entreated the Armenian Government of the circle to send the Armenian wanderers to their allotted place, and to afford them help as soon as possible. As there was a want of crown lands in the Chanat of Nakshivan, I endeavoured to persuade many Armenians to settle in the Chanats of Erivan and Karabach. As I saw, however, that the division in the Chanat of Erivan was destitute of all means to make this longer journey, I divided among them two thousand more ducats.

On the 21st I left Nakshivan, and returned on the 22nd to Choi. Fulfilling, as far as possible, the directions of your Highness, I deferred the emigration of many Armenians till the entire withdrawal of the Russian troops. As I saw the end of my labours approaching, I wished to speak of some details in person to your Highness. I, therefore, gave the charge of the divisions of Armenians remaining in their homes to the confidential officer, Prince Argutinski Dolgoruki. I left Choi on the 29th, and took the road to Erivan and Nakshivan. Here I found my last orders, and joined on the 18th of June the division of the army in active service at Kars, which made the campaign against Turkey.

After the taking of the fortress Achalzik, your Highness

ordered me to return to Erivan, in order to make a circumstantial report of my labours, and of the employment of the sums delivered to me. In spite of indisposition, I started immediately to fulfil the commands of your Highness; but when I arrived at Teflis I was attacked by a violent illness, from which I have scarcely yet recovered. In the meantime I received the report of Prince Argutinski Dolgoruki. Although the annexed documents did not contain all the accounts and references to enable me to draw up a circumstantial report, I still made out this statement, in order to fulfil your Excellency's orders without delay from the papers and information which I had myself collected. I ordered the Prince to send me, as soon as possible, the rest of his intelligence, which I shall hasten to have the honour of laying before your Excellency.

My labours began on the 26th of February, 1828, and ended on the 11th of June of the same year, when I was obliged, however, to leave one thousand five hundred families who wished to emigrate behind in their homes. During the whole time I received from your Excellency fourteen thousand ducats, and four hundred silver roubles (together about 7000*l.*), and with these means I settled eight thousand two hundred and forty-nine Christian families. The division of the emigrants in the Chanat of Nakshivan received alone more than two thousand ducats. These sums, which were entrusted entirely to my responsibility, I gave over to Captain Derubenka. The extraordinary zeal, punctuality, and method of this officer, deserve your Excellency's particular attention.

From the annexed papers, your Excellency will perceive how many families were established by each of the officers associated with me, and the sums distributed for their support; as also the table money and postage accounts of the officers, and the extraordinary disbursements made according to your Excellency's directions.

Whilst submitting to your Excellency a detailed report of the whole of my proceedings, I venture to add, that whilst you have peopled the newly acquired provinces with more than eight thousand families of an industrious hard-working population, you have opened a new source of riches for the empire. One may anticipate, with certainty, that *however great may be the sums which were expended on the emigrants,* they will still be very quickly repaid to the Government with a considerable return. Instead of the deserts which are *now* to be found in the old, extensive Armenia, rich villages, and perhaps even towns, will spring up inhabited by industrious and productive inhabitants devoted to their Monarch.

As I was a witness of the various sacrifices, and the devotion of the Armenians to the Russian throne, I take the liberty of entreating your Excellency, as the founder of their newly acquired happiness, to extend your particular care towards them, and not to omit to petition His Imperial Majesty that the condition of the wanderers may be alleviated, and that their new habitations may be built in a durable manner, not only for the sake of humanity, as on account of the special advantage of the Empire.

Whilst I state that the execution of the flattering commission entrusted to me by your Excellency makes an epoch in my life, I conceive it to be my duty to add, that I shall esteem myself peculiarly happy if your Excellency will graciously recommend to the favour of His Imperial Majesty the staff officers attached to me for some reward for their unexampled zeal in accomplishing a task often attended *with the risk of their lives.* I entreat the same in favour of the superior clergy, and those inhabitants who zealously supported me during the emigration; and that some of them may be reinstated in the rights which they so long enjoyed in Persia.

Teffis, 24th December, 1829.

[The following Despatch was written a very short time after the Cabinet of St. Petersburg had learnt the departure of the British expedition for Portugal, and had felt, as a natural consequence, the sudden prostration of all its influence in the Peninsula.

Those of our readers who watched the astonishing effects produced on the diplomatic body at the different Courts of Europe, by the speech of Mr. Canning, will not be at a loss to understand the altered tone of Russia in the present instructions.

Her object was, by appearing to range herself on the side of England in the Peninsula, to conciliate Mr. Canning, in order the more securely to gain his support in the affairs of Greece; but the tact with which, after sustaining so signal a defeat in Spain, she recovers her ground, and appears to stand forward as the most faithful and disinterested adviser of King Ferdinand, after having for so many years guided his policy to the most destructive ends, is truly admirable. In the Correspondence, inserted in this Number, the reader will perceive that the same intrigues which convulsed the Peninsula in 1826 are about to be reacted in 1836.]

DESPATCH FROM COUNT NESSELRODE TO M. D'OUBRIL,

HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY'S ENVOY AT MADRID.

St. Petersburg, January, 1827.

I have laid before the Emperor your Excellency's Despatches to 94 inclusive.

The instructions with which your Excellency has been successively furnished, on the subject of the reciprocal position of the Courts of Madrid and Lisbon, since the knowledge of the determination of Don Pedro, with regard to Portugal, cannot have left any doubt on your mind with regard to the sentiments with which His Imperial Majesty would learn that the promises of the

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Copie d'une Dépêche en date de St. Petersbourg, le Janvier, 1827, adressée par le Cte. de Nesselrode à M. d'Oubril.

J'ai mis sous les yeux de l'Empereur les dépêches de V. E. jusqu'au No. 94 inclusivement.

Les instructions dont vous avez eté successivement muni, Monsieur, au sujet de la position réciproque des cours de Madrid et de Lisbonne, dépuis que les determinations de D. Pedro à l'égard du Portugal sont connues, n'ont pu vous laisser aucun doute sur les sentimens avec lesquels Sa Majesté Imperiale apprendrait que les promesses du gouvernment Espagnol rélatives à ses in-

Spanish government with regard to its pacific intentions towards the government of Portugal, and to the care which it would take not to afford it any just subject of complaint, have suddenly been completely violated.

From the very day when the conditions on which Don Pedro renounced the throne of Portugal were proclaimed, Russia, *which was not called upon to judge the question, whether the institutions which he granted to his former country were in harmony with its wants and customs,* respected even in this act that legitimacy whose principle had been consecrated by all Europe, and which ought especially to have been honoured by a sovereign who is twice obliged to it for his crown. At the same period the Emperor came to

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tentions pacifiques envers le gouvernement Portugais et au soin qu'il apporteraint à ne pas lui fournir de justes griefs ont eté tout d'un coup complètement trompées.

Dès le jour où furent proclamées les conditions sous lesquels D. Pedro renonçait au trône de Portugal, la Russie, qui n'etait pas appelée à juger la question de savoir si les institutions qu'il accordait à son ancienne patrie convenaient à ses besoins et à ses moeurs, respecta jusque dans cet acte cette légitimité dont l'Europe entière a consacré le principe, et que devrait honorer surtout un souverain qui lui est deux fois redevable de sa couronne. A la même époque l'Empereur s'expliqua franchement

a frank explanation with the court of Madrid. He made known to it, through you, his determinations and the grounds of them. He even added the counsels of friendship. He frankly indicated the policy which appeared to him adapted not only to guarantee Spain from the dangers which she apprehended, but to secure to her positive advantages. The Emperor did more.—He contributed to obtain positive declarations which could not fail to shield his Catholic Majesty from every attack. The special question of the Portuguese fugitives shortly afterwards arose. The Emperor himself seized the opportunity of making the Spanish minister accredited to his court appreciate how much his loyal and benevolent conduct towards the government of his Most Faithful

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avec la Cour de Madrid. Il lui fit connaître par votre organe ses déterminations et leur motif. Il y joignit même les conseils de l'amitié. Il signala sans détour la marche qui lui semblait propre, non seulement à garantir l'Espagne des dangers qu'elle apprehendait, mais à lui assurer de véritables avantages. L'Empereur fit plus. Il contribua à obtenir des declarations positives, qui ne pouvaient manquer de mettre sa Majesté Catholique à l'abri de toute attaque. La question speciale des transfuges Portugais ne tarda point a s'élever. L'Empereur saisit l'occasion de faire sentir lui-même au ministre d'Espagne accredité à sa Cour, combien une conduite loyale et bienveillante pour le gouvernement

added the solemn engagement not to protect nor to countenance henceforward any undertaking against the new state of things in Portugal; and that, satisfied with these declarations, the Minister of England had resolved not to quit Madrid. But we have learnt since, that the King had refused to punish the functionaries who had violated his instructions; that this refusal had provoked the recall of the Swiss troops quartered in the Spanish capital; and that, on the other hand, a Spanish corps was assembling on the Portuguese frontier.

It appears to us so clearly proved that the first interest of a Government is to make its authority respected, and to punish those who disregard it; that, in our opinion, the wishes put forward on

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qu' il y avoit joint l'engagement solennel de ne protéger ni de favoriser dèsormais aucune entreprise contre le nouvel état de choses en Portugal, et que, satisfait de ces declarations, le Ministre d'Angleterre avoit résolu de ne pas quitter Madrid. Mais nous avons appris depuis que le Roi s'etoit réfusé à la punition des fonctionnaires qui avoient trahi ses ordres, que ce refus avoit provoqué le rappel des troupes Suisses cantonnées dans la Capitale de l'Espagne, et que, d'autre part, un corps d'armée Espagnol se rassembloit sur la frontière Portugaise.

Il nous paroit si bien prouvé que le premier intérêt d'un Gouvernement est de faire respecter son autorité et de punir ceux qui la méconnoissent, que, selon nous, les vœux enoncés à ce sujet par

this subject by his most Christian Majesty gave evident proof of his friendship for his Catholic Majesty; and that the King of Spain in opposing them has done real injury *to the very power with which he is invested.* We equally regard as so clear a truth the danger to which Spain would expose herself, if the troops she assembles were to commit the slightest act of hostility against Portugal, that we shall not here discuss the probability of such an occurrence. God grant that it may never take place, and that, above all, Spain may not force allies whose sentiments are but too well known to her to defend her no longer from the fatality which would entail upon her inevitable ruin!

Nevertheless, Sir, at the distance at which we are from the theatre of events, we cannot frame

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sa Majesté très Chrétienne portaient toute l'empreinte de son amitié pour sa Majesté Catholique, et qu'en les répoussant le Roi d'Espagne à fait un tort réel au pouvoir même dont il est investé. Nous regardons également comme une vérité si claire le danger auquel l'Espagne s'exposerait si les troupes qu'elle assemble devaient commettre le moindre acte hostile contre le Portugal, que nous ne discuterons pas ici cette hypothèse. Dieu veuille qu'elle ne se réalise jamais et que l'Espagne surtout ne force point des alliés, dont les sentimens ne lui sont que trop connues, à ne pouvoir plus la défendre de la fatalité qui l'entrainerait à sa perte.

Au reste, Monsieur, à la distance où nous sommes du thèatre

special instructions for every case which may arise, and we shall confine ourselves to indicate to you in general terms our principles and the line you have to pursue.

Russia regards as legitimate the Government established in Portugal, and she cannot recognize the right on the part of Spain to attack it directly or indirectly. Nor can she recognize on the part of Spain the right to countenance any enterprizes whatsoever against the Government of her most Faithful Majesty.

Russia further regards as legitimate the succour sent to Portugal by England.

Penetrated with benevolent anxiety for the interests of his Catholic Majesty, Russia wishes that

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des évènemens, nous ne pouvons vous tracer de régles spéciales pour les cas divers que peuvent se présenter, et nous nous bornerons à vous indiquer en termes généraux nos principes et votre rôle.

La Russie regarde comme légitime le Gouvernement etabli en Portugal et ne saurait reconnaître à l'Espagne le droit de l'attaquer directement ou indirectement. Elle ne saurait non plus lui reconnaître le droit de favoriser des entreprises quelconques contre le Gouvernement de sa Majesté tres Fidèle.

La Russie regarde en outre comme légitime les secours envoyés au Portugal par l'Angleterre.

Pleine d'une bienveillante sollicitude pour les intérêts de sa Majesté Catholique, la Russie desire que l'Espagne renoue des

Spain may renew her relations of sincere friendship with the new Government of Portugal, and that henceforth it may afford it no just subject of complaint.

The same principles induce Russia to wish that Spain should replace its relations with the Courts of Paris and of London on the most friendly footing, by decided acts which its own interest, and indeed the dignity of the Crown, demand.

In conformity with these considerations, your Excellency will employ all the influence placed at your disposal by your position and the character with which you are invested.

1st. In order to avert every measure, the consequence or even the sole adoption of which might

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rélations d'amitié *sincère* avec le nouveau Gouvernement Portugais, et que dorénavant elle ne lui donne aucun motif de réclamation.

Par suite des mêmes sentimens, la Russie desire que l'Espagne réplace *sur le pied le plus amical* par des actes éclatans, que son propre bien exige, qu' exigent même la dignité de sa Couronne, ses rapports avec les Cours de Paris et de Londres.

D'aprés ces considérations, vous userez, Monsieur, de toute l'influence que peuvent vous assurer vôtre position et le caractère dont vous êtes revètu,

1°. pour détourner toute mésure dont les conséquences ou l'adoption seule pourrait donner lieu à de justes plaintes de la part du Gouvernement Portugais.

give cause for just complaint on the part of the Portuguese Government.

2nd. To obtain at length the establishment of satisfactory relations between that Government and the Spanish Government.

3rd. To promote every measure which, in ameliorating the march of the administration of his Catholic Majesty, might prove that the King is determined henceforth to be strictly obeyed, and to bring about a lasting intimacy between his Cabinet and those of the Tuileries and St. James.

4th. To recall to remembrance the eminent services which his most Christian Majesty has continually rendered during four years to Spain, and the claims to a just deference to which they entitle him.

5th. To exercise a friendly and conciliatory in-

2°. pour obtenir que des rapports satisfaisans s'établissent enfin entre ce Gouvernement et le Gouvernement Espagnol.

3°. pour provoquer toute mésure qui pourrait, en améliorant la marche de l'administration de sa Majesté Catholique, prouver que le Roi seul devrait désormais être strictement obéi et opérer un rapprochement durable entre son Cabinet et ceux des Tuileries et de St. James.

4°. pour rappeler les eminens services que sa Majesté tres Chrétienne n'a cessé de rendre depuis quatre ans à l'Espagne, et les titres qu'ils lui assurent à une juste déférence.

tervention in every case wherein your character as Minister of a Court, which has no direct interests to support in the Peninsula, would give you the means of rendering acceptable the wishes of which you would be the interpreter, in the same manner as in the negociation in which you judiciously and successfully seconded the efforts of Mr. Lamb.

If Spain fulfils the wishes of his Imperial Majesty, such as we have defined them above, you will declare that the Emperor will always consider it his duty to prevent, in as far as depends upon himself, every unprovoked aggression directed against her, and to guarantee to her all the security to which she has a right to pretend.

If, on the other hand, Spain does not fulfil his

5°. pour exercer une intervention officieuse et conciliatrice dans tous les cas où vôtre qualité de Ministre d'une Cour qui n'a point d'interêts directs à soutenir dans la Peninsule vous donnerait les moyens de faire accueillir les vœux dont vous seriez l'interprête, comme dans la négociation où vous avez judicieusement et heureusement secondé les efforts de Mr. Lamb.

Si l'Espagne remplit les desirs de sa Majesté Impériale tels que nous les avons enoncés plus haut, vous declarerez que l'Empereur se fera toujours un devoir d'empêcher autant qu'il est en lui toute agression non provoquée dont elle serait l'objet, et de lui assurer toute la securité à laquelle elle est en droit de prétendre.

wishes; if unhappily she should deviate from t
path of safety; it will only remain for you to
clare to her that the Emperor finds himself obli
to abandon her cause, to blame loudly her pol
and to deplore for her the ever fatal consequen
of it, without being able to prevent them.

Your Excellency is authorized to lay the p
sent despatch before the Spanish Cabinet, if
should deem it advisable to do so.

Receive, &c. &c. &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE

Si au contraire l'Espagne ne remplit pas ses desirs, si par
heur elle s'écarte de cette voie de salut, il ne vous restera qu
témoigner que l'Empéreur se voit *forcé* d'abandonner sa
d'improuver hautement sa politique, et d'en déplorer pour
suites à jamais funestes sans pouvoir les prévenir.

V. Ex. est autorisée à mettre la présente, si elle le ju
sous les yeux du Ministère Espagnol.

Recevez, &c.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE AFFAIRS OF WURTEMBERG.

Of all the Cabinets of Germany, with the exception, perhaps, of that of Berlin, the Cabinet of Stuttgard is the most devoted to Russia; devoted by principle, for Russia is a powerful support against the constitutional regime; devoted by interests, which are important in the eyes of the King, who hopes by Russian assistance to obtain the command of the federal army of Germany; devoted, in fine, by family ties, which have always a certain influence on the position of a kingdom.

Of all the people of Germany, with the exception of those of Hesse and Baden, the inhabitants of Wurtemberg aspire the most ardently to the Western Alliance. First, from principle, for Wurtemberg is a country eminently liberal and enlightened; it is the native country of Schiller, and it has often appeared worthy of having given birth to that eminent man. Secondly, from interest, for a people, in order to become prosperous in com-

merce as well as to preserve their independence, requires to be allied with progressive and powerful nations. Contiguous to France, it is, by a community of interests rather than by braving the power of that country, that Wurtemberg may obtain the alliance which is called for by the public opinion of its inhabitants.

The Cabinet of Stuttgard is well aware that its policy is opposed to that of the King's subjects; it therefore seeks to combat the opinion of the country by all the means in its power, and it endeavours, on every occasion, to deceive the public with an ability which has often been successful. Sometimes it has equally deceived foreign Governments.

It is in order to unmask this system in all its bearings that we publish some documents of interest, preceded by an historical sketch, which will render them more intelligible.

Alarmed at the liberal movements in Germany, and particularly in Wurtemberg, the Cabinet of Stuttgard had ratified, on the 25th of September, 1819, a constitution which had not been ratified, but which formed a positive compact. The King had signed this compact, in which he declared that

it was the expression of his own conviction, and he had sworn by his royal dignity to maintain it for himself and his successors. (See the subjoined documents, Annexe I.)

This compact, although it may not have been in every respect in harmony with the progress of the age, had at least promised many securities; it had expressly established guarantees against any decision on the part of Frankfort, by insisting on the co-operation of the Diet of Wurtemberg. In its stipulations on the subject of taxes, it seemed to have provided against certain military decrees of the Diet, against a commercial convention with Prussia. This compact offered the most precise guarantees in favour of individual liberty, and especially in favour of the liberty of the press,—the origin and end, means and effect, of every other liberty.

Nevertheless, this compact contained an Article (89) which, in the opinion of any reasonable man, can undoubtedly be applicable only to the ordinances made in order to execute the laws, or to a state of war, but which, in the eyes of the Cabinet of Wurtemberg, seems to bear the same construction as that of Article 14 in the French

Charter, under the dynasty which has been expelled.

The Wurtemberg Charter, notwithstanding its defects, had sufficient merit to incur the hatred of the Diet of Frankfort, composed of the representatives of the Princes and free towns of Germany. The Princes of Germany, Sovereigns according to the fundamental law, are fond of becoming subjects of the Diet, when it protects them against the liberty of their own subjects. The Cabinet of Wurtemberg, therefore, was delighted at seeing the Diet oppose the execution of the compact which the King had just signed.

As the population manifested its resentment against the decrees of the Diet of Frankfort, and as the army itself seemed decided to support the population, to such an extent that the officers and soldiers insisted upon drawing up energetic declarations, the Cabinet of Wurtemberg found amongst the officers a captain, of the name of Bangold, at present Major-General and Chief of the Staff, who enjoyed, in 1819, the reputation of a Liberal, and was afterwards known by his intimacy with Frederick Muller, who died in Greece. M. de Bangold, either seeing the true state of

things or deceived at the time, was the first to draw up or sign a military address, in which, instead of the liberty of the press, (see Section 28 of the Pact,) mention only is made of liberty of thought, and which, whilst appearing to combat the Diet, especially counsels the most entire confidence in the King. This skilful address, the secret of which was unknown, succeeded in calming the population and the army.

It will be found under No. II., in the papers subjoined.

After the revolution of July, enthusiasm for France burst out more strongly than ever in Wurtemberg. The King, on hearing of the arrival of Louis Philippe at Strasbourg, hastened to meet him, in order to deceive the Wurtembergers and Louis Philippe. The former were foolish enough to allow themselves to be mystified; the latter committed the equally grave error of flattering a Prince from whom he might, at the time, have obtained everything by a menace or by indifference, and thenceforward the King of Wurtemberg, believing France to be weak, threw himself more decidedly than ever into the arms of Russia.

When, in June, 1832, the Diet of Frankfort

issued its decrees against the press, the Cabinet of Stuttgard joyfully conformed to them, in spite of the Constitution. It went so far as to prohibit the Universal Gazette of Stuttgard, which had submitted to the censorship. In order to blind the Wurtembergers, it spread the belief that it was sincerely opposed to the decrees of the Diet, but in reality, even before the promulgation of the Protocols, it had acted almost as if they had already been published.

The population protested by murmurs, by addresses, and in the Chambers: the army was extremely discontented.

In the month of August, 1831, the King had addressed an order to the Minister of War, which reveals, more than any reflection which we can offer, the spirit which animated the army. We give this curious document under No. III. It will be seen how much the government dreaded the press, even when curbed by the censorship.

Amongst the complaints addressed to the government against the severity of the censorship, posterior to the Protocols of June, we must notice a petition on the part of M. Lohbauer, the Editor of the "Hochwächter," dated 12 March,

1832. It has been since said that the government has prohibited the publication of this complaint; it is very possible; but others say that the government afterwards instigated its circulation, in order to spread the belief that it was itself opposed to the censorship. That which is certain, however, is, that the censorship continued before the Protocols. We subjoin this complaint, which may afford ground for serious reflection. (See No. IV.)

When, at length, the Protocols of Frankfort had appeared, and a dangerous sensation had been produced by them in Wurtemberg, the government had the good fortune to find, in the midst of an exasperated population, a Municipal Council at Stuttgard, which made a protest of a character as agreeable to the Cabinet, as if it had been written under its own dictation. Notwithstanding the phrases which had deceived the public, there are some expressions in it which are certainly equivocal; with regard to a benevolent explanation which might be given to the decrees; with regard to confidence in the association of states, which of course meant the Diet; in order to deceive the public, the address admits the general discontent, and demands the strict execution of the charter;

in order to please the Cabinet, it concludes by only demanding a tranquillizing assurance. This assurance was given, but the Cabinet continued as before, and the charter, as regarded the press, and the co-operation of the Diet, &c. (see Sections 3 and 28 of the Pact) was not executed. The character of the Municipal Council will be better understood on perusal of the document No. V.

Doubtless there were enlightened men in the Council. But, as in the distich of Schiller, "united they formed a monster." Schiller would have said the same of the assembly which took place at Stuttgard a few days later, on July 31, 1832, and which, after having loudly demanded the execution of the Charter, took very unfortunate steps to obtain the fulfilment of its desires. We give an article on the assembly and the address, extracted from a late publication of the Hochwächter, in which the sentences scratched out by the censorship are inserted. That which results from this article as positive is the enthusiasm of the inhabitants of Stuttgard, in whom the exercise of more discretion and judgment would have been better. The article, however, has something equivocal; the address, *signed by those who aspired to the service*

of the state, had something deceitful, although signed by honourable men, such as M. Uhland, who is a better poet and orator than a critic; that which is especially suspicious is the erasures of the censorship, and it is possible that the words which were pretended to be erased had been written afterwards to be printed at Pforzheim, or elsewhere, and in order to practise a deception in the interest of the Cabinet.

At the very moment in which we are examining this Charter, these oaths, these deceptions, these documents revealing secrets which they were destined to conceal, we have received a letter which is important, under a very different point of view, and which enables us to appreciate the European position of Wurtemberg.

This letter, translated with scrupulous fidelity under No. VII., is dated Frankfort, July the 23rd, 1836. We are assured that it is from the pen of a Liberal, by a man of talent, who wished to have it published at Paris; but the person who received it, not appreciating all its importance, communicated it to the gentleman to whom we are indebted for it. We are persuaded that the writer of this letter did not himself understand the tendency of his in-

formation; for, though it may be written by a Liberal, it is undoubtedly prompted (through some indirect channel) by a Wurtemberg Diplomatist. If the present letter, in the same manner as under the restoration the letter of a Wurtemberg Minister addressed to the "Constitutionel," against the advice of the King, could overthrow a Minister, we might be touched with compassion; but this time the letter, if the information emanates from a Cabinet, is the expression of the opinions of the King.

In order to deceive the public, this letter pretends that Wurtemberg leans towards France and Austria; but it proves that it is wholly in the arms of Russia. It accuses Bavaria of its nascent sympathies towards England; it denounces the secondary States of Germany as adverse to Prussia and Russia; according to a system which has been for some time adopted by St. Petersburg, it accuses the German Diet of pusillanimity; it reproaches the secondary States with not obeying the decrees of the Diet; it shows a desire to quarrel with the *Augsburg Gazette* for having gone too far, as the letter says, in its articles on Wurtemberg.

Extending its views, this letter urges the Diet

to assist Holland; and whilst it pretends as if military measures may be possibly adopted against Holland, it demands a previous notice of them, doubtless in order that Russia may have time to intermeddle. It promises the hand of a Princess of Wurtemberg to the reigning Duke of Brunswick, favoured by Prussia; it would lead Austria to negotiate this marriage, and, foreseeing, doubtless, that it will not take place, it overwhelms Austria with reproaches. It is violent against Greece, supported by England; against Otho, who, according to its reasoning, will not find a Queen, because Wurtemberg is too intimate with Russia to give Otho a Princess, if he were really to ask for one. It ends by alluding to pretended troubles of a grave nature in Hungary, and thus shows us the source whence these rumours arise. It is thus that a liberal correspondent, opposed to Russia, has unwittingly given information tending to further the ends of that power; it is thus that by a critical examination of such documents, one is enabled to understand their meaning, and definitively to turn them to the confusion both of Russia and of Wurtemberg.

At a subsequent period we may devote another

article to portray the present state of Wurtemberg, with its liberal population under an enslaved press; some of its journals containing articles apparently liberal, but which, supplied from suspicious sources, tend to serve the interests of Russia. We should see individual liberty equally infringed upon with the liberty of the press; and if we cannot express our sympathy for the bankrupt bookseller confined at Hohenasperg, who, in conspiring, *as it is said*, against the Government, has done much more mischief to the liberal cause; nor for his friend, the captain, who is fit to be shut up, like himself, in a mad-house, rather than in a fortress: still we should condemn proceedings in contradiction with the twenty-sixth article of the Charter, which established a regular order in the mode of prosecution. We should see on the one hand a charter in tatters, on the other, a parliamentary opposition which writes well, which often speaks well, without being always heard by Germany, but which still commits the grave error of not appreciating, in its full extent, all that energetic character of the population of Wurtemberg, which, in demanding more solemnly the execution of a Charter which suffices for the happiness of the country, would prevent a future revolution.

These few observations, compared with the an-
xed documents, may suffice to characterize a
ıbinet that wishes to deceive France, and op-
ses the interests of England, whilst it supports all
e views of Russia; a Cabinet which deceives the
pulation of the country, and which violates its
nstitution; a Cabinet which, in denouncing the
uses of the pen and of the press, sets the example
such abuses, by still graver faults than the inde-
ndent press has ever committed; for the inde-
ndent press is guided by conviction, the Cabinet
· Machiavelism; the independent press employs
gical reasoning and facts to prove its conclusions,
e Cabinet employs finesse and fraud to deceive.
will not succeed. Its tendency and its measures
n only serve to alienate even the most mode-
te.

AFFAIRS OF WURTEMBERG.

I.

EXTRACT FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHARTER OF WURTEMBERG.

25th Sept. 1819.

We, William, by the grace of God, King of Wurtemberg, make known in our own name and in that of our successors.

—— In order to satisfy, as a member of the Germanic Confederation, the obligations of the XIIIth article of the federal act, as well as the wishes of our subjects; wishes which are in harmony with our own conviction; we have convoked an assembly of the States for the 13th of July of this year, in our Residence of Ludwigsburg; . . . . it is thus that by our decision and the declaration of the States the following points have been agreed upon.

—— § 3. The kingdom of Wurtemberg makes a part of the Germanic Confederation; therefore, all the organic decrees of the Diet concerning the constitutional relations of Germany, or the general relations of the German citizens, are also binding on Wurtemberg, after they shall have been proclaimed by the King. With regard, however, to the measures necessary to fulfil the obligations established on this basis, the constitutional co-operation of the States must be obtained.

§ 10. The oath of homage is not taken to the successor, until, in a solemn charter addressed to the States of the kingdom, he has guaranteed on his royal word the inviolable maintenance of the constitution of the country.

§ 24. The State secures to every citizen personal

liberty, the liberty of conscience and of thought, the liberty of property, and the liberty of emigration.

§ 26. No one can be withdrawn from his regular judge, nor arrested, nor punished in any other way than that fixed by the law, and according to legal forms, nor can he be left for more than twenty-four hours in uncertainty as to the motive of his arrest.

§ 28. The liberty of the press and of publishing is established in all its plenitude, in conformity, however, with the laws which exist or which may be instituted against its abuse.

§ 85. Without the consent of the States General, no new tax can be imposed on the kingdom and on the citizens; no law of the state can be modified or suspended, nor can any obligation be contracted which could infringe upon the rights of the citizens.

§ 88. Without the consent of the States no law can be published, suspended, modified, or authentically explained.

§ 89. But the King has the right to make, without the consent of the States, the necessary decrees, and to take measures for executing and applying the laws, and in cases of urgency he makes arrangements, if necessary, for the safety of the state.

§ 91. All the laws and ordinances which should be in contradiction with an express stipulation of the present constitutional charter are revoked; the others are submitted to the constitutional revision.

(And after § 205, the last paragraph.)

The preceding stipulations form from henceforth the fundamental constitution of the state of our kingdom. We swear by our royal dignity, for ourselves and for our successors, to preserve and to fulfil firmly and inviolably the present compact, and thus to protect it against every infringement and violation, and to maintain it in full force.

In faith of which we have signed it with our own hand and have affixed to it our great royal seal.

Done in our capital and residence town of Stuttgard, this 25th day of September, 1819.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

L. S. By order of the King
The Secretary of State
(Signed) VELLNAGEL.

II.

ADDRESS TO THE KING OF WURTEMBERG, BY OFFICERS OF DIFFERENT RANKS OF A GARRISON TOWN IN THE KINGDOM OF WURTEMBERG.

October 26, 1819.

SIRE,

The undersigned officers approach the throne to express to your Majesty sentiments of the most respectful attachment, of an unlimited confidence, of inviolable fidelity, and of the most zealous obedience, in the midst of the profound grief with which the decrees of the German Diet of the 35th session have filled the kingdom of Wurtemberg and the whole of Germany. Your Majesty, guided by those generous views which correspond with the elevation of your mind and the progress of the age, had taken the resolution to submit the true relations of the government and the citizens, their reciprocal rights and obligations, to a common and impartial examination, and to consent, on this basis, to the establishment of a constitutional compact between the king and the people. Success has justified this great undertaking, to the eternal

glory of your Majesty, to the honour of your people, and to the confusion of those who, by narrow and selfish views, calumniate the present age and humanity. The constitution which was granted to the Wurtembergers bears the stamp of the purity of its origin, engendered as it is by the spirit of truth, and conceived in the spirit of justice. It secures to the king all the means of a useful activity, and protects the people against the abuses of power, against the encroachments of despotism. It recognizes in the people an equitable share in legislation, the privilege of paying no other taxes than those which are judged necessary by its deputies. Personal security and personal property are guaranteed to every man. The liberty of thought, the imprescriptible privilege of man, whence naturally flows the liberty of communicating thoughts, is frankly proclaimed. To the king is conceded, amongst other attributes which are due to his exalted position, the highest right, the right of pardon, to indicate that his noblest mission consists in beneficence. When this constitution, the work of an enlightened mind and of an unimpeded will, had become, by the solemn ratification of your Majesty, and by the acceptation of the deputies of the people, the pledge of future happiness, every honest heart celebrated this victory of light over darkness; an universal enthusiasm spread throughout the country, and every Wurtemberger poured forth his gratitude to Heaven, invoking its blessings on its monarch. Suddenly, this patriotic joy was troubled by the decrees of the Diet; they filled every heart with fear and anxiety. The Wurtemberger sees the sanctuary of his constitution attacked, and the welfare which it had promised endangered. The liberty of thought, secured by the spontaneous impulse of the wisdom of your Majesty, is henceforth to be shamefully fettered by a foreign power. The security of persons

and of property is threatened with ruin. The Wurtemberger is to be withdrawn from his constitutional judge, dragged into another country before a foreign inquisition, to undergo a sentence passed by unknown, un-Wurtemberg laws, or according to the inspirations of despotism. Nay, farther, the path to pardon, the way to the heart of the monarch, is to be closed; the best, the most useful citizen must be delivered over to the prosecution of the central Commission of Mayence, if he has the misfortune to displease foreign potentates; even if he displeases them by his virtues. The Diet arrogates to itself, with regard to interchange of thought, supreme official surveillance, in laying claim to the right of interdicting to every publisher who, perhaps unintentionally, may incur its disapprobation, the means of gaining a livelihood and promoting the public good.

In these encroachments we perceive an attack even on the independence of the throne, and we dread further evils which cannot fail to be soon developed. Foreign governments, regarding with jealousy the happiness of the Wurtemberg people, a happiness which they would envy in their own subjects, pretend to dare to put limits to the wisdom and goodness of your Majesty; they would prescribe to your Majesty the measure according to which your Majesty ought to grant to your people enlightenment and rights: they intend to oppose obstacles to the progress of the Wurtemberg people, they who, in their intellectual inertia and their blindness, dread the task of rivalling with our countrymen, would willingly destroy all that is good on earth, to render less visible their own shame.

Humanity deplores this work of perverse artifice, and history, one day judging the present era, will not fail to pass sentence on this crime. In the midst of the

different attacks against the name and happiness of the Germans, at an epoch of imminent danger, the Wurtemberg people directs its regards with confidence to its king, and hopes that he will protect his work and their's, and that he will show himself the powerful defender of justice and truth. The Wurtemberg people preserves with pride and gratitude the remembrance of the proof of love and esteem which the king has given them, in extending to them his hand for the conclusion of a constitutional and free compact, and in assigning to them a rank amongst the most civilized people of Europe. They understand and deserve this moral appreciation; how then could they endure to-day the shame of seeing foreign ministers insolently tear to pieces the charter signed by their king? They would lose the esteem of their monarch if they could support the thought of humiliating themselves to the point of becoming slaves of foreign despotism; *it is to their king alone* to whom they desire to confide the direction of their fate, and for him who guarantees their happiness they are ready to sacrifice with joy their fortunes and their blood. We, the undersigned, who are entrusted with the noble mission of combating, by order of the king, for the independence and the honour of our country, are animated by the same sentiments, and we await the signal which promises to us to fulfil our destiny, and to pay the debt which we owe to our fellow citizens. If in former campaigns we have courageously followed to the field our royal chief, and if we were neither unworthy of him nor of the Wurtemberg name, we hope that your Majesty will find us equally worthy now of entering on the glorious struggle for the most sacred rights of a people which has attained its majority, and for the rights of all mankind. Success cannot be doubtful. Heaven aids the good cause; the army of your Majesty cannot be con-

ings of the Censorship, and I proved, according to the letter of the law, that those proceedings were not only contrary to the precise stipulations of the constitution, but that, by applying them to the popular paper edited by me, the decrees of the Diet even are overstepped.

This complaint and my petition of the month of December last year have obtained no satisfactory result: the zeal of the Censorship has but redoubled — and this odious measure is carried on in a manner which appears every way calculated to oppose a barrier to all intellectual activity, and thus to undermine the existence of journals written in a different sense than that of the secret instructions of the Censorship.

It would be tedious to enumerate the special cases which confirm this sad truth. The accompanying numbers sufficiently prove how difficult it is to explain on any rational ground, or to conceive the possibility of, the erasures made by a secretary of the foreign department, by the councillor of legation, Baron von Linden, even were we to suppose him possessed of the smallest share of intellectual capacity.

The most moderate form of expression is no protection for opinions which are unfortunate enough to appear too free in the eyes of the Censorship: neither the scientific language of criticism nor the articles of a simple rustic are safe from mutilation. No distinction is made between articles which treat only of internal affairs and those which refer to foreign matters; it is immaterial whether they relate to the most authentic facts, prohibitions, and acts of prohibitions before the authorities, or judgments and arguments, or whether they have or have not already appeared in other Wurtemberg papers which have come under the Censorship; the most innocent expressions which may be necessary to understand the whole subject

are arbitrarily effaced. It often appears as if chance were made the judge of the intellectual interests of my journal: a term which sounds at all like those odious words, free, liberal, liberty, suffices to draw down the veto of the Censor, whilst the latter has gone so far as to declare as inadmissible the insertion of his own name, which the editor, in order to excuse himself, had printed on the sheet.

Victim of an arbitrary power insupportable to the calmest man, I can scarcely consider that I belong to a constitutional state, and every friend of his country will feel with me, not without the deepest grief, the mockery which is thus daily exercised against the most noble privilege of the human mind; against the liberty of the press, given by the constitution.

Whilst a neighbouring state celebrates, with a rapture which finds its echo throughout Germany in the heart of every well-disposed man, the festival of the free expression of thought which he has enjoyed for a short time past, the Wurtemberger sees himself impeded in every way in the exercise of this first of human rights, which he has never abused. The most efficacious means of developing the constitution is more impeded in the country which has possessed one for three centuries, than in any constitutional state. This is done at an epoch when ample satisfaction can alone compose the agitated minds, and when every infringement of the constitutional rights can only augment the causes of discontent and excite indignation.

The popular paper edited by me has no other aim than to serve the cause of truth in a simple form and within the limits of the law. I disclaim, as a calumny, every other intention with which I have been reproached, for the purpose of making me an object of suspicion.

But this knowledge imposes upon me the sacred duty of protesting anew to the supreme authority of the country against these unconstitutional procedings; and, humbly praying your majesty to re-establish the legal rights guaranteed by the fundamental law,

I am, with profound respect, &c.,

R. LOHBAUER,

Editor of the Hochwächter.

Stuttgard, March 12th, 1832.

To the Privy Council of the King.

V.

ADDRESS TO THE KING OF WURTEMBERG,

BY THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF STUTTGARD.

SIRE,

If the constitution, in securing the rights of the Wurtemberger, points out to him his duties towards the King and towards the state; if thus the constitution becomes the indissoluble bond which unites the prince to his people, the anxiety of the Wurtemberger for the free execution of the constitution is only a more striking proof of his love for his king, and of his esteem for the established law. In this love to the king, in this calm and legal attitude in the midst of agitated times, we, the representatives of the first municipality of the kingdom, have vied with each other; and if, for the same reasons, we cannot always approve of the means selected at the present period for developing and consolidating the forms of our political rights, we should perhaps be alarmed at the decrees of the Diet of the 28th of last June, if they were to be unconditionally applied to Wurtemberg. Without

conforming to the language of others, without allowing ourselves to be guided by opinions previously laid down, we have thought it our duty to form, by a strict examination, an independent opinion on the text and spirit of the decrees of the Diet. We have thus arrived at the conviction, that even if a well-intentioned explanation could prove that these decrees were not in direct contradiction to our constitution; nevertheless, a more diffuse and less loyal explanation might as well paralyze our entire constitution in its principal stipulations, and degrade it to a mere imaginary shadow.

In this respect we participate in the fears expressed by our fellow-citizens; and, if it be a crime to entertain the idea that our king was capable of allowing a single stipulation of the covenant concluded with his people to be infringed, we are nevertheless afflicted at the idea that errors and foreign exaggerations can have the power of circumscribing the constitutional rights of the Wurtembergers, who have never abused them, and of justifying in appearance a treatment and restrictions uniform in all the constitutional states of Germany. We think it, then, our duty, on the one hand, to repeat to your Majesty the oath of our inviolable love and attachment, and our wish to march in the line of the law, of order, and of moderation; and on the other hand humbly to beseech your Majesty firmly to protect the constitution of Wurtemberg from all restrictions.

Confident of the sincere determination of our sovereign to remain faithful to his oath and to maintain the fundamental laws; confident of the basis and strength of every civilized state, and of every association of states, and that justice will be observed on all sides; we march with an assured step towards a futurity, which, however serious its aspect, will be rendered serene for us and for our fellow-

citizens, jealous of their rights, if we receive from the throne a tranquillizing declaration, and the assurance that our constitution will be immutably upheld.

We are, with the most profound respect,

Your Royal Majesty's most faithful and humble

MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF STUTTGARD.

July 26, 1832.

VI.

THE OATH OF THE NEW MEMBERS OF THE MUNICIPAL COMMISSION OF STUTTGARD, AND THE PRESENTATION OF AN ADDRESS TO THE KING AGAINST THE DECREES OF THE DIET;

AN ADDRESS SIGNED BY SEVERAL CITIZENS OF STUTTGARD, JULY 31, 1832.

ARTICLE FROM THE HOCHWACHTER.

The passages within parentheses are those which the Censorship has effaced.

THE oath was taken this time with open doors, at the Hotel de Ville. The hall, the adjoining chamber, and the gallery, were filled with the citizens. It was a solemn and dignified scene. The Burgomaster Feuerlein opened the meeting by a speech, of which the calm tenor and persuasive form tended to produce pacification, order, and legality. Rejoicing at the concord existing between the magistracy and the citizens in the menacing circumstances of the latter period, he called attention to the last important incident of our political existence, viz., the declaration made by the five ministers that the decrees of the Diet do not and cannot infringe on the constitution. With a joyous confidence,

he regarded this event as a renewal of the alliance between the constitution and the government. His speech and the oath were followed by a profound silence. Then came the speech of the inspector, M. Murschell, who laid down his functions. His energetic oration bore upon many practical points on the relations of the citizens. He more particularly insisted on the circumstance that the police at Stuttgard was not entrusted, as it ought to have been according to law, to the hands of the municipal authority. He showed that there are interests more elevated than those of money; that there are interests of honour, of legal liberty, and of right. He illustrated, in calm but serious terms, the (striking) contrast between the recent constitutional measures of the committee of the bourgeoisie, which, for the good of the town and of the country, addressed itself to the magistrate on the subject of the decrees of the Diet, and between the Censorship (an institution emanating from the Cabinet) which had effaced in all the journals the address of the deputies of the citizens. His speech was accompanied by the loudest applause. He was followed by the new inspector, Doctor Walz. His eloquent appeal electrified the hearts of all. He represented, in vivid colours, the influence which the three days of July had exercised on the committee of the citizens of Stuttgard, and on the constitutional development of that committee. Finally, he proceeded to speak of the threatening and stormy horizon of our days. He invoked the courage and energy of the citizens to meet the coming tempest; and he expressed the confident belief that they would animate his fellow citizens on the sombre path before them. Thunders of applause followed the close of his speech. The ceremony thus terminated. The assembled multitude, dressed in black, waited partly before the Hotel de Ville, partly on the steps of the Hotel, in order to follow, in a calm and dignified procession, the deputation

destined to convey the address to the King in his private cabinet. This address had circulated from hand to hand for eight days, and had obtained a great number of signatures, notwithstanding the difficulty of the communication, because no assembly could have been announced or held for the purpose of signing it *en masse*. Independently of a great number of the citizens, many others still complain to this day that the address had never reached them; many loyal functionaries of the state, many candidates for the public service, advocates, and men who had been elected deputies, had signed it. At the head of these names is the celebrated name of Uhland, deputy of the city of Stuttgard. The police was apprised beforehand of the object for which the citizens were to assemble, and of the spot where the assembly was to meet. The procession arranged its march in tranquillity and excellent order. In this manner, they reached the Bärenplatz. There, suddenly the director of the town, von Kleet, ran in full uniform from the police office to the head of the procession and stopped its march. (Pale and agitated in the highest degree, his whole conduct did not bear the character which is generally stamped by the calm and deliberate exercise of legal means against illegality.) He spoke precipitately of prohibited meetings, of laws of majesty, forbade the continuation of the procession, and ordered the citizens who were present to retrace their steps immediately. Some calm words were pronounced by Doctors Walz and Murschell, who headed the deputation; but the high words (passionate) of the director of the city determined these worthy friends of order to yield to force arrayed in the garb of authority, and Walz went forward alone with the address. The others were ready to depart, after having raised a cheer for the constitution, when—people hardly believed the evidence of their senses—a division of gensdarmes issued forth from the police office, and

approached the groups. At this sight, just and energetic expressions of indignation arose in the midst of the assembly. The groups of those who were returning stopped anew; but the loyal good sense of the citizens of Stuttgard equally carried them through this trial. In a few minutes they disappeared from the square, and returned to their homes.

VII.

Frankfort, 23rd July, 1836.

The most remarkable feature of our present political position is the returning influence under which that re-action has been overpowered, which had, in its time, repelled the tide of liberalism. This state of things is mainly attributable to the fact that none of the Governments of the German confederation fear any longer the possibility of a French or German revolution. Another cause is, that the States of Southern Germany, which had lost all their support, think they may now lean with safety upon France, and that the relations which Austria has entered into with that Power are a double guarantee for their security. Since principles have again become the object of secondary consideration, the policy of interests has resumed its ancient rights; and, if circumstances be turned to account as they ought to be, we might, perhaps, soon witness the formation of a compact league extending from Paris to Vienna, against Russia and Prussia, drawn on by Russia, and holding itself in readiness for differences which may possibly arise in the East.

Bavaria, which is still undecided, might very possibly be carried on by the current of events. In this respect, Russian policy, generally so sagacious (die sonst so weltkluge russische politik) has much deceived itself. When Bavaria, rather through insensate vanity than from liberal-

ism, opposed the measures of reaction of the Diet of 1832, she was allured back by the crown of Greece being given to Prince Otho. Now that this Prince is King, it is clear that her position makes her more dependent upon the maritime powers, and that by this thread likewise Bavaria must be led. But it is here, at Frankfort, that the most decided expression of the revival which is taking place is manifest. This expression is the attitude of the federal states of the second order, who are emancipating themselves all at once from the supremacy of Austria and Prussia. From 1832 to 1834, this supremacy was a real yoke—a blind dictatorship of federal power. Some Governments opposed it, but they only encountered, like Baden and Wurtemberg, shameful defeats, and their submission was maintained by the fear of revolutions. By degrees public opinion underwent a change; it regarded those Governments as popular, in spite of the blows which they were to be made the instruments of inflicting; it regards them as reduced to this point by superior strength and from want of support; it then felt the desire to take part with them at any price against the power of the Diet. The Governments, on their side, once persuaded that liberalism had separated itself from republicanism, accepted the alliance. It is also remarkable with what timidity the Diet, which two years ago was still all-powerful, now acts towards Southern Germany, and with how little respect it is treated there. At the period of the above-mentioned dictatorship, it had launched its decrees, as a central Government would have done; the decrees appeared with éclat in the Frankfort papers, which, for federal objects, are subject to the Chancellerie of the Diet; its orders were delivered, in harsh and uncompromising terms, to the various intimidated Governments, and a *military execution on the part of the Confederacy* menaced every factious opponent. Now all is changed.—The Diet

has latterly, indeed, made certain general political resolutions, but it has so little confidence in its power that it is almost ashamed to publish them. The Governments register them and act as they please; the newspapers of Frankfort no longer receive orders to issue fulminating articles; and the Diet feels itself honoured if, after three, six, or nine months, an obscure Government, such as Mecklenburg Strelitz, Oldenburg, or a Saxon Duchy should give itself the trouble to promulgate its resolutions. A year has elapsed since the resolution was made that for the future no German newspaper should have any private correspondence on the debates of the States of Germany, but that they should only take their reports of debates from the papers of the respective States; the debates of the States of Saxony from the Saxon papers; those of Hanover from the Hanoverian, &c. No one took notice of this resolution. It was never carried into effect. It is only a very short time since the Bavarian papers gave a brief notice of an insinuation made in this sense, and one is struck at the same time with the circumstance that, notwithstanding this, a paper appearing in Bavaria, the Allgemeine Zeitung, should give every day private correspondence on the debates of the States of Wurtemburg, and that it has even just published, almost without any alteration, an attack, directed in the strongest terms, against the absolute powers of the Confederacy. Moreover, even the prohibitions of the Diet against the newspapers have no effect. In 1832, a complete sweep was made, not only of works free from censorship, but of those also which were subjected to it in mockery of the censorship of the respective Governments. The Allgemeine Zeitung was officially threatened with prohibition, as well as the German National Gazette of Brunswick. The Mercury of Swabia hardly escaped from it. With respect to books, the publishers at present no longer care, in

the least degree, for prohibitions. They sell their books in spite of them; and in the different countries they feign not to perceive the abuse. When, a short time ago, it was proposed at the Diet to prohibit the Dorfzeitung, the little principality of Saxe Meiningen, in whose territory this paper appears, boldly took up its defence, declared it would never consent to such an indignity, and triumphed in an affair in which, four years ago, neither Bavaria nor Wurtemberg could have succeeded. The central commission of inquiry no longer finds any where the same blind submission, and they begin now to spare their demands upon certain Governments, *because nothing can be done with them.*

By a singular turn of circumstances, the King of Holland may perhaps soon feel the power of the Diet, which seeks new objects wherewith to occupy itself. It has just taken into serious consideration the affair of Luxemburg. We know that, at the conferences in London, Austria and Prussia consented that in lieu of that portion of Luxemburg which is to be ceded to Belgium, a part of the province of Limburg should, in exchange, be incorporated with the confederacy. But at the moment of the attack they retired behind the following entrenchment, namely, that the Diet also must consent thereto, the Diet which at that time was nevertheless, synonymous with Austria and Prussia. Now affairs have assumed a different aspect. The Diet wishes to see the affair terminated; it is satisfied with the exchange of Limburg, and rudely urges the King of Holland, who does not chuse that Limburg should become a federal province, as the Diet did not protect him against the loss of federal territory. It is beyond doubt that this point will give rise to a serious struggle, and King William, whether wisely or not, begins to relent from his obstinacy. It is said that, in an extreme case, coercive measures are talked of, at least, as a provisional warning.

A project of a marriage is talked of between Duke William of Brunswick, and the Princess Maria of Wurtemburg, daughter of the King, born the 30th of October, 1816. It is natural that the Duke should desire before his marriage to make his definitive arrangements with the pretender to the throne of Brunswick, his banished brother, the Ex-Duke Charles, and it is said that negociations are on foot under the mediation of Austria to induce the Ex-Duke to renounce an object which he cannot hope to regain. Here again we see a tendency to a cessation of the *status-quo*, for, so long as the two brothers continue unmarried, the question remains a species of *status-quo*, a contest of succession which will always be renewed, and we may even say that the present state of things is the recognition, support, or consolidation of a state of things created by a revolution.

It has been imagined that the King of Greece came to Germany to review all the young marriageable princesses. Now, according to appearances, he must return to Athens without being affianced, or without any prospect of marriage. The fate of Greece is still too uncertain, the throne still too unstable, to induce the daughter of a prince to exile herself to partake with him the chances of such a futurity.

An obscure Saxon paper relates with much circumspection, that in Hungary the corn harvest has been so good that in consequence of the cheapness of the market a certain number of cavalry regiments have been sent into the country; but that, notwithstanding this, "*turbulent heads*" seem in those countries to have pursued their course with success. Here is an example of the diplomatic tactics of papers restrained by a censorship whose severity they must deceive.

I have only to add expressly that you may rely on the authenticity of the information relative to Luxemburg.

THE TURKISH PRESS, IN REPLY TO THE LONDON "COURIER."

FROM THE "MONITEUR OTTOMAN."

13th June, 1835. 16 of Safer, 1251.—

The English "Courier," on the appearance of a pamphlet entitled "England, Ireland, and America," has made a sortie, no less violent than unexpected, against the Ottoman Government and people.

The "Courier," like all passionate advocates, ignorant of the cause which they plead, has accumulated a mass of exaggerations, in order to spare itself the necessity of reasoning and proofs: it has substituted opprobrium for discussion. Its two articles are the complete summary of all that during ten years has been brought to market in the shape of odium and untruth respecting the Ottoman empire, by the Macfarlanes and other speculators in chronicles, who land in a country, scamper over it like dogs on the scent, and hasten back to sell to a bookseller, for their two months' subsistence, the anecdotes which they have scrapped together as their travelling provisions. Was it decorous in a respectable journal, which occupies an elevated rank in the English press, to re-open on a sudden these long forgotten sources, in order to foist on Europe the impure productions which she had already once rejected with disgust?

The picture which it draws of Turkey is not even new; it is the re-production of an old description, which has no other importance than as occupying a place in a journal to which credit is attached, and at a moment of importance to the destinies of a vast empire. Assuming as correct the colouring given by the "Courier," how-

ver sombre it be, we say, If there be in Turkey misery, depopu-
ation, and anarchy, with whom rests the blame?

You attribute it to its religion—where are your proofs? The
ccusing party has none to bring forward, but the defendant has
roofs which are incontrovertible.

In June, 1826, when the Janissaries revolted for the last time
gainst the innovation of the regular troops, which had been
ganized by Sultan Mahmoud, the standard of the Prophet is
nfurled. Religion intervenes, therefore, at this terrible crisis; it
invoked in order to decide against a body which had rebelled
gainst all reform, and against the Prince who wishes to change a
cial state degraded by long abuses, and who attacks the first
pposing obstacle. The trial is decisive of the question of the
eligion of Mahomet. At the summons of the criers, who invoked
e aid of the true believers, a hundred thousand men, united
nder the Mussulman oriflamme, crush to pieces in a few hours
e rebels.

Who can misunderstand the meaning of this victory? It is
eligion that has triumphed; it is Religion which, personified in
e Sultan, the supreme Pontiff, and in the people, the interpreters
y their actions of the religious dogmas, has proclaimed the
ecessity of reform, and struck its opponents to the ground. The
estruction of the Janissaries was a stroke of policy and of religion
nited for the same end, viz. that of improvement. And yet how
any reminiscences illustrated this still powerful body of the Janis-
aries! It commenced with the origin of the Ottoman monarchy;
s glory was identified with the most splendid conquests of which
; had been the most useful instrument—its name alone recalled
pochs of renown dear to the nation. The Janissaries had reigned
s masters during three hundred years; they had in their favour
at consecration of time which continues still to support a power
ng after it has lost all other aid. Why, then, were they over-
hrown with a facility which is one of the most remarkable facts
f this age?—Why, on the immense surface of this empire, in its
nost remote provinces, was no single defender to be found whose
esistance has called forth their re-establishment? It is because

religion was arrayed against them. It condemned their licentiousness and the general disorganization of which they were the cause, and it could not associate itself with their principle of immobility.

Since the disappearance of this corps, have we seen a single fraction of the population take up arms, at the call of religious inspiration, against the reforms successively introduced by the Sultan? They have been numerous, no one will dispute it; without stopping to discuss their merit, it is sufficient to certify that, as reforms, they would have provoked general opposition, if the argument of the "Courier" had been well founded; if religion were an insurmountable barrier to all amelioration.

Away, then, with imputations founded on worn-out declamation, and destitute of every vestige of proof, against a religion which has not yet been sufficiently studied in the institutions and habits it has created, and on which Europe has never enjoyed the means of forming an equitable opinion. We do not believe that we are equal to the task of supplying this deficiency, and we have not the pretension to undertake it; but the facts before our eyes require to be described as they strike us. Here, in Turkey, we shall always see effected at pleasure, in the smallest space of time, and by the simple force of reason, that which has elsewhere required ages of struggle and torrents of blood. The Turks owe to their religion an undoubted superiority of intelligence, of good sense, and of equity, which they never fail to display when necessity calls it into action. They fear God, and derive from this ruling sentiment the calm reason, the philosophy, which do not waste themselves in words, but which are shown in their actions. In Christendom, people fear God to a certain extent, but they dread those who intervene between God and society—the churchmen, the powerful, the doctors of all colours, who lead their flocks by ignorance, corruption, or sophisms, who drag society in a thousand opposite ways, without unity, without community of thought, and who, when the day of personal trial arrives, belie their doctrines, and by their example throw doubt on the convictions which they have formed by their lessons.

How comes it, then, that in Turkey there is misery and depopulation? Since Turkey has ceased to make herself feared, since her people, attaching themselves to the soil which she had conquered, have become sedentary and industrious, has Europe ever ceased to persecute her by her political repulsion, and by her religious hatred? Will this be denied by the "Courier," which, hardly thirty days ago, sounded the charge against Turkey, and in its manifesto mingled religion with politics.* If we examine the period of the last century, we shall see the Ottomans almost uninterruptedly engaged in gigantic wars, which they had not provoked, threatened when they were not attacked, and held by the necessity of defence in a perpetual state of alarm, which is not always war, but which never is peace. Is it, then, amidst the perils of anxiety, that the weather-beaten crew resumes its strength? is it in that perpetual state of crisis, in which blood is shed, that riches are accumulated and that population increases?†

Has the present age, so vaunted for its intelligence and its toleration, treated Turkey any better? How many blows have been struck at her during thirty years! If we recapitulate them correctly, and add the treasure and the men swallowed up in those struggles in which fanaticism and animosity were not to be found in the ranks of those who fought for their creed, their rights, and their hearths; the riches and population which still remain in Turkey would be the most conclusive argument against the detractors of this country.

The partial insurrections in the Ottoman empire, which have

* "We deny that it is possible that England, or that any civilized *Christian* country, can be interested in the support of so odious a despotism. But to suppose any such thing is to libel the British nation."—"*Courier*."

† The *Frankfort Journal* of the 11th of August has the following:—"The truth is, that the whole of the young Turks, arrived at the age of marriage, are taken for the military service; thus the country is menaced with entire depopulation, in spite of the firmans of the Sultan!" Such, then, is the effrontery of this anti-social Cabinet; and the consequences of its own violence, and of Europe's deluded co-operation, are now quoted and exposed—to cast opprobrium on the Sultan.

never been any thing but the inevitable result of external circumstances, by which all the ties had been loosened, are termed by the "Courier" anarchy. Without harping on the word, let us examine the causes of the evil.

There exists in the empire a vassal possessing a fleet, an army, and treasures, who is nominally dependent, but in reality independent. How this power has been acquired by him, and what has been the result to the people whom he governs, is a matter foreign to our present question. But he has made use of these means to hazard an attempt against his master and his country, which has been favoured by success. He is powerful, almost a sovereign; and he may still try the fortune of arms whenever he pleases. Around this power, elevated in the face of that of the Sultan, the thoughts of all the discontented are concentrated; they know that at any moment they may find efficacious assistance; intervention in case of a struggle; refuge in case of defeat. The necessities of the position which he has assumed bind his interests to those of whoever chooses to oppose the Government. What is such a power, but a permanent provocative to complaints and acts, which change their character into insurrection?

It may be objected that this danger is only so alarming, because in Turkey the discontented are numerous. Let us leave, as we have announced to the accusing party, a basis as large as they desire; we retain sufficient strength in this simple question: Does no discontent prevail in the other States of Europe? Let us examine them.

In England, if the Governor of one of the fractions of the United Kingdom, possessed of as many troops and ships and as much money as the King, were any moment to enter into a contest with equal chances of success, supported by the excitement of rivalry, what would not the wrongs of Ireland become to England?

If in France, the commander of a military division at Bourdeaux, Lille, or Strasbourg, in revolt, under any pretext, had beaten the troops of the Government, taken a third of the territory, and continued, by the intervention of neighbouring States,

to govern in the name of the King the conquered provinces, how long, even in the compact country of France, would the throne hold out against the spirit of Vendée and the attempts of the republicans?

Let us imagine the Viceroy of Hungary to be as powerful in troops and in funds as the Emperor of Austria; and blood to have been already shed; let us imagine that by a natural consequence the Sovereign, and he who imagines himself to be the Sovereign, were to stand on their guard one against the other, thus exhausting their respective strength, we should be glad to know to what lengths the ardour for insurrection would spread over Austrian Italy.

In the vast Russian empire, formed like Turkey, of different populations, let us imagine the Governor of Southern Russia, being to the Czar what Mehemet Ali is to the Sultan—would the refugees of Poland long remain absent from their hearths?

Spain offers us the spectacle of two rival powers. Under this excitement, what energy has not the resistance of Navarre displayed?

Certainly you will not dare to assert that the King of England and his Protestant subjects must disappear, in order to yield the field to Catholic Ireland; that in France, the King, and the mass of the nation which supports him, are to be supplanted by Vendée or the republic; that the Austrian Nationality is called upon to make way for the Italian provinces of that empire; that the Emperor and his millions of Russian subjects are to retire behind the snows of the Arctic regions, to give breathing room to Poland; that, in fine, Queen Christina and the defenders of her cause are to evacuate Spain, that the political religion of Navarre may rest at ease on the soil.

Observe, however, the point to which your argument tends, if you are consistent! and if you are not consistent, by what right do you assume to instruct public opinion?

Far be from us the idea of opposing accusation by accusation, and of retorting on other governments the reproaches which are addressed to that of Turkey. We show that every state has its

living, bleeding, wound; that it is everywhere difficult to satisfy every interest at once; to respond, at the same time, to the regrets of the past and the exigencies of the future; to calm the ardour of the passions; to repair every error; and to provide, without painful operations, against the numerous maladies which affect the social body. If it were granted to the Chief of a Nation to distribute happiness in equal doses, as an engineer levels the inequalities of the soil, administrative science would no longer be so valuable, and those who have possessed it would not have been entitled to the immortality of illustrious men.

Far, then, from being astonished that there is discontent in Turkey, it would be fair to ask how, with the state of things created in these countries by European policy, it has not long since been entirely engulphed in universal anarchy. Under the influence of the same circumstances, the strongest powers of Europe would have succumbed. Yet Turkey still stands erect, and only requires to gain one point, to acquire in a few years indestructible solidity: that point is, that Europe should renounce the false idea she has formed of her instability, and that, consequently, she should grant to Turkey *security for her national existence.* If this truth be questioned at the present day, the reason is, as we have said, that people have never investigated by what elements of secret vitality the Ottoman empire has sustained itself against such innumerable blows from every quarter of Christendom.

We conclude at the point where the "Courier" commenced, and we believe we plead the cause of Russia equally with that of Turkey, in repelling with all our strength the scandalous proposal which involves the destruction of the one for the advantage of the other. If Turkey is interested in defending herself against the propagation in Europe of the idea of its extinction, Russia is no less so in not allowing unmerited suspicions to rest on her good faith; suspicions, which, by obtaining credit, may excite a political crisis, the consequences of which are incalculable.

The position of Constantinople is regarded by the "Courier" as insignificant. According to it, the sooner the Ottomans are deprived of it, the better will it be for the commerce of England

and the whole world. It is the Russian empire on which it would unceremoniously bestow Turkey in Europe; and it defies the world to prove that this aggrandizement would in any respect augment the power of Russia.

That power, if consulted on the importance of Constantinople, would hold a very different language, for its Cabinet is too enlightened and far too experienced to hope that its words would obtain credit, if it were to speak lightly or with disdain of a position which commands an entire sea and the vast countries which it bounds. Russia may disavow, with plausible reasons, the projects imputed to her by public opinion; she may vaunt her disinterestedness, and inquire, with map in hand, whether so vast an empire requires new conquests. She cannot assert, like the "Courier," that the possession of Turkey would add nothing to her power. Constantinople, whenever its occupier chooses to make it so, will be the absolute Queen of the Mediterranean. From this fortress, flanked by two vast and unassailable continents, fleets, superior in force to all those which England could oppose, might issue at her orders. As to superiority of discipline, it is a merit to be acquired by practice, and the Sea of Marmora is a field for exercise, whose equal may in vain be sought for throughout the world. Thirty thousand unemployed Greek sailors, thirsting for glory and plunder, would not long be inferior to the English; and on this theatre, which is their own, they would soon profit by the lessons of their masters.

On the other hand, Constantinople is the road to India. It may be said that it is distant, and the proposition may be disputed. But, in political affairs, distances are not calculated by space. A power which holds in her hands the existence of several others advances without putting herself in motion. Is Persia, like the Ottoman empire, which is surrounded by seas, free to communicate whichever way she pleases? Enslaved, surrounded, she has no exit but by the Euxine and the Persian Gulf. If one of these ways is closed against her, one half of Persia is paralyzed in her existence, and is forced to fall at the feet of him who holds the keys. How tremendous a means of action is the exclusive possession of the channel which supplies the food of millions!

We think it superfluous seriously to discuss the assertion of the

"Courier," that the commerce of England with Odessa is more considerable than that of England with any town of the Ottoman empire. The respective importance of the places suffices alone to show the utter absurdity of this joke, and we may without exaggeration offer to prove to the "Courier" by figures, that the value of the commercial intercourse between England and Constantinople could hardly be equalled by the relations of one hundred towns like Odessa. Russia, we must acknowledge, favours by noble encouragment, and wise financial principles, the increase of commerce, which finds in all parts of her territory a beneficent protection. But, has England, in this respect, to complain of the Ottoman empire? The Sultan's Ambassador in London has recently set forth in the speech to the King, published by the "Courier" itself, the generous facilities which the commerce of Great Britain had invariably received in Turkey. The Envoy pronounced the word "reciprocity" on the part of England. Why, then, did not the "Courier" seize the opportunity to expose the futility of the words of the Turkish representative, and to bring forward the grievances of Great Britain?

That journal sums up its own grievances in these words:—"Our ancient allies are incorrigible barbarians." Incorrigible! If the Turks were to amend, as Europe would have them do, they would adopt the vices which abound there: financial aberrations, which agitate every portion of its surface, and which give rise to the expression—old Europe. Then the Turks, indeed, would be called regenerate. Unhappy, indeed, would be their fate, if they should ever be impelled into the fatal path of abandoning their national wisdom, their religious principles, and their financial doctrines! It is for the Ottomans, in contemplating civilization, in witnessing its inconsiderate animosities, its predilections for forms, without examining their principles; the existence of galley slaves, which is imposed on men in civilized climes by the absence of real philosophy, and by the miserable ambition which aspires only to material enjoyments—it is for the Ottomans, in hearing the "Courier" raise the cry of inquisitor, and on seeing it suddenly retrograde six centuries, to say in the accents of profound grief—"Christians, you are incorrigible."

ON THE SYSTEM OF RECRUITING IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.

Voluntary enlistment is hardly known in Russia, and throughout the whole empire hardly more than a few hundred individuals enrol themselves in the line, for we must not consider as voluntary engagements those which are made by the subjects who enter the corps of instruction and the schools, because they are certain of becoming officers after a short apprenticeship.

The regular troops which are not colonized are recruited by forced conscription, on the whole Christian and Jewish population, with the exception of the nobility and the clergy; but the summons are not fixed at any particular epoch, and all classes do not contribute to it equally. The citizens, the free artizans in the towns, and the peasants, called *odnodworcy*, are allowed to find a substitute, so that the weight of the conscription falls principally on about twenty-four millions of serfs, who belong as much to the crown as to the nobility.

The levies, in time of peace, are made every two or three years; they are only of one or two individuals for every five hundred, and they form altogether only a total of forty-eight thousand men; but this number is often diminished by a fourth, as well from the scandalous traffic of the agents charged with recruiting, as by the diseases engendered by the fatigues and bad treatment which the recruits undergo in repairing from their homes to the army.

The levies, during war, amount to eight and ten in the five hundred. In 1812, the Emperor Alexander issued two decrees, one of which required ten men, and the other eight men, in every five hundred.

The levies of two and four men in the five hundred, ordered by

the Emperor Nicholas in 1829, 1830, and 1831, did not furnish more than two hundred thousand soldiers, and have not filled up the deficit which the campaigns of Turkey and Poland have occasioned in the ranks of the army.

After the Ukase of the Emperor has determined the number of men to be furnished, the ministry fixes the contingent of every circle, and the governor, according to the instructions he receives, makes the distribution of them among the different classes of the population which are submitted to them.

The marshals of the nobility, in their turn, make, in each circle, the division of the contingent between the noble proprietors, who choose amongst their slaves the individuals whom they have to furnish. This care devolves on the agents of the crown for the peasants who belong to it. The freemen in the towns draw lots under the superintendence of the *politzmeister*.

The seigneurs on whom the recruiting devolves have no regard either to the age or to the social condition of the individuals subjected to the service, but only to their physical qualities; thus this mode of recruitment favours, in time of peace, the noble proprietors, who get rid of their ill-disposed people. Moreover, it permits them to tear away a father from his numerous family, an only son from his disconsolate mother, a husband from his wife, through any feelings of vengeance or avarice.

The men are received from eighteen to forty years of age. Some have been seen to reach the army as recruits, who were even above that age, which presents insurmountable difficulties in the way of instruction. If a seigneur wants money, it is sufficient for him to deliver to the governor of the province a serf fit for the service in order to obtain a receipt in anticipation of the next levy. This receipt has the value in the hands of the bearer of a bill of exchange, which is soon discounted by those who do wish to furnish men. In case of necessity, the Government may convert the obligation of service into a tax, which varies from eight hundred to two thousand paper roubles (francs) per man.

The recruits are collected in the chief place of the district and examined by a council of recruitment, composed of officers taken

in the battalions of the garrison, presided over by the governor of the province, or by the marshal of the nobility, and assisted by a physician. There every thing is venal. A great many individuals are thus received as recruits who are suffering under diseases or infirmities which ought to exempt them from service. The general-in-chief of the army may indeed reform the men unfit to serve, and summon to justice officers accused of prevarication; but this would occasion great expence, the recruits having already often marched more than a thousand miles, and cost the State a heavy disbursement.

Besides, the traffic is too general to be remedied by the punishment of a few individuals.

The period of the levies is critical, and pregnant with despair to the serfs, even to those who are most unfortunate. Some prefer death to the military service. They often mutilate themselves, cut off their fingers, pull out their teeth, or hide themselves in the woods, and one has only been able to diminish the number of those who seek to evade these extreme measures by rendering the villages responsible for these losses: when a man has mutilated himself, or fled, the inhabitants of his village must provide two in his stead.

When once the peasants have joined their regiments, they are dead to their native country and to their relations, with whom they have no longer the means of keeping up a correspondence, and whom they hardly ever see again, because, only a short time ago, they were obliged to remain a quarter of a century under their standards. And what soldier is there who, incurring the chances of war, can flatter himself with surviving twenty-five years of service? The small number of those who have outlived so many perils and fatigues have found, on returning to their firesides, their wives re-married and surrounded by another family, and they have esteemed themselves happy if by the decision of their seigneur they have been allowed to find shelter in the corner of the hovel which they had constructed with their own hands.

The military service is the greatest scourge that can be in-

flicted upon the Russian people. The emperors know it so well that, in all delicate circumstances, he promises to diminish its duration. Alexander, in 1812, and in 1813, had engaged to do so; victory made him forget his promise. Nicholas, on his accession to the throne, renewed this promise; he reiterated it after the Turkish war; finally, after the subjugation of Poland, the length of service was limited in 1831 by a Ukase to twenty-two years in the line, and twenty in the guards; but as, by a regulation in favour of discipline, a soldier may lose his seniority for the most trivial fault, this diminution of the length of service is illusory, and confers no real change on the condition of the serfs subjected to the service. It must, however, be stated that the diminution in the duration of the service does not depend solely on the will of the emperors; the disbanded soldiers return to their homes, and, as they can no longer be attached to the glebe, the seignors would be obliged to provide double the quantity of men, if they were only retained eleven years under their standards, and this would occasion great losses to them, ruining their fortunes already so burthened by the frequency of the levies.

The sole conditions required in the men destined for the infantry are a good constitution, and the height of one metre, five hundred and ninety to six hundred and ninety millimetres.

The recruits, after joining their corps, are divided into companies. One may compare the arrival of a recruit at head quarters to the entrance of a convict into the bagnio; torn from his family, his head shaved, having suffered hunger, ill treatment, the fatigue of a long march, he is already morally and physically weakened; the very idea of his condition torments him more than the certainty of a cruel and speedy death. He is at first given over to an old soldier *(dziatka)* who begins by teaching him that automaton position which he is to maintain in presence of each of his superiors; he then paints to him, in colours calculated to augment the terror with which he is already imbued, the duties which are imposed upon him, and the punishments which await his neglect of them.

The man dressed and equipped goes through the manual exer-

cise twice or three times a day; they then select a trade for him, the apprenticeship to which is the sole diversion allowed to the labours of his new situation. The captains are responsible for the double instruction of the recruits. However strict may be their surveillance, it may well be imagined that much time is required for their apprenticeship. There is no other channel of instruction than the fear of corporal punishment.

The cavalry is recruited with men of the highest stature. The choice is made among the strongest and tallest men of the levies for the heavy cavalry, and, in the absence of such men, they are taken from the infantry by the commandants of the corps, who, in general, have but little respect for the other qualities of the recruits, and for their aptitude in horsemanship.

The selection of the men destined for the artillery and the engineers is not made with greater care in Russia than that of the men enlisted in other branches of the service.

The recruits are treated, on arriving at their corps, as they are in the infantry. It often happens that several months elapse before they teach them, in the cavalry to bleed a horse; in the artillery, the service of the guns; and in the engineers, the labours of attack, and the construction of works for a campaign.

As all the garrison battalions are recruited with men of all arms, who, before they have attained the legal duration of their term, have no longer sufficient strength to continue in active service, there is no exception to this general rule, but for the battalions stationed in the governments of Orenburg and Siberia.

The regiments of the guards which, at the period of their institution, were to take their men from the grenadiers, recruit from the regiments of the line, not by taking the bravest men, as was done in Napoleon's guard, but by choosing those who unite with youth figure and appearance. The Autocrat requires fine men for his parades.

CORRESPONDENCE.

AFFAIRS OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

Paris, 19th Sept., 1836.

A month has elapsed since we first heard that disturbances were to break out in Portugal, and that it was intended to proclaim the Constitution of 1820 at Lisbon. I am enabled to assure you that this news was originally spread by the Miguelites residing at Paris, as well as by the agents of the Diplomacy of the North. At the same time our confidential correspondence with the North apprised us that Russia, and her ally Prussia, had the intention of pushing Portugal into a republican path, in order to prepare for the return of Don Miguel to that country. Letters from Rome contained similar indications, and gave reason to think that the Pope himself would promote republicanism in Spain as well as in Portugal, in order to further the ends of Don Carlos and Don Miguel. Finally, at the same period, we learnt that the regiments of Don Carlos had proclaimed the Constitution of 1812.

Last week vague rumours prevailed at Paris of the realization of these projects at Lisbon. It is possible that the Government was informed of them by the telegraph. Not much credit, however, was attached to them until to-day, when the fact is confirmed, and every one looks out for a remedy in this new crisis.

The public begins to be convinced that, under the pretext of the Constitution of 1820, the real question is the interest of Don Miguel. The public, therefore, cannot be opposed to intervention, under such circumstances; and they certainly would not compare an eventual expedition to the Peninsula with that which was undertaken in 1823 by the Duke d'Angoulême.

But the King seems still opposed to intervention; he continues to dread, however unjustly, that such an expedition may be compared to that of 1823; he does not wish to engage his Cabinet and his troops in new complications; he fears, also, that Russia would take advantage of such an intervention, to interfere in the affairs of Turkey. I still believe that, in the Council, M. Guizot is the least opposed to intervention; but, if he were to insist upon it, he would not be listened to by the King.

It is not improbable that Russia would be glad to take advantage of our intervention. The Russian Diplomatists at Paris say aloud that Russia knows of a project of coercive measures towards Portugal, on the part of England and France; that Russia, much more disinterested, is preparing to evacuate Silistria; but that she certainly would have the right to march to Constantinople, if the English and French were to appear at Lisbon.

One might certainly reply to Russian Diplomacy, first, that Turkey does not require their intervention, whilst the intervention might be demanded at London and at Paris by the Cabinet of Lisbon. One might add that in Turkey the Government and the *status quo* are not now essentially threatened, notwithstanding the conspiracies which Russia has been able to foment at Constantinople, whilst the case is very different in the Peninsula. In fact, one might intervene in Portugal and co-operate in Spain, at the same time that one might prevent the intervention of Russia, if one may make use of that expression, in Turkey. Still the King does not appear disposed to admit an intervention on the part of France.

If the King were to persist in this resolution, which is extremely probable, we might apprehend grave consequences to the Peninsula, in the encouragement thus given to the factious, and in the policy of the North, which, seeing France weakened by the events of the neighbouring countries, would assume a very threatening tone, and might push matters much farther.

As it is, the language of Northern Diplomacy towards France becomes insulting. The same diplomacy which has prepared the troubles in the Peninsula accuses the French Government of

being the author of them, by having afforded succour to the liberal refugees of Spain in 1830.

This reproach is particularly addressed to M. Molé, who became Minister of the Interior after the Revolution of July. The "Journal des Debats" replies to it to-day, in an article which appears to emanate from the Cabinet of M. Molé.

To tell the whole truth, we admit, on the one hand, that M. Molé did not succour the refugees; on the other hand, we avow and proclaim that the partizans of the Government of July did give succour in 1830, and that the Government countenanced them with pleasure. The writer of these lines can certify that the subscription lists circulated in the offices of the Ministerial journals at Paris; he himself was called upon to put down his name, and he glories in having subscribed. He could indicate the name of the person, at that time intimately connected with the Government of July, who procured the signatures to the lists; he is certain that subscriptions took place at the houses of the Ministers and at Court. The subscriptions were quite as public as those raised in favour of Greece.

People believed that the North would declare war against France; France wished, indeed, to secure her frontiers on the side of Spain, even by means of the Propaganda. If France had had the good sense to apply a remedy to Northern insolence, she might have excited liberal feelings as far as Berlin and St. Petersburg. It is probable that Louis Philippe himself will end by being reduced to such an expedient.

M. MOLÉ, IN 1830.

I.

Conversation between M. Molé and the Prussian Envoy.

Much has been said of a diplomatic note which Count Molé, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1830, addressed to the Prussian government, with respect to Belgium; foreign journals, and even

the "Journal des Debats," at Paris, and the diplomatic circles, have often spoken of this note. This mode of exposing facts might afford Prussia a pretext for denying the circumstance, the substance of which was true; it is important, therefore, to state the facts as they really happened. The details we are about to give have not hitherto been explained.

The note of M. Molé to the Prussian government never existed; but M. Molé held a conversation in 1830 with the Minister Plenipotentiary of Prussia, Baron de Werther, which has the same importance, and which is doubly interesting by throwing light on an historical fact of first-rate interest, and of affording an opportunity for appreciating the character of Count Molé, who is at present Minister for Foreign Affairs, and President of the Council.

When, in 1830, the Belgic revolution broke out, as a consequence of the revolution of July, the Prussian government made a movement to send troops into Belgium; M. Molé, informed of these preparations, immediately addressed himself to Baron de Werther, and as there was some difficulty in bringing about an interview at the Hotel des Capucines, (the new government of France not yet being officially recognised by Prussia) the minister for Foreign Affairs, recalling to M. de Werther the remembrance of their former intimacy in society, invited him to a meeting at his private house in the Rue Ville d'Evêque.

M. de Werther repaired thither, and the following are the principal points of the conversation which followed.

Count Molé. Write to your Court that if a single Prussian soldier sets his foot in Belgium, France will instantly let loose her army, and we cannot foretell where our troops would stop.

Baron de Werther. (Irritated.) How! You expect to be recognised, and you have nothing to utter but threats?

Count Molé. And those threats would forthwith be followed by acts.

This conversation, which was doubtless scrupulously reported by M. de Werther in his despatches to his cabinet, must have necessarily produced an electric effect at Berlin. The Prussian

troops did not enter Belgium, and Louis Philippe was very soon recognized as King of the French.

If the antecedent acts of Count Molé, especially in his relations with Napoleon, had entitled this statesman to the honour of being called by Louis Philippe to his councils, his firmness on the above occasion, followed as it was by so favourable a result, must necessarily have augmented still more the confidence and attachment of the King. Since that period, modifications introduced into the policy of France, or personal considerations relative to the combinations of the ministry, have removed M. Molé from the cabinet; but Louis Philippe has ended by perceiving that firmness was more useful than concession; other statesmen, not being able to approve of the errors of M. Thiers with regard to continental policy, have leant towards M. de Molé, with whom, indeed, there existed but a slight difference of opinion, with respect to internal policy, on questions which no longer exist. In this manner, the accession of M. de Molé to the presidency of the council is explained.

It is worthy of remark that, notwithstanding the conversation we have reported above, M. de Werther remained at his post in 1830. It might, therefore, be hazardous to infer that he would be recalled in consequence of the accession of M. de Molé. It hardly ever happens that the frank discussions between cabinets and foreign envoys produce changes of ministry, or the recall of diplomatists; such events are rather the result of secret enmities and intrigues being unmasked. Now, between Messrs. Molé and Werther, no intrigues of this kind took place. Both of them supported the interests of their respective cabinets. After having acknowledged the useful firmness of M. de Molé, justice compels us to add that if M. de Werther had advised in his despatches the non-invasion of Belgium and the recognition of Louis Philippe he would have deserved well of his sovereign. In fact, France had nothing to fear; a telegraphic order and two days would have sufficed to raise the tricoloured flag in the Rhenish provinces.

M. MOLÉ, IN 1830.

Conversation of M. Molé with General La Fayette.

M. Molé has been accused of having remitted one hundred thousand francs to General Lafayette, to assist the Spanish refugees, who, after the revolution of July, endeavoured to return to their own country for the purpose of exciting insurrection against King Ferdinand. This charge, brought forward by writers and journals devoted to revolutionary principles, has manifestly preferred raising M. Molé in the estimation of the radicals, for the purpose of obtaining at the same time a more important object—that of placing him on bad terms with the King Louis Philippe, and with the foreign diplomatic body. We are not the first to refute this accusation, but we have it in our power to contradict it in a more precise manner than has yet been done.

It is no doubt true that French succours were given to the Spanish refugees. Persons connected with the government contributed to these subscriptions. I know positively that the lists were circulated in the office of a paper devoted to the ministry; but the persons even in that office were not apprized of the circumstance which I am about to relate.

General Lafayette was on friendly terms with M. Molé, and called very frequently to see him. When the expedition of Torrijos was in contemplation, the general went to the minister and applied for succour. The minister replied as follows:—

"I am not the proper person to apply to in behalf of such attempts. The frankness of my character ought to be more justly appreciated. When I adopt a decision with regard to Spain, I communicate it to the ambassador of that country.

"Even you, general, will not yourself insist upon this attempt. I am officially informed by the agents of the French government, that the authorities in Spain are perfectly acquainted with the plan which it is pretended to execute. To send refugees into Spain is to deliver them up to the sword of the law."

After this conversation Lafayette could not help making the utmost efforts to stop the expedition; but the refugees were too confident in their own strength, in the weakness of the Spanish government, in the efficacious sympathy which thenceforward they expected to find in the population of the Peninsula. Torrijos set out—his fate is well known.

It was a thunder-stroke to Lafayette when he learned the fate of these unfortunate refugees. Though he had certainly nothing to reproach himself with, still he lamented that those hapless persons had not listened to the advice which he had received from M. Molé, and of which he had made himself the organ.

The writer of these lines has reason to believe that the diplomacy of the North, perfectly aware of the subscriptions raising at Paris, had lost no time in conveying the information to the cabinet of Ferdinand. Itself the author of the death of Torrijos, it could not seriously charge M. Molé with a catastrophe, which, on his part, he had done every thing to prevent.

MESSRS. THIERS AND MOLÉ.

M. Thiers was appointed president of the council for the purpose of effecting an approximation with the powers of the East. He purposed to employ Austria as an agent for accomplishing this object, and it was he who first opened the negociations for the marriage of the Duke of Orleans with the archduchess Theresa. To this end he was ready to make any kind of concessions at home and abroad. It is even asserted, and official documents seem to prove, that for a moment he went so far as to contemplate arrangements with Don Carlos.

The overtures relative to the match just referred to completely failed. M. Thiers, with good reason, no doubt, placed this disappointment much more to the account of Russia and Prussia than of Austria. Resolving to be revenged, and knowing how deep an interest the northern powers took in Don Carlos, he determined to interfere in Spain. He intended to make war at

once upon Carlism and the Constitution of 1812, in order to prevent its re-action upon France.

M. Molé has been appointed president of the council, in order to renounce at once the concessions to the North and the struggle with the Constitution of 1812. To make in other respects a clear field, he was obliged to renounce also the intervention against Don Carlos.

Thenceforward the line of policy of the new cabinet was clearly defined.

1. This cabinet does not interfere, with England, in Spain. It leaves in Spain the troops that are there; but it sends no more. Two thousand four hundred men will pass from Pau to Africa; but corps of observation will remain upon the southern boundary.

2. Notwithstanding the differences which might thence have arisen with England, the cabinet is sincerely desirous of British alliance. It faithfully executes the quadruple treaty, which has no secret article. The administration has been obliged to engage upon honour that it would prosecute the most rigorous measures against all smuggling and against the supply of any objects whatever which could assist Don Carlos; and these measures are in progress. In the great questions of European policy, France will be glad, as far as its interests permit, to go hand in hand with England; and the present ministry will cheerfully favour the commercial demands of England, as far as the interest of France and the consent of the chamber permit.

We have seen that M. Thiers had two lines of policy, and we have seen, too, that he was never to be relied upon. M. Molé will have but one single policy, and he is a statesman in whom confidence can be placed.

The composition of the ministry also offers guarantees. By the side of M. Molé we see Messrs. Guizot and Duchatel, who are favourable to the English alliance.

As for domestic policy, M. Thiers had trod in the steps of his predecessors. He had granted no amnesty; he had continued the trials begun in April. That which had been firmness under the

administration of his predecessors had become levity in his hand; without fixed principles, he attacked individual liberty; and among the refugees, for example, who were sent out of France, he selected those who were least dangerous, but denounced by the diplomacy of the North.

Under M. Molé, I know not if the king will decide upon an amnesty, but nobody seems to expect any trials before the peers. M. Molé was always hostile to these. M. Martin du Nord will think no more of his post of attorney-general to the Court of Peers, now that he is a minister.

Thiers' administration was divided. He was not unfrequently at variance with the *Tiers-Parti* and with M. de Montalivet. France has now a more united ministry, especially since the last appointments, which complete the balance and conciliate persons.

A point more difficult to judge of is the position of the new ministry with respect to the Chambers, that is to say, a multitude of persons whose opinions cannot be guaranteed from one day to another. However, on the one hand, M. Guizot has a strong party in the Chamber; on the other, M. Molé is on good terms with several leaders of the *Tiers-Parti*; the appointment of M. Bernard secures the support of other members of the *Tiers-Parti*; Messrs Persil and Martin du Nord possess great influence over the Chamber; M. Dupin, tied down by his work against all intervention, cannot openly attack the cabinet on this point. It is possible that the ministry will maintain its place.

Were I called upon here to express my private opinion, I should not fail to adduce such motives as would encourage an efficacious co-operation in Spain. But all I have to do is to record facts. That co-operation will not take place.

That England should persevere appears natural enough; but that she should make the whole alliance depend on that question is what I cannot imagine. The whole of enlightened Europe would deplore such a result.

THE PORTFOLIO;

A COLLECTION OF

STATE PAPERS,

AND OTHER

DOCUMENTS AND CORRESPONDENCE,

HISTORICAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND COMMERCIAL.

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LONDON:
F. SHOBERL, JUN., 4, LEICESTER STREET,
LEICESTER SQUARE.
1836.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE STATE OF OUR EASTERN RELATIONS.

The events which have recently taken place in Persia, to which we alluded in our last Number, are calculated to awaken the most painful reflections in the breast of every Englishman. We use a general expression, because we are convinced that there breathes not a man in the British dominions so destitute of public spirit, as to view with indifference the continued successes of a power, whose ambition, equally incompatible with the peace of the world and the well-being of mankind, is marked by the deadliest hostility to England, under the dangerous disguise of friendship, good-will, and alliance.

It was our painful duty during the last session of Parliament to expose the errors into which his Majesty's Government had been beguiled in the affairs of a country, hardly less important than Persia. We proved that during the last five years our funds, our marine, our diplomacy, and the whole of our moral influence, had been applied to the promotion of Russian ascendency in the Mediterranean, through our support of the Russian faction in Greece, and that the payment of the third series of the loan would only serve to arm that country against ourselves. We conjured the House of Commons to pause in this unfortunate affair, and our warning was re-echoed by almost all the leading organs of public opinion. His Majesty's Government thought it advisable, hereupon, to lay before Parliament additional information in support of its violation of all our international engagements with Greece, in order to uphold the usurpation of a foreigner, whose future prospects and pension in Bavaria

are wholly dependent upon his subserviency in Greece to the Russian predilections of his Sovereign King Louis. Yet, no sooner had England pledged herself to the payment of £250,000, professedly to appease a state of anarchy brought about by the Arch-Chancellor to impose on our humanity, than the announcement is made of the approaching nuptials of King Otho with a Princess closely connected with the house of Romanow; and scarcely have we time to recover from this humiliating defeat, when our attention is called to the loss of Persia.

The laurels which Russia has reaped on this important field were planted no less than three-and-twenty years ago. By the treaty of Goolistan she guaranteed the succession of the Persian crown to Abbas Meerza, the eldest son of the late monarch. The latter died at the close of 1834, having been preceded to the grave, a few months previously, by Abbas Meerza, who left a son Mohammed. Russia immediately recognized this Prince as the legitimate sovereign; but it was reserved for England to follow in her path, to furnish the Prince with a subsidy, soldiers, and her whole diplomatic support, and to seat him on his throne by force of arms, whilst British officers reduced under his subjection the southern provinces of his kingdom, the attachment of whose nobles to the interests of England had hitherto been inviolate. In all these transactions the Russian Embassy judiciously represented to the Persian monarch that England was only following the impulse given to its Cabinet by the Emperor's command. To such an extent was Russian duplicity applied, that, on the dismissal of Lord Melbourne's administration, her emissaries were instructed to represent, throughout the whole of the Eastern world, that the change was effected through the Russian Ambassador in London; that the Emperor, disgusted with the subversive doctrines of the Radicals, had managed to place at the head of the Coun-

cils of England a field-marshal of her own, in order to strike to the heart the revolutionists and demagogues of Ireland; and that thenceforth England would cordially act in concert with the Emperor in preserving order, from the German Ocean to the Pacific. Thus the hatred of millions against the Russian name was paralyzed through fear of displeasing England.

When a distinguished Oriental traveller, who had traced throughout the East the progress of Russian deceit, explained eighteen months ago to the Duke of Wellington the extent of Russian designs, he was looked upon and persecuted as an enthusiast, or an impostor; and yet the very event which has just taken place was distinctly predicted by him to the Duke. It was represented that, unless England put an end at once, by energetic action, to the system of imposture by which our interests and our honour were daily and hourly prostituted to the furtherance of Russian ambition, we should find *at the fitting time* Persia turned against us. The proposition appeared absurd, when it was considered that the monarch of that country owed his crown and security, the country its civil and military organization, and the people their repose, to British influence: and the very fact of Russia patiently contemplating the growing strength, union, and civilization of the country, was adduced as a proof that her influence had been entirely overthrown.

"But is not Russian complacency to be accounted for on other grounds?" was the traveller's reply. "Has Russia no interest in the strength, union, and military organization of Persia? Is not her present repose the test of her confidence in her own diplomatic influence? Does she not wish Persia to be powerful in her own hands against India?" The idea was startling. Events have proved its truth.

A brilliant Embassy, sent from England to compliment the Shah on his accession, has just terminated, after more

than a year's negotiation; and the result of our diplomacy is the supreme control of Russia over the counsels of the Shah, the retirement of our officers from his service, and the march of a Persian army to Herat, in defiance of the British Envoy.

The triumph of Russia in this instance cannot fail to be followed by the most disastrous effects on our influence throughout the whole of Asia. The independent Potentates of Tartary, the subsidiary Princes of India, the maritime populations of the Persian Gulf, the Mahometans of Hindostan, all aroused by the innumerable emissaries of the Emperor, will not fail to spread through the Oriental world the humiliation of the British name; whilst to the accumulated difficulties of the British Government will be added the natural consequences of their neglect of our diplomatic interests at Constantinople, which it required but a stroke of the pen to arrange, at least three months ago.

The following extract from that admirable pamphlet, "The Progress of Russia in the East," will serve to illustrate the importance of the question.

"The interest which Great Britain has in the preservation of Persia is more immediately with reference to her Indian empire, and her interest in Turkey is more immediately connected with the state of Europe; but the influence of each on the other is such, that the sacrifice of either would almost necessarily involve the fall of both. The resources of Persia in the hands of Russia would suffice to neutralize the whole remaining power of the Sultan in Asia; and the control of the resources of Turkey by Russia would lay Persia prostrate without a blow. The whole interest we have in both is, therefore, ultimately at stake in each, and that double interest taken in all its bearings, political and commercial, in Europe and in Asia, is perhaps as important as any we have to defend beyond the limits of these islands."

[It is some consolation, amidst the realization of evils so clearly predicted, to record the labours of those who have made the East the field of their special inquiry; and we feel that the following Memoir of Lieutenant-Colonel Chesney, drawn up three years ago, may not be uninteresting to the generality of our readers.]

OBSERVATIONS ON PERSIA,

AS AN ALLY,

AND AS THE CHEAPEST AS WELL AS MOST IMPORTANT FRONTIER LINE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL CHESNEY.

DRAWN UP IN THE YEAR 1833.

The interests of Persia and of England are so closely connected and of such mutual importance, that the very existence of the former as a nation depends solely on its continued connection with England, and if ever this shall cease by the withdrawal of our fostering care, that enfeebled and powerless, but still capable, kingdom will become not only dependent upon, but tributary to, Russia; which power would then be possessed of a lever which must shake our moral strength in the East, and threaten directly the ultimate loss of the richest jewel in the British diadem.

As every step which encroaches on the power of Persia, or the provinces which once belonged to her (especially towards the Indus), tends directly towards this fatal result, it would seem to follow, as a natural consequence, that it becomes a para-

mount object with Great Britain not only to maintain the integrity of Persia, as to its ancient limits in that quarter, but also to endeavour to render her strong, united, and prosperous.

England does not appear to have pursued any very decided line of policy in Persia of late years, and, either from negligence, or more probably from a consciousness of the purity of her own intentions, she seems to have been indifferent to, or fearless of, the ultimate results of the slow and insidious advances made towards our territory, which, if permitted, will, like a petty stream, continue to increase, undermining the banks in its progress, until in the sequel it would become a mighty torrent, capable of bearing down all before its course, and certain of unhinging the moral and social ties, by which we at present secure the happiness of millions of mixed and prosperous nations inhabiting our Asiatic Empire, now become, in a greater degree than ever, the envied object of intrigue to more than one leading European Power.

Russia gives her undivided attention to the future, and is contented with slow and gradual advances, organizing by little and little, as she proceeds in a career which in all likelihood is at

present limited to the possession of a counter-check upon the East, rather than fixed on so daring an enterprize as that of its conquest, for which her limited revenue of fifteen or sixteen millions is not at all adequate, whilst a protracted contest must be altogether ruinous; but as she has encroached, and will continue to encroach, upon the weaker countries situated upon her Asiatic frontiers, until some power of equal strength shall be opposed to her progress, the time seems to be nearly arrived when it becomes of infinite importance to consider whether we should take any, and, if so, what steps, to arrest the natural march of the Scythians towards the attractive regions which lure them irresistibly to the South East; whether, in short, it is not in our power, by a little judicious expence and by diplomatic exertions in Persia, to keep the country out of the hands of Russia, and thus avoid a comparatively enormous expence in having to adopt the alternative of making a barrier in Afghanistan, with a great increase of European troops to support it on our Western and Northern frontiers.

With a view to the consideration of this important question, so as to place some of the main

bearings before his Majesty's government, in the best way I am able, I shall proceed to divide the question into the five following leading branches.

1st. Whether Russia has shown designs and projects Eastward.

2ndly. The present state of Persia.

3rdly. The probable result of her being left to Russian intrigues and of the influence of Russia in the East.

4thly. The military topography of Persia.

5thly. On the means of rendering Persia strong and united.

With regard to the leading point, a single glance will probably be deemed sufficient, since it can scarcely be doubtful that the intrigues of Russia must be sufficiently known to government, from different and more correct sources than could fall to the knowledge of any individual, during travels, however extensive they may have been, and however favourable to such acquisition.

As far back as 1717, Peter of Russia sent Prince Alexander Bekewitch with a force to seize the gold mines of Khiva, and open a commerce with India; but the expedition failed.

Peter passed the Caucasus in 1719, and in 1722

gained, by treaty, Ghilan, Mazanderan, and Astrabad, which were regained by Nadir Shah, in 1735.

In 1800, the Emperor Paul incorporated Georgia with Russia.

The treaty between Napoleon and the Shah of Persia, ratified in May, 1807, at Finkenstein, arranged the invasion of India; and General Gardanne was sent to the Shah, in consequence, to forward the details of its execution.

In 1814, the treaty of Goolistan gave Russia all her acquisitions south of the Caucasus. The Persians engaged not to keep a fleet on the Caspian, and Russia on her part engaged to support Abbas Mirza's succession, to whose court at Tabreez a Chargé d'Affaires was immediately sent, and where a Mission has remained ever since.

In 1822, the Russian Ambassador gave a Memoir to the Shah, exciting the war against Turkey; which circumstance being brought home, the act was disavowed by Russia, and her Ambassador was removed.

During this war, Mohammed Ali Mirza, in marching against Bagdad, sent Daoud Satoree* to

* Daoud Satoree, a native of Bagdad, who died at Ispahan on his way southward, mentioned before his decease that he had

propose to assist the Emperor Alexander, by giving him Bussora, and to co-operate in his projects towards India, if he would guarantee that Prince's succession,—but the latter died, and the invasion failed.

General Mouravief was then sent on a special mission to the Khan of Khiva; but he was imprisoned, and he failed in his object, which was supposed to relate to the march of troops.

In violation of our part of the treaty of Goolistan, framed by Sir Gore Ouseley to obstruct the march of troops, &c., secret articles were added to the late treaty of Turcomantchai to provide supplies in case a Russian army should have occasion to march through Persia.

In this treaty it was provided that if the subjects of either party should encroach on the other,

been employed on this delicate matter between St. Petersburgh and the Shah. The outline of this plan I lately learned at Aleppo from an individual who had a share in it. The first idea seems to have sprung from Vaisseau, the former consul at Bagdad, and was immediately approved of by Napoleon, who, after the necessary inquiries, formed his plan of landing at the ancient Seleucia (from Toulon), and then marching to Maragh, which was to be the pivot of operations along, or by, the Euphrates to Bussora, which city was to be fortified as a place of arms for the conjoined ulterior operations against India. A person awaited the fleet, provided with a signal, but the Russian war called the troops elsewhere.

or proceed to acts of violence towards persons or property, the injured party should consider it a breach of the treaty,* and resent it accordingly.

No theatre could possibly be more favourable to the gradual schemes of a designing power than that of Persia, where the personal interests and intrigues of several princes are directly opposed to each other, and the people at large are almost indifferent to the result, being perhaps quite as well disposed to be satisfied with a government altogether foreign, as with the continuance of the present dynasty, which has been so fatally prolific in the number of princes and governors, each grinding the people under him to the utmost; and the whole kingdom being open to the most barefaced bribery, from the highest to the lowest; it is therefore no very difficult task for such a cunning, calculating power as Russia to gain a very commanding interest, for which purpose she has only to espouse the cause of any one of the Princes, whose success must then be certain, distracted as the country is. Thus placed on the throne at the expence of a heavy load of debt, in gratitude and cash, he must in spite of himself become the

* A similar provision was inserted in the treaty of Adrianople.

mere tool of Russia, which power would in this way succeed in obtaining the real disposal of all the resources of Persia, where a formidable army may be easily formed at a very moderate expence, and without any difficulty, because our system has prepared the Persian to receive that military discipline for which his abstemious, hardy habits so peculiarly fit him. Fifty thousand efficient men, organized by Russia, would speedily conquer and subject most completely Bokhara, Herat, Candahar, and the other provinces as far as the Indus, thus obtaining a paramount influence in central Asia, which would seriously threaten, if not completely command, by its central position, Bagdad, Kourdistan, and the other weakened portions of Asiatic Turkey and Persia. This latter country, instead of continuing divided and miserably weak, would then prove so fearfully strong that no future exertion of an ordinary kind could dispossess such an enemy as Russia. Once established there, she would ever remain so; and its possession, besides other advantages, would give her the choice of six routes, by any of which she could ultimately move towards more tempting regions, viz., two routes through the Usbeck and Turcoman territo-

ries, three through Persia, and the sixth by Mesopotamia.

In considering the fourth point, or the military topography of Persia, the limits of such a paper as this will necessarily permit little more than a very general outline of the leading features, commencing by a succinct sketch of the routes first alluded to, three of which are through the country itself, and the remaining three would skirt its territory, and be thus flanked and commanded.

The first is from Orenburg through the steppes of Kirghis to Bokhara, and thence by Balkh to Cabool and Attock :—during at least one half of this distance an army would be exposed to the flying attack of the hordes of Turcomans who would hang on its flanks and rear, and even water must be carried, which would alone occupy one-third of the whole of the baggage camels, necessarily much exposed throughout an extensive and exceedingly difficult line of communication which must be secured, and this could only be done effectually by gradually organized conquests, so as to form one base after another, in approaching the grand seat of future operations.

The second and less difficult route would be to

cross from the Caspian at the Manghishlak to Khiva, and that part of the Oxus; this distance, according to Berache, is performed in eighteen marches of camels and ten of horses; it is a desert, with the exception of one village, Orgunje Khann, and drinking water must be carried all the time, that of the wells or pits being brackish, as well as distant from each other.

The caravans choose the time of the snow for their journey, on account of the water procured by melting it; and, at that season, the lower part of the Oxus is necessarily more or less frozen and unavailable for boats; but this difficulty may be doubtless overcome, or avoided by management: for example, an army could move across the desert towards the close of winter, merely leaving time to construct their boats and rafts by breaking up the ice, and then begin to ascend the stream to Kilif near Balkh, whence to Cabool it is but two hundred and fifty miles, and from hence a feeder may be followed to the main stream of the Indus. During such a protracted march, the flank would be much exposed to attacks from the side of Persia, and the difficulties of securing the communication would become sufficiently great to render it

necessary, as in the former case, partly to conquer and organize the country, which, in addition to the supply, is capable of furnishing some fifty thousand horses of a superior breed, and admirably adapted for cavalry.

The third route would be a *coup de main* march from Astrabad on the Caspian, through Khorassan to Herat, whence there are three practicable roads to Kandahar, and two from thence to the Indus; they are in the direction of Attock: the other is that of Shickapoore, the whole being a distance of nearly two thousand miles, with supplies more or less abundant all the way; but it would be scarcely within the means of Russia to provide the necessary resources to accomplish so lengthened a march, nor would it be quite possible, if it were strenuously opposed by the Persians, who could intercept the communications seriously by hanging on the flanks: this, therefore, as well as the fourth and fifth lines of march, would require the previous subjection of Persia; at least so far as to command her means and resources,* which point once gain-

* The reader will not fail to remark that the intelligent author of this Memoir never dreamt of Russia acquiring Persia through diplomatic means, and of calculating her diplomatic strength with sufficient accuracy to rejoice in secret at the civilizing exertions

ed, and a native army organized, two additional and more practicable routes would remain open. One of them, the fourth, through the heart of Persia to Shiraz, and thence to a base through the Mukran to Hydrabad, on which there would be supplies, and no real opposition short of the Indus.

The fifth from Herat as a centre. This point is at nearly an equal distance from Kirman, Yezd, Tubbus, Toorsheez, Mushed, Bokharah, Balkh, and Kandahar, all of which would afford supplies without difficulty, according to the opinion of a talented military man, Colonel Borowski, for one hundred and fifty thousand men. Fifty thousand superior light cavalry could be mounted, formed, and organized on the spot and in the adjoining plains, and then, by manœuvres in front of the Anglo-Indian army, they would endeavour to draw it southward until its flank could be turned by a second corps ascending the Oxus as high as Balkh, in order to *deboucher* on Peshawur, using a feeder of the Indus from about Orciagoi to facilitate this operation, and finally opening a route for the main body as far as the Indus, without any serious dif-

of England, in preparing an apt instrument to be turned by her against us.

ficulty as to supplies, or the transport of its material throughout the distance. The route, according to Colonel Borowski and others, is comparatively open, and affords abundance of provisions, *as will be perfectly known to Russia through her employés* with the troops in the field, particularly the engineer Senieno, who, although considered a decided Russian agent, continues to serve in the Persian army.*

The last, and possibly the only route by which a *coup de main* is really much to be feared, is the very feasible and rapid descent of the Euphrates on rafts from a little below Erzeroom, which may be accomplished at the flooded season to the sea in eight or ten weeks, carrying guns, stores, and the troops along a rapid current, at the depth of about fourteen feet water. The fertile countries of Mesopotamia and Chaldea afford timber and every necessary supply for these ulterior operations, whether by sea or a coast march, accompanied by a flotilla of flat boats, which, when moving along shore, supported by the army, would be almost

* The consciousness that the minutest details of the resources of these countries is perfectly well known to Russia relieves us from any doubts whatsoever as to the propriety of publishing a Memoir, which we should otherwise consider confidential.—Ed.

unattackable, as has been treated of more at large in a separate paper on the important, and to us (if in an enemy's possession) most formidable * pashalick of Bagdad.

The general character of Persia is that of a mountainous arid soil, almost without rains, scantily supplied with water, and thinly peopled. The valleys are, in general, sufficiently fertile, although but partially cultivated; and, as the recesses of the mountains afford safe retreats, not only for the wandering, but also for the fixed inhabitants, who occasionally desert their villages, carrying their stock and provisions with them, a very little previous arrangement would leave nothing but desert on the enemies' line of march, without even that most indispensable of all supplies—water.

The Persian boundary to the south-west is flanked and well secured by the strong mountains of Koordistan. On the south it has the Persian Gulf and the Indus, and north-east the very suf-

* We reserve the communication of this paper to a future period, trusting that any members of the Cabinet who may hitherto have questioned the importance of the numerous warnings respecting the danger of Russian encroachments may at length have discovered their error.

ficient protection of the wild tracts of Turcomans and the desert country along the Caspian. North and south, the present extremities of the country are exceedingly strong, and the intervening long distance is very favourable to defence throughout.

To begin with the northern frontier, Azerbijan is traversed by a succession of mountain ranges behind the Araxes, offering numerous defensible positions and passes very difficult for any army to force in marching southward; this accomplished, it would become necessary to reduce one or both of the respectably strong places of Ardabil and Khoi, forming two places of arms behind the mountains; the former toward the Caspian, and the latter westward in the plains near the Turkish frontier.

Some distance southward of Terk, a place scarcely tenable for want of simple repairs, the character of the country changes; and, after passing the strong position of Koflan Koh, the mountains alter their direction to the south south-east in a double chain, thus offering a long and moderately narrow valley, in general very level, and extending almost continuously from thence by Zengan, a town of some strength, with a wall, towers, and citadel, and by Ispahan, an open city, to Yesdikast and Horunsher,

defensible posts; and, finally, almost to Shiraz, the capital of Farz: the intervening space between the two high arid mountain chains being more or less cultivated, and occupied by villages almost invariably fortified by mud walls and semicircular towers, loop-holed throughout, and sufficiently defensible against the mountaineers and other predatory hordes; offering, besides, respectable points d'appui and keys to the numerous positions which a defending army could take up in succession, as it retreats with both flanks well secured, and safe from being turned by the mountains on which they lean. Towers of any size are few, and distant from each other. Rivers are scarcely to be met with, and water is almost exclusively supplied by means of underground canals, called kanauts, brought from a head of water, which is found by sinking several shafts, or wells, close together, and carried thence (at the same level) for the distance of many miles, not unfrequently as many as fifteen. The grand route, or mountain-path alluded to, leading southward through the heart of Persia, is occasionally traversed at right angles by lesser ranges; but it is not until close to Shiraz that the great line of mountain defence crosses it, and continues its course onwards with little interruption.

The capital of Farz is situated behind the lower portion of this range, which is here double; the approach to it through the pass to the north is very defensible, and the round towers, connected by the high mud walls of the city, with its citadel in the interior, would offer a respectable resistance; but it is the almost impassable range of mountains to the south which would form the real strength of the principality, chiefly composed, as it is, of marble and other rocks lying at an angle of about 70°: it is not to be assailed by troops in a body, who could only manage to scramble up when quite unopposed, by some two or three individuals at a time. Therefore, an invading army must obtain, or endeavour to force its way through, the regular passes, which are numerous and most formidable. Zatal, twelve or fourteen hours south-west of Shiraz, would sufficiently offer every means of defence. The still stronger pass of Kummerage, nine hours from Kazadan, the level of which (two thousand feet high) is only to be ascended by a zig-zag narrow path, exceedingly steep; and, finally, that of Doriky, which commences at eighteen hours from Bushire, and extends more than twenty miles along a narrow, winding valley, having a broken

range of high rugged mountains on each side, terminating with marked crests: and as some of the passes could be turned, if common pains were taken; and as the others, eastward in the direction of Bunderebers, are no less difficult, there can be little doubt that the principality of Shiraz might be successfully defended against an invading army, whatever might be the fate of the rest of the kingdom, which, however, is sufficiently unfavourable to an enemy's advance throughout. An arid mountain soil, with little water, and a thin population, would give the easy means of laying every thing waste before the advancing foe, who would find himself obliged to bring his provisions, and even water, as the service of the kanauts would be cut off; added to which he would encounter a strong country, requiring to be forced at every step: and, if the people should be sincerely opposed, they are, from their habits of riding on horseback, directly to the rear, then dispersing, and suddenly reforming, likely to prove the most formidable and successful defenders; for it is sufficiently clear that Persia only requires something like unanimity to be able to defend herself most effectually: and this brings us to the

last consideration, viz. how to render her strong and flourishing.

The name and influence of England are so great throughout the whole country, that we could accomplish her civilization and complete amelioration with little trouble, free from suspicion, and at a very moderate expense; for all of which we should be amply repaid from the security arising from this excellent barrier, and the future benefits to our commerce, whenever industry and peace shall be re-established.* The succession to the Crown is the first and dearest wish of Abbas Meerza, but this cannot be well obtained by his own means. The league between Hussein Ali Meerza, Mohammed Tagli Meerza, and Hassan Ali Meerza, would alone be sufficient to prevent it, independently of the general opposition of his other brother, which is also likely to cause his failure, and throw the kingdom into the greatest state of anarchy, unless he obtain foreign assistance. As the Russians show more willingness to give it than we do, he must naturally fall into their trammels, unless Great Britain should decide on taking a more lead-

* Of course all these advantages are turned against us from the moment that our influence is lost.—Ed.

ing part, giving such support as would be calculated to secure the tranquil accession of the Prince: and if this be done, he would gladly, and most likely sincerely, depend upon us entirely; feeling certain (as he does) that we have no sinister designs, and have no more to do with Russian intrigues, of which he perceives the motives, and fears the result. But Abbas Meerza would rather run all risks, and lose the crown altogether, sooner than preserve the throne by holding it as the tool and helpless dependent of Russia; and there is still sufficient time to prevent this great evil, simply by increasing the regular army sufficiently to preserve the tranquillity of the kingdom, and secure the prince-royal's succession to the crown and full command of the whole revenue of the empire; at which time, or soon after, our expenditure could gradually diminish and cease altogether, as soon as Persia becomes one united kingdom instead of numerous divided provinces, and having its commerce increased in proportion to the additional security. There would be ample means (and without taking so much from the people as the local governments do at present) to supply the necessary regular army of about thirty thousand

or forty thousand men in all, as a peace establishment, which would cost less than the same force in any other country in the world. A Persian regiment of infantry costs about £13000.

Ten regiments of infantry, 13,035, at ...	£130,350
One ditto of Arabs, 1000, at	15,600 with camels
One ditto Lascars, 13,025, at	13,025; 800 on dromedaries
Two ditto slaves, 500, at	21,050
	£180,025

Proposed, ten regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, one of Arabs; expense for 13,639—£180,025.

From the foregoing calculation, founded on the actual cost of the Persian troops, it is sufficiently clear that for a sum of about £200,000 a year, we could support fifteen thousand effective men in Persia, including the additional pay to two general officers, and two sergeants to each thousand men; and if the Shah and Prince-Royal together were to maintain an equal number (allowing the money for

pay to pass through the British officers attached to the service) there would be an effective force of thirty thousand men, with tents, forges, and artizans commensurate, equal to any service, and infinitely better adapted to a tropical clime than Europeans ever can become. The artillery, after being organized with light pieces, shells, and the other European improvements, should be drawn by camels, which very much diminish field labour; the camel is the cheapest and most effective animal in such climates, also the easiest supported; and, for the same reasons, the chief part of the cavalry should be mounted on dromedaries. The number of this useful army has been limited to what would be barely sufficient for a good reserve in action.

The other duties of a campaign could be performed by irregulars, who may be had in any required numbers, both horse and foot, at any moment of need. Once provided with such an army, it will become an easy task to bring Khorassan, and the other provinces eastward, into real subjection, and the whole kingdom into internal tranquillity, which, once gained, could be easily maintained by stationing a sufficient body of troops in each seat of Government, causing the

Princes or Governors to disband their own mischievous levies, and receive in future specified annual allowances out of the royal taxes, which might be easily arranged for each individual, the proceeds being paid into the hands of an officer paid for this object; thus taking from the local authorities the power, as well as the excuse, of oppression. It is very certain that no individual would pay more than is right, if he knew the sum at which he was assessed. If redress were to be given when a complaint is made to the local authority, and finally to the King, if that complaint should fail, nothing would be more easy than to put an end to the arbitrary taxes levied on the passing commerce and residents, which are the more oppressive, as they are farmed out. Great as the exertions are, comparatively little finds its way into the royal treasury; whereas in the supposed case of a deputy from the King, and settled payments, all surplus would find its way thither, after defraying the salaries of the Governors, and the other expences for the troops; the latter being relieved every year by a succession of changes, moving from head-quarters in turn, one stage each year, until they had moved round from city to city

to the original point of departure; and if ever the revenue of Persia shall be fairly collected by these, or any other means, it will be found amply sufficient to maintain a regular force of from thirty to forty thousand men, and also the expenditure of the State at large, without the necessity of continuing to secure the proposed surplus; nor can there be any doubt that much less than what is exacted from the oppressed people at present would answer every purpose of the State, were it fairly administered, there being a much greater and more expensive force scattered over the different provinces, than what is proposed to be substituted, in order to secure the first and greatest of all objects of interest, tranquillity, with its immediate consequences, increased commerce and civilization.

The geographical position of Persia renders it of the utmost consequence to maintain her integrity at all risks, and almost any cost, as the best security we can have for the immediate tranquillity, as well as the ultimate preservation, of our Eastern possessions; and to effect this object, she must, in the first place, be rendered quite independent of Russia, and equal to a single-handed

combat with her in the field, which can alone be done by organizing and consolidating, somewhat extensively, the means of the country, allowing her to regain, as far as may be practicable, the ancient limits of the Indus, which we have the means of doing most readily, without being suspected of mischievous designs; a result scarcely to be avoided, if we turn our thoughts seriously towards Affghanistan, as has been contemplated, and where any thing like a barrier would cost a far greater sum than the proposed changes in Persia, and would be effected, if at all, with a degree of difficulty and suspicion, which must render the task serious, and probably even impracticable at last; but if we decide against emancipating Persia, it would certainly be desirable, at least, to organize the principality of Shiraz. The Prince has requested arms, and the officers and troops both to be paid, so that this part of the kingdom might be organized without any expence, and endeavours be made, besides, to do something to preserve Herat, and the country eastward, by attempting to unite them into one kingdom of some strength. Persia is very difficult for an army, and even more fatal to life than most countries; as it suffers from the

extremes of heat and cold, to a degree which leaves very little time in favour of military operations, and more particularly sieges. Therefore, a few places made strong, with a proper disposal of a small army around, would render the country more than defensible. However, as a mere question of expence, independently of greater efficiency, the road is far more open in Persia than in any other quarter; and it will most likely be found, if examined minutely, that the expence of forming that kingdom into an effectual boundary would be much less than the establishment of any other effectual line, even within our own limits, where it would not have the advantage of keeping an enemy at a distance, as in the case of Persia, whose very existence is linked with India—consequently, the stronger we make the former, the more peaceful she becomes, the less will it be necessary to expend on the frontier garrisons of defence of India itself, which might, in fact, be reduced in exact proportion to the growing and independent strength of the future Shah. One year well occupied by skilful officers in forming an army, and repairing some of the fortresses, would enable Persia to cope successfully against

Russia, when fighting at such a distance from her resources, as she must carry on a war to the ruin of her very limited treasury, and at the risk of revolts in Poland, the Caucasus, Georgia, &c., and even Armenia.

The hope of raising the notion to an independent State is much cherished, and it is fortified by the natural difficulties of the country, almost all foreign invasions having failed, except that of Alexander. Their former greatness is not forgotten; the result of the Greek war has produced an electrifying effect amongst the Armenians, amongst whom there would have been a rising, had not the Russians prudently removed many thousand families, with their Patriarch, into Russia. "Why not do something for us, as you did for the Greeks?" was the constant question. Persia has its natural difficulties increased by extremes of heat and cold, which leave no intervals for military operations and sieges. Enormous difficulties attend the transport of all materials. The Persian is enterprising; and in pursuit of mercantile projects, he visits Constantinople, India, and Tefflis; and by the slow and difficult pace of the caravan he transports from the first of these places to Is-

pahan, Shiraz, &c., European cloths, ginghams, plain printed and glazed cottons, sugar, tea, coffee, copper, cutlery, &c.; from the second he imports from Bushire indigo, calico, shawls, muslins, &c., which even find their way to Constantinople from Tefflis. Russian manufactures and Venetian ducats are given in return for the silk of Ghilan. The staples of Persia are tobacco, rice, and pipe sticks. The rivers are not taken advantage of. The lower orders are oppressed; villages sometimes become communities of robbers. If order reigned, what might not be made of the Karoon, a considerable stream, navigable from the sea to Shuster, the only obstruction being an artificial bend at Weiz! This is a shorter way, almost by one-half, from Bushire to Ispahan and Hamadan. Beyond the Karoon there are inlets, such as the Komm or Karonabastson, falling into the Fralor Korna; the Dialla into the Tigris, below Bagdad; the two Zabs, near Monsul; and, finally, the Tigris, all accessible to river steamers. Goods might be conveyed up the Euphrates to Eringan, in less than ten days whence, the copper, and other heavy return might be embarked, instead of being carried

Before the late Russian war, a

the troubles at Bagdad, about two thousand mules laden with merchandise passed annually between those cities; the latter city and Erzeroom taking thither jewels, silks, and cotton stuffs, coffee, shawls, gall-nuts, indigo, &c., and taking in return to Bagdad and Drawlon alone about four hundred tons of coarse tobacco, pipe sticks, orpiment, Persian goats' wool, sheep's wool, cotton, skins, beaver, and German cloths, cutlery, glazed cottons, and muslins.

A late traveller, Mr. Mason, understood to be an American, and by some thought to be a Russian employé, who descended the Indus in 1830, described that river as being perfectly navigable all the way below Attock; and from a still more recent account collected by Colonel Berache, it appears that large boats ascend as high as Moultan, from whence shallow streams—for example, of two and a-half feet draught of water—according to the same authority, make their way to the borders of Dushawar, and as the abundance of timber to be met with on the banks of this noble stream would amply supply fuel, the transport of merchandise could be effected at the very cheapest rate up to Peshawur, if not a good deal further towards Ca-

bool and Kandahar, which countries would thus be supplied infinitely more easily and cheaper; and the surplus would be transported with ease by the superior camels of Bocharsai. These two centres in the several directions of Furrah, Herat, Khorassan, and Balkh, (from the last a branch of the Oxus,) would transport it into the fertile valleys of Samarcand, Bokhara, and also along the river to Khiva, with a facility and cheapness which must put an end to any thing like competition on the side of Europe, as the distance by land renders the difficulties so very much greater in bringing cutlery, broad cloths, &c., than by the proposed new line of the Indus. The returns would be the valuable manufactures of those countries; also fur skins, precious stones, and a superior breed of horses, well adapted for the cavalry of India, and to be had at a very cheap rate in great numbers.

The three brothers who govern Cabool, Kandahar, and their dependencies, have lately given their adhesion to Persia, with an engagement to pay an annual tribute of fifty thousand tomauns. The assistance proposed by Russia would certainly enable the Prince Royal to *subject completely Herat, Khorassan, and Khiva,* thus regaining the

original boundary of the Indus, *and were this to be effected with Russian means, and under her influence,* it is not very probable that we should receive any great assistance in carrying on our commerce into the interior from this side of India. The late intrigues, in conjunction with Khiva, as developed at Mushid, as well as those with the army at Sinde, point out too clearly that it is now become a simple question whether we are to give Persia such assistance as will free her from Russian policy.

Scarcely was the ink dry after Hussein Meerza's return from St. Petersburg, when the object of the article of the treaty became apparent, by the demand of Russia to be allowed to punish the Usbecks, separately or conjointly with Persia. Finding herself thus committed, Persia, instead of endeavouring to extricate herself, got deeper into the trammels, by discussions on the subject, during which it was broadly hinted by her late enemy, that she might indemnify herself to the eastward for the loss of Georgia, and that Russia was ready to assist her with officers and arms, and would furnish and pay from two thousand to four thousand body guards for the Prince; and, if the same report be

true, by the remission of the last crore for the Russian army. These offers are said to have proved too tempting for the Prince Royal, who consented to the combined movement, and he had already received twelve field-pieces, two thousand stand of arms, and an officer of the Etat Major, Baron d'Aube, to march on Khiva and Bockhara, when the well-timed interference of the British mission, with the hopes they ventured to hold out of supplies being eventually granted in officers and arms, arrested their progress, at the very same moment when the Polish Revolution caused the four thousand troops already marching for Orenburg to find other occupation for a time. More recently, according to report, the Emperor of Russia has written to the Shah and Prince Royal, offering to contribute towards the expences of the Khorassan campaign; and it is also believed that, under the secret auspices of Russia, the Ameers of Sinde have sought a marriage with one of the King's daughters, and another alliance with the Shah, ostensibly to oppose Runjeet Sing; and it is but too apparent that there is an understanding with Russia in the movements eastward; whether it be sincere on the part of Abbas Meerza, or merely

a temporary expedition to get out of the debt, without foreseeing the evils of calling in foreign assistance against the Khan of Khiva and others.

The design against Khiva became known by pure accident. Yalantoosh Khan was about to proceed thither on a special mission from the Prince, to demand the restitution of all the Russian and Persian slaves, with a future annual tribute of one hundred thousand tomauns. The Envoy was provided with letters from the Russian officer, Baron d'Aube, which, in case of a refusal, he was to give to a Russian agent, pointed out at Khiva, who was to forward them to a sea-port on the Aral, so as to reach Count Suchtelen, the Governor of Orenburg, who would in consequence have put troops in march to meet them, and effect the demand by force of arms. This was to have taken place in April, as was admitted by the Minister of Abbas Meerza, who had ineffectually opposed Abbas Meerza's present understanding with Russia, being quite aware that a march on Bokhara would end by placing that country at the feet of Russia: because, after once obtaining a footing on any pretext, such as repressing the Uzbeck's slavery, Russia would always have the

same motives to urge as excuses to continue to maintain her ground. During the discussions which followed the discovery of the Khiva mission, Abbas Meerza admitted that *the Russians watched his progress eastward with the greatest anxiety and interest*, but that he had not asked assistance since last year, when it was opposed by our Envoy; and that the offers on the present occasion were made by the Russian Government spontaneously, to relieve the Prince's difficulties, and see him through them without humiliation. Thus the Russians pursue one steady course of policy, in order to gain all the influence possible in the Persian councils—doubtless with a view to the East, which Yermoloff has been heard to say should be the real policy, giving up European affairs—and from all accounts, Dolgorouky's chief occupation (when at Ispahan two years ago) was in making inquiries about the practicability of the different routes towards the Indus, through Herat, Cabool, &c.; and it is to be feared that the communication which must, in all human probability, follow the King's death, will give Russia such a commanding influence in Persia, that she can easily make the country a stepping-stone onwards,

since whatever Prince may be placed on the throne by her support will naturally become her willing instrument, and through him, and his nominal Government, the resources of the kingdom would in reality be more effectually at command, than if it were an open conquest: and as Russia probably looks before her in this way, she is naturally willing to sacrifice the remainder of the debt, and give up other points, perhaps Georgia itself, to urge Persia onwards in the east, where she knows the Prince must fail, *unless he calls in her assistance*, or receives our's in sufficient time.

Having thus glanced at the first point of consideration, the intrigues of Russia, we naturally come to the second, viz., the present state of Persia.

No country is more exposed to the influence of intrigue or more enfeebled than Persia, owing to the discords, distraction, oppression, and bribery, which prevail throughout the kingdom.

The population does not much exceed seven millions; and one-third is composed of the Bactiaries, or Mountaineers, and Failie Ariby, all more or less predatory and independent, scarcely contributing any thing to the State, and much more inclined to take from it when circumstances favour their spoliation, either collectively or separately; nor

would some of them hesitate for an instant to lay the King himself, or his treasure, (when slightly guarded,) under contribution. Less than five millions comprize the fixed population of Persia; each province and locality has separate interests and objects — the attention of its Governor, in almost all cases one of the King's sons, being directed to his own coffers, without any idea of benefitting the State to which he is nominally, rather than really, subject, paying a fixed annual tribute to it, and squeezing from the people double the amount for his own use, which causes oppression and discontent to a degree quite unknown in any other part of the world; and as pecuniary fines are the general punishment for crime, any sort of irregularity or delinquency is regarded with pleasure, because it gives an excuse to exact more money in the place of punishment—a practice equally general throughout, from the Sovereign to the lowest grade in the State.

The present dynasty is by no means popular with the people; and is quite hated by the Synds, a numerous body of families, who would raise the people against them, particularly for one of the Sophi branch, if ever there should be a contest for the crown.

DESPATCH FROM COUNT POZZO DI BORGO TO COUNT NESSELRODE.

No. 38.

Paris, 20th March—1st April, 1827.

The Despatch which your Excellency has done me the honour to address to me, dated the 2nd of March, relative to the Mission of Couriers, has reached me, and I shall conform to the orders which it contains. Consequently, an express will set out from hence on the 1—13th of April, and successively, every two months, independently of the other communications which circumstances may call for. As it happens that the Imperial Missions in Italy occasionally re-

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Copie d'une Dépêche du Comte Pozzo di Borgo, en date de Paris, le 20 *Mars*—1 *Avril,* 1827. *No.* 38.

La Dépêche que V. Ex. m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 2 Mars, rélativement à l'envoi des Couriers, m'est parvenue et je me conformerai aux ordres qu'elle contient; en conséquence, il partira d'ici un exprés le 1—13 Avril, et successivement tous les deux mois, indépendamment des autres expéditions que les circonstances pourront motiver. Comme il arrive que les Missions Impériales en Italie recommandent de tems à autre leurs paquets

commend their Despatches to my care, and that the ulterior transmission of them is referred to the period of sending my own, and therefore to delays which it has hitherto been difficult to calculate, I shall hasten to inform our ministers at Turin and at Naples of the arrangements which your Excellency has just adopted, in order that they may take advantage of them according to their convenience. I have already communicated on the subject with Prince Lieven.

The news from Spain of the 11th—23rd ult. states that Count Ofalia, sent on an extraordinary mission to Paris and to London, is charged with demanding the entire evacuation of the Peninsula by the French and British troops. This unexpected proposal will require much

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à mes soins et que la transmission ultérieure de ces dépêches est soumise à celle des miennes et par cela même à des retards qu'il etait difficile jusqu' à présent de calculer, je m'empresserai d'informer nos ministres à Turin et à Naples de l'arrangement que V. E. vient d'adopter, afin qu'ils en profitent selon qu'il leur conviendra. J'ai déjà fait savoir la même chose au Pce. de Lieven.

Les nouvelles d'Espagne du 11—23 Avril portent que le Comte d'Ofalia, envoyé en mission extraordinaire à Paris et à Londres, est chargé de demander l'évacuation entière de la Péninsule par es troupes Françaises et Brittanniques. Cette proposition inat-

time and reflection before being accepted. The presence of those troops has for its object the preservation of peace beyond the Pyrenees. It remains to be seen whether their retirement will not be the signal of war between Spain and Portugal, accompanied by intestine dissensions in the two countries. This prospect appears to be so evident, that it cannot have escaped those even who put forward the above-mentioned proposal, and who probably only do so in the expectation of such a result, indulging in the hope that it will turn to the advantage of their own views and passions.

As M. d'Ofalia has not yet arrived, one cannot send any further details on this important

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tendue exigera beaucoup de tems et de réflexion avant d'être acceptée. La présence de ces troupes à pour but la conservation de la paix au-delà des Pyrenées: reste à savoir si leur retraite ne sera pas le signal de guerre entre l'Espagne et le Portugal, accompagnée de dissensions intestines dans les deux pays. Cette perspective semble si évidente qu'elle n'a pu échapper a ceux même qui mettent en avant la proposition sus-mentionnée et qui ne la font probablement, que dans l'attente de ce résultat, se berçant de l'espoir qu'il tournera au gré de leurs vues et de leurs passions.

M. d'Ofalia n'etant pas encore arrivé, on ne saurait dans ce moment mander plus de détails sur cette importante affaire. Je

affair. I shall not fail to devote to it all the diligence and interest which it merits. It will be essential to know also in what manner the offer of Spain will be received in London.

A Spanish Courier, who is believed to be the bearer of this new plan, passed three days ago through Paris, on his way to Vienna, whence he will proceed to Berlin, and then to St. Petersburg. I hope, in my next communication, to furnish the Imperial Cabinet with more information than I can offer at present, and to enable it to form its opinion on an entire knowledge of the subject.

Lord Granville is still in London. I have received nothing from Prince Lieven. The

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ne manquerai pas de la suivre avec toute la diligence et l'intérêt qu'elle merite. Il sera essentiel de connoître également de qu'elle manière l'offre de l'Espagne sera reçue à Londres.

Un Courier Espagnol, porteur, à ce qu'on croit, de ce nouveau plan, a passé il y a trois jours par Paris, pour aller à Vienne, de là il se rendra à Berlin et ensuite à St. Petersbourg. J'espère par ma première expédition de fournir au Cabinet Impérial plus de renseignemens que je ne puis lui offrir actuellement, et de la mettre en état de former son opinion avec entière connaissance de cause.

Lord Granville est encore à Londres : je n'ai rien reçu de M. le P. de Lieven. L'Ambassadeur Anglais a invité le Corps Di-

English Ambassador has invited the Diplomatic Body for the 11—23d April, the anniversary of the King's birth-day, which announces that his arrival will take place before that period.

The Minister of Marine has just received by telegraph the report that his Imperial Majesty's ship the "Czar Constantine," and the frigate "Helena," sailed from Toulon the 17—29th March; the former for Portsmouth, and the latter for Cherbourg.

I have the honour to be,

&c. &c.

(Signed) POZZO DI BORGO.

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plomatique pour le 11—23 Avril, jour anniversaire de la naissance du Roi, ce qui annonce que son arrivée aura lieu avant cette époque.

Le Ministre de la Marine vient de recevoir par le Télégraphe le rapport que le vaisseau de sa Majesté Impériale le Czar Constantin et la frégate l'Héléne, ont mis à la voile de Toulon le 17—29 Mars, le premier pour Portsmouth et la seconde pour Cherbourg.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRECEDING DESPATCH.

The preceding Despatch illustrates the importance of Paris, as a central point of diplomatic information, and shows the advantage which an able diplomatist at that Court possesses in having under his view, at the same moment, the latest intelligence from the Embassies in London, Naples, Rome, Turin, Switzerland, Lisbon, and Madrid.

Our readers will remember the paragraphs which appeared last year in various journals, describing the interest publicly expressed by the Emperor Nicholas, in the establishment of a line of steam packets between Havre and Hamburgh, which diminished the period required for communication between Paris and St. Petersburg to little more than a week.

Universality and simultaneousness of action are two of the leading features of Russian diplomacy, and a main cause of her moral influence; but there is an expression in the preceding Despatch which throws new light on the extent of her diplomatic power. We allude to the fact of the Russian Am-

bassador at Paris obtaining a knowledge of the movements of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean by means of the French telegraph. The inference to be drawn from this circumstance is not unimportant, since it is evident that in the event of a renewal of that collusion between Russia and France which existed from 1815 to 1830, the Emperor may acquire at St. Petersburg a knowledge of the movements of our own ships of war in the Mediterranean, before those movements are even known at the Admiralty in London; and the Russian Ambassadors at Paris and at London may receive such information actually a fortnight before the British Government.

This power, in the event of hostility between Russia and England, would go far to neutralize the advantages we possess in our superior maritime force. But it is only a fraction of the numerous benefits which Russia may derive from diplomatic influence at Paris, to secure the recovery of which she exerts every effort to re-awaken those feelings of national jealousy which she fostered during a quarter of a century of warfare between England and France, and to excite which she unceasingly propagates throughout the world, as a political

axiom, that the two countries are, and must ever remain, *natural* enemies.

Another point of view worthy of remark in this Despatch is the anti-social spirit displayed by the Russian Ambassador with regard to the affairs of the Spanish Peninsula. If Russian diplomacy had never fanned the flames of antagonistic principles, what meaning could attach to the assertion, that the withdrawal of the British and French troops from Portugal and Spain would be the signal for intestine dissension in those countries?

Does not the very expression imply a knowledge of the elements of those dissensions, and consequently the power of Russia to foment them, whenever it may suit her purpose to make a diversion in the West, in order to veil her projects in the East?

[We sincerely trust that the difference between France and Switzerland may not blind both parties to their own national interests, immediately endangered as they are by the political interests of the Prussian League.]—Ed.

ON THE RELATION OF SWITZERLAND

TO THE GERMAN COMMERCIAL LEAGUE.

(Extracted from the Work of Dr. Nebenius on the Customs' Union.)

Switzerland already enjoys, for the introduction of many articles of manufacture into the territory of the Union, advantages proportioned to the quantity of her imports. We can only hope that the relations with this neighbour-country may take a form, which may be favourable to the animation of mutual intercourse. The nature of its exports and its wants makes it, perhaps, more than any other country dependent on the Union. With regard to the transit trade and commission trade, many important interests exist in common, which, however, are not cultivated with as much care by the Cantons as on the German territory.

The disadvantageous consequences weigh heavier on the transit trade of Switzerland, since there is an active competition between the southern seaports, in the same manner as between the northern ports; and every thing which burdens or facilitates the carriage on the roads leading from the one seaport, favours or renders difficult, under otherwise similar circumstances, the competition proceeding from another seaport. If much has been done of late to facilitate communications, we still remain far behind other states. We particularly allude to those facilities which are not obstructed by any kind of hindrances, namely, duties of different kinds, which increase the cost of transport.

A glance at the proportion of the freights for the transmission of goods from the harbours of the Adriatic through the Tyrol, from Marseilles through France, and from Genoa through Switzerland, to Kehl or Strasburg, shows the peculiar advantage to Switzerland of a diminution of the cost of carriage on the latter route. We find the usual freight on the road from Genoa to Strasburg, and from Strasburg to Genoa, for fifty kilograms, including the transit duties and road-tolls, 8 fl. to 8 fl. 30 kr.; on the road from Trieste to Strasburg, and thence to Trieste, 6 fl., 6 fl. 30 kr. to 7 fl. The freight on the former, therefore, is from 1 fl. 30 kr. to 2 fl. higher. *

The ordinary freight by land from Marseilles to Strasburg is from 4 fl. 12 kr. to 5 fl. 19 kr.; from Strasburg to Marseilles it is only 3 fl. 41 kr. A difference, therefore, exists of 3 fl. 20 kr. to 5 fl. 19 kr., for 50 kilograms; whilst the transmission from Genoa to Marseilles (without the insurance, which, late in the year, rises from $\frac{3}{4}$ to $\frac{7}{8}$ per cent., but is lower in summer) costs only 1 fl. 10 kr. to 1 fl. 17 kr.† These proportions of freight are of great importance at certain periods for Switzerland in her commerce with southern fruits and Levant goods, as well as for the goods which form the commission trade as for the transit trade, which is connected with it, since the smallest saving of cost decides on the route to the market where the goods are to be disposed of.

* The calculations) cost of freight from Mannheim for ordinary goods give us similar results:—

	Freight.	
From Genoa to Mannheim .	7 fl. 34 kr.	Period of delivery
Trieste to ditto . .	6 fl. 15 kr.	35—42 days.
Venice to ditto . .	5 fl. 20 kr.	

† The freight for 50 kilograms for the transmission by the steam-boat from Marseilles to Genoa is given in the price lists themselves at only 1 franc 60 cents, or about 41 kr.

REPLY OF A POLE TO A "MANCHESTER MANUFACTURER."

The author of a pamphlet, under the title of "Russia," by a Manchester Manufacturer, has undertaken to prove, not only that the mistrust and apprehension entertained in England against Russia are exaggerated and unjustifiable, but that even the eventual acquisitions of Russia, including the occupation of Constantinople, could not sufficiently affect the interests of England to engage her to oppose them by the force of arms. This ultra-utilitarian author appears unwilling to admit that, under any circumstance, the moral interests of an individual or of a people can be allowed any weight whatever, in comparison with its material interests. The preservation of the latter absorbs his exclusive attention, and one can easily conceive that, with such views, the Polish cause could find no favour in his sight. But to plead the non-intervention of Great Britain in the affairs of that unhappy country, and at the same time to inveigh against its present and past condition, are two very different things. The author is not contented with maintaining that England has too little direct interest in the fate of Poland, to sacrifice to it her useful relations with Russia; he even pretends that Poland has fully deserved to be effaced from the list of the independent nations of Europe, and sneeringly adds, that she is at the present moment happier than ever. Let us examine more closely the value of these sweeping assertions.

The author begins by informing his readers that he cannot sufficiently condemn, with them, the perfidy and violence by means of which Ancient Poland was dismembered. But immediately after this oratorical precaution, he sets to work,

on the authority of some passages from the Manual of Modern History, by Professor Heeren, of Gottingen, to describe Ancient Poland as an anarchical, depraved, disorganized, ignorant, and irreligious society, "in which the nobility was incessantly at war with the neighbouring states," and in which "the people enjoyed no power over property of any kind, and possessed less security of life and limb than has been lately extended to the cattle of this island by Mr. Martin's Bill;" in which, in fine, the country "groaned and bled, with scarcely the slightest intermission, from 1572 until the period of the first partition." "At the present day," continues the author, "what a difference: read the Encyclopædia of Doctor Lardner, and the report of Mr. Jacob; you will there see that the peasants in Poland enjoy personal freedom and may acquire every kind of property; that agricultural and manufacturing industry have made an astonishing progress in that country; and that the nobility alone has lost its ancient privileges and its political preponderance; it is therefore only to regain these privileges that this nobility plunged Poland, in 1831, into all the miseries of an unequal and bloody contest."

"The peasants joined, to a considerable extent, the standard of revolt; but this was to be expected, (we continue to quote from our author) in consequence of the influence necessarily exercised over them by the superior classes, and because patriotism or nationality is an instinctive virtue, that sometimes burns the brightest in the rudest and least reasoning minds; and its manifestation bears no proportion to the value of the possessions defended, or the object to be gained."

The fall of ancient Poland, therefore, according to the "Manchester Manufacturer," was only "the triumph of Justice;" and the present fate of Poland appears to him to be "infinitely more happy" than it would have been if the

nobility had succeeded, in 1831, in imposing anew its iron yoke on the other classes of the inhabitants. Such is the succinct and faithful summary of the arguments, in which ignorance disputes the palm with honesty. We shall, first of all, prove the latter.

Having before our eyes Heeren, Lardner, and Jacob, as comprising the whole erudition as regards Poland, and, on the other hand, the commonest elementary data on the modern history of Russia, we still defy any impartial man in the world to admit one or other of the suppositions with which the Manchester Author sets out, viz.—1st, that the dismemberment of ancient Poland was only the result of the tyranny and oppression exercised by the Polish nobility over the other classes; and, 2ndly, that Russia has improved the condition of these same classes. How happens it that the Author has never discovered in the works which he quotes that, if Poland has been continually weakened by the political faults of the nobility, that same nobility, ever since the reign of Poniatowski, made the most honourable efforts to ameliorate the form of government, to extend the protection of the laws to the other classes of society,—in short, to constitute itself in a European manner, at the very moment when the three neighbouring despots attacked it under the pretext of its jacobinical tendency?

Who is there so ignorant as not to know that, at the period when the Polish peasant was attached to the glebe, the same system existed equally in the greater part of the Austrian and Prussian possessions, and that slavery, such as never has existed in Poland, was the lot of the peasants in Russia? The latter country has kept up this state of slavery until our own days; and, far from having abolished serfage in the kingdom of Poland, where the Code Napoleon, introduced in 1808 and 1810, had destroyed the very traces of it, Russia herself has constantly refused, in her other

Polish provinces, to sanction the enfranchisements which different Assemblies of the nobles, like that of Wilna, under the Presidency of Romer, had proposed of their own accord. In the face of such a state of things, what writer with any pretensions to honesty would think of attributing results favourable to the welfare of the mass in Poland to the civilizing rule of the Russians? What Mr. Jacob and Dr. Lardner say of the material progress by the kingdom of Poland, since 1815, is very true; but it has only been the natural result of fifteen years of peace, and, above all, of the institutions, laws, and national administrative forms, which all the despotism of the Russian Czars had hitherto been unable to wrest from a kingdom, bound to their empire by a separate Constitution. Four Diets took place in the kingdom of Poland, before the last Revolution. Their records of observations and petitions, presented to the Emperor Alexander and to Nicholas, contain the indestructible evidence that, far from favouring the most numerous and the poorest classes of society, the Russian Government never even satisfied the generous demands addressed to it in favour of those very classes, by the Polish Representatives. This fact alone relieves us from the necessity of demonstrating any further the disgraceful injustice with which the author of the above pamphlet has allowed himself to judge of the recent state of Poland. We shall proceed to examine with what incorrectness and levity he pretends to retrace to us its past history.

First of all he describes, in long and emphatic phrases, the interminable contests between Poland and the neighbouring States. "Devastated by foreign and civil wars, and by famine and the plague, that followed in their train, the exhaustion of peace itself now served but to develop new miseries. Fanaticism and bigotry armed themselves with the sword, as soon as abandoned by the worshippers of

Mars; and they waged a warfare against the souls and bodies of their enemies, with a fury that knew no bounds."

Nevertheless, all history proves that the most important territorial acquisitions of Poland, such as the re-union of Lithuania, of Prussia, of Courland, and of Livonia, took place in a pacific manner, and with the free consent of the interested countries; and, as for the taste for conquests, the kings and the nobility of Poland, far from having been ever able to indulge in it, had, alas! too much to do to defend themselves incessantly against the continual invasions of the Muscovite, Turkish, and Tartar hordes, as well as against the unjust aggressions—first, of the Emperors of Germany, the Kings of Bohemia, and the Teutonic Knights; then of the conquerors, such as Gustavus Adolphus, Charles Gustavus, and Charles the XII. of Sweden. In the eighteenth century, Poland was almost continually occupied by Russian troops, which does not prevent the Manchester author from representing us as always animated by a spirit of violence, formidable to our neighbours. The civil wars which followed the royal elections, from 1572 to 1764, lasted, perhaps, altogether one or two years; for the only encounters of this kind which may be termed serious took place only in 1588, 1697, and 1733, when the party of one of the pretenders, supported by foreign forces, offered resistance to the other; whilst the long struggle which followed the accession of Stanislaus Leczinzki, in 1704, cannot be characterized as a civil war, resulting from an election to the Throne, because it was only a simple incident in the great war of the North against Charles XII., Augustus of Saxony, and Peter I. of Russia. What, then, are we to say of the description of this religious fanaticism, which, according to the Manchester author, exterminated the population in Poland? But it was Poland that received under her protection the Jews, successively banished from almost every part

of Europe. It was Poland that, during the bloody reign of Mary of England, and of Catherine de Medicis in France, saw her States-general, with her Bishops at their head, propose and sign "pacem inter dissidentes de religione." If, at a later period, and in the course of the two last centuries, the history of Poland offers some examples of intolerance and religious persecution, this country never attained any thing like the state of cruel fanaticism which continued to afflict those States, which were reputed the most civilized in Western Europe. The wars and massacres which the Manchester author describes to his readers, but which he wisely abstains from quoting, never took place in Poland. But let us pursue our painful, but, at the same time, easy task, of exposing the inconceivable historical absurdities of the work to which we allude.

In maintaining that Poland has deserved its fall, and that degenerate nations alone fall under a foreign yoke, the author, in order better to explain his ideas, adds: "The annals of the world do not exhibit an example of a great nation, such for instance as Prussia, *united*, well governed, rising in intelligence, morals, and religion, and advancing in wealth and civilization, falling beneath the destroying hand of a conqueror." To quote such a sentence is to appear, in a certain degree, to have done justice to it. We shall only remark that if the epithet *great nation*, applied to Prussia, sufficiently indicates that the author is not fond of looking far back into history, when speaking of Prussia as a nation protected against conquest; 1806 has, doubtless, already appeared to him too remote a date: one cannot, however, refuse him the merit of the discovery that the Rhenish provinces, Saxony and Polish Posen, are *intimately united* to Prussia.

A quotation from the report of Mr. Jacob is almost as happy as the eulogium on the greatness of Prussia. Mr. Jacob

maintains, "that one of the first acts of the Emperor Alexander was to restrict the use of titles to the possessors of property in that country, where *previously rank had descended to all the descendants of a son.*" The Manchester author founds on this the proof, that the Russian Government always endeavoured to diminish at least the number of the small tyrants who oppress Poland. Be it remarked, that in the work of Mr. Jacob, the question refers to no other country than the kingdom of Poland, created in 1815, to which he was sent on a mission of commercial inquiry. Now, would not any one believe, according to the words of Mr. Jacob, that the Emperor Alexander had introduced into the kingdom of Poland a sort of right of primogeniture amongst the nobles, with the view, no doubt, of confounding the younger branches of the family with the mass of the people? But, not only has nothing similar been instituted in the kingdom; but the only legislative measure of the Russians which bears any resemblance to the assertion of Mr. Jacob, and which, besides, only applies to the Polish provinces of Russia, is the Ukase, in virtue of which, the nobles who do not possess a certain funded property, without losing their titles of nobility, do not vote in the assemblies in which the latter elect their functionaries every three years. Can one conceive a more gratuitous absurdity than that of establishing a chain of reasoning on a fact, first of all reported with the greatest incorrectness, and which has no reference whatsoever to the country (we mean the kingdom of Poland) about which the author is specially occupied?

We shall only make one more extract from the Manchester pamphlet, which explains perfectly the nature of the information respecting Poland, and the profoundness of the political views of the author:—

"We hesitate not emphatically to assert, that it was wholly, and solely, and exclusively, at the instigation, and

for the selfish benefit of this aristocratic fraction of the people, that the Polish nation suffered for twelve months the horrors of *civil war*, was thrown back in her career of improvement, and has since had to endure the rigours of a conqueror's vengeance."

Our only reason for quoting this passage at full length is because the author himself has given it in italics. Now, in the kingdom of Poland, where the revolution of the 29th of November, 1830, broke out, the law no longer recognizes the aristocracy even in the upper chamber of peers, which does not possess the privilege of hereditary rank: civil equality is common to all the inhabitants, and the political rights are exercised with so much liberality in their conditions, that it is only necessary to acquire the smallest funded property in order to be an elector, and to pay sixty francs of direct taxes in order to be eligible.

But, in order to please the Manchester author, who maintains that the aristocratic fraction alone made and carried on the revolution of 1830 for its own profit, let us at once admit, since we cannot discover this aristocracy constituted in the kingdom of Poland, that it has really been predominant in the two chambers composing the Diet, which pronounced the dethronement of the Emperor Nicholas, and substituted its own power in his place. Without continuing the discussion about words, it would be for the Manchester Manufacturer, in his turn, to show some acts of this Diet, indicating the slightest intention to secure to itself special advantages and privileges which it did not possess before the revolution. Now, we defy the writers most hostile to the Polish cause to find in the acts of the Diet of Warsaw, which have been sufficiently made known to the public, the slightest tendency (we will not say egotistical or speculative) but even aristocratic. God only knows the thoughts of men, but if the Polish aristocrats of 1830 cherished the designs

imputed to them by the Manchester Manufacturer, we must at least agree that they have known how to conceal them perfectly, as long as they were in power, in order, no doubt, to find a compensation on the road to Siberia.

"Poland has suffered twelve months of *civil war*," says the author of "Russia." A singular civil war certainly, in which out of a national army of thirty thousand men, and a population of four millions of inhabitants, all of whom had taken the oath of fidelity to the Emperor Nicholas, this legitimate and benevolent Sovereign, dethroned by a simple aristocratic faction, was unable to rally under his standard during the whole campaign one single detachment of his Polish subjects!!!

These few words appear to us sufficient for the object for which they are intended.

We have shown that Mr. Cobden's arguments on the subject of Poland are glaringly inconsistent with historical truth, and with the events that have taken place in that country.

The general character of the pamphlet is such as to meet with the entire approbation of Russia, and we feel convinced that the Russian Government will not fail to bestow on its author the testimony of its satisfaction in a manner the most agreeable to the Manufacturer himself, and the most encouraging to all who may henceforth follow in the same line. *

Paris, 25th September, 1836.

* We allude to Blackwood, Tait, and some other imitators of the "Northern Bee."

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of the Portfolio.

Constantinople, 14th of September, 1836.

SIR,

Never has England had a more favourable opportunity of establishing a commanding influence in Turkey than at the present moment. Our Ambassador, left alone to fight his own battles, under circumstances which might have appalled any diplomatist, has yet kept his ground without support from his Government. The desire of the Divan is even unequivocally manifested to place their reliance in us, and to strengthen the connection between the two countries—though one Minister remains in office who is an eye-sore to Lord Ponsonby. Not the least remarkable proof of the indifference to censure from Russia is the attention lately shown to Sefer Bey, the Circassian chieftain, who, after remaining here several years undistinguished, has been honoured with a diamond snuff-box, as a present from the Sultan. All the sentiments by which he was actuated, and which he wished to proclaim, may be easily comprehended. This fact announces to the Circassians that he considers the contest in which they are engaged legitimate, and their cause his own.

It is, assuredly, not less our own cause, if India has any value in our eyes; and the way in which Russia has just put forward the Persians as her pioneers is sufficient to show that the danger predicted has not been imaginary; while the very means she would use were anticipated. Her communications with Persia, however, are yet unsafe and imper-

fect, while she has enemies in the Caucasus, who may gain possession of the passes. The news of the fall of the Castle of Souljook was, I am happy to say, premature; though the situation of the Circassians is distressing, from the occupation of so much of the coast between Anapa and Ghilingik by the enemy. They are entirely dependent on their communications with the sea for their supplies of salt, besides other wants, which can only be supplied by commerce.

Numerous applications have been made to Mr. Green, an English merchant here, to employ a steamer under his charge to convey passengers and goods between this and the coasts of Abasia and Mingrelia. He presented, in consequence, a memorial to the Ambassador, detailing the encouragement offered, and the capabilities for a valuable intercourse with those countries, now closed to us by the Russian blockade. The laws of nations admit of no such indefinite blockade, still less of one which has never yet been regularly communicated to other Governments. Nor can Russia, without manifest absurdity, claim a country as her own, where she never had a foot of ground, except the soil on which her soldiers stand, and make war on it, at the same time, as an enemy. The question will, I believe, be speedily put to the test; and it is full time to ascertain whether the British flag, and the rights of commerce, are to be violated with impunity, by the usurpers of the seas in the neighbourhood of their Cimmerian Bosphorus, from whence a century ago they could not have sent a single gun-boat.

Wherever new channels open on their frontiers favourable to real civilization and the prosperity of nations, by increased facilities of intercourse, Russia determines that barbarism shall interpose, and blasts the prospect by every means at her command. It was expected in England that, after the discussion on Mr. P. Stuart's motion, the obnoxious quarantine at the mouth of the Danube was to be

abolished; your readers may be assured that, so far from this being in contemplation, Russia is only trying to gild the pill and make it more palatable, having not long since submitted her last modified regulations to our cognizance for approbation. Not an iota of her usurped sovereignty is thus relinquished; and her efforts to obtain, by a side-wind, this acquiescence in her pretensions, must surely have met with a proper repulse from our Cabinet. So long as Lord Palmerston is Foreign Minister, and alive to the necessity of our obstructing Russian aggrandizement, and protecting Turkey, for which he is known to be a cordial advocate, we ought not to expect a concession compromising our participation in the freedom of river navigation, as established by the Treaties of Vienna, and founded on universal rights, if these treaties had never existed. The stipulations concluded at Adrianople between the Porte and Russia are only valid as far as these two Powers are concerned, and cannot invalidate the independent privileges of other nations, without their sanction by a general Congress of the parties to the Treaty of Vienna. Russia, by the extension she has given to her authority, is actually making war on them; thus a British ship, on any pretext or suspicion, may be dragged out of her course to perform quarantine at Odessa, in virtue of the unrepealed Ukase. Yet this vessel may be bound to a Turkish or Austrian port on the Danube, and only passing by a portion of the Russian territory, where she can have guards all along the shore to prevent communication. The purposes to which the article in the Treaty of Adrianople regarding quarantines might be applied was, of course, like every other usurpation of Russia, overlooked by us at the time. She had, however, well made her calculations as to the importance of seeming harmless formalities for protection against infection. Why is it that only after the establishment of the steam navigation between Constantinople

and Galatz, and the opening of a valuable British direct trade with that and other ports on the Danube, she issued her quarantine regulations, imposed visits on shipping and tolls? Why, *then*, only—when there had been an intercourse at all times with the Turkish ports outside by boats or other vessels? Her object was to show Austria and central Germany their dependence on her for their communications with other countries through the Black Sea, as soon as they began to be developed; to thwart the prosperity of the Turkish provinces on the Danube and Servia, and prove to England that our flag shall nowhere be free, when it comes in contact with her shores.

The Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi was made to exclude our navy for ever from the Bosphorus and the Black Sea, because there it can reach the focus whence all the preparations must be directed for the extension of Russian dominion over the South and East. We have but to open relations with the Circassians, and a chain will be stretched across the Caucasus from the Euxine to the Caspian, by tribes of indomitable mountaineers, who are the doorkeepers of Persia, and, through Persia, of India.

Liberate the navigation of the Danube from all restraints, and Austria and Germany then have interests in common with us, opposed to Russia, to whom they must now submit. All this but leads to the conclusion that neither our flag will be respected in the Black Sea, nor will the prospects of peace be secure, till we can command free ingress there for a British squadron, whenever its presence is wanted. To accomplish this, we have only to change places with Russia in the influence she exercises over Turkey. The Porte is willing and eager to be called on to enter into the connexion. Our Government has the means in its hands; and it only rests with the country to insist on the conclusion of the contract.

S.

Constantinople, the 21st September, 1836.

SIR,

The state of affairs here is, I am sorry to say, by no means a subject of congratulation. Mr. Ellis arrived last Saturday from Tabreez. The Shah is completely Russian, and as much bent as ever on taking possession of Herat; only physical difficulties may, for the present, thwart the success of the project. We have lost all control over the Persian Government. It could not be otherwise. Russia shows that Court that she is left unmolested in these countries, and that England is too remote, or powerless before her. The road by which our influence must reach Persia is through Turkey, which we tremble even to touch. Here we must meet Russia face to face, and contest every inch of ground with her in our intercourse with the Divan. With the dismissed Reis Effendi, Russia had been put to the rout. Till very lately every Turkish Minister was eager to disavow any connexion with her, and to show as much partiality for England. It only remained for our Government, by following up the blow, to make the victory complete. From its silence, Russia has again rallied, and triumphs over us in her turn. The British nation cannot be aware of the situation in which our Ambassador is placed, and that, after the decision he displayed to support the honour of the country, and the success gained, every thing is in danger of being (if it be not already) lost.

The removal of the Reis Effendi was a personal satisfaction to Lord Ponsonby, who, from the responsibility he had incurred in breaking off all intercourse with him, could not otherwise have kept his post. It was a concession, though unavowed as such, to his country; but, with this, the question is far from being at rest. The Ambassador, after presenting his proofs against all the parties implicated in the

outrage on Mr. Churchill, left it to the Porte to make proper voluntary reparation, or to his own Government to decide and insist on the terms. To this hour no answer has been received for communication to the Porte; not the least direct atonement has been made for the offence; and, within these last few days, the subordinates concerned in it have all been promoted. They are under the immediate authority of Achmet Pacha, accused by Lord Ponsonby, and the facts admitted by the Porte, of being far more culpable in the injurious treatment of Mr. Churchill than the Reis Effendi, who has alone incurred the penalty.

Achmet Pacha himself, whose dismissal from the councils of the Sovereign, and office near his person, Lord Ponsonby declared in his opinion to be indispensable, to do full justice to England, has been raised to a still higher dignity, and created Pacha of Brussa. It was considered, at first, probable that this was done as an intended cover for sending him to reside in the capital of his district, should the demands of our Government have forced him into retirement. The distinction with which he has just been pleased to treat the very individuals who deserved disgrace and severe personal chastisement is a signal proof, on the contrary, that we are set at defiance. Russia, as I have stated, had already openly stepped forward to shield Achmet Pacha against all pursuits which his misconduct towards us might excite. Emboldened by our indifference, timidity, or procrastination—for one or the other term must be correct, Achmet Pacha, the favourite of the Russian Mission and Court, is put forward by her to make this exhibition of his own grandeur and will, to shew England that Russia has received amends for the affront offered to her in the sacrifice of another Minister, whom she also wished to protect.

Our Ambassador can of course do nothing; he is reduced to total inaction; he appealed to his Cabinet, from whence

no echo has returned; and he occupies the situation of representative of our Sovereign, without the power of showing the opinion entertained of his conduct on one of the most trying occasions, I may say the most important, in his diplomatic career in this country. If Lord Ponsonby is considered to have obtained sufficient amends, or to have gone too far, the interests and dignity of England suffer infinitely more by the delay in the notification to the Porte and to the world than could happen by at once clearing up the point. Knowing what public opinion here is, the strong impression which a decisive attitude produces on the minds of the Turks, who are fully aware that this is really a question of British or Russian ascendency, I am far from intimating that the disapproval of Lord Ponsonby's proceedings would not be a step to be deplored, and, perhaps, irretrievable for the country.

It is only the attendant determination, evinced by actual means, to rescue Turkey at once from its perils, that can counterbalance the effect of putting an end to the services of our present Ambassador. He would then be rewarded for all personal considerations, in the accomplishment of the grand object which has been the aim of a great portion of his life, and for which his indefatigable efforts here have paved the way. If we keep much longer in the background, Turkey will slip through our fingers like Persia, and we may at once resign ourselves to this as an infallible consequence of our irresolution. Russia is not idle, though we are; she has just called out by ukase a fresh levy of five men in every thousand throughout her empire, which, on the whole population, may give her eighty thousand additional soldiers. She is known for the last twelve months to have had agents dispersed among the Greeks in Roumelia to stir up discontents. The emigrations from the neighbourhood of Sharkoy into Servia have been traced to her

instigation, and there are strong reasons to conclude that the Porte has information of a dangerous spirit being afloat among this portion of its subjects. There is no other way of accounting for an order determined on at the Porte, though not yet issued, to prohibit the use of wooden clappers as a summons to divine service at the Greek churches, a practice which has been allowed them (instead of bells) ever since the capture of Constantinople. They might be used as a signal for insurrectionary meetings, which Russia has been preparing; infatuation itself could not otherwise have devised a more effectual means of irritating the Greeks, by interfering with their religion, and throwing them into the arms of Russia for fraternity. It is thus she repays the evacuation of Silistria, while the garrison, transported to the right bank of the Danube, is ready to assist the Porte in keeping the Greeks in order, or back them on, just as it may suit her game.

Mr. Boutenieff did not, as was anticipated, let slip the notice of the present to Sefer Bey, the Circassian, by the Sultan, without a furious remonstrance, and demand of explanation, why a snuff-box had been sent from the Sovereign to an individual who was the known, though unauthorized, agent of insurgents in a country ceded by the Porte to Russia. The Turkish Ministers, shrinking from a justification of the bold gift, replied that it had been presented without their cognizance, and they presumed it was merely bestowed by their Master to reward the stranger's skill in archery. How pitiable to see a Government reduced to this evasion in regard to its true defenders, and towards a power perpetually fomenting discord in its bosom, while we are tamely looking on!!

S.

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the French diplomatists in Belgium have left our Government, it appears certain that the discontents, and the diplomatic misunderstandings of Belgium, have been fomented by Prussia. That power, whilst ostensibly flattering the Belgians to obtain their accession to the Customs' Union, detests the King of Belgium, the Prince of Portugal, and the ducal house of Saxe-Coburg. In its enmity to Saxony, which, supported by Austria, contributes to prevent the aggrandizement of Prussia, the Court of Berlin has gone so far as to spread, in the journals of its agents, a report that disturbances had broken out in Saxe-Coburg; and this report was circulated with so many details, that every body at first believed it to be true; but it was wholly unfounded. Saxe-Coburg will remain tranquil; the Belgian Government will maintain itself; legal order, an order conformable to oaths, will be re-established in Portugal.

Since Don Miguel and the North are conspiring against Portugal, it is but natural that public opinion in France should declare itself more and more against these conspiracies, and by all possible means prevent their duration. It has given great satisfaction at Paris to learn that the Court of St. James', which has besides to protect the persons, the property, and the commerce of the English, is strengthening its squadron in the Tagus. *The diplomatists of the North at Paris were first informed of this*, and they have endeavoured to get up articles in the newspapers against this expedition; but well-informed persons have unmasked these designs. The French Government cannot but approve this expedition, which will be at the same time serviceable to the French residing in Portugal. The more careful the English squadron shall be to protect the interests of both countries, the more the public approbation, and, I may say enthusiasm, in behalf of the British enterprize will increase in Paris. At the same time, enlightened public opinion

would see with satisfaction French ships alongside of the English. If these French ships were to cruize a little on the coasts eastward of Spain, this might serve to render Carlist succours more difficult, to alarm the Carlist guerillas, and, perhaps, to overawe the ultra-radical party. Thus England would approve the demonstrations against the disorders in Spain, France would support the eventual demonstrations against the disorders in Portugal, and the Anglo-French differences would be adjusted. I say the demonstrations, for assuredly there will be no fighting in Portugal; the majority of the country will of itself overthrow the more or less voluntary supporters of Don Miguel and the North.

Enlightened persons in France make a difference between the situation of Spain and Portugal, between the Constitutions of 1812 and 1821. The Spanish Constitution is supported by a strong majority, which is arrayed against Don Carlos; the Portuguese Constitution of 1821 by a minority, which is extremely serviceable to Don Miguel. The Constitution of 1812 supersedes the inefficient *estatuto real;* that of 1821, the liberal Charter of Don Pedro. If the whole Peninsula had a Charter as liberal as Don Pedro's, this might be all the better for both the countries of the Peninsula and their allies.

The demi-official press of France is beginning to paint Spain in dark colours. We conceive that there is tactical skill in these reports. There cannot be anarchy at Madrid, where Martinez de la Rosa is allowed to reside; and we do not believe in the success of Don Carlos.

The misunderstanding with Switzerland originates in a snare laid for France by the Northern Powers, and into which M. Thiers rushed headlong. The North feigned to offer its alliance, and Austria affected to hold out the hope of a marriage, if France would take part against the refugees in Switzerland, and against the liberal policy of that

country. To support the charges against the refugees, they were denounced as implicated in a plot against Louis Philippe, which was to break out on the 28th of July. After the review had thus been prevented, the circumstance was used as a pretext to decline the marriage, and France was left with the Swiss quarrel on her shoulders.

Switzerland having gone great lengths against France and against her Ambassador, M. Molé cannot help following up the matter; but he will strive to come to an adjustment. The foreign papers assert that France will not have the majority at the Diet; M. Molé believes the contrary. Should he find himself mistaken, France may, perhaps, be obliged to accept the mediation of England, which our Government now refuses. At any rate, M. Molé seems thankful for the mediation which England is disposed to grant; and he does not listen to the other powers which make the same offer. How could he give ear to the Russian Diplomacy, which is at the same time exciting the radicals of Switzerland?

The "Morning Chronicle" complains of the accusations preferred by French Diplomacy against the internal policy of Switzerland: that Journal is in the right. It is, also, in the right to censure the tone of the last French note. But it errs in charging the Government with what the Council is supposed to have done; and it mixes up M. Molé too much with the faults of M. Thiers.

The new French Administration has just manifested its good intentions by taking the first step towards an amnesty. M. Thiers was hostile to it. The first idea of the amnesty belongs to Marshal Gerard; M. Guizot was favourable to it; M. Molé also made it a condition at the moment of the entrance of Persil and Martin (du Nord) into the Council.

This commencement of amnesty will produce a lively

sensation in Europe, which will at length ascertain that the French Government is sufficiently consolidated to entertain no more fears of its old internal enemies. We should not be surprised if Austria, in consequence of this conviction, should draw a little closer towards France. Inhabitants of Vienna now at Paris say that the Archduchess Theresa is betrothed, but they know not to whom! Still, if M. d'Appony himself were to promise her hand to the Duke of Orleans, his promise ought not to be relied upon.

The Ministry hopes to meet the Chamber with the commencement of amnesty and the adjustment of the misunderstanding with Switzerland. It is not at all afraid of M. Dupin, who declared himself against all intervention. It reckons upon a fraction of the *tiers-parti*, connected with Messrs. Molé, Bernard, and Rosamel. In a word, it hopes to obtain a majority.

However, in order to make sure of a majority, it will have occasion for more acts than those which it has begun or consummated; and it will have, also, occasion to carry to the Chamber still more guarantees of the English alliance.

POSTSCRIPT, OCTOBER 17, 1836.

AFFAIRS OF SWITZERLAND.

AFFAIR OF CONSEIL.

We have this moment received a singular communication which throws new light on the Swiss question. It appears certain that the report from Berne of the 23rd of September, which produced the difference with France, reposed on very equivocal data. It appears to be proved that the depositions of Conseil were as false as those of his witnesses, and one

might even tax Switzerland with bad faith in having removed these witnesses. The result of the following information is that Conseil clumsily invented his lies, because they may be refuted.

In reading attentively the following observations, one acquires the conviction that Conseil never was a spy of the Foreign Department, nor of the French Embassy; and until we receive a proof to the contrary, which is not furnished by the report of the 23rd of September, we are as little inclined to believe that he was a spy of the Minister of the Interior.

We have received the following details from so authentic a source, that we are led to think our information conformable to that which the French Ministry must have equally received. The truth cannot fail to transpire at the Diet. The Swiss authorities will then have to acknowledge the incorrectness of the report, and thenceforth the misunderstanding can hardly fail to terminate without delay.

Copy of a Note from the Duc de Montebello to the Swiss Government.

I.

(TRANSLATION.)

Berne, July 19, 1836.

GENTLEMEN,

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has just acquainted me, that he has been informed by the Minister of the Interior, that a certain person of the name of Conseil had procured a passport made out in the office of that Minister for M. Cheli (Napoleon) for Switzerland. This individual, compromised in the affair of *Fieschi*, professes the most subversive doctrines, and will be equally dangerous every where. I am, therefore charged, Sir, to require from you the arrest

and expulsion of the person named Conseil; and I have the honour to request that you will have the goodness to communicate to the different cantons the facts relating to him, and the order which I have received with respect to him. You will have the goodness to inform me of the result of your proceedings.

I request your Excellency to receive the assurances, &c. &c. &c.

The Ambassador of France,

(Signed) DUC DE MONTEBELLO.

To M. M. the Avoyer and Council of
State of the Republic of Berne.
Federal Directory.

II.

Extract of the Report drawn up at Berne the 3rd of September, and observations thereupon.

"The demand which formed the subject of the note of the French Embassy was communicated to the States on the 23rd of July; on the 6th of August the Department of Justice and the police of the republic of Berne gave an order to the director of the central police, that, in the event of Conseil being arrested in the Canton, immediate notice should be given of the circumstance to the French Embassy."

A correspondence from Berne makes an important remark on this passage. It has been verified, that, at the period when the Directory communicated the demand of the Embassy to the Cantons, the authorities at Berne had known for more than ten days of the presence at Berne of that individual, where he enjoyed to a certain degree the protection of the police, whose chief, Mr. Watt, had received his passport,

and had delivered to him his permit of residence, notwithstanding that Conseil had himself declared to him his name, his presumed implication in the affair of Fieschi, and the steps taken by the French Government against him. One is inclined to doubt the good faith of the Bernese Government, in giving to the Director of the central police the order to arrest, *in the event* of his being discovered in the Canton, a man who had resided there several days in virtue of the authorization of the police themselves.

"On the 10th of August, at ten o'clock in the evening, the Prefect of Nidan received information that amongst many strangers . . . there must be a spy. Hereupon this functionary made them produce their passports. Two were handed to him under the names of Berthola and Migliari, a third under the name of Mr. Hermann, of Strasburg; the latter given by the French Embassy on the 15th of November, 1835, and signed by M. de Belleval."

This information was given to the Prefect of Nidan by the Italian refugees, the same who had commenced at Berne the violent proceedings against Conseil — the same who had dragged him to Fribourg, and thence conducted him to Nidan, where they had convoked the Members of the *Jeune Suisse*. The authorities of Nidan arrested a man *denounced* as a spy; they left at liberty those who, according to their own avowal, had assumed the functions of agents of police.

"Hermann (Cheli Conseil) confessed that he had been for some time in the service of the French police. On the 12th of August he was delivered over to the central police of Berne, with his two travelling companions."

It is still evident from the correspondence from Switzerland, that, in spite of the above-mentioned order, which was given to the central police, the French Embassy has never been informed of the arrest of this individual!

It is singular, also, that the Bernese Government should

have at the same time protected the two companions, Berthola and Migliari, even to the extent of not allowing them to be conducted by gensdarmes to the frontier; to the extent even of demanding for them passports from the French Embassy, passports for France, (passports which had been refused.)

"The examining judge acknowledged, by his decision of the 24th of August, that there was ground for investigation."

This examining judge is a Neufchatel refugee.

"Conseil declares that, about the first days of June last, he entered the service of the police of Paris, (the Ministry of the Interior.")

Supposing that this assertion of Conseil were true, what would it prove? That the French police had sent an agent into Switzerland to discover whether the refugees premeditated any attempt against the Royal Family of France. Thus the Swiss police protects the man who avows, himself, that he was implicated in the crime of Fieschi; and arrests the man who declares himself to be charged with watching over the plots against the King's life.

"He was refused the permission to reside; and Conseil received the order to quit Berne."

Notwithstanding this, M. Watt left Conseil sixteen days at Berne, whence he did not depart till the 26th, not the 22nd of July, that is to say, three days after the Ambassador had demanded his arrest.

Conseil even declared, in the examination, that at the moment of his departure the police had viséd the false passport for France; and this allegation has not been contradicted.

It is, then, a Swiss authority which knowingly viséd a false passport.

"He becomes an agent to provoke disclosures. Conseil

has formally declared, in the interrogatories, that he had received the most positive orders from the police of Paris not to provoke disclosures, and to confine himself to keep a good look out."

The report makes no mention of this circumstance.

"In the evening of the 6th of August, Conseil went very late to the French Embassy." (Here follows his interview with the Duc de Montebello.)

Conseil did not appear at the Embassy. It was at first said that it was the 7th of August; the alibi being proved, they stated the 6th of August, the day on which M. de Montebello receives company; and they invented the fable, according to which it was affirmed that he was received in the midst of a numerous assembly, where music was performed.

"As the secretary could not be found," &c.

Nevertheless, this secretary was at the assembly at the Ambassador's.

Conseil states, "I entered a saloon in which was a pianoforte," &c.

The minuteness of the description proves nothing; the Embassy, like the Chancellerie, is constantly open to many persons.

"The Ambassador told me," adds Conseil, "that his secretary would give me another passport."

It was, according to Conseil, because the passport contained his description. But the succeeding passport also contains his description.

"A functionary affirms the correctness of the description."

It was, perhaps, the same functionary who drew up the description.

"The papers of Conseil were remitted to the hands of the prefect of Nidan."

The greater part of these papers were not found on the person of Conseil, but on that of Bertola.

"The whole of the passport of the 15th of November, 1835, is written in the same hand, instead of being only signed by the secretary."

But every day, from twelve o'clock till two, when the clerks go to dinner, there is a secretary to deliver and fill up the passports.

"Whilst all the passports delivered by M. de Belleval bear the signature on the right: 'Pour l'Ambassadeur de France, the Chargé d'Affaires,'" &c.

It is false; when there is no Ambassador at Berne, one cannot put *pour l'Ambassadeur*. It very often happens that, M. de Montigny not being at the Chancellerie, his signature is not affixed.

"Conseil was not at Berne the 15th of November, 1835."

But that does not prove that Conseil, or some one else, could not have bought a passport delivered in November 1835 to a M. Hermann.

"The passport of the 25th of November, 1835, belongs to a new form, of which the stone impression could not have existed in 1835."

This is incorrect; for ever since the Embassy of M. de Rumigny, the form of the passports has remained the same.

"One requires no one to believe any thing to be true, because Conseil may have asserted it; one must say pretty nearly as much of the four other Italians."

It is impossible to judge this whole affair better than the report does itself in this *sentence*.

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

NEGOCIATIONS ON THE GREEK QUESTION.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROTOCOL OF APRIL THE 4TH.

THE period has arrived when we conceive it our duty to lay before the public the series of Diplomatic documents which illustrate the policy of Russia during the negotiations respecting the pacification of the East. It was our original intention to have commenced our analysis of the proceedings of the Russian Cabinet with the events of 1791, and to have traced in succession the marvellous results of her diplomacy in all her treaties with England, down to the signature of that most remarkable document—the Protocol of April the 4th, 1826. We should have been thus enabled to explain, by incontrovertible evidence, that the gradual but astonishing progress of that Power is to be attributed to her early acquisition of a science, the rudiments of which, and even the knowledge that it is a science, have yet to be

learnt in this country. We should have shown that, in every Treaty concluded with England, Russia has contrived to put forth ostensible motives with such consummate art as to have entirely blinded the most distinguished of our statesmen to her real designs, and that her European and Asiatic ascendency has been acquired, and could only have been acquired, by a dexterous use of the influence and support of England.

But the time which would be requisite for producing any beneficial result on public opinion by so interesting a revelation is unfortunately made use of by Russia with such restless energy for the accomplishment of her immediate ends, that we deem it more advisable to hasten the exposure of her projects on the theatre of her present exertions, feeling perfectly convinced that the possession of Constantinople, by fraud or by force, is the aim of all her efforts, and that upon her success or defeat in that object depend not alone the vital interests of England, but those of the whole civilized world.

We have thought it advisable to prefix a copy of the Protocol of April the 4th, as it will be frequently referred to in the Despatches

and notes which will appear in our following Numbers.

The circumstances which led the Embassy of the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburgh, on the accession of the Emperor Nicholas, are truly remarkable.

At the Congress of Verona, Lord Strangford had been entrusted by the Emperor of Russia with the adjustment, at Constantinople, of the differences between Russia and the Porte—differences the origin of which we ascribe to the perfidious incitement of the Greek Revolution by Russian emissaries, and by the non-fulfilment, by Russia, of the Treaty of Bucharest. The whole series of Lord Strangford's negotiations exhibit the most persevering efforts to compel the Turks to make a sacrifice of every point at issue with Russia; and the result of his Lordship's endeavours, as might naturally have been expected, when the preservation of peace was put forward as the *object* of them, was the constant recurrence of still further demands on the part of Russia, when she found so convenient and powerful an advocate of her claims in the person of a British ambassador. It is inconceivable that it should not have oc-

curred to an English statesman that Russia would never feel inclined to stop in so advantageous a career, when the longer we continued to advocate her interests, the more did we necessarily contribute to the advancement of her power by ruining our own.

As might have been expected from so extraordinary a line of policy, Russia derived from British simplicity a fresh incitement to aggression against Turkey, and at the period of the Emperor Alexander's death it became known in England that he had intended immediately to declare war against the Sultan to obtain the redress of those very grievances which Lord Strangford professed to have already settled.

In the meanwhile, Mr. Stratford Canning, who had set out for Constantinople as the new Ambassador to the Porte, had been invited by the Greeks to mediate for their reconciliation with the Sultan. Their invitation was transmitted to England.

On the accession of the Emperor Nicholas, the Duke of Wellington went to St. Petersburg to offer the mediation of England between Russia and the Porte, and the joint mediation of Eng-

land and Russia between the Porte and the Greeks.

We are persuaded that on a careful study of the Protocol which was signed between the two Courts on the latter point, it will be apparent that the concert of Russia with England rendered the consent of the Porte a matter of impossibility, and that Russia, aware of this impossibility, signed the Protocol, and thus derived, from the fact of having committed England against Turkey, the courage necessary to send an ultimatum to Constantinople, to secure her own separate interests, by the Convention of Akerman.

PROTOCOL OF CONFERENCE

BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND RUSSIAN PLENIPOTENTIARIES, RELATIVE TO THE MEDIATION OF GREAT BRITAIN, BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN PORTE AND THE GREEKS.

Signed at St. Petersburgh, March 23rd, (April 4th) 1826.

TRANSLATION.

His Britannic Majesty having been requested by the Greeks to interpose his good offices, in order to obtain their reconciliation with the Ottoman Porte—having, in consequence, offered his Mediation to that Power, and being desirous of concerting the measures of his Government upon this subject with His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias; and His Imperial Majesty, on the other hand, being equally animated by the desire of putting an end to the contest, of which Greece and the Archipelago are the theatre, by an arrangement which shall be consistent with the principles of religion, justice, and humanity—

The Undersigned have agreed:

I. That the arrangement to be proposed to the Porte, if that Government should accept the proffered Mediation, should have for its object—to place the Greeks towards the Ottoman Porte, in the relation hereafter mentioned; Greece should be a dependency of that Empire, and the Greeks should pay to the Porte an annual tribute, the amount of which should be permanently fixed by common consent. They should be exclusively governed by authorities to be

chosen and named by themselves, but in the nomination of which authorities the Porte should have a certain influence.

In this state, the Greeks should enjoy a complete liberty of conscience, entire freedom of commerce, and should, exclusively, conduct their own internal Government.

In order to effect a complete separation between individuals of the two nations, and to prevent the collisions which must be the necessary consequences of a contest of such duration, the Greeks should purchase the property of Turks, whether situated on the continent of Greece, or in the Island.

II. In case the principle of a Mediation between Turks and Greeks should have been admitted, in consequence of the steps taken with that view by His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, His Imperial Majesty would exert, in every case, his influence to forward the object of that Mediation. The mode in which, and the time at which, His Imperial Majesty should take part in the ulterior negotiations with the Ottoman Porte, which may be the consequence of that Mediation, should be determined hereafter by the common consent of the Governments of His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty.

III. If the Mediation offered by His Britannic Majesty should not have been accepted by the Porte, and whatever may be the nature of the relations between His Imperial Majesty and the Turkish Government, His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty will still consider the terms of the arrangement specified in Article I. of this Protocol, as the basis of any reconciliation to be effected by their intervention, whether in concert or separately, between the Porte and the Greeks; and they will avail themselves of every favourable opportunity to exert their influence with both parties, in order to effect this reconciliation on the abovementioned basis.

IV. That His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty should reserve to themselves to adopt hereafter the measures necessary for the settlement of the details of the arrangement in question, as well as the limits of the territory, and the names of the Islands of the Archipelago to which it shall be applicable, and which it shall be proposed to the Porte to comprize under the denomination of Greece.

V. That, moreover, His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty will not seek, in this arrangement, any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence, nor advantages in commerce for their subjects, which shall not be equally attainable by all other nations.

VI. That His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty, being desirous that their allies should become parties to the definitive arrangements of which this Protocol contains the outline, will communicate this instrument confidentially to the Courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin, and will propose to them that they should, in concert with the Emperor of Russia, guarantee the Treaty by which the reconciliation of Turks and Greeks shall be effected, as His Britannic Majesty cannot guarantee such a Treaty.

Done at St. Petersburgh, the 23rd of March, (4th April) 1826.

(Signed) WELLINGTON.
NESSELRODE.
LIEVEN.

OFFICIAL LETTER FROM PRINCE LIEVEN TO MR. CANNING.

London, 7th (19th) November, 1826.

I hastened to communicate to my August Master the official letter dated the 4th of September, in which your Excellency, in exposing the views of your Government with regard to the pacification of Greece, has examined the course to be pursued, in order to induce the Ottoman Government to co-operate with us for this end, in the double hypothesis of a rupture, or of a happy termination of the negociations of Akerman.

Copie d'un office à Mr. Canning de la Part de M. le Prince de Lieven.

Londres, le 7 (19) Novembre, 1826.

Je me suis empressé de porter à la connaissance de mon Auguste Maître l'office en date du 4 Septembre, dans lequel V. Ex. en exposant les vues de son Gouvernement rélatives à la pacification de la Grèce, a examiné la marche à suivre pour amener le Gouvernement Ottoman à co-opérer à ce but, dans la double hypothèse de la rupture, ou d'une heureuse conclusion, des négotiations d'Akerman.

His Majesty the Emperor has received, with all the interest which they deserved, the overtures, replete with frankness and useful ideas, which this communication of your Excellency contained; and the hypothesis of the success of the negociations with the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries being now happily realized, my August Master has authorized me to concert with your Excellency—1st. The method to be followed in communicating to the Courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin, your official letter of the 4th of September, and my answer of this day: and, 2nd. The means of inducing them to take a part in the steps which Russia and England will take towards the Porte, in order to give them that collective character so much in conformity with the wishes of the Emperor, as well as

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S. M. l'Empereur a accueilli avec tout l'intérêt qu'elles méritoient les ouvertures pleines de franchise et de pensées utiles que cette communication de V. Ex. contenoit, et l'hypothèse du succès des negociations avec les Plénipotentiaires Ottomans s'étant heureusement realisée, mon Auguste Maître m'a autorisé de concerter avec V. Ex:—

1°. Le mode à suivre pour communiquer aux Cours de Vienne, de Paris, et de Berlin, son office du 4 Septembre, et ma réponse de ce jour: et 2°. Les moyens de les engager à prendre part aux démarches que la Russie et l'Angleterre feront auprès de la Porte à leur imprimer ce caractère collectif si conforme aux désirs de

with the wishes of the English Government, and to throw into the balance the whole weight of a completely European agreement.

I am likewise ordered to announce to the British Cabinet, in the name of his Imperial Majesty, in answer to the official letter of the 4th of September:—

That it is agreed between Russia and England, that this official letter itself shall serve as an instruction in common to M. de Ribeaupierre, and to Mr. Stratford Canning.

That, so soon as M. de Ribeaupierre shall have arrived at Constantinople, he will have to concert with the Ambassador of his Britannic Majesty, upon the official and simultaneous steps to be taken by both Courts towards the Porte, in order

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l'Empereur comme à ceux du Gouvernement Anglais, et à mettre dans la balance tout le poid d'un accord complettement Européen.

J'ai en outre ordre d'annoncer au Cabinet Britannique, au nom de S. M. Impériale, en réponse à l'office de V. Ex. du 4 Septembre.

Qu'il est convenu entre la Russie et l'Angleterre que cet office même servira d'instruction commune à M. de Ribeaupierre et Mr. Stratford Canning.

Que dès que M. de Ribeaupierre sera arrivé à Constantinople il auroit à se concerter avec l'Ambassadeur de S. M. Britannique sur les démarches officielles et simultanées que les deux Cours

to communicate to it the Protocol of the 23rd of March (4th of April), to invite it to concur in it, and to propose to it also the immediate conclusion of an armistice.

That, in case of a negative answer on its part, and under the supposition that this proposition, at once the most simple, and the best calculated to act upon the mind of the Grand Signor, should obtain the assent of the Allied Courts, they will menace the Porte with the withdrawal of the Representatives of these Courts, and with a leaning towards Greece, which will finally lead them to recognise her independence.

That if, at the expiration of a delay, the limits of which shall be determined, the Porte should still persist in the same refusal, they shall effect their

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feront ensemble auprès de la Porte pour lui communiquer le Protocole du 27 Mars (4 Avril) l'inviter à y adhérer, et lui proposer également la conclusion immediate d'un armistice.

Qu'en cas de réponse négative de sa part, et dans la supposition que ce moyen à la fois le plus simple et le plus propre à agir sur l'esprit du Grand Seigneur obtienne l'assentiment des Cours Alliées, ils menaceront la Porte de la retraite de représentans de ces Cours et d'un rapprochement avec la Grèce, qui finira par les amener à reconnoître son independance.

Que si, à l'expiration d'un delai qu'il s'agira de determiner, la

departure, and shall announce the above-mentioned intentions with regard to Greece.

In communicating to your Excellency these determinations, founded on the views announced by the British Government itself, it remains for me still to fulfil the duty of reiterating, in the name of my August Master, the assurance that his Majesty knows how to appreciate the ties formed by the Protocol between the two Courts; that he regards the results to which they have already led as most fortunate; that he is firmly resolved to follow them up; and that he is intimately persuaded that he shall see the work of conciliation and of peace, undertaken under such favourable auspices, brought to a satisfactory issue.

(Signed) LIEVEN.

Porte persiste encore dans le même refus, ils effectueront leur départ et annonceront le rapprochement ci-dessus mentionné.

En communiquant a V. Ex. ces déterminations basées sur les vues enoncées par le Gouvernement même de S. M. Britannique, il me reste encore à remplir le devoir de lui réitérer içi, au nom de mon Auguste Maître, l'assurance que S.M. sait apprécier les liens que le Protocole a formés entre les deux Cours, qu'elle regarde comme très heureux les résultats auxquels il a déjà conduit, qu'elle est fermement decidée a'y donner suite, et qu'elle a l'intime conviction de voir amenée à une issue satisfesante l'œuvre de conciliation et de paix entreprise sous d'aussi favorables auspices.

FROM PRINCE LIEVEN TO MR. CANNING.

(CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET.)

London, November 7, (19) 1826.

SIR,

In announcing to your Excellency the concurrence of the Imperial Cabinet in the line of conduct proposed by the British Government with the view of effecting the pacification of Greece, as well as the resolution of my August Master to proceed without loss of time to the execution of it, it is my duty at the same time to call the attention of the English Cabinet to a point upon which it

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Copie d'office à Son Excellence Monsieur Canning, Londres, le 7 (19) Novembre, 1826. *(Confidentielle et reservée).*

MONSIEUR,

En annoncant à Votre Excellence l'adhesion du Cabinet Impérial au plan de conduite proposé par le Gouvernement Britannique dans le but d'effectuer la pacification de la Grèce ainsi que la resolution de mon Auguste Maître, de proceder sans perte de temps à son exécution, il est de mon devoir d'appeler en même temps l'attention du Cabinet Anglais sur un point

is of the highest importance that the two Cabinets should come to a *confidential* understanding before taking any ulterior step. Doubtless it cannot have escaped the sagacity of the British Ministry, that it is of importance to the dignity of the Powers who shall decide upon engaging seriously in the salutary work of the re-establishment of peace in the Morea and in the Archipelago, not to proceed in this undertaking unless with the firm determination of terminating it in a manner conformable to the principles which they shall have established, even if the coercive measures which they should employ, and which the Cabinet of St. James' points out, should prove insufficient; and that nothing would be more fatal to the consideration

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sur lequel il est de la plus haute importance que les deux Cabinets s'entendent *confidentiellement*, avant d'entreprendre toute démarche ultérieure.

Il n'aura certainement pas échappé à la sagacité du Ministère Britannique qu'il est de la dignité des Puissances qui se seront une fois decideés à entamer sérieusement l'œuvre salutaire du rétablissement de la paix en Morée et dans l'Archipel, de ne procéder à cette entreprise que dans la ferme résolution de la terminer d'une manière conforme aux principes qu'elles auraient etablis quand même les moyens coercitifs qu'elles employeraient et que signale le Cabinet de St. James se trouveraient insuffisans, et que rien ne serait plus fatal à la considération qui ne doit cesser d'en-

which ought always to surround the first Powers of the Christian World — nothing would place their policy in a more false light, than to announce, by a brilliant demonstration, that they intend to pacify the Levant, and then either not to be able, or not to dare, to realize this intention. The position of Russia especially would then be attended with serious inconveniences. By the happy issue of the negociations of Akerman, she has obtained the redress of all the *particular grievances with which she had to charge the Porte;* she has secured her state of territorial possession on the Asiatic side of the Black Sea; she has guaranteed great advantages to the provinces protected by his Imperial Majesty, in virtue of treaties; and she has finally restored to vigour

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vironner les premières puissances du monde chrétien, rien ne placerait leur politique dans un plus faux jour que d'annoncer par des mesures d'éclat qu'elles vont pacifier le Levant et de ne pouvoir, au de n'oser, ensuite realiser cette volonté. La position de la Russie surtout offrirait alors des inconveniens trés graves. Par l'heureux issu des negociations d'Akerman, elle à obtenu le redressement de tous les griefs particuliers qu'elle avait à la charge de la Porte, assuré son état de possession territoriale sur les côtés Asiatiques de la Mer Noir, garantie de grands avantages aux provinces que Sa Majesté Imperiale protége en verta des

the privileges of Russian commerce in the Ottoman Empire.

In breaking with the Porte relations but just renewed under the most favourable auspices, Russia would renounce all these advantages. The Turks, for the sake of making reprisals, would not fail to regard as annulled all the concessions which they have made, and it would require, perhaps, new efforts to replace affairs, in this respect, upon the same footing on which they were placed by the treaty of Akerman.

The Emperor ardently hopes that things will not come to this extremity, and that the union of the great Christian Powers will convince the Ottoman Government of the impossibility of an

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traités, enfin remis en vigueur tous les privilèges du Commerce Russe dans l'Empire Ottoman.

En rompant avec la Porte des relations à peine renouées sous les plus favorables auspices la Russie renoncerait à tous ces avantages. Les Turcs, pour user de représailles ne manqueraient pas de regarder comme non avenues toutes les concessions qu'ils ont faites, et il faudroit peut-être de nouveaux efforts pour remettre à cet égard les affaires sur le pied ou les ont placées les negociations d'Akerman.

Sa Majesté Imperiale espère vivement que les choses n'en viendront point à cette extrémité, et que l'accord des grandes Puissances Chretiennes convaincra le Gouvernement Ottoman de

ulterior prolongation of the barbarous struggle, which deluges the shores of the Levant with blood. Nevertheless, if, contrary to all attempts, the counsels of prudence should fail to triumph over the obstinacy of the Divan, and if, after *all the sacrifices she has made*, Russia should not at least obtain the definitive arrangement of the affairs of Greece, in conformity with the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April,) his Majesty does not conceal from himself that his Cabinet would have played a part to which he could not, under any circumstances, consent to expose it.

The Emperor, then, only enters upon the Greek question with the firm determination of deciding it; and it is under the intimate persuasion that the British cabinet participates in these sentiments,

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l'impossibilité d'une prolongation ulterieure de la lutte barbare qui ensanglante le Levant. Néanmoins, si contre toute attente, les conseils de la prudence échouaient contre l'obstination du Divan, et si, par tous les sacrifices qu'elle aura faits, la Russie n'obtenait pas au moins l'arrangement definitif des affaires de la Grèce, conformement au protocole du 23 Mars (4 Avril), Sa Majesté ne se dissimule point que son Cabinet aura joué un rôle auquel elle ne saurait l'exposer dans aucun cas.

L'Empereur n'entame donc la question Grecque qu'avec la ferme determination de la résoudre, et c'est dans la persuasion intime que le Cabinet Britannique partage ces sentimens qu'elle

that he has authorised me to concert with your Excellency the ulterior measures which it would become indispensable to adopt, if the departure of the ambassadors accredited at Constantinople, and the prospect of an independent Greece, recognized by the first Courts of Europe, should still prove insufficient, to induce the Porte to adhere to the stipulations of the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April), 1826.

(Signed) LIEVEN.

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m'a autorisé de concerter avec Votre Excellence les mesures ulterieures qu'il deviendrait indispensable d'adopter, si la retraite des Ambassadeurs accrédités à Constantinople, et la perspective d'une Grèce independante reconnue par les premières Cours de l'Europe, ne suffisait pas encore pour engager la Porte à adhérer aux stipulations du protocole du 23 Mars (4 Avril) 1826.

(Signé) LIEVEN.

TRANSLATION.

LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO PRINCE LIEVEN.

20th November, 1826.

MON PRINCE,

I have laid before the King, my master, your Excellency's letter, dated yesterday, in answer to the one which I had the honour of addressing to you on the 4th* of September, and which your Excellency had transmitted to Moscow, to be submitted to the consideration of your August Sovereign.

The King has seen, with the most lively satisfaction, the cordial adherence of the Emperor of Russia to the plan of conduct suggested in my letter of the 4th of September, for the execution

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Dépêche de M. le Sécrétaire d'Etat Canning au Prince de Lieven, en date du 20 *Novembre*, 1826.

MON PRINCE,

J'ai mis sous les yeux du Roi mon Maître la lettre de Votre Excellence, en date d'hier, en réponse à celle que j'avais eu l'honneur de lui addresser le 4 Septembre, et que Votre Excellence avait transmise à Moscow, pour être soumise à la considération de votre auguste Souverain.

Le Roi a vu avec la plus vive satisfaction l'adhésion cordiale de l'Empereur de Russie au plan de conduite suggéré dans ma lettre du 4 Septembre pour l'exécution du protocole d'Avril; et

* See Stapleton's Life of Mr. Canning, vol. iii., p. 260.

of the Protocol of April; and I have consequently received the orders of his Majesty, to lose no time in concerting with your Excellency the mode of communication to be adopted towards the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, of the plan thus concerted between our two Courts.

The declaration that the instructions founded on my letter of the 4th of September, and intended for the guidance of his Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, might serve equally as instructions for M. de Ribeaupierre, his Imperial Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, *is most flattering to the British government*,* and offers a powerful motive for hastening the ulterior steps in this important affair, in

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j'ai reçu en conséquence les ordres de Sa Majesté de ne point perdre de temps à concerter avec Votre Excellence le mode de la communication à faire aux Cabinets de Paris, de Berlin, et de Vienne, du plan ainsi convenu entre nos deux Cours.

La déclaration que les instructions, basées sur ma lettre du 4 Septembre, et destinées à diriger l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté à la Porte, pourraient également servir d'instructions à M. de Ribeaupierre, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté Imperiale, est infiniment flatteuse pour le gouvernement Britannique; et fournit un puissant motif pour hâter les demarches

* Surely more flattering to Russian sagacity! M. de Ribeaupierre allowed the Divan to understand that England was the prime mover in favour of the Greeks.—Ed.

order that the direction to be given to his Majesty's Ambassador, to enter on the execution of these instructions, should reach him as soon as possible after the arrival of M. de Ribeaupierre at Constantinople.

In consequence of the invitation made to me by your Excellency, I propose that instructions should be sent without delay to the British and Russian Ambassadors and Ministers at Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, to communicate conjointly to those different Courts my letter of the 4th of September, and that of your Excellency, dated yesterday; adding the expression of the well founded hope entertained by our two Sovereigns, of finding the said Courts disposed to co-operate with the parties who signed the Protocol, in the

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ultérieures dans cette importante affaire, de manière à ce que l'ordre à donner à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté d'entamer l'exécution de ces instructions puisse lui parvenir aussitôt que possible après l'arrivée de M. de Ribeaupierre à Constantinople.

En conséquence de l'invitation que Votre Excellence m'en a faite, je propose que des instructions soient envoyées sans delai aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres Britanniques et Russes à Paris, Berlin, et Vienne, pour communiquer conjointement à ces différentes Cours ma lettre du 4 Septembre, et celle de Votre Excellence en date d'hier; en y ajoutant l'expression de l'espoir fondé qu'entretiennent nos deux Souverains de trouver les dites Cours disposées à coopérer

pacification of the east of Europe, and that they will send instructions to their Representatives at Constantinople to communicate frankly with his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, and with the Minister of your August Master in that capital, with the assurance that Mr. Stratford Canning, as well as M. de Ribeaupierre, has orders to meet, with the most entire confidence, any overtures which they may make to them on this subject.

According to the opinion of my Court, it would be more advisable to leave to the discretion of those powers themselves to decide, whether the concert in question should be established by means of instructions on their part to their respective representatives at Constantinople, or whether a more

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avec les parties signataires du Protocole à la pacification de l'orient de l'Europe, et qu'elles enverront des instructions à leurs Représentans à Constantinople, pour entrer en communication franche avec l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique, et le Ministre de Votre Auguste Maître dans cette capitale; avec l'assurance que Mr. Stratford Canning, ainsi que M. de Ribeaupierre, ont ordre également d'aller avec la plus entière confiance au devant de toutes les ouvertures qu'ils pourraient leur faire à cet égard.

D'après l'opinion de ma Cour, il serait plus convenable de laisser à la discrétion de ces puissances à décider elles-mêmes si le concert en question doit s'établir au moyen d'instructions de leur part à leurs Représentans respectifs à Constantinople; ou si

formal accession of those powers to the Protocol would be preferable.

We do not pretend to insist upon such an accession, but we should behold it with pleasure, whether it should take place on the part of all, or of some of those powers. In the same manner, we should be ready to accept the co-operation of all those powers, or of some of them, to the degree and in the manner in which each of them should think fit to offer it.

What is very important to us to ascertain, as soon as possible, is, whether each of them is disposed to unite with us in the measure of recalling its diplomatic representative at the Porte, in case of an obstinate refusal on the part of the Sultan to listen to every proposal of accommodation.

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une accession plus formelle de ces puissances au Protocole devait être preférée.

Nous ne prétendons pas insister sur une pareille accession, mais nous la verrions avec plaisir, soit de la part de toutes ou de quelques unes de ces Puissances; de même, nous serions prêts d'accepter la co-opération de toutes ces Puissances, ou de quelques-unes dentr'elles, au dégré et de la manière dont chacun jugerait plus convenable de nous l'offrir.

Ce dont il nous est très important de nous assurer le plutôt possible, est, si chacune d'elles est disposée à s'unir à nous dans la mesure de rappeler son Représentant diplomatique près la Porte

Your Excellency will observe, on referring to my letter of the 4th of September, that it is there stated as our opinion, that the efficacy of the menace of recalling *the Christian missions* from Constantinople, or that of the act of recall itself, would principally depend upon the degree of participation which this step would have obtained on the part of the other powers. The hope is, at the same time, there expressed that, if Russia and England should concur in recommending a similar step, Austria, France, and Prussia, would not follow a different course.

But the question which remains to be solved is, to know whether in case that, contrary to our

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dans le cas d'un refus obstiné de la part du Sultan de prêter l'oreille à toute proposition d'accommodement.

V. Ex. observera en se référant à ma lettre du 4 Septembre, qu'il y est allégué, comme notre opinion, que l'efficacité de la menace de rappeler les missions Chrétiennes de Constantinople, ou celle de l'acte même de ce rappel, dépendrait principalement du dégré de participation que cette démarche aurait obtenu de la part des autres Puissances. On y exprime en même temps l'espoir que si la Russie et l'Angleterre concourent à récommander une telle démarche, l'Autriche, la France, et la Prusse ne poursuivront point une marche différente.

Mais la question qui reste à résoudre est celle de savoir si, dans le cas que, contre notre espoir, la France, l'Autriche, et la Prusse

hopes, France, Austria, and Prussia, should refuse to withdraw their missions, it would be expedient for Russia and England alone to withdraw their's, leaving the others still to continue to reside at Constantinople; or whether, in such a case, it would not be more prudent to omit this special measure, and to proceed at once to such ulterior steps as the other powers might consent to adopt.

It appears to us, on mature reflection, that it would be more advisable that Mr. Stratford Canning and M. de Ribeaupierre should receive orders not to put forward the threat of retiring from Constantinople, unless the other powers should authorize their representatives to concur in it.

The allies might be required to communicate, at

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refusent de retirer leurs missions, il serait expédient pour l'Angleterre et la Russie seules de retirer les leurs, en laissant continuer la résidence des autres à Constantinople; ou s'il ne serait point, en pareil cas, plus prudent d'omettre cette mesure spéciale et d'en venir d'abord à telles mesures ulterieures que les autres Puissances voudraient consentir à adopter.

Il nous parait après une mure réflexion qu'il sera plus convenable, que Mr. Stratford Canning et M. de Ribeaupierre eussent ordre de ne point mettre en avant la menace de se retirer de Constantinople à moins que les autres Puissances n'autorisent leurs Représentans à y concourir.

Les alliés pourroient être requis de communiquer en même

the same time, to their missions at Constantinople, the reply which they would make to England and to Russia.

It is only, in our opinion, when all hope of a favourable reception of the propositions on the part of the allies shall be extinguished, that the menace of withdrawing the Christian missions should be employed: and it ought only to be in consequence of a direct report from the Representatives to their respective Courts, and of special orders on the part of the latter, that the measure in question should be carried into effect.

The arrangements necessary to precede or to accompany such a step, particularly on the part of England and of France, require so long an in-

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temps à leurs missions à Constantinople la réponse qu'ils feraient à l'Angleterre et à la Russie.

Ce n'est que lorsque tout espoir d'un accueil favorable des propositions de la part des alliés serait eteint, que la menace de retirer les missions Chrétiennes devrait (d'après nôtre opinion) être employée; et ce n'est qu'à la suite d'un rapport direct des Représentans à leurs Cours respectifs et des ordres spéciaux de la part de ces dernières, que la mesure en question devrait être mise en exécution.

Les arrangemens necessaires pour faire précéder ou accompagner une telle démarche, surtout de la part de l'Angleterre et de la France, exigent un tel intervale; et la connaissance qu' aurait

terval: and the knowledge which the Porte would have, that a courier charged with such a message would have been despatched from Constantinople would, perhaps, be calculated to produce upon the minds of the Mussulman Ministers an impression of a nature to prevent the necessity of executing the orders of which the courier would be the bearer on his return.

In the supposition that the other powers would refuse to concur in the menace of withdrawing their Representatives, we ought, in our opinion, to endeavour to induce the allies to proceed immediately to the second line of conduct, pointed out in my letter of the 4th of September, in which, as it was originally suggested by Austria, we may, it is to be hoped, confidently rely on her support.

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la Porte, qu'un courrier chargé d'un semblable message aurait été expédié de Constantinople, serait peut-être propre à produire, sur l'esprit des Ministres Mussulmans, une impression de nature à prevenir la nécessité d'exécuter les ordres dont le courrier serait porteur à son retour.

Dans la supposition que les autres puissances refusassent de concourir dans la menace de rétirer leurs Représentans, nous devrions selon nôtre opinion tâcher d'induire les alliés à en venir de suite à la seconde ligne de conduite indiquée dans ma lettre du 4 Septembre, laquelle ayant été originairement suggerée par l'Autriche, nous pouvons, comme il est à espérer, nous reposer avec confiance sur son appui.

In general we are decidedly of opinion that no effort must be spared, in order to secure the co-operation of our allies, and even, should the occasion present itself, of that of other powers—that we ought, in fine, to obtain the co-operation of all, or of the greatest number possible, of those powers, and on the greatest number of points.

It is, perhaps, true that this plan of action, and the incidental communications to which it might give rise, will require time. But we do not think that this will be a positive disadvantage.

No appearance of any considerable and immediate change is to be perceived in the state of affairs between the Porte and the Greeks.

Winter unavoidably brings with it a suspension

En général nous sommes décidemment d'opinion qu' aucun effort ne doit être épargné pour nous assurer la co-operation de nos alliés—et même, si l'occasion s'en présente, celle d'autre Puissances—que nous devons enfin obtenir la co-opération de toutes ou du plus grand nombre possible de ces Puissances—et sur le plus de points que nous pourrons.

Il est peut-être vrai que ce plan d'action et les communications incidentes qu'il pourrait occasionner prendront du tems. Mais nous ne croyons pas que ce soit un désavantage positif.

On n'apperçoit aucune apparence d'un changement considérable et immédiat dans l'état des affaires entre la Porte et les Grecs.

L'hyver améne forcément avec lui une suspension d'hostilités et

of hostilities, and, before the approach of a season favourable to the renewal of them, we hope that a conventional armistice may be concluded, which we consider, in accordance with the Government of your Excellency, to be a necessary accompaniment to a friendly negociation.

I believe I have touched upon all the points of your Excellency's letter, upon which it seemed essential to dwell.

If I do not conclude mine without reminding your Excellency that the definitive recognition of a separate and independent State in Greece (which constitutes the essential part of the plan suggested by Austria) is comprised by us in the modifications explained in my letter of the 4th of September; and that, likewise, we do not consider a

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avant l'approche d'une saison favorable à leur rénouvellement, nous espérons qu'un armistice de convention pourra être conclu, armistice, que nous considérons, d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Votre Excellence, comme un accompagnement nécessaire d'une négociation amicale.

Je crois avoir touché tous les points de la lettre de Votre Excellence : auxquels il semblait essentiel de l'arrêter.

Si je ne termine pas la mienne, sans rappeler a Votre Excellence que la reconnaissance définitive d'un état séparé et indépendant en Grèce (ce qui constitue la partie essentielle du plan de conduite suggéré par l'Autriche) est compris par nous avec les modifications expliquées dans ma lettre du 4 Septembre; et

simple refusal of our mediation by the Turkish Government as a sufficient motive for war; I request your Excellency to be persuaded that I only mention these circumstances, lest the omission of them should cause unfounded uneasiness to the allies, which would be unfavourable to the co-operation we so earnestly desire, and which so evidently offers the best chance of success in a conciliatory negociation.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

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qu'également nous ne considérérions point un simple refus de nôtre médiation par le Gouvernement Turc comme un motif suffisant de guerre; je prie Votre Excellence d'être persuadée que je ne cite ces particularités que de crainte que leur omission ne fit conçevoir aux alliés des inquiétudes sans fondemens, et défavorables à la co-opération que nous désirons si vivement, et qui présente si évidemment les meilleurs chances de succès à une négociation conciliatoire.

J' ai l'honneur, &c. &c.

TRANSLATION.

LETTER FROM MR. CANNING TO PRINCE LIEVEN.

November 20, 1826.

MON PRINCE,

I have reserved to myself to answer Your Excellency's confidential letter of yesterday separately.

The answer which I have to make to it is short, but it will, I hope, be satisfactory.

We think that our greatest efforts ought to tend to secure the co-operation of our allies, of all, if possible, and to the extent of the plan which we

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TRADUCTION.

Dépêche de M. Canning à M. Le Prince de Lieven, en date du 20 Novembre, 1826.

MON PRINCE,

Je me suis réservé de répondre séparément à la lettre confidentielle de Votre Excellence, en date d'hier.

La réponse qui j'ai à y faire est courte mais elle sera satisfaisante, je l'espère.

Nous pensons que nos plus grands efforts doivent tendre à nous assurer la cooperation de nos Alliés; de tous s'il est possible, et pour l'etendue du plan que nous proposons; si non au moins du

propose; if not, at least of the greatest number of them, and as far as will be practicable.

We think that, in order to attain this object, we ought to employ all just and honourable means, and especially those of consultation and deference, with regard to the questions of arrangement as to the time and mode of the negociation; as well as upon the choice of the form of accession to which the allies might each in particular give the preference, whether by means of instructions, or by notes, or by taking part in the Protocol.

Nevertheless, however sincere may be our desire to obtain the co-operation of the other Cabinets, and however great may be the importance which we attach to it, we are by no means of opinion that

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plus grande nombre d'entr'eux et pour autant qu'il sera practicable.

Nous pensons que, pour atteindre cet objet, on doit employer tous les moyens justes et honorables, et spécialement ceux de consultation et de déférence quant aux questions d'arrangement sur le temps et le mode de la négociation, ainsi que sur le choix de la forme d'accession à la quelle les Alliés pourraient chacun en particulier donner la préférence, soit au moyen d'instructions, soit par notes, ou bien en prenant part au Protocole.

Cependant, quelque sincère que soit nôtre désir d'obtenir la co-operation des autres Cabinets, et quelque grande que soit l'importance que nous y attachons, nous ne sommes nullement dans

the execution or non-execution of the stipulations of the Protocol ought to be essentially dependent upon their concurrence or refusal.

We would neglect nothing in order to obtain the support of the other powers; but the refusal of their co-operation ought not, in our opinion, to alter, in any respect, the stipulations of the Protocol, and we are prepared, in this case, to pursue with Russia alone this work of conciliation and of peace, mutually acknowledging ourselves to be under the obligation of sparing no effort to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion.

I have the honour to be,

&c., &c., &c.

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l'opinion que l'exécution ou la non-exécution des stipulations du Protocole dût être essentiellement dépendante de leur concours ou de leur refus.

Nous voudrions ne rien négliger pour entrainer avec nous les autres Puissances, mais le refus de leur co-operation ne doit à nos yeux altérer en aucune façon les stipulations du Protocole, et nous sommes préparés, dans ce cas, à poursuivre avec la Russie seule cette œuvre de conciliation et de paix que nous nous reconnaissons mutuellement dans l'obligation de n'épargner aucun effort pour porter à une issue satisfaisante.

J'ai l'honneur d'être,

&c., &c., &c.

DESPATCH FROM PRINCE LIEVEN TO COUNT NESSELRODE,

DATED LONDON, 15 (27) NOVEMBER, 1826. NO. 160.

THE principal Secretary of State of his Britannic Majesty received the communication of your Excellency's despatch containing the ulterior development of the plan of our Court, relative to the pacification of Greece, with the feelings of lively satisfaction which the conformity of our views with those of the English Government produced, and fully appreciated the noble frankness with which the Imperial Cabinet entered into the detail

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Copie d'une Dépêche du Comte de Lieven, en date de Londres, le 15 *(27) Novembre,* 1826. *No.* 160.

LE principal Secretaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique a reçu la communication de la dépêche de Votre Excellence contenant le développement ultérieur du plan de nôtre Cour, relativement à la pacification de la Grèce, avec le sentiment de la vive satisfaction que lui feroit éprouver la conformité de nos vues avec celles du Gouvernement Anglais, et en rendant la plus complette justice à la noble franchise avec laquelle le Cabinet Impérial est

of the most delicate circumstances of this affair, on the eve of a crisis which must decide the future relations of Russia with the Ottoman Government.

He repeated to me several times that he considered the mutual confidence which the two Courts shew towards each other as the most favourable omen of success; that the Imperial Government might rely upon an entire reciprocity on the part of the Cabinet of St. James'; and that, under such auspices, the work of peace and of conciliation which they have jointly undertaken, promised to obtain an early and entire success.

In accordance, on the principal points of view, with the official despatch of the 4th of September, the answer of our Court contains two propositions,

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entré dans le détail des circonstances les plus délicates de cette affaire à la veille d'une crise qui alloit décider des rapports futurs de la Russie avec le Gouvernement Ottoman.

Il m'a répété à plusieurs reprises qu'il considéroit comme le présage le plus favorable d'une reussite la confiance mutuelle que se témoignoient les deux Cours, que le Gouvernement Impérial pouvoit compter sur une entière réciprocité de la part du Cabinet de St. James, et que sous de tels auspices l'œuvre de paix et de conciliation qu'ils ont entreprise en commun promettait d'obtenir un prochain et entier succès.

D'accord dans les points de vue principaux avec l'office du 4 Septembre, la réponse de nôtre Cour contient deux propositions

which, in its opinion, proceed from the original plan of England—that of the immediate demand of an armistice, and of the examination of the measures to be pursued in case of an obstinate refusal on the part of the Porte. With regard to the last point, I have exposed in detail in my secret despatch of this day, sub No. 159,* the reasons which induce Mr. Canning to desire that it should not be discussed at present. With respect to the first, I have had no difficulty in convincing the Secretary of State of the justice of the arguments of our Cabinet, and, as your Excellency will perceive by the instructions given to Mr. Stratford Canning, this article has been decided to the satisfaction of our Court.

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qui, selon lui, dérivent du plan originaire de l'Angleterre—celles de la demande immédiate d'une armistice et de l'examen des mesures à prendre dans le cas d'un refus obstiné de la Porte. Quant au dernier point, j'ai exposé en detail dans ma dépêche réservée de ce jour, sub No. 159, les motifs qui portent Mr. Canning à désirer qu'il ne fût point discuté encore. Quant au premier, je n'ai point eu de difficulté à convaincre le Sécrétaire d'Etat de la justesse des raisonnemens de nôtre Cabinet; et comme Votre Excellence en jugera d'après les instructions données à Mr. Stratford Canning, cet article à été décidé à la satisfaction de nôtre Cour.

* We shall give this Despatch in our next number.—Ed.

When the explanations of Mr. Canning, given in my secret despatch, had authorised me to proceed in the negociation, we immediately employed ourselves in examining the most proper mode of conciliating the co-operation of the allies. It was agreed that I should address to Mr. Canning the official letter which Your Excellency will find annexed,* and which, with the exception of the modifications which I have already indicated, is conceived precisely in the terms of the orders which had been transmitted to me by the despatch of the ministry of the 17th of September. The first Secretary of State made the answer to it, which I have also annexed.†

In drawing up this document, Mr. Canning has more particularly sought to make manifest

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Lorsque les explications de Mr. Canning consignées dans ma dépêche reservée m' eurent autorisé de proceder dans la négociation, nous nous occupâmes immediatement de l'examen du mode le plus propre à nous concilier la cooperation des Alliés. Il fut convenu que j'adresserais à Mr. Canning l'office que Votre Excellence trouvera ci-joint, et qui, sauf les modifications que j'ai déjà indiqueés, est du reste exactement conçu dans les termes des ordres qui m' avoient été transmis par la dépêche du ministère du 17 Septembre. Le principal Secretaire d'Etat y fit la réponse également ci-annexé.

Dans la rédaction de cette pièce, Mr. Canning s'est particulièrement attaché à faire ressortir le desir des deux Cabinets d'obtenir

* See page 549. † See page 560.

the wish of the two Cabinets to obtain the concurrence of the allies; to do away with all subjects of controversy; and to bring forward the resolutions which we had agreed upon in the light most favourable for their reception. His principal object is to induce the Allies to announce a formal adherence to our views, persuaded that the principle of this adherence being once obtained, it will be less difficult to induce them to adopt the details of it.

Your Excellency will observe that the measure of the retirement of the representatives is only suggested under the condition of its adoption by the Allies. Mr. Canning asserts that he has always perceived the efficacy of these means, and he proves it by referring to the terms of his official letter of the 4th of September.

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le concours des Alliés; à écarter les sujets de controverse; et à presenter les résolutions dont nous etions convenus sous le jour le plus propre à les faire accueillir. Son objèt principal est de porter les Alliés à énoncer une adhesion formelle à nos vues, persuadé que, cette adhesion une fois obtenue en principe, il sera de moindre difficulté de les amener à en adopter les développemens.

Votre Excellence observera que la mesure de la retraite des Représentans n'est suggérée que sous la condition de son adoption par les Alliés. Mr. Canning prétend avoir toujours envisagé ainsi l'efficacité de ce moyen, et il le prouve en se référant aux termes de son office du 4 Septembre.

He thinks, besides, that it is not for our interest entirely to unveil to our Allies the course which we have agreed upon, before they unite themselves to us. The Cabinet of the Tuileries, notwithstanding the inclinations which it manifests, notwithstanding the ardour, I would almost venture to say religious enthusiasm, with which the King of France expressed himself verbally to Mr. Canning, on the work of pacification, would, perhaps, at this moment withdraw from the immediate adoption of this measure; and that of Vienna, which Mr. Canning believes to be decidedly opposed to our views, might seek to turn it to our disadvantage by impugning the motive of our measures towards the Porte.

The same considerations have induced us not to

Il croit d' ailleurs qu' il n' est point de nôtre intérêt de devoiler complètement à nos Alliés la marche dont nous sommes convenues, avant qu' ils ne se fussent joints à nous. Le Cabinet des Tuileries, malgré les dispositions qu' il temoigne et malgré la chaleur, j'oserai même dire l'enthousiasme religieux, avec lequel le Roi de France s'est exprimé de vive voix vis-a-vis de Mr. Canning sur l'œuvre de la pacification, reculeroit peut-être en ce moment dévant l' adoption immédiate de cette mesure, et celui de Vienne, que Mr. Canning croit decidemment contaire à nos vues, pourroit chercher à en tirer parti contre nous, en dénaturant le motif de nos demarches auprès de la Porte.

Les mêmes considérations nous ont engagé à ne point aborder

touch as yet on the question of the *delay* to be fixed for the answer of the Porte.

In the demand for the concurrence of the Allied Courts, Mr. Canning leaves them the choice of the mode in which they might desire to express it, whether by signing the Protocol with us, or by acting by means of their representatives at Constantinople, or finally by supporting that part of our plan alone which they shall think fit to adopt. The British Ministry think that we cannot reckon upon an equal degree of assistance on the part of all our Allies; that the Cabinet of Paris, according to all probability, would accede without restriction to our views, and would frankly aid us in the accomplishment of them; that that of Berlin, on the ground of its want of maritime

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des à présent la question du *delai* à fixer pour la réponse de la Porte.

Dans la demande d' adhesion des Cours Alliés, Mr. Canning leur abandonne le choix du mode dont elles voudront l'énoncer, soit en devenant co-signataires du Protocole, soit en agissant par l'organe de leurs Representans à Constantinople, soit enfin en ne secondant que telle partie de nôtre plan qu'elles jugeront convenable d'adopter. Le Ministère Britannique croit que nous ne pouvons compter sur un égal degré d' assistance de la part de tous nos Alliés; que le Cabinet de Paris, selon toutes les probabilités, accederoit sans restriction à nos vues et en poursuivroit franche-

power, would take no active part in the negociation, whilst from Vienna we should only obtain that species of doubtful assistance, which a feeling of shame alone would prevent it from refusing us in such a cause.

In case the threat of the withdrawal of the representatives should not be able to be carried into effect in consequence of the opposition of the other courts, Mr. Canning proposes to proceed immediately to that of forming relations with Greece, followed by an early recognition of her independence. He has thought it necessary to leave to the Allies the choice of this alternative, on account of the great difficulties which he foresees on the part of France in the adoption of the first proposal.

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ment l'accomplissement avec nous; que celui de Berlin, se fondant sur la nullité de ses moyens maritimes, ne prendroit point une part active à la negociation, tandis qu' à Vienne nous n' obtiendrions que cette espèce d'assistance douteuse qu' un sentiment de pudeur l'empêcheroit seul de nous refuser dans une cause semblable.

Au cas ou la menace de la retraite des Representans ne pourroit être effectuée par suite de l'opposition des autres Cours, Mr. Canning propose de proceder immediatement à celle d'un rapprochement avec la Grèce suivie d' une reconnoissance prochaine de son independance. Il à jugé nécessaire de laisser le choix de cette alternative aux Alliés, à cause des grandes difficultés qu' il prevoit de la part de la France à recueiller la première proposition.

As this course necessarily occasions some delays in the execution of the plan of pacification, I have made Mr. Canning feel the necessity of abridging it as much as it is in our power to do; and I urged, in case our proposals should obtain their sanction, that the Allied Cabinets should be solicited to send directly to their ministers at Constantinople an order to unite in the steps taken by the representatives of Russia and of England.

Although Mr. Canning does not entirely coincide in our ideas of the urgency of the moment, and is of opinion that the confusion which reigns in the capital of the Ottoman empire, the exhausted resources of Ibrahim Pacha, the efforts which France has engaged to make to induce the

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Comme cette marche apporte nécessairement quelques delais à l' execution du plan de pacification, j' ai fait sentir à Mr. Canning la necessité de les abréger autant qu'il etoit en nôtre pouvoir, et j'ai insisté auprès de lui pour que les Cabinets Alliés fussent invités, dans le cas ou nos propositions obtiendroient leur approbation, d'envoyer directement à leurs Ministres à Constantinople l'ordre de se joindre aux démarches des Representans de Russie et d'Angleterre.

Quoique M. Canning ne partage point entièrement nos idées sur l'urgence du moment, et que, selon lui, la confusion qui regne dans la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman, l'épuisement d'Ibrahim Pacha, les efforts que la France s'est engagée de faire auprès du Pacha d'Egypte, pour le determiner à ralentir son zele, et la

Pacha of Egypt to relax in his zeal, and the encouraging position of the Greeks at sea, prevent the risk of a sudden change in the relative position of Turkey and Greece, nevertheless, he hastened to adopt my idea.

Wishing, on his part, to give a proof of the desire of his government to accelerate the march of the negociation, he asked me to add to the communication to the allied courts of his official letter of the 4th of September, and to my answer of the 7th, (19th,) November, that of his reply of the 8th, (20th.)

We have consequently addressed to the representatives of the two courts at Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, in conformity with the overtures which we had made to them on the same subject, the two official letters which Your Excellency will find

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situation rassurante des Grecs sur mer ecartent le danger d'un changement subit dans la position relative de la Turquie et de la Grèce, neanmoins il s'est empressé d'accueillir mon idée.

Voulant de son côté donner une preuve du desir de son gouvernement d'accélérer la marche de la negociation, il m'a demandé de joindre a la communication aux Cours Alliés de son office du 4 Septembre, et de ma reponse du 7, (19), Novembre, celle de son replique du 8, (20.)

Nous avons en conséquence addressé aux Representans des deux Cours à Paris, Vienne, et Berlin, à l'instar des ouvertures que nous leurs avions faites sur le même sujet, les deux offices que

annexed, and which have been sent to Paris and Vienna by English couriers despatched on the 10th, (22nd.) instant.

Mr. Canning having communicated to me the note which Lord Granville and Sir Henry Wellesley have orders to annex, in remitting the documents above mentioned, I communicated it to my colleagues at Paris and Vienna, and, on the occasion of the departure of Lord Clanwilliam to his post, I put M. Le Comte d'Alopeus likewise in possession of it. Your Excellency will find a copy annexed.

Finally, I have the honour to submit to you, M. le Comte, the instructions which Mr. Stratford Canning received early in September, and

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Votre Excellence trouvera ci-joints, et qui ont éte envoyés a Paris et Vienne par des couriers Anglais expediés dans la journée du 10, (22), du courant.

M. Canning m'ayant communiqué la note dont Lord Granville et Sir Henry Wellesley ont ordre d'accompagner la remise des documens ci-dessus indiqueés, j'en ai fait part à mes Collegues près les Cours de Paris et de Vienne; et à l'occasion du départ de Lord Clanwilliam pour son poste, j'en ai également mis en possession M. le Comte de Alopeus. Votre Excellence en trouvera une copie ci-près.

Finalement, j'ai l'honneur de vous soumettre, M. le Comte, les instructions que Mr. Stratford Canning à reçues dans les premiers

those which are sent to him this day. The principal Secretary of State communicated them to me, with the official letter annexed, which is accompanied by a translation, as well as the other English annexes, quoted in the body of my despatch.

The essential modification which these instructions make in the original plan, consists in suspending every step, until the receipt of the first intelligence of the course adopted by the three allied Courts. As our own had determined that every new attempt with the Porte, unless supported by energetic language, and by the adoption of coercive measures, which would assure its success, would be derogatory to the dignity of the intervening powers, and that the choice of these

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jours de Septembre, et celles qui lui sont envoyées aujourd'hui. Le principal Sécrétaire d'Etat me les a fait tenir avec l'office ci-joint, que j'accompagne d'une traduction, ainsi que les autres annexées Angloises citées dans le corps de ma dépêche.

La modification essentielle que ces instructions apportent au plan primitif consiste à suspendre toute démarche jusqu' à la reception des premiers avis sur le parti adopté par les trois Cours Alliées. Comme la nôtre avoit jugé que toute tentative nouvelle auprès de la Porte, à mions d'être appuyée d'un langage énergique, et de l'emploi de mesures coercitives qui en assureroient le succés, seroit contraire à la dignité des Puissances intervenantes ; et que le choix de ces mesures alloit devenir un objet de discussion

measures was about to become an object of discussion between the allied Cabinets, we have thought it conformable to the intentions of our Courts, that their Representatives should not broach this question until they should be in a situation to avail themselves of the means placed at their disposal.

As the answers of the Courts are to be directly transmitted to Constantinople, the delay cannot be a long one.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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entre les Cabinets Alliés, nous avons cru qu'il était conforme aux intentions de nos Cours que leurs Representans n'entamassent cette question que lorsqu'ils seront à même de faire usage des moyens mis à leur disposition.

Les réponses des Cours devant être directement transmises a Constantinople, ce delai ne sauroit être long.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

FALLACY OF THE RUSSO-GERMAN PRESS.

[The following extract from a *Wurtemberg* journal shows the ingenious arguments with which Russia endeavours to blind European opinion to her real object. The memoir to which this letter refers is a genuine document, but the fallacy here adopted consists in the Russian Cabinet pretending that the conquest of Constantinople would divert her from her real aim—the acquisition of India; whereas the possession of Constantinople at once secures that aim, which never can be accomplished so long as the Bosphorus and the Euxine are accessible to a British fleet. We have marked in italics those passages in this extract which are expressly designed to mislead public opinion.]

EXTRACT FROM THE "GERMAN COURIER."

September 28th, 1836.

WHILST in western Europe the greatest attention is paid to those operations of Russia which affect the more proximate interests, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg appears anxious for the present to place these affairs in the back ground, in order to be able to devote her entire activity to Oriental affairs. It would appear as if Russia had entirely abandoned her aim of incorporating, at a more or less remote period, European Turkey with the Russian Empire, and to have adopted a vast and certain plan of extending Russian power towards the centre of the commerce of the world and of universal dominion. Men exalted by their station allude to the existence of a highly interesting memoir which was presented a few years ago to the

Emperor by a talented Russian statesman,* in which the natural motives and the necessary results of the proposed line of policy were elucidated with the most perfect knowledge of the question. The author therein represented how fruitless and replete with danger would be the efforts of Russia for the conquest of Constantinople, where, if the object were even attained, in consequence of the many points of interest between the new and then Christian capital of the South and the remaining European states, and the constant threats of the maritime powers, who would thereby be affected, a new policy would arise, which would be anti-national, and might, sooner or later, effect the division of the empire. In the latter case, Russia would lose all the fruits of her former victories. Nay, one might safely maintain that the possession of Constantinople would, of necessity, entirely draw Russia from the object which her military power and her geographical position point out to her, namely, supremacy over Asia, and the speedy acquisition of India; or, in other words, universal dominion; because she would have to exert the entire efforts of her colossal expansion *to defend points against the European powers*, probably Austria included, which, although of high importance in themselves,

* General Yermaloff. ED.

are still very disproportionate to the immeasurable advantages that are to be acquired in Asia. By such a course, her power towards the East would be checked. If Constantinople were even taken, still its possession must be maintained by constant wars, and by extension to the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean, *where England, France, and Austria would follow every step, and might wage war for each important point.** But Russia would augment her power and her dominion, under much more favouring circumstances, if she were to apply her exertions in the direct route to India. Here no European power can follow her, and, once arrived at the goal, it would only be necessary to engage England in a war, the issue of which could not be doubtful, in order to place the entire destinies of the world in the Emperor's hands, and the commerce of the world in the hands of the Russian nation. Bombay might as well be in the possession of Russia without the necessity of its causing a division in the empire, as it is at present in the possession of England, without injury to the national unity of Great Britain. But the possession of Constantinople would threaten Moscow and St. Petersburgh with a southern Greek empire. In the

* What must be Russia's appreciation of European intellect, when she can presume to put forth such contemptible fallacies!

south, Russia's influence would be continually secured by the affection of the Greek Catholic population, and would thereby support the conquests to be made in Asia. The means assigned as specially necessary to the proposed end are the undisputed possession of the coasts of the Caspian, and the passes and mountains of the Caucasus, a preponderating influence in Persia, and the emigration of the Christian populations of Central Asia into the Russian provinces, acquired by conquest from Persia and Turkey.*

A nerve of Russian power must be thereby formed in Central Asia, and thence in due time applied to the conquest of India. This new turn of Russia's policy is of infinitely more scientific importance, and it elucidates many appearances in her most recent diplomacy. The Porte appears already to have some anticipation of it, and looks with anxious regards to her Asiatic possessions, which cannot be defended at a critical moment, like European Turkey, by her oldest allies. Probably the Turkish ambassador, who is returning from Teheran, will be able to communicate to the Sultan further details of the plan laid down by Russia.

D. C.

* These are but the preparatives of Russia — means to the acquisition of India, which will promptly be made use of *after* the occupation of Constantinople.—Ed.

ON THE RELATION OF FRANCE TOWARDS THE GERMAN CUSTOMS' UNION.

(FROM THE GERMAN OF DR. NEBENIUS *.)

We rejoice to see many enlightened friends of freedom of trade, in that country which is bordered by the long extent of the Customs' Union, participating in our views on the union of the German states. "Germany is concentrating itself: Germany feels the necessity of unanimity: through a powerful tie it unites many hitherto independent members in one and the same bond: this bond is freedom of trade: it borrows from our revolution the means of peace: it works the fall of its internal tolls—the animated and universal watchfulness which this mercantile alliance stirs up shows clearly that it is one of the greatest events of our epoch: it is, in our eyes, one of the brightest symptoms of the new era which has commenced for Europe."—Thus does a Frenchman greet the Union, in which he can perceive nothing that can occasion the slightest uneasiness to France. Without doubt the relations of France and Great Britain to the Union are, in many respects, essentially dissimilar.

The trade hitherto between France and Germany, and particularly the interests of French manufacturing industry, are by no means affected in the same degree as the British trade and manufacturing interests by the Union Tariff. The relations of the products of the German countries, and those of their western neighbours, are of that kind, that, notwithstanding the circumscribing laws of France, the value of the mutual imports of products and all sorts of goods, taken as a whole, is, since that time, much more nearly equalized; and, besides, an understanding upon mutual facilitation is rendered much easier. Both parties have no unimportant trading interests in common, the powerful furtherance of which becomes possible through the Union—so far from the favourable position which Germany attains with regard to other countries being injurious to France, it is to be expected, on the

* It is matter of infinite astonishment to us that this remarkable work has not been hitherto translated into English or French.

contrary, that, in all the advantages which Germany will acquire in its commerce with other countries, France will at least have a direct share.

We shall endeavour to demonstrate this still more clearly: but, first, we must be allowed to examine the lists of French imports and exports, in order to form an opinion of the importance of the German market in general to France.

In the year 1832, France exported to all parts of the world, including her colonies, in foreign and home goods, to the value of - 696,282,132 Frcs.

In fine metals - - -	100,878,999
In French goods—	
Produce - - - -	146,622,345
Manufactured goods - -	360,792,629

On the whole, the exports, including the foreign goods drawn from the entrepots, but not including the fine metals, amounted,

To Prussia, to - - - -	10,681,054 Frcs.
The Hanse towns - -	16,688,515
Germany - - - -	49,552,925
	76,922,484 Frcs.

Hence it is clear, that the exports to Germany, with the exception of Austria (which, with Lombardy and Venice, stands under a separate head in the official returns), amount to about one-ninth of the total export trade of France to all parts of the world.

Perhaps a larger proportion appears in the export of French goods, of which are exported—

	Raw Products.	Manufactures.
To Prussia - -	6,504,666 Frcs.	2,532,976 Frcs.
Hanse towns -	7,779,066	5,689,878
Germany - -	5,077,252	38,158,530
	19,360,984 Frcs.	46,381,384 Frcs.

The imports into Germany, of French goods, were therefore on the whole, of the value of 65,742,368 Frcs., rather more than one-eighth, and less than one-seventh of the total exports of French goods.

Of all countries, Germany, next to Great Britain, took the largest quantity of raw materials, and, next to the United States, the most French manufactured goods: while Great Britain received to the value of 34,258,570 Frcs. of the former, and the United States, to that of 47,650,992 Frcs. of the latter.

If we compare the total value of French goods which are sent to Germany (with the exception of Austria) with the exports to other countries, we shall find that Germany stands first after Great Britain, which, with Gibraltar, Malta, and the Ionian Islands, receives to the value of 67,430,482 Frcs., therefore not much more than Germany.

From the German fairs, it is true, French manufactured goods are sent to foreign countries, and of what is furnished to the Hanse towns a part only reaches the internal market of Germany: but Austria and Russia are for the most part closed against French manufactures, and what finds its way thither, and to the distant countries of the south east, may be amply compensated by the supplies obtained by Germany directly through Belgium and Switzerland. In fact, these two countries, and particularly Switzerland, appear to receive such considerable imports in proportion to their population, that we are fully justified in this supposition. We find, namely, in the year 1832, the total exports to Switzerland of French and foreign goods amount to 55,871,769 Frcs.; to Belgium, 50,048,593 Frcs.; the exports of home raw materials to Switzerland, 9,443,567 Frcs.; to Belgium, 13,688,428 Frcs.; and in French manufactures to Switzerland, 25,537,385 Frcs.; to Belgium, 27,188,994 Frcs. It is from the amount of the consumption of French manufactures, in particular, that we may determine with certainty that a considerable part of them reach the German markets through the medium of Switzerland.

The total imports or value of all foreign goods imported into France was, in 1832, exclusive of the precious metals	652,872,341 Frcs.
The import of precious metals	133,174,800
Import for home consumption especially	505,093,488
In articles for the manufactures	290,968,356

Consumable unwrought products - -	196,117,755
Manufactures - - - -	27,987,377

For internal use, and to be exported again, goods of all kinds were imported—

From Prussia, to the value of	- -	23,368,928 Frcs.
Hanse towns - - -		15,204,775
Germany - - - -		22,385,405
Total	-	60,959,108 Frcs.
And in ready money	-	14,790,100

Hence it is clear that the value of the imports from Germany amounts to about $\frac{1}{11}$ of the total imports, and is from 15 to 16 millions of francs below the value of the French imports into the German countries.

A broader basis of comparison is found in the proportion of the imports to the home consumption.

For consumption are imported, as requisites for manufactures—

From Prussia - -	4,997,089	17,429,151 Frcs.
Hanse towns -	3,612,057	
Germany - -	8,820,005	

In raw consumable materials—

From Prussia - -	10,212,991	26,541,819
Hanse towns -	8,504,803	
Germany - -	7,824,025	

In manufactured goods—

From Prussia - -	3,274,216	6,553,561
Hanse towns - -	237,112	
Germany - -	3,042,233	
Total - -		50,524,531

Hence Germany has furnished—

Of the whole value of the imports for home use -	1-10th
Of the import of requisites for French manufactures, nearly - - - - -	1-16th
Of the import of raw consumable articles, nearly -	1-7th
Of imported manufactures - - - -	1-4th

If we compare, however, the imports of France from Germany with her exports of her own products and goods to Germany, it appears that these exports of 65,742,368 Frcs. exceeded the imports of 50,524,531, by 15,217,837 Frcs.; and that the French exports in raw materials to Germany were to her imports of raw materials and requisites for manufactures in the proportion of 1 to 2¼; whereas, Germany imported seven times the quantity of manufactures from France, that France imported from Germany.

It may be easily supposed that the results differ from year to year—but thus much is clear, that, in the trade between France and Germany, the total exports and imports are much more nearly equalized than in the trade between Great Britain and the German States. We find in former years, when the excess of the exports was greater than in the year 1832, viz. in the year 1831, and others, that, according to the official valuation, the imports of France from Germany exceeded her exports thither, as in the year 1830. We cannot decide with certainty, from the excess in the amount of ready money sent to France, in a series of years, that Germany has to cover a considerable portion of her debt for goods by the transmission of specie to France, on account of the paper circulation, and of the equalization of the trading balances through the medium of a third market.

For the rest, similar results are everywhere found, with relation to the comparisons which have been given of the year 1832. In the year 1830, the exports to Germany in French products and manufactures were 1-9th of the whole exports of such articles; and the imports from Germany, for home consumption, were about 1-8th to 1-9th of the total imports for home use. As in the year 1831, Germany supplied 1-7th of the articles of consumption, and 1-4th of the imports of manufactures.

The greatest variations are presented in consequence of the varying fraitfulness of years, and of the French regulations for the import of raw consumable products for home consumption. Whilst, in 1832, the value of these imports from Germany, Prussia, and the Hanse towns, was reckoned at 26,541,819 Frcs., we find in the import list of 1833, the import of such products

reckoned at only 7,138,000 Frcs. These imports, diminished in the relation of 4 to 1, must necessarily have had a reaction on the exports of French manufactures, which, in 1832, amounted to 46,381,354 Frcs.; and, in 1833, to only 37,871,497 Frcs.

The exports in home and French products and manufactures to the German states of 67,391,901 Frcs., amounted still to about $\frac{1}{11}$ of the total imports; and the exports in home products and manufactures, of 58,800,888 Frcs., to about $\frac{1}{10}$ of the exports of French articles to all countries. Whereas the imports from the German states, at the most, of 57,420,205 Frcs., were only about $\frac{1}{12}$ of the total imports; and the imports for consumption from Germany, of 38,919,583 Frcs., only amount to from $\frac{1}{14}$ to $\frac{1}{13}$ of the total imports for consumption.

Let us now consider the influence that the Customs' Union seems likely to exercise upon the trade with France.

Above all, it is clear, in this respect, that the Customs' Union cannot immediately affect *the exports of German products and manufactures* to France, as most of these articles are quite free, and the others only moderately taxed on exportation. Only, in so far as the Union tariff is favourable to the prosperity of German manufacturing industry, and the increased activity of trade increases the demand for raw materials and for the means of subsistence for the working class, can it directly occasion a diminution of the sale of productions of the German soil.

On the other hand, the extension of the Customs' Union tariff over almost all the German states, into which hitherto the import of foreign manufactures was not rendered difficult, and which besides this served as magazines and channels for the conveyance of such goods into the neighbouring German states, will not remain without a palpable direct influence upon *the imports from France*. But, as little as the Union tariff threatens to limit the French export trade, in the same degree as it does the British, so little will its operation bear even a remote resemblance to the influence which the French tariff exercises upon the imports from Germany.

France, as we have seen, does not send us the same quantity of

common and cheap cottons, muslin, nankeen, common and dearer woollen stuffs, and stuffs of mixed wool and cotton, that England does; but a much smaller quantity of cottons, though in general of better quality, and proportionably a greater quantity of fine and light woollens and stuffs made of the hair of other animals, and especially of silk stuffs and fashionable articles, than Great Britain does.

Whilst the duty of 85 fl. which the Union tariff lays, per cwt., upon cotton goods, on the middling and cheaper sorts amounts to from 30 to 60 per cent., or more; on finer and more expensive goods, it amounts to only 10—20 per cent. of their value.*

Whilst the duty of 51 fl. 2½ kr. per cwt. (50 kilogrammes) on middling and cheaper woollen cloths, and woollen and cotton mixed stuffs, is a burden of 15—30, and more, per cent.; on finer cloths and stuffs of wool, and the hair of other animals, it is only 10, 5, and even less, per cent. on the value.

On an average, silk stuffs, which are the chief branch of French exports, are much more moderately taxed than other manufactured goods. The duty of 187 fl. 5 kr. per cwt. is not more than 12 per cent. of the value of the raw materials, when cleaned and prepared for being wrought; and the goods which are completed, and which are raised 1½ or twice, or even more considerably in value, appear in the same proportion to be still less burdened.

The duty of 93 fl. 32½ kr. per cwt. on jewelry falls in a still heavier proportion upon the English hardwares than upon French jewelry and ornamental articles, watches and clocks. If we examine the official and detailed re-statements of the French administration of the customs, we shall easily perceive that, upon the whole, all manufactured goods which French industry has to offer to the German markets, are, with few and upon the whole unimportant exceptions, but moderately taxed by the Union tariff; and that especially the duty upon the numerous articles of luxury, with which France has hitherto furnished us, will not affect our imports in any material degree.

* We find French cottons, on an average, in the official statements of value, rated at 26 Frcs. per kilogramme; therefore at about 580 fl. per cwt. of 50 kilogrammes.

French industry will therefore at most, with regard to common cotton goods, upon the sale of which the tariffs of the earlier Unions have already operated, sell a few cwt. less; through the restriction of the sale of fine woollen cloths, the imports of which have for some years been rather diminished, it will suffer upon the whole an inconsiderable loss; and in simple and plain silk stuffs it will find competition more difficult: but, on the other hand, in the chief branches of its exports, in which it was indebted to the good taste, to the number and variety of forms, to the beauty of the patterns, and to the happy choice of colours, for its success in the German markets, it will feel the operation of the Union tariff but very little; because the customers for such goods, even by an addition equal to the duty of from 5 to 10 per cent., will not be deterred from the selection of what is most pleasing to them.

The Union duties upon chemical products and requisites for manufactures of many kinds, of which Germany receives no inconsiderable proportion from France, have no injurious influence upon the export trade of France, with perhaps some, and at the same time inconsiderable, exceptions.

Of the natural productions upon which the Union tariff falls, wine, brandy, and oil in particular, are those in which French products are interested. Olive oil has only a duty of 2 fl. 48¾ kr. per cwt. (50 Kil.) laid upon it; and, for the use of manufactures, it pays only a very moderate duty of 50 kr. per cwt.

It is only French brandy and wines, the export of which to Germany is clogged with a tax of 8 Thalers, or 13 fl. 38¾ kr. the cwt. A duty of 450—500 fl. the ton (of 15 hectolitres, or 2000 middle-sized bottles) is even for higher-priced wines a high duty, and exceeds the cost of the middling and inferior sorts. What may be said of the duties on those articles of industry which appertain to the realm of taste or fashion, is, at the same time, more or less applicable to all natural products, to which climate and soil give a peculiar quality. In other productions a trifling tax is often the occasion that the indigenous producer has the advantage over foreign competition, or the consumer contents himself with a substitute which supplies his necessities

just as well as the foreign article of industry. If the duty, however, falls on a foreign production which the native soil either does not yield at all, or not nearly of the same quality, the tax must then be borne, or the enjoyment renounced. Products of this kind may, provided especially they are much in request, bear a high duty without any remarkable influence upon the consumption, and on the selling price of the country which produces them. Now this is applicable, in an especial degree, to those French wines which are among the objects of luxurious enjoyment. Whoever is prepared to give 2—3 fl. for a bottle of wine, is not deterred by a duty of 18—24 kr. On the contrary, a duty of 450 to 500 fl. the ton, on all other kinds, cannot be otherwise than injurious to the sale in Germany, and must have a reaction upon the price of them. These high duties have, however, subsisted for a long time in the north of Germany: in southern Germany, since the year 1822, when the French duty on German fat cattle was raised, they have been partly not much lower, and partly high enough to exclude the common kinds which were more similar to the German products of some of the western departments, as to circumscribe very much the import of French wines. The Union duty will therefore, under *existing circumstances*, occasion no very sensible changes; but only, perhaps, in rather a stronger degree, cause the injurious influence to continue, which the regulations of 1822 have exercised, on all inferior and middling sorts of French red wine, and on all her southern wines.

The Union duty may, however, with the exception of the import duty on French wine, be considered, on the whole, as very moderate, when compared with the restrictions to which German trade is subjected in France. Here, in almost all branches of manufacturing industry, importation is in the rule prohibited; and in the few cases in which foreign goods are not unconditionally rejected, high duties have, for the most part, nearly the same effect as a prohibition. It is to these restraints that we must ascribe the fact, that our exports in manufactures are only from $\frac{1}{8}$ to $\frac{1}{7}$ of the value of our imports of French fabrics and manufactures. It is

true no prohibition falls upon the productions of one principal branch of German manufacturing industry, namely, linens; and the duties which are raised on their import for use do not reach the highest rate of the French tariff, but being, in proportion, three, four, or more times higher than the duties which the Union lays upon silk goods, they are high enough to limit the import to a moderate quantum, and to make the sale only possible when the seller is contented with the smallest profit. Although the French prices of imported articles, in comparison with the German prices, are as much higher as the French valuation of exported articles is lower than the German prices, yet thus the duties of French Tariff on linens amount, therefore, to twenty and more per cent of the official fixed value. They may, therefore, easily rise to 25 or 30 per cent above the German cost prices.

Cotton and woollen goods, leather, and leathern manufactures, cannot, with a very trifling exception, be imported; and those silk goods which are not prohibited are subjected to 2½, and a still higher duty than in the Union, viz., plain silks, (for which the Union with a less difficult competition could find a sale) in their import by land are exposed to a duty of 17 francs 60 cents the kilogramme, or, inclusively of the tithe, of 1036 francs 60 cents the metrical cwt.

France was led back into the path of an excessively restrictive system of commerce, by two unfortunate experiments in the application of the principles of freedom of trade. In the year 1786, too rapidly, and without regard to existing relations, the barriers were thrown down, which afforded a protection, then much less to be dispensed with than now, to indigenous industry, against that country which was the furthest advanced in the cultivation of arts and manufactures, viz., Great Britain. The consequence was as rapid a return to the system of restriction.

Under the dominion of Napoleon, the overpowering pressure of the continental system, as it was called, excited a desire for greater freedom of trade. After the fall of Napoleon, neither measure nor aim were preserved; and the ports were opened to

foreign trade with a liberality, the effects of which, after a few months, led back to the old path.

At first the earlier principles were adhered to, by which manufacturing industry was protected, and the products of the soil, in so far as they could not, like Colonial articles of subsistence, be regarded as objects of duties of consumption, were, with few exceptions, either not at all, or only moderately taxed. However, the restrictions were soon extended to agricultural products, and even to such articles as were employed by industry, as auxiliary or transforming materials. The animated restrictive competition between the patrons of agriculture and of industry gradually gave more and more consistency to the system of restriction, as well in relation to the strengthening of the protection, by prohibitions, or by raising the duties, (which, from 1017 to 1826, fell particularly on linen,) as in relation to the number of the protected branches of production. It descended even to the lowest branches in the realm of industry, such as to the making of lampblack, the produce of which was burdened with a duty of 12 francs the metrical cwt.

The duties on sheep's wool, which, in 1816, was only 1 franc for the 100 kilogrammes, and which had only during a short time reached a more considerable height, were, by later laws, (1820 and 1822) fixed at 33 per cent of the value; the duties on fat cattle, which first in the year 1816 were fixed at a moderate import duty (of 3 francs the ox,) were, in 1822, considerably raised.

Restrictive regulations against the import of corn at a low price were first established in the year 1819.

At the same time the export duties were on various articles diminished, which formerly, partly for fiscal reasons, and partly to facilitate the introduction of raw material, had been burdened with high duties.

With whatever specious reasons such a Customs' system may be defended, all comes at last to the simple principle: France must sell as much as possible to foreign countries, and import from them as little as possible.

He who considers the duties as a means of securing more or

less to those branches of industry which minister to the wants of the great mass of people, the supply of the home market to awaken industry, and in so far as natural circumstances are compatible with independence of foreign countries, to secure this independence, may possibly and partially, according to circumstance, or perhaps with preponderating advantage, attain this end; but never will a means be found to place a country in a situation to continue to sell more, and to import less from foreign countries.

If, notwithstanding the increasing restrictions during a course of years, the exports from France have, on the whole, thereby increased; such is a phenomenon we have also observed in other countries: but the imports have increased, as well as the exports, and, in fact, in a much more uniform proportion than the Customs' lists show. The general increase of foreign trade in almost all countries proves only thus much, that the increase of productions was still greater than the influence of the restrictions, and it is particularly the extraordinary increase in the use of the productions of foreign parts with which the increase of European exportation in general is connected.

In so far, however, as the limitation of the imports attains the nearest aim proposed, its direct influence on exportation will not fail to take effect, and will, in fact, exist, though it cannot be specially pointed out in the grand result of many crossing causes. There can be no doubt in particular, that the restrictions imposed on the import of German products into France have had an injurious re-action upon the export of French wines, and impeded in foreign markets the competition of her industry with the industry of other countries.

Now, people are thinking again, as in England, of a return to the principles of freedom: they wish, however, not to be too hasty; with due consideration for contending interests, they aim only at a gradual introduction of the reforms demanded by the common welfare: this is, in principle, good: but, in holding back, they may miss the right measure and aim. All that has happened latterly, or that is announced as at hand, appears to us;

indeed, as well for Germany as for Great Britain, quite unimportant; while from all attempts and all explanations that have been made, it is more and more manifest that the facilitating of the trade with Germany is far more urgent and less difficult than an understanding with Great Britain; and that this must even be considered as conditional upon the lowering of many heavy duties upon German productions.

The removal of the prohibitions, which has been, in part, already accomplished, and is in part only in prospect, with relation to very fine woollen goods, lace made of any other material than silk, and prepared by the hand at the spindle, Cachemere not produced in Europe, Indian pocket and neck handkerchiefs, watches, scented leather, and other less important articles, is of no benefit to German industry. The diminution of duties, which has been already made to facilitate the introduction of many productions of nature, or is in contemplation, is likewise unimportant.

The Corn Laws, which change in a reverse ratio to the prices, are to remain in force.

The contemplated duty on mineral waters, in stone bottles, at 1fl. the 100 kilogrammes, is, indeed, moderate; but, as far as I know, it has not come into operation.

The proposed diminution of the duty on fat cattle is inconsiderable. On all kinds of horned cattle, 7 centimes; on wethers, rams, sheep, and lambs, 12 centimes are to be paid; on the kilogramme of the weight of the live beast, nevertheless, the duty per head never exceeds $\frac{4}{5}$ of the existing duties (50 francs and 10 per cent additional on an ox). Swine weighing 50 kilogrammes and more are to be taxed 12 francs; under 50 and above 15 kilogrammes, 6 francs; and under 15 kilogrammes, 50 centimes.

According to the diminution of duties already in operation, uncombed raw wool is burdened with a duty of 20 ($\frac{2}{3}$ of the existing duty) and combed wool, with 30 per cent of the value, together with the tithe.

The ordonnance which enacts this reduction has moderated the duties upon a number of other articles, viz., flax, sulphur, green

vitriol, copper in bars, and sheet ivory, mother of pearl, gall-nuts, shumac, dyeing woods, Prussian blue, lake, indigo, &c.

These diminutions correct, it is true, in favour of French industry, solitary mistakes in the former regulations; but they still leave, on many of the above-named articles, very high duties; (as, for instance, on lake, 50, 75, and 100 fr. the metrical cwt.; on Prussian blue, 150 frs.: on indigo, 50 centimes to 2 frs. the kilogramme;) and cannot, on the whole, judging by the choice of the objects, be considered as a very favourable step towards the facilitation of the trade with Germany. Among the articles, the import of which has been facilitated by a reduction of the duties, we find but one which does not appertain to the requisites for manufacturing industry, and which is of any importance — namely, engravings on copper, lithographic works, and music, which are relieved from the additional duty of five per cent of the value, but are still burdened with a fixed duty of 349 frs, 25 centimes (including the tithe) the 100 kilogrammes.

Among the projects which in 1834 were laid before the Chambers, we find even proposals for raising the duties; viz., a proposal of laying a duty of 50 frs. on raw sample linen yarn, of 70 frs. on raw twisted, of 90 frs. on bleached and coloured simple, and 150 frs. on coloured twisted yarn, per metrical cwt.

If it was gratifying not to find this rise in the Tariff of last summer, on the other hand, when we cast a glance over the natural commercial relations between the two countries, and the influence which the French Tariff has upon the occasional condition of its own land, it is certainly to be lamented in the common interests of the two countries, that the high duties, more especially upon the raw materials, which Germany has to offer, should be continued.

We ask what advantage has France derived from the extension of the restrictive regulations on raw German materials? What sacrifice has she to weigh against the advantages she would derive from the removal of these regulations? We find an answer to this question which the Minister of Trade laid before the Chamber of Deputies.

After mentioning that no duty on cattle existed before 1816, and that the duty imposed in the year 1822, when the prohibitive system was developed in all its strength, was raised from 3 fr. to 50 fr., he continues in substance as follows: "We must acknowledge that this was an extraordinary step. Still the duty was far from producing the effects which had been expected from it. It weighed, on the contrary, in many provinces, with severe cruelty. The price of cattle did not sensibly increase; foreign importation continued in about the same proportion. The reason of this is quite clear. The northern department, which drew their supply of cattle from Belgium; the eastern department, which received their's from Baden and Switzerland, continued to import them from these countries; and paid the duty, high as it was, because they could not supply their wants from Normandy or Saintonge. The duty, therefore, was an oppressive burden on certain provinces, without affording a countervailing advantage to the others."

What grounds can one have for giving the slightest support to a measure on which such a judgment is pronounced?

An artificial revenue has been created for one class of producers, whilst, on a great portion of the German market, the price of cattle has increased far beyond the duty, which was to be expected as the result of the free competition with the German cattle trade. But it is a mistake to look upon such an artificial rise in the price as a general advantage, even for the agricultural classes. The more opulent proprietor may derive his advantage from it; the far more numerous class, which does not possess the means of providing for the future, is oppressed by a rise in the price of cattle, by the difficulty of purchasing them. It is known, that in many parts this useful instrument of agriculture represents in the hands of the less opulent classes a passive capital, which but too frequently forms in the contracts for cattle the object of mischievously usurious transactions for the great majority of the smaller landed proprietors. Instead of rendering the acquisition

of cattle difficult to this class, the general interests of agriculture require that it should be facilitated, in order that whilst this class of proprietors is unable to pay the higher price, it should not become a prey to usury.

(*To be continued.*)

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE.

Paris, 19th October, 1836.

The information published in the "Portfolio" with regard to Spain, the execution of the quadruple alliance, and our relations with England in general, has produced a great sensation here; we have reason to believe that it has been appreciated in the highest quarter, because it explains the true state of the case with regard to important points; and it could only be received with joy by the public, which recognizes in the English alliance and in the execution of the quadruple treaty the guarantee of a happy future. The result has been the cessation at length of the common-place accusations, according to which our Government was said to be allied with Don Carlos and with Russia, or at least such assertions, if they are still repeated in certain journals, cease to produce any effect. There only remain some reproaches of a secondary character, according to which our Government is said to be not sufficiently energetic in preventing succours in favour of the Carlists — a negligence which, if it were true, might be capable of an injurious interpretation. These, and other reproaches, have even found their way into the columns of two journals of note—the "Morning Chronicle," and the "Courrier François."

Whilst acknowledging the good faith of these journals, which may have been deceived by reports, we think it im-

portant to establish the truth on these points also. The London journal has, above all, insisted on a pretended carelessness of the Custom-house officers in the South; the "Courrier François" went farther; in its columns of yesterday it states:—

"1. That under M. Thiers we had a legion in Spain; this legion has returned.

"2. The Douaniers no longer exercise any surveillance.

"3. There had been a rivalry of good-will between England and France in favour of Spain; scarcely have the doctrinaires appeared than every thing is changed; we retire from the contest: and is not this," cries the "Courrier François," "a change in our policy—a change in our relations with England, according to which we may shortly see an end of our alliance?"

Our reply to these questions is, that the French foreign legion has not returned to Spain — that the Custom-house officers perform a stricter guard than ever, and that they are supported by the troops of the line — that France and the French Government, opposed to Don Carlos, continue to show their interest towards the Government of Isabella — finally, that the French Ministry, whilst renouncing an intervention in Spain, seeks the alliance of England with infinitely more zeal than did M. Thiers.

But, instead of opposing assertion to assertion, we will combat facts which are not authenticated by official documents whose correctness no one can contest. What we have already said on the subject, we should have been able to prove by documentary evidence; but, henceforward, in order to reply to assertions the most generally spread at present, we shall lay before our readers the following communications:—

I.

From M. Molé to Count Campuzano.

(TRANSLATION.)

6th October, 1836.

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

General Alava had placed at the disposal of General Harispe, for the military service of Spain, funds, of which a sum of one hundred and twenty or one hundred and fifty thousand francs has remained unemployed. Several reports which have reached the King's Government on the present position of the legion but too clearly confirm what had been previously said of the extreme destitution of this corps, so distinguished for its bravery and its discipline. Under these circumstances, of which it would be superfluous to explain the consequences, the King's Government conceives it may be useful to serve the interests of Spain, to suggest the proposal that the funds remaining disposable in the hands of General Harispe should be applied, as soon as possible, to the most pressing wants of the Foreign Legion. I, therefore, have to request you to have the goodness to recommend to the Cabinet of Madrid a request, against which I can the less foresee any objection, as the definitive application which it is proposed to make of the sum in question will not be at all at variance with the destination which the preceding administration in Spain had assigned to it.

(Signed)

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

MOLE.

To Monsieur le Comte de Campuzano.

II.

From Count Campuzano to M. le Comte Molé.

(TRANSLATION.)

Paris, 8th October, 1836.

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

I have the satisfaction of being able to inform your Excellency, in reply to your letter of the 6th instant, which only reached me yesterday evening, that, by the courier whom I had at that moment sent, I warmly recommended the state of the Foreign Legion, in consequence of a conversation I had had with General Bernard, and in which I had learnt the state of destitution of that corps, so distinguished by its bravery and by its discipline. It will thus be an easy duty for me to bring the object of your Excellency's letter to the knowledge of my Court.

In this persuasion, I beg your Excellency to receive the assurances, &c.

(Signed) LE COMTE CAMPUZANO DE RECHEM.

To Monsieur le Comte Molé, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

To the Minister of the Interior.

(TRANSLATION.)

Bayonne, 10th October, 1836.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,

In consequence of the recurrence of the fraudulent practices of the exportation of horses, and conformably to the reiterated instructions of your Excellency, the individuals composing the guard of surveillance have been on special duty day and night. Independently of the Custom-house

officers, the special commissioners perform alternate duty with the subalterns and brigadiers of the gendarmerie to establish ambuscades; and the troops of the line are called upon to assist in this duty, and to multiply its efficiency on a greater number of points; but, when one has to combat the action of a whole population trained to this sort of traffic, in a country eminently adapted to smuggling, one cannot hope for greater results than those which have been obtained. The present state of things is as follows:—The merchants take care that the horses shall arrive at Bayonne, or in the villages, on the market days. The traders of the frontiers arrive; those who can afford it purchase a horse; those who have not sufficient funds give a pledge for payment, or the same individual has several passed to his account on paying a premium, which varies from forty-five to seventy francs. When the horses are once thus separated, they spread over the frontier, and from that time the whole family of guides is employed by espionage in lighting the paths, the woods, the ravines, that they must traverse. Lights, cries, whistles, (the meaning of which is known to the horsemen), give them warning. The uniforms of the gendarmerie and of the troops of the line facilitate the discovery of the ambuscades. The Custom-house officers disguise themselves more easily, and conceal themselves with more skill; but the country is so well known by the smugglers, that they almost always guess, if they have lost sight of them for a moment, the spot where the discovered posts may have been re-established. Still, notwithstanding these difficulties, the subjoined report of the Director of the Customs proves, that out of sixty-six horses who have attempted to pass, nine have been seized, and four have been turned back.

(This account is from the 31st of August to the 5th of October, 1836. The result is in substance, that attempts at

exportation have been made at Sarre, Rassebone, Larressore, Ainboa, Arcanguez, Arassa, Urdos de Raigorray, Lasse, Harnavalt, &c.)

I may affirm that not more than seventy horses reached the other side of the frontier until the 7th of this month.

(Here follow details, of which we reserve the publication for a future period.)

. . . The price of each horse is considerably increased on his arrival on the other side of the frontier.

Still this smuggling trade was carried on, on account of private persons, who with two horses ransomed themselves, or their sons, from the service. Don Carlos, on the demand of the Commander-in-chief, Villaréal, has just changed this regulation, by exacting one thousand two hundred francs instead of horses; because, as happened last year, these young horses can with difficulty support the climate, and two or three months pass before they become capable of rendering good service.

Three-fourths of those which were exported last year died during the winter, without having been employed in the service.

People dread in Spain the requisition for horses, and many of them are taken to the Carlists, who pay pretty well for them, and thus receive them accustomed to the climate. I am certain of the truth of this report.

The circumstance above-mentioned explains the fact of the resumption of the smuggling trade, and I have even learnt this morning, from persons coming from the country, that families are in a state of destitution, because they have been refused by the officers of the Carlist cavalry.

Finally, your Excellency's orders are a new motive for us to redouble our watchfulness.

(Signed) THE INSPECTOR.

EFFECT OF "THE PORTFOLIO"

ON THE

POPULATIONS OF TURKEY, CIRCASSIA, AND GEORGIA.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM CONSTANTINOPLE.

September 20th, 1836.

The publication of the "Portfolio" has produced amongst the nations of the East a sensation to which there is no parallel. Translations of it are constantly being made into Turkish; and although they are not printed, they are handed about from family to family; but the *fact*, the mere fact of such a publication, is quite sufficient for the Turks. They know the Russians. What they want to learn is something about England: and the publication of Russian Despatches in *England*, laying bare what they have no doubt of, viz., the projects of Russia, fills them with exultation and hope; and is worth ten thousand homilies.

But chiefly is it on the Circassians that this publication has produced a powerful effect.* They look on it as their own, fancy it as possessed of some talismanic power, fling it among the Russians, and threaten them with it. It has also found its way into Georgia. The betrayal of the conspiracy of the Georgian Princes was stated in one of the Numbers as having been made by Mehemet Ali. *Now* the Russians have industriously spread the report throughout Georgia that it was Abbas Meerza who betrayed that instrument to Russia, so as to exasperate the Georgians against the Persians, and to put an end to every future chance of co-operation between them. The number of the "Portfolio" which states the transaction as it really occurred has been translated into Georgian and sent to Tefflis.

* We have just received a most interesting report from Circassia, which will be given in our next Number.—Ed.

BRITISH INFLUENCE AT CONSTANTINOPLE.

To the Editor of the Portfolio.

Constantinople, October 5, 1836.

SIR,

The long expected answer from our Government on the Churchill affair arrived on Sunday last, brought by Mr. Bell in eighteen days, and fully approving of all Lord Ponsonby's conduct. The definitive despatches were only to be forwarded a few days after, so that it yet remains to be seen what communications our Ambassador is authorized to make to the Porte on the subject, and how any demands are, in case of refusal, to be enforced. It is high time that our dignity should be rescued from the discredit thrown upon it by the late arrogant message of M. Boutenieff against Pertez Effendi, and the insinuations in the continental journals, that Lord Ponsonby had been abandoned by his Government, as having advanced farther than it dared venture to follow up. To coincide with the credit, on the contrary, given him by the Cabinet for the spirit he has displayed, he must be instructed to insist on the dismissal of Achmet Pacha from the councils of the Sultan, no matter under what form carried into effect, or we shall be bearded and taunted by Russia as much as ever. Has our Ministry then resolved to go the whole length required in the Turkish question? For all this is involved, in order to ensure the Sultan's compliance with the terms, which would restore our Ambassador to the proper position and influence befitting the representative of the British Sovereign.

The termination of the war in the Kurdistan was not achieved without a near approach to the junction of Persia with the rebels. An act of treachery on the part of that Court missed taking effect, which is almost unparalleled in modern politics: at whose instigation could this have taken place? certainly not that of England. The subserviency of Persia to Russia has been already discovered and signalized; and the latter, if unjustly accused of any participation in the intrigues of her protégé, must throw the blame on the proverb, "*noscitur a sociis.*" Ravenduz Castle was the last stronghold of the rebel Curdish Pacha, Mohammed. When pressed to extremity, he had a few days before his surrender entered into a compact with envoys from the Persian Miri Asker, or commander on the frontiers, to receive the assistance of twelve thousand troops, the greatest part only five hours' distant within the Turkish territory, and the third division on its march to follow. A portion of the price stipulated for this succour, and for an asylum in Persia in case of need, had already been paid, when the rebel Pacha was induced to dismiss its emissaries, and forego the desperate resource. He surrendered instead unconditionally to the Turkish General-in-chief, Reschid Pacha, and has thrown himself on the Sultan's mercy. The Persians not only had the perfidy to offer support to a rebel against his Government with which they were at peace, but previously tendered the co-operation of their army to the Porte against the same chief, in order to receive double wages. Had the intrigue succeeded (of which the particulars given are perfectly authentic) Kurdistan would still have remained unsettled, and the presence there of the main Turkish army been indefinitely prolonged, or as soon as it evacuated the country after the conquest of Ravenduz Castle, the rebel Curd having first escaped, would have returned from Persia to renew the same horrible disorders. Persia must also

have connected herself with his cause, and entered as a principal into the war, if the Porte did not choose to overlook an egregious injury and open affront. These are the fields in which Russia gathers her harvest—can it be doubted that she has been the sower?

We have her again at work here to embarrass the finances of the Porte, in the remittance of the last instalment of the indemnity for the evacuation of Silistria. This sum, amounting to twenty-five millions of piastres, £250,000, had been paid over in Turkish coin, under a verbal understanding between the mint and the Russian mission that it was to be exported in the same specie, and some compensation made for the loss. It was ascertained, by the unusual demand for bills during two posts previous to the last, that part of the money had been secretly invested by friends of the Russian Court Banker, and this in bills purchased from the Turkish Mint Agent, with which he supplies the market to any extent, in order to keep down the exchanges, and prevent the exportation of gold. The effect was to raise the exchange, which it already has done, two per cent., and prevent the mint continuing its purchases of bullion—forcing it, eventually, to issue its own coin at a loss, or resort to a further depreciation, fatal to the character and interests of the government. The Turkish authorities insist on the engagement having been given not to interfere with the exchange, and are highly indignant at its violation—but what can the Porte do whilst fluttering in the talons of the Russian vulture?

Our Consul-General in Egypt has been giving a specimen of his zeal for our commercial interests, which cannot be too highly appreciated by the country. Russia having a more advantageous tariff with the Porte than England, especially for internal trade, had induced Mehemet Ali to consent to its introduction in his territories. Representations on the

effect of this preference having been laid before our government, they were further transmitted to our Consul-General at Cairo. He has, in return, just sent up by the Nile Steamer an Ukase of his Highness Mehemet Ali, annulling the Russian privilege, and breaking through treaties made by the Sultan, which he had already put in operation. This is acting the part of a sovereign with a witness—of course to show *us* that he is no friend of Russia, nor cares about setting her at defiance, when he well knows she will be extremely obliged to him for any mask he can throw over their connexion. This is also the triumph of the British agent—instead of insisting on the Pacha's placing British commerce on the same footing as that of Russia, to be on a par with the most favoured nations—or giving the utmost possible latitude to our existing tariff.

S.

END OF VOL. IV.

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